Introduction

[1]               Mr. Grewal is before the court on two counts of breach of trust, contrary to s. 122 of the Criminal Code.[1]  The charges are that, between October 19, 2015 and April 23, 2019, Mr. Grewal, while being an official (a Member of the House of Commons, Parliament of Canada),

[2]               The Crown closed its case after nine weeks of trial.  Immediately thereafter, Defence Counsel brought a motion for a directed verdict.

[3]               The charges against Mr. Grewal relate to the period during which he served as a Member of Parliament (“MP”) for the constituency of Brampton East.  Mr. Grewal concedes that, as an MP, he was an “official” and he held an “office” – both within the meaning of s. 122.

[4]               Mr. Grewal does not dispute that, during the period covered by the indictment, (a) he was experiencing an as yet unacknowledged and untreated gambling problem, and (b) he obtained loans from personal and family friends in an effort to cover his mounting losses from gambling at the Casino du Lac-Leamy (“the Casino”), located in Gatineau, Quebec.  Mr. Grewal submits that his behaviour, while unhealthy, was not criminal.

[5]               The Crown’s theory is that Mr. Grewal sought loans from friends or family friends (a) to whom he provided assistance with immigration matters (“the immigration lenders”) and/or
(b) he invited to attend a small reception in New Delhi during Prime Minister Trudeau’s trip to India in February 2018 (“the India trip lenders”).  The Crown’s theory is that, in both scenarios, Mr. Grewal’s solicitation of funds was connected with the duties of his office.

[6]               The Crown asks the court to consider Mr. Grewal’s conduct in the context of his role as an MP.  The Crown relies on the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons (“the COI Code”) as the standard by which to measure Mr. Grewal’s conduct.  The Crown highlights that the purpose of the COI Code includes maintaining the public’s trust and confidence in MPs.  The Crown emphasizes the importance of MPs serving the public interest and refraining from serving their private interests when performing their parliamentary duties and functions.

[7]               The Crown’s position is that Mr. Grewal’s conduct represents a marked departure from the standard of conduct and responsibility demanded by the nature of his office.

[8]               Turning from the actus reus to the mens rea of the offence of breach of trust, the Crown’s theory rests in part on inferences being drawn to support a finding that Mr. Grewal intended to use his office for something other than the public good.  For all but one of the immigration lenders, the Crown’s theory requires inferences be drawn that Mr. Grewal,

[9]               For one of the immigration lenders, the immigration assistance was provided after Mr. Grewal obtained a loan from that individual.  Mr. Grewal was personally indebted to the India trip lenders when he included their names on a list of invitees to a reception at which the Prime Minister would be attending.  Regarding the lenders to whom Mr. Grewal was personally indebted when benefits were conferred on them or on someone whom they knew, the Crown’s theory is that Mr. Grewal’s conduct demonstrates partiality towards those individuals.

[10]           For all of the lenders (immigration and India trip), the Crown points to Mr. Grewal’s failure to disclose his level of indebtedness to others when making each loan request.  The Crown’s theory requires an inference be drawn that Mr. Grewal’s conduct in that regard was both intentional and part of an effort to prevent anyone from learning of his actions – because he knew his conduct was in breach of the COI Code.

[11]           In summary, the Crown’s theory is that Mr. Grewal acted intentionally in using his office for the improper purpose of personal financial gain: (a) in obtaining loans from individuals to whom he had previously provided the benefit of immigration assistance, and (b) in conferring benefits, directly or indirectly, on individuals from whom he had previously obtained a loan. 

[12]           For both counts, the Crown submits that the evidence is capable of supporting an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Crown asks that Mr. Grewal’s motion be dismissed.

[13]           Mr. Grewal submits that the offence of breach of trust is not designed to criminalize all forms of suspicious or improper conduct on the part of individuals who hold public office.  Mr. Grewal emphasizes that the Crown must establish a nexus between the alleged misconduct and his role as an MP. 

[14]           Mr. Grewal submits that the court is required to consider the constellation of circumstances surrounding the loan requests.  Those circumstances include the nature of the loan; the prior relationship, if any, between Mr. Grewal and the lender; the manner in which the loan was made; the nature of the lender’s dealings with the government; Mr. Grewal’s state of mind; and the lender’s state of mind.

[15]           Mr. Grewal submits that the Crown’s theory ignores evidence before the court as to (a) the routine nature of the immigration assistance provided to the lenders, (b) the lack of significance to the India trip lenders of an invitation to the indoor reception held at Canada House in Delhi; and (c) the culturally specific form of moneylending practiced within the Punjabi-Sikh community in Brampton and followed by several of the lenders.

[16]           The Crown acknowledges that there are inferential gaps between the evidence and some of the elements which the Crown must establish for the offence of breach of trust.  Mr. Grewal highlights that the task for the court is to assess whether the evidence is reasonably capable of supporting the inferences upon which the Crown’s theory rests.  Mr. Grewal submits that the evidence is not reasonably capable of supporting many (or any) of those inferences and, in any event, is not capable of supporting an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

[17]           Mr. Grewal asks that the motion be granted and that he be acquitted on both charges. 

[18]           The task for the court is to determine “whether or not there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could return a verdict of guilty”.[2]  Put another way, a motion for a directed verdict should not be granted “in any case in which there is admissible evidence which could, if it were believed, result in a conviction”.[3]  

[19]           The sufficiency of the evidence must be assessed with respect to each element of the subject offence.  For a case to go to the trier of fact, the court must be satisfied that the Crown has adduced “some evidence of culpability for every essential definitional element of the crime for which the Crown has the evidential burden” (emphasis in original).[4]  

[20]           In assessing the adequacy of the evidence, the judge is not to assess the credibility or reliability of the evidence.[5]

[21]           When the theory of the Crown’s case rests at least in part on circumstantial evidence, “the judge must engage in a limited weighing of the whole of the evidence … to determine whether a reasonable jury properly instructed could return a verdict of guilty”.[6]  This limited weighing exercise requires the judge to assess “the reasonableness of the inferences to be drawn from the circumstantial evidence”.[7]

[22]           The judge must take the Crown’s case at its highest.[8]   Doing so requires that the judge
(a) accept the credibility of the evidence upon which the Crown relies, and (b) where more than one inference can be drawn, consider only the reasonable inferences that are favourable to the Crown.[9]

[23]           The theory of the Crown’s case against Mr. Grewal rests in part on circumstantial evidence and inferences it will ask the trier of fact to draw.  It is therefore important to understand what is meant by a “reasonable inference”.

[24]           In Watt’s Manual of Criminal Evidence,[10] the author provides the following explanation of what is meant by an “inference” and as to when an inference may be drawn:

[25]           The Court of Appeal for Ontario provides guidance as to when an inference may be reasonably drawn from the evidence before the court. 

[26]           In R. v. R.K.,[12] the Court of Appeal determined an appeal from a jury verdict of guilty on a charge of second degree murder.  One of the grounds of appeal was that the trial judge had misdirected the jury on the test to be applied in determining whether a reasonable inference could be drawn from the circumstantial evidence.  The Court agreed with the appellant that the trial judge erred in his charge by telling the jury on numerous occasions that they could draw an inference from the established facts “only if the inference flowed ‘easily and logically from [the] other established facts’”[13] (emphasis in original).

[27]           In granting the appeal, the Court explained when an inference may be drawn:

[28]           Two other judgments from the Court of Appeal, in which the subject of inferences is addressed, stem from decisions made at preliminary inquiries and, thereafter, by a reviewing judge.  The first such decision is R. v. Dwyer.[15]

[29]           At his preliminary hearing, Dwyer was committed to stand trial for second degree murder.  His application for an order of certiorari quashing the committal was dismissed.  On appeal, Dwyer submitted that both the preliminary hearing judge and the reviewing judge failed to appreciate the “distinction between a possibility and some level of probability.”[16]  Dwyer submitted that, as a result of that failure, the preliminary hearing judge drew inferences that were both unreasonable and nothing more than mere speculation.[17]

[30]           The Court of Appeal disagreed with Dwyer’s characterization of the inferences drawn by the preliminary hearing judge and dismissed the appeal.  At para. 4, the Court described the types of inferences available to a preliminary hearing judge: “Reasonable inferences are not necessarily likely or probable inferences.  The inference that is most favourable to the Crown must be drawn at the preliminary inquiry stage.  Difficult inferences may nonetheless be reasonable.”

[31]           More recently, the Court of Appeal decided R. v. Kamermans.[18]  The accused were a husband and wife charged with several counts of forgery and other offences.  The preliminary hearing judge discharged the Kamermans on the forgery charges.  The reviewing judge quashed the discharge and remitted the case to the preliminary hearing judge for consideration on the whole of the evidence, including the essential elements of the offence of forgery.

[32]           The Court of Appeal dismissed the Kamermans’ appeal.  The Court agreed with the reviewing judge that the preliminary hearing judge made three jurisdictional errors.[19]  One of those errors was discharging the Kamermans, at least in part, because the preliminary hearing judge had difficulty drawing inferences proposed by the Crown. 

[33]           The Court described the types of inferences available to a judge on a preliminary hearing: “Whether an inference is easy, hard or difficult to draw is of no moment to a decision on committal.  Provided the inferences advanced by the Crown are within the field of available inferences and provide evidence of each essential element of the offence, committal follows.”[20]

[34]           In his submissions, Mr. Grewal cautions that the trier of fact must not bridge gaps in the evidence by engaging in speculation or conjecture.  Mr. Grewal submits that, for an inference to be drawn from established primary facts, the inference must be based in logic and flow from human experience.  Mr. Grewal relies on two decisions in support of his submissions in that regard: Jackson[21] and R. v. Villaroman.[22]

[35]           Mr. Grewal’s reliance on the decision in Jackson is entirely understandable; his reliance on the decision in Villaroman is, however, of concern to the Crown.  The review of Villaroman which follows is provided to emphasize that Mr. Grewal relies on the decision for a limited purpose.  He does so to support of his submission that an inference, if drawn, must be based in logic and flow from human experience.  Mr. Grewal does not rely on Villaroman for the portions of the decision which relate to the content of jury instructions regarding circumstantial evidence.

[36]           In Villaroman, the accused was convicted on a charge of possession of child pornography, with the Crown’s case based mainly on circumstantial evidence.  The Court of Appeal for Ontario concluded that the trial judge misstated the current law with respect to circumstantial evidence.  The Court of Appeal determined the verdict at trial was based on evidence that was unreasonable.  The conviction was set aside and an acquittal entered.

[37]           The Supreme Court considered “whether the trial judge erred by requiring that ‘any conclusion other than guilt’ be based on the evidence”.[23]  The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the verdict of guilt at trial.

