[1]         Are public school teachers protected from unreasonable search and seizure by s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms if the search and seizure is performed in the workplace by their employers?

[2]         There is no doubt that they are.

[3]         Plainly, the nature of the protection afforded – what constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure in particular circumstances – differs where a search is conducted by employers rather than the police, reflecting the different interests at stake. But whether the right is asserted in administrative or judicial proceedings, the essential purpose of the right remains the same: section 8 of the Charter protects the reasonable expectation of privacy.

[4]         In this case, the private communications of two teachers recorded on their personal, password-protected log were read and captured by screenshots taken by their school principal, and then used by the respondent school board to discipline them. I conclude that the labour relations arbitrator erred in interpreting and applying s. 8 and reached an unreasonable decision in dismissing their grievance. The Divisional Court erred in upholding the arbitrator’s decision.

[5]         I would allow the appeal and quash the award of the arbitrator for the reasons that follow.

[6]         Ms. Rai and Ms. Shen (the “grievors”) were employed on contracts to teach Grade 2 at Mount Joy Public School in the York Region. They were two of a group of four teachers assigned to teach Grade 2 in the 2014-15 school year.

[7]         Shortly after the school year began, problems arose amongst the group members. The grievors felt that one of the other teachers, Mr. Hui, was not an effective member of the group and that he was receiving preferential treatment from the school principal, Mr. Pettigrew. They were concerned about how this might impact their own performance reviews. Ms. Shen contacted the union for advice and was told to keep notes about her concerns.

[8]         Following her union’s advice, Ms. Shen started a log using her personal Gmail account. She authorized the second grievor, Ms. Rai, to have access to the log. The log was password protected and accessible only to the two grievors; both could contribute to the log and read it. Although the log could be accessed using an internet browser on a workplace laptop, it was not saved on any workplace drive or on the laptops. It was stored “in the Cloud” on Ms. Shen’s private Google account.

[9]         The content of the grievors’ log was not known to others, but its existence was known by some within the school. Ms. Shen acknowledged that she told another member of the Grade 2 teaching group, Ms. Pereira-McKenzie, about the log and that discussions about the log between her and Ms. Rai may have been overheard by other employees.

[10]      Three people told Mr. Pettigrew of their concerns about the environment in the workplace – an environment described as “toxic” by the arbitrator – and the possibility that the grievors were keeping a log. Mr. Pettigrew discussed the matter with the Board Superintendent, who advised him to speak with human resources. He did so, and in December the IT department searched the Board’s online files to see if there were any files shared between the grievors. Nothing was found. A search of the school’s hard drives and Google drives also failed to find anything.

[11]      On December 16, Mr. Pettigrew entered Ms. Shen’s classroom after classes had ended and she had left for the day. He saw that the laptop computer provided by the school for classroom use was open and touched its mousepad. A document called “Log Google Docs” opened on the screen. Mr. Pettigrew read the document and began to scroll through it. He realized that this was the grievors’ log he’d heard about and used his cellphone to take screenshots of the entire log – about 100 entries in total.

[12]      Mr. Pettigrew informed the Board Superintendent that he had obtained the log and read it. The Superintendent instructed him to confiscate the grievors’ classroom laptops and he did so. Subsequently, Mr. Pettigrew downloaded the screenshots he took, printed the pages, and forwarded the material to the Board. The Board searched the confiscated computers but nothing was found on them.

[13]      In January 2015, the Board issued letters of discipline to the grievors for failing to conduct themselves in accordance with the Ontario College of Teachers’ Standards of Practice. The letters referred to the fact that the grievors had used Board technology to access and maintain a log during Board time and had made approximately 100 entries about the principal and another teacher. The Board placed written reprimands on their files for three years.

[14]      The union grieved the discipline. It sought to have the reprimands rescinded and sought $15,000 in damages for each of the grievors for breach of their privacy rights. The grievance proceeded to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the collective agreement. By the time the lengthy arbitration hearing ended more than three years had passed, and the reprimands had been removed from the grievors’ files. The parties agreed to proceed solely on the claim that the grievors’ “right to privacy” had been breached.

[15]      The arbitrator began with the decisions of this court and the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34. She noted that, as in Cole, the laptop computers in question were not for the grievors’ exclusive possession and use; they were owned by the Board and were for classroom use by students as well as teachers and the principal. Nor were the laptops secure: one of the grievors had left her laptop password (but not her personal Gmail log password) on a post-it note attached to her laptop. However, the grievors had not stored personal information on the Board’s laptop computers. In these circumstances, the arbitrator found that the grievors had a diminished expectation of privacy concerning information that was accessible on the laptop computers.

[16]      The arbitrator noted that in Cole, the Supreme Court approved this court’s finding that employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy, even in the context of information on a work-issued computer, if incidental personal use of the computer is permitted or reasonably expected. The Board’s workplace policies in that case did not determine the matter because they concerned the monitoring of email communication and internet use, whereas this case concerned the use of the Board’s computer and internet service to access a private Google account.

[17]      The arbitrator went on to apply the “totality of circumstances” test set out by Fish J. in Cole at para. 40:

[18]      The arbitrator made the following findings:

[19]      However, the arbitrator found that because Ms. Shen left the grievors’ log open on the Board’s laptop, she had only a diminished expectation of privacy. The arbitrator then went on to consider several breaches alleged by the union.

[20]      The arbitrator found that the principal’s duty under s. 265 of the Education Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.2 to ensure a safe school environment authorized reasonable searches and seizures without prior judicial authorization. She also noted that arbitral case law balances employees’ personal privacy interests with employers’ right to manage their enterprises. The arbitrator stated:

[21]      This was a limited, targeted search, which indicated that the Board had taken a careful and considered approach. The arbitrator concluded that the Board’s search of its IT platforms did not violate the grievors’ privacy.

[22]      The arbitrator found that, as the principal, Mr. Pettigrew had the authority to ensure that the laptop had been turned off at the end of the school day and that he touched the mousepad to see if the computer had been shut down. When he saw the document called “Log Google Docs”, he realized he had found the grievors’ log. The arbitrator found that Ms. Shen had left the log “in plain view on her classroom laptop”, able to be seen by anyone who touched the laptop before it would shut down automatically after 30-40 minutes of inactivity. Mr. Pettigrew had found the log by “pure happenstance” and the arbitrator accepted that he did not know it was on a personal Google Docs account.

[23]      The arbitrator found that the grievors had left the log in plain sight and should have expected that anyone permitted to look at the laptop may look at what was visible on it. Thus, the grievors had a diminished expectation of privacy in the log that was not breached by the principal looking at what was visible when he activated the laptop.

[24]      The arbitrator found that the grievors’ log contained notes of what was happening at the workplace, including observations of Mr. Hui, Mr. Pettigrew, and other people at the school. Although the log included the grievors’ point of view, and so was close to their respective “biographical cores”, the arbitrator characterized the grievors’ log as being “far from personal or intimate information about either of them.” Moreover, the log did not reveal the grievors’ personal views about school staff because they had been making those views known long before the log was found. The arbitrator concluded that Mr. Pettigrew’s action in scrolling through the log and taking screenshots of the entries was not a breach of the grievors’ privacy, analogizing the principal’s actions to those of the IT technician in Cole.

[25]      The arbitrator found that once Mr. Pettigrew found the log, it was reasonable for the Board to think that it was stored on the laptop and to search the laptop. Moreover, the search was conducted in a reasonable manner. Thus, the grievors’ reasonable expectation of privacy was not breached.

[26]      The only issue on judicial review concerned the arbitrator’s conclusion that the grievors’ reasonable expectation of privacy had not been breached by the employer’s actions. The court concluded that the issue was not rendered moot by the removal of the discipline from the grievors’ records and there remained a live controversy concerning the grievors’ rights that required resolution.

[27]      Justice O’Bonsawin, Kiteley J. concurring, applied a reasonableness standard of review to the arbitrator’s decision and concluded as follows:

[28]      Justice O’Bonsawin concluded that the arbitrator’s decision was reasonable. She added this comment, addressing the dissenting reasons of Sachs J.:

[29]      Justice O’Bonsawin stated that the onus on the union was “particularly difficult to satisfy” because it involved what she described as two levels of deference: “not only is the decision protected by the ‘reasonableness’ standard, but it must be kept in mind that the Arbitrator was only required to determine whether the actions of the Board constituted a ‘reasonable’ search.”