[38]           The Supreme Court saw the appeal in Villaroman as an opportunity to provide clarification on the law with respect to circumstantial evidence.[24]  The Supreme Court stated that potential inferences “must be considered in light of all the evidence and the absence of evidence, assessed logically and in light of human experience and common sense.”[25]  This passage concludes a paragraph in which the Supreme Court considered how, in a jury charge, a trial judge could caution the jury about too readily drawing inferences of guilt.  Earlier in the same paragraph, the Supreme Court said the following:

[39]           The Supreme Court continued its review of the law with respect to circumstantial evidence by highlighting that “[in] assessing circumstantial evidence, inferences consistent with innocence do not have to arise from proven facts.”[27] 

[40]           The Supreme Court summarized the interplay between circumstantial evidence and the burden of proof in a criminal case:

[41]           The final sentence of the passage quoted above serves to highlight that the Supreme Court’s review and consideration of circumstantial evidence, and how inferences may be drawn from proven facts, were in the context of an appeal from a decision at trial – not a decision either at a preliminary hearing or on a motion for a directed verdict. 

[42]           In Jackson, the Court of Appeal for Ontario highlighted that concerns related to properly instructing a jury in applying the standard of reasonable doubt to circumstantial evidence, and to alerting a jury to the perils of leaping too quickly to conclusions based on circumstantial evidence, are not germane to the function of a preliminary inquiry judge (or to a judge on a motion for a directed verdict).[29] 

[43]           Returning to the decision in Villaroman, the Supreme Court stated that potential inferences “must be considered in light of all the evidence and the absence of evidence, assessed logically and in light of human experience and common sense.”[30]  The concept of “common sense” was addressed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario and by this court in decisions which post-date the decision in Villaroman.

[44]           In its 2021 decision in R. v. Steele, the Court of Appeal for Ontario cautions that concerns could arise if “the trier of fact draws inferences based on generalizations about human behaviour; it is in this process that drawing a common-sense inference may mask stereotypical or discriminatory reasoning”.[31]

[45]           In two recent decisions from this court, Schreck J. expresses concern about inferences based on common sense:

[46]           Mr. Grewal asks the court to be cautious of relying on “common sense” when drawing inferences related to the culturally specific form of moneylending practiced within the Punjabi-Sikh community in Brampton and followed by several of the lenders.

[47]           I turn next to the elements of the offence of breach of trust.   

[48]           In R. v. Boulanger,[35] the Supreme Court of Canada reviews the history, both at common law and under the Code, of the offence of breach of trust.  Based on that review, the Court identifies five elements, each of which the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:

[49]           The first four elements of the offence define the actus reus; the fifth element defines the mens rea.[37]

[50]           The actus reus of the offence of breach of trust is not defined with precision – either by statute or case law – because of the wide range of conduct the offence is intended to cover.[38]  In Boulanger, the Supreme Court concludes that “[any] attempt to limit the offence to specific acts or omissions would undoubtedly fail to foresee all the circumstances in which an official might breach the public’s trust.”[39]

[51]           As set out in the introductory section of this ruling, Mr. Grewal concedes that, during the period covered by the indictment, he was an “official” and held an “office”, both within the meaning of s. 122 of the Code.  With respect to the first of the five elements of the offence, Mr. Grewal does not dispute that there is evidence from which an inference of guilt can be drawn beyond a reasonable doubt.

[52]           At the heart of Mr. Grewal’s motion is his submission that there is no evidence – direct or circumstantial – to support an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to the second element.  Mr. Grewal’s position is that the Crown has failed, even for the purpose of the test at this stage of the proceeding, to establish that his alleged conduct was in connection with the duties of his office. 

[53]           As the third and fourth elements identify, the court must consider the “appropriate standard of responsibility and conduct demanded of the accused by the nature of his office.”[40]  Yet, it is not every breach of the appropriate standard, no matter how minor, that will be sufficient to remove the conduct from the realm of administrative fault and place it within the realm of criminal behaviour.[41]

[54]           With respect to the fourth element, the Crown must establish that “the public official’s conduct [represents] a ‘marked’ departure from the standards expected of an individual in the accused’s position of public trust.”[42]  The accused’s conduct must be “so far below acceptable standards to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in the office holder … [because] the law does not lightly brand a person as a criminal.”[43]

[55]           In support of its theory that Mr. Grewal’s conduct constitutes a marked departure from the conduct expected of an MP, the Crown relies on the governing principles set out in the COI Code.  For example, the Crown relies on the governing principle which requires an MP to “arrange their private affairs in a manner that bears the closest public scrutiny, an obligation that may not be fully discharged by simply acting within the law”.[44] 

[56]           As another example, the Crown relies on the sections of the COI Code which prohibit an MP from accepting “any gift or benefit [including a financial benefit] connected with their position that might reasonably be seen to compromise their personal judgment or integrity.”[45]  In that regard, the Crown asks the court to consider the interest-free component of the majority of the loans which Mr. Grewal received.

[57]           As a final example, the Crown highlights the prohibition from acting in any way to further the MP’s private interests when performing parliamentary duties and functions.[46]  The Crown relies on Mr. Grewal’s decision to place the names of the two India trip lenders on the guest list for the indoor reception in Delhi, at a time when Mr. Grewal was indebted to each individual.

[58]           Mr. Grewal’s position is that the court need not look beyond the second element to
conclude that the Crown has not met its burden at this stage of the proceeding.  Mr. Grewal’s alternative position is that the Crown has not met the applicable burden with respect to the mens rea of the offence (i.e., the fifth element).

[59]           The fifth element requires that the Crown establish that the accused “acted with the intention to use his or her public office for a purpose other than the public good, for example for a dishonest, partial, corrupt or oppressive purpose.”[47]  

[60]           It is not sufficient for the Crown to demonstrate that the public official’s conduct resulted in them receiving a benefit; the Crown must establish that the accused specifically intended the non-public-good purpose of their conduct (even if amidst other motives for the conduct).[48]  Put another way, the Crown must prove that the specific acts which form the actus reus of the charge were carried out for the non-public good purpose required to establish the fifth element.[49]

[61]           The Crown’s theory is that the circumstantial evidence is capable of supporting a reasonable inference that Mr. Grewal acted with the requisite intention.  Mr. Grewal’s position is that when the whole of the evidence is considered, there is no reasonable inference to be drawn which supports the mens rea of the offence – at all, let alone beyond a reasonable doubt.

[62]           Every essential definitional element of the offence of breach of trust must be considered.  Given Mr. Grewal’s concession regarding the first element, I start with the second element of the offence of breach of trust.

[63]           The Crown relies on Mr. Grewal’s solicitation of funds from individuals to whom immigration assistance was provided (directly or indirectly) and from individuals whose names Mr. Grewal placed on the guest list for a private reception with Prime Minister Trudeau in Delhi, India in February 2018.  I will first address the alleged conduct in relation to the immigration lenders, followed by the alleged conduct in relation to the India trip lenders.

[64]           Before considering the immigration assistance provided by Mr. Grewal to the immigration lenders, it is helpful to know the type of immigration-related work carried out by Mr. Grewal and the staff in his constituency office.

[65]           The court heard from two individuals who worked in Mr. Grewal’s offices:

[66]           Both individuals testified about the process in the constituency office for providing immigration-related assistance to members of the public.  Their evidence covered the receipt of requests for, preparation of, and the delivery of support letters to be included as part of visa applications.  The Crown relies on several letters of this kind in support of its theory with respect to Mr. Grewal’s solicitation of funds from the immigration lenders.

[67]           Ms. Bottomley and Ms. Haq both testified that immigration-related work, in the form of support letters and other types of assistance, made up the majority of the work carried out in the constituency office.  Based on her experience over two summers, Ms. Bottomley estimates the immigration-related work amounted to at least 80 per cent of the casework conducted in the constituency office.

[68]           Both individuals describe Mr. Grewal as dedicated to serving the needs of his constituents.  One or both of Ms. Bottomley and Ms. Haq, testified that Mr. Grewal,

[69]           One or both of the women also testified that Mr. Grewal’s dedication to “customer service” included instructions to the constituency office staff to do what they could to assist individuals
(a) even if the subject matter of the request was not within the federal government’s jurisdiction, and (b) who did not live in the Brampton East riding.

[70]           Given that Ms. Haq worked primarily out of the parliamentary office, she had limited exposure to how immigration-related work was carried out on a daily basis in the constituency office.  That said, the limited experience she described in that regard was consistent with Ms. Bottomley’s description of how that work was done.

[71]           What follows is a summary, based primarily on Ms. Bottomley’s evidence, of how requests for, preparation of, and delivery of immigration support letters were handled in the constituency office.

[72]           Requests for immigration support letters were received by phone, by email, or in person at the constituency office.  The individual making the request would be provided with a blank “Support Letter Form”,[50] to be completed and returned to the office.  The form identified that it was from Mr. Grewal’s office.

[73]           A completed form included information about both the applicant (most frequently an individual applying for a type of visa) and the individual inviting the applicant to Canada.  A constituency office employee would input the information from the form into a standard template letter.[51]  The completed support letter was typically available within 24 hours of the receipt of the completed form.  The completed support letter would be provided, in electronic and/or hard copy format, to the individual who requested it.

[74]           Over the course of her two summers at the constituency office, Ms. Bottomley prepared hundreds of support letters using the template.  Ms. Bottomley’s evidence is that Mr. Grewal was unaware of most of the support letters prepared by his constituency office staff; his approval was not required for the majority of the support letters prepared and provided to constituents and others.

[75]           The support letters were provided for free to anyone who requested one, with the exception of a period in 2017 during which the volume of casework in the office was particularly high.  At that time, Mr. Grewal instructed his staff to direct non-constituents to make requests for support letters from their own MPs. 

[76]           The standard template letter used in the constituency office (a) was partially pre-prepared, (b) was on Mr. Grewal’s House of Commons letterhead, (c) allowed for options of one or more inviters, (d) distinguished between a “general letter” and a “personal guarantee letter”, and
(e) included Mr. Grewal’s electronic signature. 

[77]           For a general letter, the wording included the following:

[78]           For general letters, the word “strongly” would be included in the first line if the individual preparing the letter was directed by a caseworker in the constituency office to include that language.  As appears from the standard form wording, if the requester so insisted, an assurance of the applicant’s return before the expiration of the visa would also be included in a general letter.

[79]           For a personal guarantee letter, the wording was as follows:

[80]           Ms. Bottomley’s understanding is that personal guarantee letters were prepared on direction from Mr. Grewal and, on occasion, when requested by a caseworker.  Ms. Bottomley’s belief is that in the latter instance, the caseworker would, in turn, have been directed by Mr. Grewal to have a personal guarantee letter prepared. 

[81]           Ms. Bottomley could remember only one situation in which a personal guarantee letter was prepared.  Her evidence is that Mr. Grewal knew (a) the people for whom the letter was to be prepared, and (b) the circumstances of the case.  Ms. Bottomley testified that Mr. Grewal would, in that situation, likely have provided an assurance that the inviter/sponsor would ensure the applicant would return home prior to the expiration of their travel visa.

[82]           Mr. Grewal and the staff at both his constituency and parliamentary offices relied on a WhatsApp group to exchange text messages.  The subjects covered in the text messages included immigration assistance.  At times, Mr. Grewal sent a message about someone inquiring for immigration-related assistance or to request that staff follow up with Immigration Refugee and Citizenship Canada (“IRCC”) on cases.