[30]      Justice Sachs held that the Charter was engaged because the Board is a state actor and the grievors have s. 8 rights in the workplace. The arbitrator was required to balance the grievors’ s. 8 Charter rights against the principal’s statutory objectives under s. 265 of the Education Act. Justice Sachs considered that although the arbitrator did not reference the case, in essence she applied the framework from Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395. Justice Sachs concluded that the arbitrator unjustifiably limited the grievors’ rights and as a result reached an unreasonable decision.

[31]      The arbitrator erred, first, in using the contents of the grievors’ log – the fruits of the search – to justify the violation of their privacy. The principal’s incidental finding of the log did not entitle him to search the log further. Second, the arbitrator erred in finding that the contents of the log did not touch on the grievors’ biographical core. That finding contradicted her earlier finding that the grievors’ subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable, as the biographical core of personal information includes the private thoughts of people, and their likes and dislikes concerning matters they observe. Third, the arbitrator erred in concluding that the log was in “plain view”. Even if that concept could justify the activation of the computer by touching the mousepad, it could not justify the principal’s subsequent actions in scrolling through the log. The plain view doctrine justifies seizure, not exploratory searches, and there is no basis to alter the meaning of the doctrine in the employment setting.

[32]      Given that the arbitrator misunderstood s. 8, she could not balance s. 8 Charter values with the statutory objectives. Permitting the Board to scroll through the grievors’ log and take pictures of its contents was not justified by the statutory objectives of the Education Act. If the principal was concerned that the grievors’ actions were causing dissention in the workplace, he was entitled to discipline them. He was not entitled to read their private thoughts and discipline them for those thoughts.

[33]      On an appeal from an order of the Divisional Court concerning an application for judicial review of a tribunal decision, this court must determine whether the Divisional Court identified the proper standard of review and applied it correctly. This is sometimes described as the court “stepping into the shoes” of the Divisional Court. In effect, this court conducts a de novo review of the tribunal decision: see e.g., Longueépée v. University of Waterloo, 2020 ONCA 830, 153 O.R. (3d) 641, at paras. 47-48, applying Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559, at paras. 45-46.

[34]      The case was argued in the Divisional Court on the basis that the arbitrator’s decision was subject to review on a reasonableness standard. Following completion of the oral hearing, the court wrote to the parties inviting them to make supplementary written submissions on the standard of review in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, 441 D.L.R. (4th) 1. The court wrote to the parties a second time, seeking submissions on whether the possibility of a breach of s. 8 of the Charter raised a constitutional question within the meaning of paragraph 17 of Vavilov that had to be answered correctly.

[35]      The appellant took the position that whether the grievors’ rights under s. 8 of the Charter were violated was a question that had to be answered correctly and that error in the arbitrator’s s. 8 analysis rendered her decision unreasonable per se. The respondent maintained that the arbitrator’s decision involved an individualized, fact-specific assessment rather than a fundamental structural constitutional question, and so did not raise the sort of constitutional question that required a correct answer. On appeal, the respondent acknowledges that the Charter applies to the school board but maintains that the arbitration did not involve the Charter and argues that the Charter issues raised by the Divisional Court should be ignored.

[36]      Although the arbitrator did not specifically reference s. 8 of the Charter, her analysis clearly relied on s. 8 case law. The union’s application for judicial review asserted that the arbitrator erred in interpreting and applying the case law governing the reasonable expectation of privacy and the Divisional Court addressed the Charter rights claims in its decision. In my view it is appropriate for this court to address the application of s. 8 to the facts of the case on appeal.

[37]      The factual findings of the arbitrator are entitled to deference, but whether the grievors had a reasonable expectation of privacy is a question of law that is subject to review for correctness: R. v. Shepherd, 2009 SCC 35, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 527, at para. 20.

[38]      I begin with a brief discussion of the application of the Charter and the issues raised.

[39]      The most complete analysis of the application of the Charter to school boards is found in the reasons of Gonthier J. (Bastarache J. concurring) in Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, 2002 SCC 86, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710. Justice Gonthier stated that there was “no doubt” that a school board is a branch of government subject to the Charter by operation of s. 32. He stated, at para. 121:

[40]      A majority of the court has never held that the Charter applies to school boards, but cases decided subsequent to Chamberlain are premised on the assumption that it does. For example, in R. v. M. (M.R.), 1998 CanLII 770 (SCC), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393, the Supreme Court accepted the Crown’s concession that the Charter applied and proceeded on the assumption that schools constitute part of government, and as a result the Charter applied to the actions of a vice-principal. The Supreme Court similarly assumed that the Charter applies to school officials in Cole – again, conceded by the Crown.

[41]      I would proceed on the same assumptions accepted by the Supreme Court in M. (M.R) and Cole. Whether the Charter applies because school boards are inherently governmental in nature, such that all of their activities are bound by the Charter, or instead applies only insofar as the school board is performing the governmental activity of maintaining proper order and discipline in the school as required by the Education Act, need not be determined for purposes of this appeal. It is enough to say that s. 8 applies to the actions of the principal and the school board.

[42]      There is nothing surprising in this. It is clear the protection of s. 8 is not limited to the criminal and quasi-criminal law context: see e.g., R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd., 1990 CanLII 137 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627 (s. 8 applies to production of documents under the Income Tax Act); and Comité paritaire de l’industrie de la chemise v. Potash, 1994 CanLII 92 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 406 (s. 8 applies to labour inspections under provincial legislation). Justice O’Bonsawin erred in asserting that employees do not have s. 8 rights in a workplace environment.

[43]      Doré is concerned with balancing Charter values and rights with statutory mandates in the context of the exercise of discretionary power. It is not concerned with how Charter values or rights are to be recognized or interpreted. As Chief Justice McLachlin said in her concurring opinion in Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 293, at para. 116, Charter rights must be given a consistent interpretation, regardless of the state actor that interprets them:

[44]      The grievors’ Charter rights were alleged to have been limited not by the arbitrator but by the respondent school board. In the normal course, the arbitrator would have been required to determine whether the grievors were subject to an unreasonable search and, if so, whether the school board was entitled to rely on the evidence it obtained as a result of the breach in making its decision to discipline the grievors. The balancing to be done was akin to balancing under s. 24(2) of the Charter, rather than Doré. Given that the discipline was spent by the time of the arbitration, the arbitrator was required only to determine whether the grievors’ s. 8 Charter rights were violated by the search, and as noted above, whether the grievors had a reasonable expectation of privacy is a question of law that is subject to review for correctness.

[45]      As a preliminary matter, I note that the appellant was not required to serve notice to the Attorneys General pursuant to s. 109(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, because this case does not concern the constitutional validity or constitutional applicability of an Act of Parliament or the Ontario Legislature, of a regulation or bylaw, or of a rule of the common law. Nor was a remedy under s. 24(1) claimed in relation to an act or omission of the Government of Canada or the Government of Ontario. As in M. (M.R) and Cole, this case proceeded on the premise that the Charter applies to school boards. No notice is required in relation to the acts of the principal where a s. 24(1) remedy is not sought.

[46]      The principles governing freedom from unreasonable search and seizure are well established. Whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy is a normative question: it requires the evaluation of a person’s legitimate interests to determine whether they should be given priority over competing interests. It is not a matter of describing what a person’s expectations are or predicting what they would be. The determination is necessarily a value-laden inquiry that is conducted in fact-specific circumstances.

[47]      In R. v. Edwards, 1996 CanLII 255 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, the Supreme Court instructed that a reasonable expectation of privacy is to be determined having regard to the “totality of circumstances”. The following questions are relevant:

[48]      The key question is whether an expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable, and that is informed by several non-exhaustive considerations:

[49]      Although various aspects of the search were impugned before the arbitrator, the focus of the appeal concerned the principal’s actions in reading the grievors’ log, taking screenshots of the entries, and sending the screenshots to the Board, which then relied on this evidence to discipline them. As I will explain, the arbitrator erred in several respects.

[50]      The subject matter of the search was the grievors’ personal messages to one another – their electronic conversation that was stored not in the Board’s computer but “in the Cloud”, which is offsite memory storage space provided by Google.