[83]           It is important to understand the context within which immigration assistance is provided by MPs and considered by IRCC.  Joseph Nassr, an operations manager within the Client Support Centre of IRCC, testified about (a) the IRCC process, (b) the types of services that MPs can provide to constituents, (c) the IRCC response to letters and requests from MPs and senators, and (d) which employees within IRCC are responsible for decisions in response to applications or to requests for reconsideration.

[84]           IRCC has a department dedicated to fielding inquiries from MPs, senators, and their respective staff members: the Ministerial Centre for Members of Parliament and Senators (“MCMPS”).  Mr. Nassr testified that MPs and senators have a “right of access” to information on immigration files.  MPs and senators can contact MCMPS to receive updates and details on all immigration files.

[85]           The majority of the inquiries to MCMPS from MP offices are made by staff members.  On occasion, MPs will personally make a telephone inquiry of, or send an email to, MCMPS.  Regardless of the source of the inquiry or email – an MP or a staff member – the process at MCMPS is the same. 

[86]             Specific requests made of MCMPS are forwarded to the responsible visa office.  The requests handled in that manner include those for reconsideration of an application or for an expedited review of a file. 

[87]             Mr. Nassr also testified about immigration support letters.  An MP or someone from their office can provide immigration support letters to MCMPS.  The MCMPS agents send the support letters to the responsible office for consideration.

[88]           Whether dealing with the receipt of immigration support letters, a request for reconsideration, or a request for an expedited review of a file, MCMPS agents are not immigration officers; they do not assess the files.  The MCMPS agents pass on the letter or request to the responsible office, where the outcome is determined.  The weight, if any, given to a support letter or to a request from an MP is entirely within the discretion of the officer at the responsible office.

[89]             Mr. Nassr reviewed several documents related to requests sent from Mr. Grewal’s office to MCMPS which have nothing to do with any of the immigration lenders.  These documents include: a reconsideration request;[54] an urgent request for an expedited review;[55] and support letters or emails stating that Mr. Grewal “personally guarantees” the applicant will abide by the terms of their visa.[56]

[90]           The Crown’s theory is that, when Mr. Grewal sought loans from individuals to whom he had provided immigration assistance, he was acting in connection with the duties of his office – because as a sitting member of Parliament, it was within his power to provide immigration assistance. 

[91]           Six of the seven immigration lenders are discussed in this section of the ruling: Surjit Singh Brar, Lakhvir Singh, Padam Tatter, Manpreet Dhillon, Arinder Singh Hans, and Daljit Sahota.[57]  The seventh immigration lender, Yousef Yenilmez, also falls into the category of India trip lender.  Mr. Yenilmez’ relationship and interactions with Mr. Grewal are discussed in the section below, titled “India Trip Lenders”.

[92]           In this section, I summarize the evidence of the immigration lenders, other than Mr. Yenilmez, on a lender-by-lender basis.  The summaries address the nature of the lender’s relationship with Mr. Grewal and/or his family, the loan requested and made, the use made of the money loaned, the repayment of the loan, and the immigration assistance provided by Mr. Grewal.

[93]           The evidence regarding Mr. Grewal’s use of the loaned money is from forensic accountant Tracy Hayward.  Ms. Hayward was qualified to give expert opinion evidence based on (a) a source and use analysis of several of Mr. Grewal’s bank accounts,[58] and (b) the Casino records. 

[94]           Ms. Hayward’s analyses cover two periods.  The first is the “pre-election period” (from December 16, 2013 to October 18, 2015); the second is the “post-election period” (from October 18, 2015 to March 5, 2019).  By way of example, Ms. Hayward testified that, in the pre-election period, the total of the funds deposited into the nine accounts for which she had records was $531,336; for the post-election period, the total of the funds deposited into the same accounts was $11,332,207.  Those amounts include deposits from the Casino.

[95]           Mr. Brar is in his mid-fifties.  Since 2015, Mr. Brar has been the Chief Executive Officer of Maverick Freight Systems; he previously owned a trucking company.

[96]           Mr. Brar met Mr. Grewal’s father and Mr. Grewal’s uncle, Gurdeep Dhillon, in the early 1990s, when all three men worked as taxi drivers at the Toronto airport.  The Grewal family and Brar family are both part of the Punjabi-Sikh community in the Brampton area.  In addition, Mr. Brar has connections to the Kabaddi club, where Gurdeep Dhillon is a member.  

[97]           Mr. Brar lives in the Brampton East riding.  Gurdeep Dhillon encouraged Mr. Brar to support Mr. Grewal in his federal election campaign.  Mr. Brar ultimately did so and, in turn, encouraged his family members to do the same. 

[98]           Mr. Brar attended an event at Mr. Grewal’s home (possibly related to Mr. Grewal’s engagement) and the temple portion of Mr. Grewal’s wedding.  Mr. Brar called Mr. Grewal on occasion if he needed advice, such as a referral to a lawyer.

[99]           Mr. Brar communicated with Mr. Grewal about two immigration matters.  Mr. Brar believes that the first time he did so was in 2016.  

[100]      The first communication in 2016 is about neighbours of Mr. Brar’s brother.[59]  The neighbours are aware of a 25-year old man who had passed away, in Canada, and whose parents wish to travel from India to Canada to bury their son.  Mr. Grewal tells Mr. Brar to have the neighbours attend at Mr. Grewal’s constituency office.

[101]      Mr. Brar’s understanding is that Mr. Brar’s brother and the neighbour(s) went to see Mr. Grewal.  Mr. Brar does not know what, if anything, Mr. Grewal did to assist the neighbour(s).  In the end, only the young man’s mother was permitted to travel from India to Canada; the father was not permitted to do so.

[102]       In 2019, Mr. Brar speaks with Mr. Grewal about a visitor visa for Mr. Brar’s cousin.  In May 2019, Mr. Grewal sends an email to the MP Question section of IRCC.[60]  In the email, Mr. Grewal requests that the IRCC reconsider the cousin’s request for a visitor visa.[61]

[103]      In the spring of 2016, Mr. Grewal approaches Mr. Brar for a loan of $100,000.  Mr. Brar asks Mr. Grewal why he needs the loan.  Mr. Grewal says he needs the loan for two reasons: he has a student loan and he had borrowed money from someone at a high interest rate and wishes to pay the money back. 

[104]      Mr. Brar goes home and discusses the loan request with his wife; she is reluctant to have Mr. Brar provide the loan.  After Mr. Brar’s father-in-law intervenes, Mr. Brar agrees to provide a $50,000 loan to Mr. Grewal. 

[105]      On June 24, 2016, Mr. Brar provides Mr. Grewal with a bank draft for $50,000.  Mr. Grewal prepares, and the two men execute, a written loan agreement.  The agreement sets out the term of the loan (one year) and the interest rate.  Mr. Grewal provides Mr. Brar with twelve post-dated cheques to cover the interest.  Mr. Brar never cashes the cheques; he rips them up.

[106]      On June 27, 2016, Mr. Grewal deposits the $50,000 into one of his bank accounts.  The next day, Mr. Grewal loses $20,000 at the Casino.

[107]      In response to pressure from his wife, Mr. Brar asks Mr. Grewal to repay the full amount of the principal.  That request is made at around the time of Mr. Grewal’s wedding in 2018.  On July 6, 2018, Mr. Grewal provides Mr. Brar with a bank draft payable to Mr. Brar’s wife.  After being repaid, Mr. Brar tears up the loan agreement he and Mr. Grewal had signed.  

[108]      The tracing period applied by Ms. Hayward in relation to the Brar loan is from June 27, 2016 to July 19, 2016.  In Ms. Hayward’s opinion, a minimum of $7,100 from the Brar loan was used at the Casino; the maximum amount from the loan potentially used at the Casino was $18,000. 

[109]      At the end of the tracing period, the account into which the $50,000 from Mr. Brar was deposited was in overdraft.  Ms. Hayward’s opinion is that, although not all of the $50,000 was used at the Casino, Mr. Grewal used more than $50,000 from the account during the three-week tracing period.

[110]      Mr. Singh is 57 years old.  He is the Vice-President of the Buffalo Group of Companies, which carries on business in the transportation industry, parking, and a small amount of development.  Since 2011, Mr. Singh has been living in Brampton East – Mr. Grewal’s electoral riding and the neighbourhood in which Mr. Grewal lived and continues to live.  Mr. Singh and Mr. Grewal first met in 2012, in the neighbourhood. 

[111]      In describing his relationship with Mr. Grewal, Mr. Singh testified that, among other things, they are friends, they know each other’s families, they attend each other’s functions, and they have been to each other’s homes on many occasions.

[112]      In 2017, Mr. Singh requests assistance from Mr. Grewal for a visa application made by Mr. Singh’s cousin (“Handpal”).  Prior to Mr. Singh seeking this assistance, Handpal’s application for a visitor visa to Canada has already been rejected twice.  Mr. Singh asks Mr. Grewal for help.  Mr. Grewal says that he will check to see why Handpal’s visa application was refused.

[113]      Mr. Singh drops supporting documents (his Canadian passport, documents related to home-ownership, etc.) off at Mr. Grewal’s office.  Mr. Grewal provides what Mr. Singh describes as a “standard letter”.  Mr. Grewal or someone on his staff tells Mr. Singh to have Handpal apply again.  Handpal does so and is granted a visitor visa; he arrives in Canada on November 22, 2017. 

[114]      In the fall of 2017, Mr. Grewal requests a loan of $50,000 from Mr. Singh.  Mr. Grewal tells Mr. Singh that the loan is to help pay student loans or some other debt.  The request is made anywhere from three days to several weeks prior to the date on which Mr. Singh loans the money to Mr. Grewal. 

[115]      On November 24, 2017, Mr. Singh provides Mr. Grewal with a personal cheque for $50,000.  The cheque is drawn on an account held jointly by Mr. Singh and his wife.  The only term attached to the loan is that it be repaid within one year.  The loan arrangement is not reduced to writing. 

[116]      On November 27, 2017, Mr. Grewal deposits the $50,000 cheque into one of his TD Bank accounts.  The balance in the account at the time is $6,335. 

[117]      Mr. Grewal repays the full amount of the loan on November 9, 2018.

[118]      Ms. Hayward’s tracing period in relation to the Singh loan is from November 27, 2017 to December 8, 2017.  Within the tracing period, there is a $100,000 withdrawal to the Casino. 

[119]      Ms. Hayward’s opinion is that, because the funds from the Singh loan are co-mingled with other funds, it is possible that none of money from the loan was applied towards the $100,000 Casino withdrawal. 

[120]      Ms. Hayward did, however, express the opinion that some portion or all of $18,255 from the Singh loan was used to fund withdrawals from the TD Bank account totalling $132,529 during the tracing period.  These withdrawals include transfers to Mr. Grewal’s TD Visa account and payments to other individuals.

[121]      Mr. Tatter is in his early sixties.  He has been in business, as the owner of Brampton Kitchen & Cabinets, for 32 years.  The business is located in Brampton, although Mr. Tatter does not know in which federal riding.  There is no evidence as to the federal riding in which Mr. Tatter resides.

[122]      Mr. Tatter has known Mr. Grewal for approximately 16 to 17 years.  When Mr. Grewal was much younger, he attended at the cabinetry shop once a week to spend time with the son of Mr. Tatter’s business partner.  Mr. Grewal had not visited Mr. Tatter’s place of business for at least a year prior to December 2017 (when Mr. Grewal made a request for a loan).

[123]      Mr. Tatter is a member of the Punjabi-Sikh community in the Brampton area.  In keeping with that community and culture, Mr. Grewal referred to Mr. Tatter as “uncle” – as a sign of respect for a close, older male friend.

[124]      Mr. Tatter met Mr. Grewal’s father only once or twice.  Mr. Tatter knew Mr. Grewal’s uncle, Gurdeep Dhillon, through the sport of Kabaddi.  Mr. Tatter has not been involved in that sport for 10 to 15 years.

[125]      In May 2016, Mr. Tatter seeks Mr. Grewal’s assistance regarding a visitor visa for a friend of Mr. Tatter’s (Deepak Thakur).  At the time, Mr. Tatter asks Mr. Grewal for “the standard letter”.  Mr. Tatter understands that the letter will make it easier for Mr. Thakur to obtain a visa. 

[126]      Mr. Tatter understood from Mr. Thakur that he received a letter from Mr. Grewal.  Mr. Tatter recalled seeing a personal guarantee letter from Mr. Grewal in support of Mr. Thakur’s visa application.  The IRCC records for this matter do not, however, include such a letter.  The records include a copy of an email from Mr. Grewal’s constituency assistant.[62]

[127]      Mr. Thakur’s visa application is not successful; Mr. Thakur does not make the trip to Canada.

[128]      Some time after loaning Mr. Grewal money, Mr. Tatter refers an employee to Mr. Grewal for assistance with a visa for the employee’s sister.  Mr. Tatter is not involved in the matter and is unaware of its details.

[129]      On December 2, 2017, Mr. Grewal phones Mr. Tatter and then attends at his place of business.  When meeting with Mr. Tatter, Mr. Grewal requests a loan.  Mr. Grewal’s stated reasons for the loan are twofold: to pay an instalment on another loan and to reduce the interest rate on a high interest loan.

[130]      Mr. Tatter agrees to loan Mr. Grewal $100,000.  Mr. Tatter gives Mr. Grewal a cheque drawn on an account in the name of the company through which Mr. Tatter invests his money.[63]  Mr. Grewal fills out the cheque and Mr. Tatter signs it.  The only term which Mr. Tatter imposes is that the loan be repaid within one year; otherwise there will be a form of penalty (i.e., interest).  The loan arrangement is not reduced to writing.

[131]      Two days later, on December 4, 2017, Mr. Grewal deposits the full amount of the cheque into a TD Bank account.  Prior to the deposit being made, the balance in the account is $53,352.  On the same day, Mr. Grewal makes a purchase of $100,000 at the Casino and loses the entire amount.

[132]      The loan is repaid within a year – in 2018 – after Mr. Tatter is contacted by the first of the two police forces who communicate with him about Mr. Grewal.

[133]      Ms. Hayward traced the use of the $100,000 from the Tatter loan during the period from December 4 to 8, 2017.  In her opinion, a minimum of $46,648 from the Tatter loan was used at the Casino; the maximum amount from the loan potentially used at the Casino was $100,000.

[134]      Mr. Dhillon is 49 years old.  Mr. Dhillon’s business interests include (a) full ownership of a truck transport company in Bolton, (b) partnerships in two automobile dealerships in Ottawa,
(c) an ownership stake in a truck stop in Belleville, and (d) since September 2019, part-ownership of a Hampton Inn located in Brampton.  All of the businesses are located in Ontario.

[135]      Mr. Dhillon’s residence is in a federal riding for Vaughan, Ontario.

[136]      Mr. Dhillon has known members of Mr. Grewal’s extended family since 1993, when he immigrated to Canada from India.  After moving to the Mississauga area in 1996, Mr. Dhillon met more members of Mr. Grewal’s family.  Mr. Dhillon describes himself as a friend of Mr. Grewal’s family. 

[137]      Mr. Dhillon did not have a relationship with Mr. Grewal prior to 2015.  In the years 2015 through 2019, Mr. Dhillon saw Mr. Grewal approximately five times per year at family, social, or community gatherings.  Politicians from all levels of government were in attendance at some of the community gatherings.    

[138]      Mr. Dhillon reached out twice to Mr. Grewal for assistance with immigration matters.  First, in May 2016, Mr. Dhillon seeks assistance with applications by his cousin and his cousin’s wife for travel visas to attend a wedding in Canada.  Mr. Grewal provides a support letter in May 2016.[64] 

[139]      The May 2016 support letter includes the statement, “I strongly recommend that [the applicants] be granted visitors [visas]”.[65]  In addition, the letter includes personal guarantee wording, with Mr. Grewal stating, “I personally guarantee they will honor the terms of their visitor [visas] and return to India at the end of their trip.”[66]

[140]      The visa applications by Mr. Dhillon’s cousin and the cousin’s wife are not successful.

[141]       Second, in December 2016 or in 2018,[67], Mr. Dhillon requests a support letter for his wife’s sister.  The sister-in-law is applying for a visitor’s visa for travel to Canada.  Mr. Dhillon does not see a letter at the time.  In his testimony, Mr. Dhillon expressed a belief that a letter, with Mr. Grewal’s signature on it, was provided at the time.  There is no evidence as to the outcome of the visa application by Mr. Dhillon’s sister-in-law. 

[142]      Mr. Dhillon occasionally referred his employees to Mr. Grewal’s office for immigration-related assistance.  Mr. Dhillon did not contact Mr. Grewal on those occasions.

[143]      Mr. Dhillon only contacted Mr. Grewal directly if the immigration-related assistance  sought was personal.  For those matters, Mr. Dhillon provided the requisite documents and information to the constituency office; he may also have contacted Mr. Grewal by phone.

[144]      In late April or early May 2018, Mr. Grewal calls Mr. Dhillon and asks for a loan of $100,000.  Mr. Dhillon does not have any memory of Mr. Grewal providing a reason for the loan.  Mr. Dhillon agrees to provide the loan with no terms, conditions, or repayment plan attached to it.  The loan arrangement is not reduced to writing.

[145]      On May 3, 2018, Mr. Dhillon provides Mr. Grewal with a bank draft for $100,000.[68] 

[146]      On May 7, 2018, Mr. Grewal deposits the $100,000 from Mr. Dhillon to a Royal Bank of Canada account.  At the time of the deposit, the balance in the account is $4,350.  Also on May 7, 2018, there is a withdrawal from the account to the Casino in the amount of $100,000.  Mr. Grewal loses the entire amount at the Casino the same day. 

[147]      The loan is repaid in full in the fall of 2018, within a day or two after Mr. Dhillon is contacted by the Peel Regional Police about Mr. Grewal.

[148]      Ms. Hayward’s tracing period in relation to the Dhillon loan begins and ends on May 7, 2018.  In Ms. Hayward’s opinion, a minimum of $96,650 from the Dhillon loan was used at the Casino; the maximum amount from the loan potentially used at the Casino was $100,000.

[149]      Arinder Singh Hans is a 52-year old businessman who works in the trucking and transportation industries.  He is the owner-operator of one company and the owner of another company.  Mr. Hans’ residence is not within the Brampton East riding.

[150]      Mr. Hans has known Mr. Grewal and his family, including both Mr. Grewal’s father and uncle, for 28 years.  Mr. Hans considers Mr. Grewal’s uncle, Gurdeep Dhillon, to be a close friend.

[151]      Mr. Hans’ relationship with the Grewal family is such that he feels he played a role in raising Mr. Grewal.  Mr. Hans considers Mr. Grewal to be like a little brother or son and now, in Mr. Grewal’s adult life, to be a close family friend.    

[152]      Mr. Hans asks Mr. Grewal to provide a support letter for Mr. Hans’ nephew who wants to travel to attend a family wedding in Canada.  In examination in chief, Mr. Hans testified that the request for the support letter was made in the fall of 2018.  In cross-examination, when shown a support letter, which he did not identify, Mr. Hans testified that the request was made in late 2016 or early 2017. 

[153]      The request for the support letter is addressed in an exchange of text messages between Mr. Hans and Mr. Grewal.  As part of that exchange, Mr. Grewal says he will have the file checked from his office.[70]  Mr. Hans attends at Mr. Grewal’s office and a member of the constituency office staff prepares a support letter.[71] 

[154]      The Crown submits that the support letter provided was a personal guarantee letter.[72]  The January 2017 support letter has not been admitted into evidence; it is a lettered exhibit and its admission into evidence is subject to authentication.  Portions of the letter were read into record by Mr. Hans; the personal guarantee portion was not.

[155]      The visa application by Mr. Hans’ nephew is not successful.

[156]      On May 8, 2018, Mr. Grewal telephones Mr. Hans and requests a loan of $250,000.  Mr. Grewal says he needs the money because the closing date is approaching for a property that he is purchasing and his mortgage application was not approved.  Mr. Grewal tells Mr. Hans that the loan will be repaid within two or three months.

[157]      On the same day, Mr. Hans agrees to provide the loan; Mr. Grewal sends Mr. Hans the relevant bank particulars; and Mr. Hans deposits the money directly into Mr. Grewal’s account.  The loan is interest-free and no terms for the loan are discussed.  The loan arrangement is not reduced to writing. 

[158]        When the loan money is deposited into Mr. Grewal’s bank account, the account has a balance of $4,327.  On the same day the money is deposited, $250,000 is withdrawn to the Casino and Mr. Grewal loses the full amount. 

[159]      The loan is repaid in full in November 2018.  Mr. Grewal’s uncle, Gurdeep Dhillon, provides Mr. Hans with a cheque for $250,000 to repay the loan.

[160]      Ms. Hayward’s tracing period in relation to the Hans loan begins and ends on May 8, 2018.  In Ms. Hayward’s opinion, a minimum of $245,658 from the Hans loan was used at the Casino; the maximum amount from the loan potentially used at the Casino was $250,000.

[161]      Mr. Sahota is in his early fifties and resides in the Brampton East riding.  Mr. Sahota owns two businesses: a tire sales company and a truck driving school.  Mr. Sahota was introduced to Mr. Grewal, socially, through the nephew of Mr. Sahota’s business partner.

[162]      Prior to the loan request, Mr. Sahota’s contact or involvement with Mr. Grewal includes (a) five to ten occasions when Mr. Grewal visited Mr. Sahota’s place of business (with or without the business partner’s nephew), (b) in the community at weddings, Kabaddi tournaments, and temple, and (c) filling out a form for membership with the Liberal Party.  Mr. Sahota testified that he joined the Liberal Party in an effort to support Mr. Grewal’s 2015 nomination as the Liberal candidate for the Brampton East riding.

[163]      Although Mr. Sahota has known Mr. Grewal’s father for a long time, it was not until Mr. Grewal ran for office that Mr. Sahota learned that the two men are father and son.

[164]      The immigration assistance upon which the Crown relies with respect to Mr. Sahota post-dates the loan made to Mr. Grewal.  For that reason, I start with the loan and follow with the immigration assistance. 