[51]      There can be no doubt that the grievors had a direct interest in the information contained in their log: each contributed to the personal conversation that the Board used to discipline them. That the grievors had a subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of their personal conversations is also clear. Ms. Shen’s decision to use the Board’s computer to access the log neither precludes nor diminishes the grievors’ expectation of privacy. Nor does her failure to close the computer when she was finished using it. This was a careless oversight at best, given that the computer would otherwise time out and shut itself down in a relatively short period of time. The grievors did all that they could to protect the privacy of their communications. Their log was at all times password protected and reserved to their use. The grievors had every reason to expect that their conversation was, and would remain, private.

[52]      The grievors’ subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable and deserving of protection. Their log was simply an electronic record of their private conversations. Many private conversations occur electronically rather than in person or by telephone, through email, texting, or similar means. The potential for personal information being revealed in such conversations is great.

[53]      I emphasize potential because the objective reasonableness of an expectation of privacy is determined having regard to the potential for personal information to be revealed, not whether the information revealed is in fact personal: R. v. Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 608, at paras. 31-32. The arbitrator erred in concluding otherwise.

[54]      In any event, whether information is considered part of the “biographical core” of a claimant is not determinative of the objective reasonableness of an expectation of privacy. The arbitrator found that the information in the grievors’ log was “not close enough to the Grievors’ biographical core” to find that their privacy was breached. In doing so, the arbitrator erred by treating the biographical core concept as a prerequisite to the protection of the right.

[55]      Biographical core information is merely a type of information – one factor that may be considered in determining whether, as a normative matter, a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. It is not a prerequisite for that finding: see R. v. A.M., 2008 SCC 19, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 569, at para. 68 per Binnie J.; see, generally, Chris Hunt and Micah Rankin, “R. v. Spencer: Anonymity, the Rule of Law, and the Shrivelling of the Biographical Core” (2015) 61 McGill L.J. 193, at pp. 211-15.

[56]      Thus, definitions of the “biographical core” concept must be approached with care. Although the concept has been held to include “information which tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual” (R. v. Plant, 1993 CanLII 70 (SCC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, p. 293), it is not to be understood as limited to similar or analogous details. Whether the grievors’ log contained intimate details about them is not relevant to whether the grievors’ private communications should be protected. The grievors’ log was, in essence, their diary. They were entitled to record their private thoughts – including complaints about co-workers and supervisors – for their own purposes and to expect that those thoughts would remain private.

[57]      The grievors’ reasonable expectation of privacy in their log was not diminished as it would have been if, for example, the grievors had deliberately provided access to the log to third parties; stored their log on the Board’s laptop computers where it would be widely accessible; or were otherwise indifferent to their privacy. I reiterate that the grievors did all they could to protect their privacy. Ms. Shen inadvertently left the log open on the Board’s computer. The arbitrator’s conclusion that the log was left in “plain sight” and that the grievors had only a diminished expectation of privacy as a result skewed her analysis of the reasonableness of the search.

[58]      The statutory authority for the search was s. 265 of the Education Act, which prescribes the duties of school principals in relevant part as follows:

[59]      These provisions establish authority in principals to make decisions in a wide range of circumstances governing students and staff alike. This authority is properly interpreted broadly, given principals’ educational and administrative responsibilities.

[60]      The authority of principals to search students is well established: see e.g., M. (M.R.). The focus in M. (M.R.) is on the responsibility of teachers and principals to ensure student safety, and the need for flexibility to deal speedily and effectively with breaches of school regulations and to discipline problems that may arise. These considerations are not likely relevant in the case of teachers and others who may be working in the school, but they cannot be ruled out. For example, in R. v. Jarvis, 2019 SCC 10, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 488, a principal seized a camera pen that was being used by a male teacher to make surreptitious video recordings of female students.

[61]      Searches carried out for regulatory or administrative purposes do not raise the same concerns as searches in the context of criminal law and the standard of reasonableness may be met more easily. I am prepared to assume, for the purposes of this case, that the authority of principals may authorize a power of search and seizure concerning others who may be in the school, including teachers. That said, the rationale supporting such authority concerning students suggests that this power may seldom be exercised with teachers, and the nature of the search permitted will be limited.