[165]      In early June 2018, Mr. Grewal contacts Mr. Sahota by telephone and requests a loan of $200,000 or some lesser amount.  The telephone conversation lasts a matter of minutes.  Mr. Grewal does not say what the loan is for; and Mr. Sahota does not ask.  Mr. Grewal explains he needs the money for three to four months.  Mr. Sahota assumes that Mr. Grewal needs the money for his wedding.

[166]      Mr. Sahota agrees to loan the full amount requested.  The two men do not discuss interest on the loan.  Mr. Grewal offers to reduce the loan arrangement to writing; Mr. Sahota declines and says he is not in a hurry to get the money back.

[167]      Mr. Grewal contacts Mr. Sahota by telephone on June 8, 2018.  Mr. Grewal says he needs the money and asks when he can expect to receive it.  The two men meet that day in a parking lot.  Through their respective car windows, Mr. Sahota provides Mr. Grewal with a $200,000 bank draft, drawn on Mr. Sahota’s line of credit.

[168]      Mr. Grewal deposits the $200,000 into his bank account on the same day he receives the bank draft.  Prior to that deposit being made, the balance in the account is $24,954. 

[169]      Between June 8, 2018 and June 12, 2018, Mr. Grewal makes a $225,000 withdrawal from the account to the Casino.  Mr. Grewal loses $125,000 at the Casino on June 11, 2018; he loses $100,000 on June 12, 2018.

[170]      The loan is repaid in two instalments. The first instalment is paid in November 2018, by way of a $50,000 cheque from Mr. Grewal’s uncle, Gurdeep Dhillon.  That payment is made in the days following the Peel Regional Police speaking with Mr. Sahota about Mr. Grewal.  The balance of the loan is paid in the spring of 2021.  Mr. Grewal provides Mr. Sahota with $100,000 to put towards the purchase price of a property for which Mr. Sahota has a deal closing at the time.

[171]      The tracing period applied by Ms. Hayward for the Sahota loan is June 8 to 12, 2018.  In Ms. Hayward’s opinion, a minimum of $199,846 from the Sahota loan was used at the Casino; the maximum amount from the loan potentially used at the Casino was $200,000.

[172]      In July 2018, Mr. Sahota is the President of the Kabaddi Federation of Ontario (“KFO”).  In that capacity, he signs a letter addressed to The Minister of Immigration and Citizenship (“the KFO letter”).  The KFO letter is drafted by an assistant to Mr. Sahota (i.e., in his capacity as the President of the KFO). 

[173]      The KFO letter is intended to assist a Kabaddi player’s return to Canada and continued participation in a tournament taking place in Toronto and Vancouver.[73]  The player’s participation in the tournament had been interrupted, in early June, because of a family emergency in India.  The player’s original visa is single-entry, thus he requires another visa.

[174]        One of the tournament organizers requests Mr. Sahota’s assistance in the form of a letter.  Mr. Sahota gives the signed KFO letter to the tournament organizer who requested it. 

[175]      The KFO letter is an attachment to a July 11, 2018 email from Mr. Grewal to the MP Question section of IRCC.[74]  The email is addressed “To whom it may concern”.  In his email, Mr. Grewal asks that the player’s file be reviewed quickly so as to permit the player’s continued participation in the Kabaddi tournament in Canada. 

[176]      Mr. Sahota testified that, in his capacity as the president of the KFO, he wanted the player to return to Canada;  in his capacity as a member of a competing club, however, he did not want the player, from a rival club, to return.  There is no evidence as to the outcome of the application for a visa permitting the Kabaddi player to return to Canada.

[177]      The Crown identifies Moe Jaber as one of the immigration lenders.  The Crown concedes that, on the evidence, it cannot establish that Mr. Grewal received a loan from Mr. Jaber in exchange for immigration assistance provided by Mr. Grewal.[75]

[178]      In the fall of 2015, Mr. Jaber worked in the office of a Cabinet Minister.  Mr. Jaber met Mr. Grewal when they were both working on Parliament Hill.  The two men became friends and socialized in the Greater Toronto Area.  Mr. Jaber testified as to a series of loans between the two men – from Mr. Jaber to Mr. Grewal and from Mr. Grewal to Mr. Jaber.

[179]      I do not include Mr. Jaber in the immigration lenders whose evidence is considered in detail in this ruling.  The Crown asks the court to consider Mr. Jaber’s evidence in support of proposed inferences related to (a) the level of Mr. Grewal’s desperation to obtain funds with which to gamble, and (b) Mr. Grewal’s motive when requesting loans.  I have considered Mr. Jaber’s evidence in the context of the limited weighing of the evidence as a whole.

[180]      In her source and use analysis, Ms. Hayward identified individuals or companies who made deposits of more than $10,000 (per deposit) to one or more of the nine accounts for which she had records.  In the pre-election period, there were seven such individuals or companies.  In the entire period reviewed, from December 16, 2013 to March 5, 2019, there were 39 individuals or companies who funded deposits in an amount in excess of $10,000 (per deposit).  The immigration lenders and India trip lenders are included in the 39 individuals or companies.

[181]      For example, five individuals made deposits in the range of $300,000 to $575,000.  None of the immigration or India trip lenders fall into that category.  The immigration and India trip lenders fall into one of the three remaining categories:

[182]      During the pre-election period (ending on October 18, 2015), the total amount of the deposits made by the seven individuals or companies was $197,516.  When the entire period (both pre and post-election) is considered, the 39 individuals or companies were collectively responsible for deposits totaling $6,613,265.

[183]      There is no evidence as to the reasons why the individuals, other than those who testified at trial, were responsible for deposits into Mr. Grewal’s bank accounts.  Nor is there any evidence as to the terms pursuant to which deposits were made by these other individuals or companies. 

[184]      I next consider the Crown’s theory and the inferences relevant to the six immigration lenders whose evidence is reviewed in paras. 95 to 176, above.

[185]      The second element of the offence of breach of trust requires the Crown to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged conduct was “in connection with the duties” of Mr. Grewal’s office as an MP.  The Crown submits that, as a public official, Mr. Grewal should not benefit from the provision of services in the fulfilment of his official duties and responsibilities.  In that regard, the Crown relies on Mr. Grewal requesting loans from individuals to whom he had previously provided a form of immigration assistance. 

[186]      The Crown also submits that, as a public official, Mr. Grewal should not confer a benefit upon an individual to whom he is indebted at the time the benefit is conferred.  The Crown submits that such conduct demonstrates partiality towards the individual.  The Crown relies on Mr. Grewal’s indebtedness to Mr. Sahota at the time when Mr. Grewal requested that IRCC carry out an expedited review of the Kabaddi player’s temporary resident visa application. 

[187]      The Crown asks the court to consider the provision of immigration services to be either a benefit or demonstrative of partiality regardless of (a) whether the assistance was provided directly to the immigration lender, and (b) the outcome of the specific immigration matter.

[188]      The Crown asks the court to conclude there is some evidence to support a reasonable inference that there was not a strong personal connection between Mr. Grewal and several of the immigration lenders.  The Crown discounts the extent of the personal relationship, if any, between Mr. Grewal and the immigration lenders as a factor in Mr. Grewal’s decision to request a loan from those individuals.  Mr. Grewal, on the other hand, relies on his personal and/or family connection to the immigration lenders as the driving factor in his decision to request a loan from each of them.

[189]      For the purpose of this motion, it is not necessary to address inferences regarding the nature of the relationship between Mr. Grewal and/or his family and the immigration lenders. 

[190]      Most important at this stage of the proceeding are two other inferences which form part of the Crown’s theory.  For the five immigration lenders for whom immigration assistance was provided before Mr. Grewal requested a loan, the Crown asks the court to conclude there is some evidence to support a reasonable inference that, in Mr. Grewal’s mind, the prior immigration assistance created a scenario in which the individual would be “more likely to provide the loan”[76] or “more receptive to the request”[77] for a loan.  The Crown’s theory is that Mr. Grewal’s thought process in that regard connects the loan request with the duties of Mr. Grewal’s office.

[191]      For the remaining immigration lender, Mr. Sahota, the Crown asks the court to conclude there is some evidence to support a reasonable inference that in providing the immigration assistance, Mr. Grewal acted partially towards Mr. Sahota.  The Crown’s theory is that the partial treatment connects the loan request with the duties of Mr. Grewal’s office.

[192]      For the reasons which follow, I find that, the inferences sought by the Crown (summarized in paras. 190-191, above) do not fall “within the field of available inferences”.[78]  It is not a matter of either inference flowing “less than easily”.[79]  It is not a matter of either inference being difficult, not necessarily likely, or not probable.[80]

[193]      I find that there are no positive proven facts from which either inference may be drawn; the proposed inferences amount to impermissible speculation or conjecture.[81]  The evidence is not capable of supporting an inference that, in Mr. Grewal’s mind, the prior immigration assistance created a scenario in which the individual would be more likely to provide, or be more receptive to the request for, a loan.  Nor is the evidence capable of supporting an inference that Mr. Grewal acted partially towards Mr. Sahota.  

[194]      As an MP, Mr. Grewal approached fulfilling his duties and responsibilities by emphasizing to his staff the importance of service to constituents and, when the workload permitted, non-constituents.  Assistance with immigration matters was the single largest component of the work done in the constituency office.

[195]      To say that immigration support letters were routinely provided by Mr. Grewal’s constituency office is an understatement.  In her eight months as an intern in that office, Ms. Bottomley prepared hundreds of support letters.

[196]      Even with her limited experience, Ms. Bottomley understood that support letters were not required for temporary resident visa applications; they were simply “nice to have”.  The lack of significance of a support letter in the temporary resident visa application process was confirmed by Mr. Nassr.  Support letters are not required as part of a visa application.  Mr. Nassr described the “default” as being that support letters are not included with visa applications.

[197]      The evidence of Ms. Bottomley and Mr. Nassr does not amount to some evidence to support the proposed inferences.  To the contrary, based on their evidence it would be unreasonable to draw the proposed inferences.

[198]      The Crown and Mr. Grewal disagree as to whether, for the purpose of the second element of the offence, and the five lenders who received immigration assistance before a loan request was made, the court is to consider what was in the mind of each of the lenders at the time of the loan request:

[199]      For the purpose of this ruling, it is not necessary to consider what was in the mind of each of those five lenders when they received the loan request.  The court is, however, required to engage in a limited weighing of the evidence as a whole to assess the reasonableness of the proposed inference.[82]  The evidence of the lenders who testified about their respective understanding of, and experience with, immigration support letters is part of the evidence as a whole.  The lenders’ evidence in that regard is therefore considered in assessing the reasonableness of the proposed inferences.

[200]      In summary, the lenders who testified about their understanding of and experience with immigration assistance said the following:

[201]      When considered in the context of the evidence as a whole, the immigration lenders’ evidence does not amount to some evidence to support the proposed inferences.  To the contrary, based on the immigration lenders’ evidence, it would be unreasonable to draw the proposed inferences.

[202]      In weighing the evidence as a whole, the shear number[84] of other depositors (a) detracts from the potential reasonableness of the proposed inference as to the significance of prior immigration assistance in Mr. Grewal’s mind when seeking out a lender, and (b) contributes to my conclusion that the proposed inferences with respect to the immigration lenders cannot reasonably be drawn. 

[203]      I find that it would be unreasonable to infer that Mr. Grewal considered the immigration assistance provided to any one of Messrs. Brar, Singh, Tatter, Dhillon, and Hans to be of sufficient significance to cause them to be more likely to provide, or more receptive to a request for, a loan. 

[204]      For the same reasons, I find that it would be unreasonable to infer that, when providing immigration assistance related to the Kabaddi player, Mr. Grewal placed such a degree of significance on the assistance that, in his mind, he acted partially towards Mr. Sahota.

[205]      Before considering the immigration assistance specific to each immigration lender, I also consider the evidence regarding other funds deposited into Mr. Grewal’s bank accounts.  

[206]      Whether considered in the context of the evidence as a whole, or on a lender-by-lender basis, the evidence as to the timing, nature, and outcome (where known) of the immigration assistance upon which the Crown relies does not amount to some evidence to support the proposed inferences.  To the contrary, for the reasons which follow on a lender-by-lender basis, it would be unreasonable to draw the proposed inferences.

[207]      Mr. Brar approached Mr. Grewal about a couple in India who wished to travel to Canada to attend to the burial of their 25-year old son.  Mr. Brar was at least two degrees of separation removed from the couple.  Mr. Brar became aware of the situation because the couple was known to his brother’s neighbour.  The matter was not personal to Mr. Brar. 

[208]      Mr. Brar knows only that the brother’s neighbour met with Mr. Grewal.  Mr. Brar does not know what assistance, if any, Mr. Grewal or his office provided for the couple.  In the end, only the mother of the deceased man was permitted to travel from India to Canada.

[209]      The immigration assistance upon which the Crown relies with respect to Mr. Brar does not amount to some evidence to support an inference that, in Mr. Grewal’s mind, the assistance (if any) would make Mr. Brar more receptive to a loan request.  To draw such an inference requires speculation and conjecture (a) as to whether any assistance was provided, (b) that Mr. Grewal was aware of the assistance, and (c) that Mr. Grewal connected the assistance provided to the couple in India to Mr. Brar. 

[210]      It is neither reasonable nor logical to infer that Mr. Grewal would, if aware that only the mother (and not the father) was granted a visa, consider the assistance of sufficient significance that it would make Mr. Brar more receptive to a loan request.

[211]      Mr. Singh received a general support letter and was told to have his cousin make a third application for a temporary resident visa.  The application was ultimately successful.  The assistance provided by Mr. Grewal and/or his office was nothing other than routine.  There is no evidence to support an inference that this routine assistance had any impact on the decision made at the IRCC responsible office. 

[212]      The immigration assistance upon which the Crown relies with respect to Mr. Singh does not amount to some evidence to support an inference that, in Mr. Grewal’s mind, the assistance would make Mr. Singh more likely to agree to a loan.  To draw such an inference requires speculation and conjecture as to why Mr. Grewal would, in his mind, consider the assistance provided to be anything other than routine.

[213]      In May 2016, approximately 1.5 years before Mr. Grewal made the loan request, Mr. Tatter sought Mr. Grewal’s help with respect to a temporary resident visa for a friend.  Mr. Tatter requested, and understood that his friend received, a “standard” support letter.  The friend’s temporary resident visa application was unsuccessful.

[214]      The immigration assistance upon which the Crown relies with respect to Mr. Tatter does not amount to some evidence to support an inference that, in Mr. Grewal’s mind, the assistance would make Mr. Tatter more likely to agree to a loan.  To draw such an inference requires speculation and conjecture as to whether Mr. Grewal was aware that a support letter (typically prepared without his input and knowledge) was prepared for the friend. 

[215]      It is neither reasonable nor logical to infer that, 1.5 years after the assistance was provided and despite the rejection of the friend’s application, Mr. Grewal would consider the assistance to be of sufficient significance to make Mr. Tatter more likely to agree to a loan.

[216]      In May 2016, Mr. Dhillon sought Mr. Grewal’s help with a temporary resident visa application for Mr. Dhillon’s cousin and the cousin’s wife.  A personal guarantee letter was provided.  Both applications were unsuccessful.  Later the same year, Mr. Dhillon sought a support letter for his sister-in-law.  Mr. Dhillon believes a support letter was provided at the time, although he did not see such a letter if it was provided.  There is no evidence as to the outcome of that application. 

[217]      The immigration assistance upon which the Crown relies with respect to Mr. Dhillon does not amount to some evidence to support an inference that, in Mr. Grewal’s mind, the assistance would make Mr. Dhillon more likely to agree to a loan.  To draw such an inference requires speculation and conjecture (a) as to whether any assistance was provided with respect to the sister-in-law’s application, (b) that Mr. Grewal was aware of the assistance, if any, provided with respect to the sister-in-law, and (c) that more than a year after providing a personal guarantee letter for the cousin and the cousin’s wife, Mr. Grewal remembered doing so.

[218]      It is neither reasonable nor logical to infer that Mr. Grewal would consider the assistance provided in support of the two failed applications (for the cousin and the cousin’s wife) to be of sufficient significance to make Mr. Dhillon more likely to agree to a loan.

[219]      More than a year before the loan request, Mr. Hans requested assistance from Mr. Grewal with respect to a temporary resident visa application by Mr. Hans’ nephew.  Mr. Hans personally attended at Mr. Grewal’s office and obtained a support letter prepared by a member of the constituency office staff.  The nephew’s application was unsuccessful.

[220]      The immigration assistance upon which the Crown relies with respect to Mr. Hans does not amount to some evidence to support an inference that, in Mr. Grewal’s mind, the assistance would make Mr. Hans more likely to agree to a loan.  To draw such an inference requires speculation and conjecture (a) as to whether Grewal was aware of the support letter having been prepared, and (b) that more than a year after the letter was provided Mr. Grewal remembered it.

[221]      It is neither reasonable nor logical to infer that, more than a year after the assistance was provided and despite the failed application, Mr. Grewal would consider the assistance to be of sufficient significance to make Mr. Hans more likely to agree to a loan.

[222]      Mr. Sahota is distinct from the other immigration lenders; he loaned money to Mr. Grewal before immigration assistance was provided for the Kabaddi player.  The immigration assistance provided by Mr. Grewal regarding the Kabaddi player was in the form of an email to MPMCS requesting an expedited review of the player’s file. 

[223]      There is no evidence that Mr. Sahota ever dealt personally with Mr. Grewal about the Kabaddi player.  Mr. Sahota was not the organizer of the tournament in which the player was participating.

[224]      The immigration assistance upon which the Crown relies with respect to Mr. Sahota does not amount to some evidence to support an inference that, in Mr. Grewal’s mind, the assistance was of sufficient significance such that it demonstrates partial treatment towards Mr. Sahota.  To draw such an inference requires speculation or conjecture as to whether Mr. Grewal was aware
(a) of the inclusion of the KFO letter in the materials attached to his email to IRCC, and (b) that the KFO letter was signed by Mr. Sahota.  Speculation and conjecture are also required as to why Mr. Grewal would consider that the request for an expedited review of the player’s file carried greater weight than any other such request.

[225]      The inferences required to support the Crown’s theory on the second element of the offence of breach of trust, as it relates to the immigration lenders, can neither reasonably nor logically be drawn based on a limited weighing of the evidence as a whole.  There is no evidence to support an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the immigration lenders and the second element of the offence of breach of trust.

[226]      I turn to the two India trip lenders – Messrs. Dhugga and Yenilmez.

[227]      In February 2018, Prime Minister Trudeau travelled to India.  Included on the trip was an official delegation comprised of the Prime Minister and several Cabinet Ministers.  Backbench MPs who participated in the trip, including Mr. Grewal, were not part of the official delegation.

[228]      The trip also included a business delegation, which was not part of the official delegation.  The business delegation consisted of individuals who had registered for the trip through one of two organizations: the Canada-India Business Council (“C-IBC”) and the Indo-Canada Business Chamber (“ICBC”).

[229]      Anyone travelling to India who was not part of the official delegation was personally responsible for their travel and other expenses for the trip.  Backbench MPs and members of the business delegation paid their own way.

[230]      The trip to India included two anchor events – a reception in Mumbai on February 20, 2018 and a reception at the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi on February 22, 2018 (“the Delhi event”). 

[231]      There were three ways by which members of the public could receive an invitation to the anchor events.  First, the High Commissioner’s Staff (“the Mission staff”) prepared a list of the names of the individuals it wanted on the guest list.  Second, an individual who had signed up for the trip through either the C-IBC or the ICBC could identify the anchor events they wished to attend (i.e., one or both of the events).  The names of the individuals would be placed on the guest list for the anchor event(s) selected.  Third, the PMO prepared a list of the names of individuals it wanted on the guest list for the anchor event(s).

[232]      The Delhi event included an outdoor reception, for approximately 1,000 invited guests, on the grounds of Canada House.  The Delhi event also included a smaller indoor reception.  The indoor reception was for approximately 150 invited guests; it took place inside Canada House.  This smaller reception was intended as a “meet and greet”, at which the invited guests could spend a few moments with the Prime Minister and have their photograph taken with him.  The indoor reception was intended to last approximately 45 minutes and take place immediately before the outdoor reception.

[233]      Mission staff prepared a separate list of 150 invitees to the indoor reception.  Some of the names on that list were provided to the Mission staff by the Prime Minister’s Office (“PMO”).  The PMO’s list included five names submitted by each of the backbench MPs participating in the trip. 

[234]      Mr. Dhugga’s name and Mr. Yenilmez’ name were on the list which Mr. Grewal submitted to the PMO.  Mr. Grewal was indebted to the India trip lenders when he submitted their names to the PMO for inclusion on the guest list for the indoor reception. 

[235]      The court heard from three individuals who were involved in planning the India trip, played a role in organizing the Delhi event, and/or attended the Delhi event:

[236]      Each of these witnesses testified about one or more of the compilation of names for inclusion on the guest list for the indoor reception in Delhi, the logistics for the Delhi event, and the two receptions. 

[237]      Messrs. Dhugga and Yenilmez testified about their respective participation in the India trip and attendance at the Delhi event, including the indoor reception.

[238]      For the purpose of the motion, the court’s focus is on Mr. Grewal’s decision to include the names of the India trip lenders in his submission to the PMO for the indoor reception guest list. 

[239]      Of the three witnesses who were involved in the organization and execution of the Delhi event, only Ms. Kattar Miller interacted with Mr. Grewal regarding the five individuals whose names could be placed on the guest list for the indoor reception.  For that reason, only her evidence is summarized below. 

[240]      The evidence of Ms. Prachar and Mr. Patel is, of course, part of the evidence as a whole and therefore considered in the limited weighing of evidence on the motion.

[241]      On at least two occasions, Ms. Kattar Miller reached out to MPs to obtain lists of names.  First, she identified the MPs who intended to participate in the India trip.  From those MPs, Ms. Kattar Miller requested their respective lists of stakeholders whom the MPs wanted to invite to attend one or both of the Mumbai and Delhi anchor events. 