[62]      In M. (M.R.), the Supreme Court held that the general rule requiring prior authorization by a warrant, established in Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., 1984 CanLII 33 (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, was not feasible in the context of the search of a student by a school authority. The court added that the criminal law standard – reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence has been committed and that evidence can be found at the place of the search – was also unworkable concerning students. The need to act quickly to protect students and provide an orderly atmosphere for learning reduces students’ expectation of privacy and permits a “more lenient and flexible approach” to searches and seizures by principals than by the police: M. (M.R.), at para. 47. It is enough if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a school rule has been or is being violated and that evidence will be found in the location or on the person of the student subject to search and seizure.

[63]      M. (M.R.) counsels flexibility and consideration of all the circumstances in determining whether a search and seizure is reasonable. The court added that school authorities are in the preferred position to determine whether reasonable grounds exist. That said, the considerations set out in M. (M.R.) are based on concerns about students – concerns that are unique to students given their age and the responsibility school officials have for their welfare.

[64]      School authorities such as principals are not responsible for the welfare of teachers and staff in the same way as students, and the need to act quickly concerning teachers and staff is less likely to arise. In my view, concerns arising out of employment relationships in the workplace are unlikely to justify a similarly broad and flexible search and seizure authority. Branding workplace relationships “toxic” does not alter this.

[65]      It is not possible to prescribe the circumstances in which a search and seizure will be reasonable in workplaces governed by the Charter. Workplaces differ dramatically, and whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists depends on the unique circumstances of each case. For example, employees engaged in policing or security services may have lesser expectations of privacy, as their employers may have a greater need for the authority to conduct searches and seizures in the workplace.

[66]      All of this is simply to emphasize the normative nature of the reasonable expectation of privacy: all the relevant circumstances must be considered in determining whether a search and seizure is reasonable in a particular case.

[67]      The arbitrator found that although the principal had been looking for the grievors’ log, he found it by happenstance. This finding in no way absolves the Board’s responsibility for the principal’s subsequent actions or renders the search reasonable. Once the principal realized he was looking at the grievors’ log, it was as though he had found their diary. He had no legitimate purpose in reading it, let alone taking screenshots of it and submitting it to the Board. The principal failed to respect the grievors’ reasonable expectation of privacy.

[68]      This was not a case in which the principal stumbled across a dangerous situation that required urgent action. He had not discovered anything dangerous at all. What he had discovered was the private conversations of the grievors. It was a record of thoughts he was not entitled to know.

[69]      According to the arbitrator, there was a “judgmental quality” to the log entries. The arbitrator appears to have fixed on this characterization to justify the principal’s actions. Because the log was concerned mainly with the grievors’ views about other people, the arbitrator said it was “far from personal or intimate information about either of them”, and so not close enough to the grievors’ biographical core to breach their privacy. Moreover, the principal had obligations under the Education Act to protect a safe, healthy, and orderly learning environment. Once he saw the log and reviewed it, he was entitled to conclude that it contained information that may be contributing to a toxic work environment at the school.

[70]      This reflects a clear misunderstanding of both the nature of the log and the grievors’ s. 8 rights. A person’s thoughts about others are no less personal to them than their thoughts about themselves. The grievors were within their rights to be judgmental – to criticize the school, their fellow employees, and the principal in their private communications. Their private thoughts were not to be mined by the school principal to address his employment relations concerns, no matter how innocently the principal may have come upon the log or how pressing his concerns were.

[71]      In summary, the arbitrator erred in interpreting and applying the law concerning the grievors’ s. 8 rights and reached an unreasonable decision. The majority of the Divisional Court erred in asserting that the grievors did not have the right to the protection of s. 8 in their workplace and erred in asserting that the arbitrator’s decision was subject to two levels of deference. The principal’s actions in reading the log, taking screenshots of it, and sending it to the Board violated the grievors’ reasonable expectation of privacy and constituted an unreasonable search under s. 8.

[72]      That is sufficient to dispose of the appeal. There is no need to return the matter for further arbitral proceedings.

[73]      I would allow the appeal and quash the award of the arbitrator.

[74]      The union is entitled to costs in the Divisional Court and in this court. The parties informed the court that they have largely agreed on costs. They may make brief 2-3 page submissions to this court within 30 days of this decision if necessary.