[242]      Sometime after she obtained the lists of stakeholders, Ms. Kattar Miller was informed that the indoor reception had been added to the agenda for the Delhi event.  Between February 13, 2018 and February 16, 2018, Ms. Kattar Miller exchanged several emails with Mr. Grewal about the five people he could invite to the indoor reception if he wanted to do so.

[243]      Ms. Kattar Miller’s first email, sent on February 13, 2018, begins with “Hi Raj”.[85]  Ms. Kattar Miller addresses the indoor reception in the following manner:

[244]      In her communication with MPs, including Mr. Grewal, about the indoor reception, Ms. Kattar Miller did not provide any guidance as to, or restrictions on, whose names the MPs could include in their respective lists of five names.

[245]      Mr. Grewal responded to Mr. Kattar Miller by email on February 15, 2018.[87]  The substantive portion of his email is nothing more than a list of five names.  Of the India trip lenders, only Mr. Yenilmez’ name is included in that list.[88]  Mr. Dhugga’s name does not appear on the first list of names submitted by Mr. Grewal.

[246]      In an email sent on February 15, 2018, Ms. Kattar Miller inquired of Mr. Grewal about an individual whose name appeared on both Mr. Grewal’s list and a list from another MP.[89]  On February 16, 2018, Mr. Grewal replied by email; he told Ms. Kattar Miller to keep the individual’s name on the other MP’s list. 

[247]      Mr. Grewal also provided a revised list of five names.  The name “Andy Dhugga” replaced the name of the individual whose name was removed from Mr. Grewal’s list and remained on the other MP’s list.[90]  Mr. Yenilmez’ name remained on Mr. Grewal’s list, as did the names of Mr. Grewal’s father and two other individuals.

[248]      Ms. Kattar Miller collated the names received from the MPs for inclusion on the indoor reception guest list.  She forwarded the collated list to the individual who was the head of “Advance” for the trip.  The list was ultimately forwarded to the High Commissioner’s Deputy. 

[249]      There is conflicting evidence as to whether a separate invitation to the indoor reception was ultimately sent to the 150 invitees.  For the purpose of this motion, it is not necessary to resolve that issue. 

[250]      The inclusion of the names of the India trip lenders on the guest list for the indoor reception is only one component of Mr. Grewal’s conduct upon which the Crown relies with respect to the second element of the offence.  The other component of the conduct is the prior solicitation of funds from the India trip lenders.

[251]      Set out below is a summary of the evidence for each of the India trip lenders as to the nature of their relationship with Mr. Grewal and/or his family, the loan requested and made, the use made of the money loaned, when the loan was repaid, and the lender’s participation in the India trip. 

[252]      Mr. Dhugga is 54 years old and lives in the Brampton East riding.  He is the Chief Executive Officer of New Millennium Tire Centre, a successful Brampton-based business with 17 locations across Canada.

[253]      Mr. Dhugga has known Mr. Grewal since he was a young boy.  For the past ten years or more, Mr. Dhugga and Mr. Grewal have been part of a group of friends who spend time together over dinners and at functions.  Mr. Dhugga testified that he has a close personal relationship with Mr. Grewal.

[254]      Mr. Dhugga knows Mr. Grewal’s father and Mr. Grewal’s uncle, Gurdeep Dhillon.  Mr. Dhugga considers his ties to Mr. Grewal’s family, which date back many years, to be “very strong”.

[255]      In early June 2017, at either a BBQ event in Brampton or a Kabaddi event, Mr. Grewal speaks with Mr. Dhugga to request a loan.  The conversation occurs in a public place, with other people around. 

[256]      Mr. Grewal explains that he needs the money because “he has done some investment somewhere[;] he had borrowed money from somebody and he needs to return that money.”  It does not matter to Mr. Dhugga why Mr. Grewal needs the money; Mr. Dhugga does not ask questions.  Mr. Dhugga understands that Mr. Grewal is “stuck somewhere” – he is asking for the money because he needs it.  Mr. Dhugga agrees to loan money to Mr. Grewal because he is like Mr. Dhugga’s own child.

[257]      Mr. Grewal asks to borrow $250,000.  Mr. Dhugga loans $200,000, because that is how much money he has available.  Mr. Dhugga does not charge interest and the loan agreement is not reduced to writing.

[258]      On June 12, 2017, Mr. Dhugga provides Mr. Grewal with a bank draft for $200,000.[91]  Mr. Grewal deposits the money into an account the same day.  The balance in the account before the money is deposited is $12,154.  On June 13, 2017, Mr. Grewal obtains a bank draft for $150,000 and writes a cheque for $65,000, both payable to the Casino.

[259]      Mr. Dhugga testified that he believes the loan was repaid in 2019.

[260]      Ms. Hayward’s tracing period for the Dhugga loan is June 12 to 17, 2017.  In Ms. Hayward’s opinion, a minimum of $195,628 from the Dhugga loan was used at the Casino; the maximum potentially used was $200,000.

[261]      February 2018 is not the first time that Mr. Dhugga participated in events in India involving a Canadian Prime Minister.  Mr. Dhugga previously accepted an invitation to participate in an official trip to India by then Prime Minister Harper.  Mr. Dhugga described travelling to India on the Prime Minister’s plane and staying with the Prime Minister “all the time” during a five-day trip.

[262]      In February 2018, Mr. Dhugga is in India for personal reasons, as he typically is around the same time each year.  Mr. Dhugga does not consider Prime Minister Trudeau’s trip to India to be a “big deal” for him personally.

[263]      The offices of five MPs had contacted Mr. Dhugga to invite him on the India trip.  Mr. Dhugga’s response to each invitation was the same – if he is in India at the time, he will attend only the Delhi event.

[264]      Mr. Dhugga receives two invitations: one to the Mumbai event and the other to the Delhi event.  Mr. Dhugga does not know which of the five MPs, by whose offices he was contacted, put his name on either invitation list – assuming any one of them did so.  Mr. Dhugga does not ask Mr. Grewal to include his name on any guest list – including the lists for the two receptions at Canada House in Delhi.  At no time prior to the Delhi event, is Mr. Dhugga aware that his name is on a guest list for the indoor reception.

[265]      Mr. Dhugga attends the Delhi event, including the indoor reception, with a friend.  Mr. Dhugga testified that,

[266]      While in the lineup for a photograph with the Prime Minister, Mr. Dhugga exchanges business cards with an individual in the hotel industry.[92]  This contact leads to an opportunity for Mr. Dhugga to purchase a property.  Ultimately, Mr. Dhugga chooses not to pursue the opportunity.

[267]      Mr. Yenilmez is 45 years old.  He is not part of the Punjabi-Sikh community in the Brampton area.  He does not live in the Brampton East riding. 

[268]      Mr. Yenilmez first met Mr. Grewal at a Liberal Party event held shortly after Mr. Grewal was elected as an MP.  Mr. Yenilmez has been a member of the Laurier Club for years.  He is a member of the “Leader Circle” – a group of the Laurier Club’s top 15 to 20 donors to the Liberal Party.  Through his involvement with the Laurier Club, Mr. Yenilmez met Liberal Party politicians on many occasions before he came to know Mr. Grewal.

[269]      Together with one of his cousins, Mr. Yenilmez is a co-founder of Zgemi Inc. (“Zgemi”), a construction company.  In March 2017, Mr. Yenilmez and his business partner hired Mr. Grewal to work part-time as in-house counsel for Zgemi.  Mr. Grewal provided Mr. Yenilmez with confirmation from the Ethics Commissioner that Mr. Grewal was permitted to work for Zgemi in that capacity.

[270]      Mr. Yenilmez knew Mr. Grewal socially.  They saw each other at Liberal Party events.  Mr. Yenilmez attended Mr. Grewal’s wedding.

[271]      Mr. Yenilmez is unique amongst the lenders because he is both an India trip lender and an immigration lender.  The immigration assistance upon which the Crown relies was provided before the loan request was made.  I start with a summary of Mr. Yenilmez’ evidence about the immigration assistance and follow with a summary of his evidence about the loan request and the India trip.

[272]      In the summer of 2017, Mr. Yenilmez’ sister and niece wish to travel from Turkey to Canada.  They each apply for a temporary resident visa on two or three occasions; each time their applications are unsuccessful.

[273]      Mr. Yenilmez reaches out to either Mr. Grewal or to someone in the constituency office for help with the relatives’ temporary resident visa applications.  A personal guarantee letter is provided in late July 2017.[93]  Mr. Yenilmez does not recall whether he received the letter from Mr. Grewal or someone in the constituency office. 

[274]      The relatives’ applications, which include the personal guarantee letter from Mr. Grewal, are rejected; this outcome is known before Mr. Grewal approaches Mr. Yenilmez for a loan.

[275]      Mr. Grewal approaches Mr. Yenilmez for a loan in late 2017 or early 2018.  The conversation about the loan is initiated by Mr. Grewal and takes place in Mr. Yenilmez’ office.  Mr. Grewal does not provide any details regarding the reason for the loan.  Mr. Yenilmez asks when he can expect to be repaid.  Mr. Grewal says he will repay the loan in six months, by re-financing a condominium unit in Toronto which he and his wife own.

[276]      On January 26, 2018, Mr. Yenilmez (on behalf of Zgemi[94]) and Mr. Grewal enter into a loan agreement that is reduced to writing.[95]  The agreement identifies the principal amount of the loan ($200,000) and the condominium unit, the latter as a form of security for the loan.  At Mr. Grewal’s insistence, the agreement includes an interest charge of $2,000.

[277]      On February 2, 2018, Mr. Grewal attends at Mr. Yenilmez’ office to pick up a cheque, drawn on a Zgemi bank account, for $200,000.[96]  On February 5, 2018, Mr. Grewal deposits the cheque into a Royal Bank of Canada account.  Immediately prior to that deposit, the balance in the account is $20,825.

[278]      In March 2018, Mr. Yenilmez asks Mr. Grewal about repayment of the loan.  Mr. Grewal replies that he is unable to repay the loan at the time, but he is “working on it”.  The loan is eventually repaid, in two instalments, in the latter half of 2018.  Mr. Yenilmez believes that $70,000 was repaid by wire transfer in September 2018; the final instalment of $130,000 was paid in November 2018.

[279]      Ms. Hayward’s tracing period for the Yenilmez loan is February 5, 2018 to April 12, 2018.  Ms. Hayward’s opinion is that, in those ten weeks, a minimum of $134,235 from the Yenilmez loan was used at the Casino; the maximum amount potentially used at the Casino was $200,000.

[280]      Before turning to the India trip, I address the Crown’s theory with respect to Mr. Yenilmez as an immigration lender.  The immigration assistance upon which the Crown relies with respect to Mr. Yenilmez does not amount to some evidence to support an inference that, in Mr. Grewal’s mind, the assistance would make Mr. Yenilmez more likely to agree to provide a loan.  To draw such an inference requires speculation and conjecture as to whether Mr. Grewal was aware of the assistance. 

[281]      In addition, it is neither reasonable nor logical to infer that, more than six months after Mr. Grewal provided the personal guarantee letter and despite the failed applications, Mr. Grewal would consider the provision of the personal guarantee letter to be of sufficient significance to make Mr. Yenilmez more likely to agree to a loan.

[282]      Approximately one month prior to the start date of the India trip, Mr. Yenilmez learns from reading a newspaper that Prime Minister Trudeau plans to travel to India on an official trip in February 2018.  Mr. Yenilmez wants to go to India “with Mr. Trudeau’s team – delegates” to make business connections and generate business for Zgemi. 

[283]      Approximately one week after learning about the trip, Mr. Yenilmez contacts Mr. Grewal by telephone.  Mr. Yenilmez inquires about how he can be part of the delegation on the trip.  Mr. Grewal tells Mr. Yenilmez to register with C-IBC.  Mr. Yenilmez in turn instructs his assistant to register him for the trip with C-IBC.  Mr. Yenilmez calls Mr. Grewal again – this time to make sure that he is properly registered for the trip through the C-IBC.

[284]      As set out in paras. 245 and 247, above, Mr. Yenilmez’ name is one of the five names submitted by Mr. Grewal to the PMO for inclusion on the guest list for the indoor reception.  Mr. Grewal does not tell Mr. Yenilmez that his name has been placed on this list.

[285]      Mr. Yenilmez travels to India as part of the business delegation.  He attends the Mumbai anchor event on February 20, 2018.  While at that event, Mr. Yenilmez has his photograph taken with the Prime Minister.  Two days later, Mr. Yenilmez attends the Delhi event at Canada House.  Mr. Yenilmez is still not aware that his name was submitted by Mr. Grewal for inclusion on the guest list for the indoor reception. 

[286]      Once Mr. Yenilmez is through the initial security screening and registration/check-in table for the Delhi event, he sees guests walking towards the front of Canada House.  He follows along with that group and enters the residence.

[287]      While inside the residence, Mr. Yenilmez takes a photograph with the High Commissioner; sees and speaks briefly with Mr. Grewal, a Cabinet Minister, and another MP; joins the line for a photograph with the Prime Minister; makes small talk with others in the line; and, after waiting in line for 30 to 45 minutes, has his photograph taken with the Prime Minister.  Mr. Yenilmez then wanders about the interior courtyard for five minutes before exiting the residence and attending the outdoor reception.

[288]      While at the Delhi event, Mr. Yenilmez interacts with business people – some of whom he has met previously and others he has not.  Some of the business people give Mr. Yenilmez their business cards; he gives those individuals his business card in exchange.  In the end, no business materializes for Zgemi from Mr. Yenilmez’ attendance at the Delhi event.

[289]      With the evidence of the two India trip lenders summarized, I consider the Crown’s theory and the inferences relevant to those individuals.

[290]      The second element of the offence of breach of trust requires that the Crown establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged conduct was “in connection with the duties” of Mr. Grewal’s office as an MP. 

[291]      The Crown submits that, as a public official, Mr. Grewal should not confer a benefit upon an individual to whom he is indebted at the time the benefit is conferred.  The Crown submits that Mr. Grewal gave the India trip lenders the benefit of access to an exclusive event at which they would have an opportunity to network, with politicians (including the Prime Minister) and business people, in an effort to further the lenders’ respective business interests.  The Crown emphasizes that only ten days passed between the date on which Mr. Yenilmez lent Mr. Grewal money and the date on which Mr. Grewal submitted Mr. Yenilmez’ name to the PMO. 

[292]      The Crown’s theory is that Mr. Grewal’s submission of the India trip lenders’ names to the PMO, at a time when he was indebted to those individuals, (a) demonstrates partiality towards them (an improper purpose), (b) connects the prior solicitation of funds with the duties and/or use of Mr. Grewal’s office, and (c) falls within the scope of conduct covered by the offence of breach of trust. 

[293]      For the following reasons, I find that the Crown has not established that there is some evidence to support an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to the India trip lenders and the second element of the offence of breach of trust.

[294]      The Crown highlights that each of the charges in the indictment covers a 3.5-year period (from October 2015 to April 2019).  The Crown submits that the solicitation of funds and the submission of names to the PMO are part of a continuing course of conduct within the period covered by the indictment – thus connecting the solicitation of funds with the duties and/or use of Mr. Grewal’s office.  For several reasons, I reject that submission.    

[295]      In support of its submission, the Crown relies on the 2006 decision of the Ontario Court of Justice in R. v. McCague.[97]  In McCague, Trotter J. (as he then was), considered the principle of criminal law that “there must, at some point in time, be an intersection of the act and fault requirements of the criminal offence in question”.[98]  Trotter J. noted that, “The point in time at which the act and fault requirements of an offence coalesce will vary with the nature of the offence and the manner in which the charge is drafted.”[99]

[296]      In McCague, the accused was charged with two counts of fraud.  For each count, the alleged conduct was framed as occurring on a single day – described by Trotter J. as a “static time frame”.[100]  Trotter J. observed that the manner in which the charges were drafted “created serious problems of proof” for the Crown.[101] 

[297]      The charges against McCague arose from his dealing with a couple, the Befrenes, regarding residential renovation work.  McCague met with the Befrenes in April 2004.  At that time, he accepted an $8,000 cheque from them as a deposit towards $24,000 in work.  When he accepted the cheque, McCague told the Befrenes he would start the work several months later.

[298]      McCague met with the Befrenes again in early August 2004 – when the start date for the renovation work was approaching.  The Befrenes paid McCague $10,000 at that time (instead of a second instalment of $8,000, as previously agreed).  The couple paid the higher amount based on McCague’s promise that he would start the work at an earlier date than had originally been agreed upon.  McCague never showed up to do the renovation work.

[299]      McCague was charged with fraud in relation to both the April 2004 cheque ($8,000) and the August 2004 cheque ($10,000).  He was acquitted on the charge related to the April 2004 cheque.  Trotter J. was not satisfied that the Crown had established that it was McCague’s intention, when he received the first cheque, to defraud the couple.[102] 

[300]      Trotter J. said that “Had the time frame for the information included the [April 2004] transaction in a continuing course of conduct, or had [McCague] been charged with theft by conversion of the $8,000, again within the appropriate time frame, [he] might have treated [the] transaction differently.”[103]

[301]      Trotter J. convicted McCague on the second charge, related to the August 2004 cheque, satisfied that, when McCague accepted the $10,000 cheque, he intended to defraud the couple of the money. 

[302]      Regarding Mr. Grewal, the Crown’s theory is that the solicitation of funds – whether in 2017 or 2018 – and the submission of the names of the India trip lenders to the PMO constitute the type of “continuing course of conduct” of which Trotter J. spoke in McCague.  I disagree. 

[303]      Mr. Grewal’s solicitation of funds from the India trip lenders and the submission of their names to the PMO are not analogous to McCague accepting the April 2004 cheque from the Befrenes with the intention of doing the work and, by August 2004, changing his intention in that regard. 

[304]      Approximately seven months passed between the date on which Mr. Grewal obtained a loan from Mr. Dhugga and the date on which Mr. Grewal included Mr. Dhugga’s name on a list submitted to the PMO.  It is noteworthy that Mr. Dhugga’s name was not included in the original list of names submitted by Mr. Grewal to the PMO.

[305]      It was not until at least several days after Mr. Grewal obtained a loan from Mr. Yenilmez that information about the indoor reception at the Delhi event, and the potential to include five names on the guest list, was disseminated by the PMO to MPs. 

[306]      On the evidence, it would be unreasonable to infer that,

[307]      The reliance in the indictment on a 3.5-year period, during which the conduct is alleged to have occurred, does not assist the Crown in satisfying the evidentiary burden it bears to establish that the solicitation of funds is “connected with” the duties and/or use of Mr. Grewal’s office.

[308]      I find that the only reasonable inference available on the evidence is that the solicitation of funds from each of the India trip lenders is a discreet act, separate and apart from the submission of names; the solicitation of funds and the submission of names are not part of a continuing course of conduct on Mr. Grewal’s part.

[309]      Even if it could be said that the solicitation of funds and the submission of names were part of a continuing course of conduct (i.e., connecting the solicitation of funds with the duties and/or use of Mr. Grewal’s office), I find that the Crown has not established that there is some evidence to support a reasonable inference that the submission of names amounts to partial treatment of the India trip lenders and, therefore, improper use of Mr. Grewal’s office within the meaning of the offence of breach of trust.

[310]      Mr. Grewal was not given any criteria to apply when deciding whose names to submit to the PMO.  It was left entirely within the discretion of the MPs, including Mr. Grewal, to compile a list of five names.  The Oxford online dictionary defines “discretion” as “the freedom or power to decide what should be done in a particular situation”.[104]

[311]      The extent to which the MPs were free or had the power to decide whose names to include on their respective lists is evident from the names that were ultimately submitted by the MPs.  The list of names gathered by the PMO from MPs and Cabinet Ministers includes the father and brother of one of the Cabinet Ministers on the trip.[105]  Like that individual, Mr. Grewal included his father’s name on the list of five names submitted to the PMO.

[312]      When responding to Ms. Kattar Miller’s emails, Mr. Grewal was free to apply whatever criteria he chose in deciding which names to submit to the PMO.  Absent any criteria by which to measure qualification for inclusion of a name on the list, there is no evidence to support an inference that Mr. Grewal was partial towards either of the India trip lenders.

[313]      The offence of breach of trust “defies precise definition because of the range of conduct that it is designed to cover”.[106]  At the other end of the spectrum, the offence is not intended to capture “every breach of the appropriate standard of conduct, no matter how minor”.[107]  In the absence of any governing criteria, and with Mr. Grewal having exercised his discretion in a manner consistent with the exercise of discretion by at least one Cabinet Minister, it is difficult to see how the inclusion of the names of the India trip lenders in the submission to the PMO falls within the range of conduct that the offence of breach of trust is intended to cover.   

[314]      The inferences required to support the Crown’s theory on the second element of the offence of breach of trust, as it relates to the India trip lenders, can neither reasonably nor logically be drawn based on a limited weighing of the evidence as a whole.  There is no evidence to support an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to the India trip lenders and the second element of the offence of breach of trust.

[315]      I find that the Crown has not adduced “some evidence of culpability”[108] for the second element of the offence of breach of trust.  I conclude that a reasonable jury properly instructed could not render a verdict of guilty.

[316]       In light of my finding with respect to the second element, it is not necessary for me to consider the third, fourth or fifth elements of the offence of breach of trust.

[317]      Mr. Grewal’s motion for a directed verdict is granted.  He is acquitted of the two charges of breach of trust for which he is before the court.

[318]      I wish to thank all counsel and the court staff for the professionalism with which they approached their respective responsibilities throughout the nine weeks of trial.  I also wish to thank all counsel for the civility with which they approached their work.

[319]      The degree of professionalism and civility demonstrated by all counsel are only two elements of the high quality of advocacy displayed throughout this trial.  I am grateful to counsel for their respective attention to detail and thoroughness.  Those qualities were evident in the written materials filed and oral submissions made throughout the trial, to and including the motion for a directed verdict.