Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Questioning and addressee knowledge

  • Original Research
  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

There are norms for asking questions. Inquirers should not ask questions to which they know the answer. The literature on the norms of asking has focused on such speaker-centered norms. But, as I argue, there are addressee-centered norms as well: inquirers should not ask addressees who fall short of a certain epistemic status. That epistemic status, I argue here, is knowledge.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See Whitcomb (2017) for defense of a speaker-ignorance norm for questioning. Hawthorne (2004, p. 24) also endorses such a norm. As a norm of inquiry more generally, the ignorance norm is defended by Friedman (2017) and van Elswyk and Sapir (2021). See Archer (2018) for critical discussion.

  2. Recent work on the norms of inquiry includes: Falbo (2021), Friedman (2019a), Friedman (2019b), Friedman (2020), McGrath (2021), Millson (2020), Thorstad (2021), van Elswyk and Sapir (2021), Whitcomb (2017), and Woodard (2022).

  3. Though sometimes ‘question’ in ‘ask a question’ refers to a speech act and not to a semantic content, as in ‘ask a rhetorical question’. Rhetorical questions are a kind of speech act, not a kind of semantic content.

  4. Braun (2011) and Groenendijk and Stokhof (2011) make similar distinctions. I won’t be very meticulous in making these terminological distinctions in what follows, with the hope that it will be clear from context what sense of ‘question’ I’m using.

  5. Some theorists, e.g. Sadock (1971), take rhetorical questions to be instances of assertion. (See e.g. Caponigro and Sprouse (2007) for criticism.) But my argument in this section doesn’t depend on whether they are questions or assertions. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.

  6. See e.g. Biezma and Rawlins (2017) and Caponigro and Sprouse (2007).

  7. Though see Levinson (1979) and Wilson and Sperber (2012, ch .10) for arguments against such general accounts of questioning.

  8. See Fogal et al. (2018, ch. 1) for a helpful overview of the debate.

  9. Although it is widely accepted that inquiring attitudes like wondering and curiosity are relations to questions, it is controversial whether these relations are irreducible or ultimately reducible to propositional attitudes in some way. See Haziza (forthcoming) and Friedman (2013) for discussion. I need not take a stance on this issue here.

  10. See e.g. Schlöder (2018) for some of the logical issues.

  11. One might still wonder how AKN would compare to other norms in the literature. I am open to interpreting AKN in a number of different ways, but one I view as plausible is formulated in terms of permission: One may ask addressee A the question Q only if A knows Q, where ‘may’ denotes an epistemic permission, and takes scope only over the antecedent. SIN would then be interpreted in a similar way: One may ask Q only if one does not know Q. This is similar to how the knowledge norm of assertion is often formulated: One may assert p only if one knows p. Thanks to an anonymous referee for asking me to clarify this.

  12. George (2013) and Phillips and George (2018).

  13. See Kelp and Simion (2020), Maitra (2011), and Marsili (2019) for a discussion of the issue of constitutivity and some reasons for skepticism.

  14. This suggestion can be traced back to Jeffreys (1939), who claims that in asking, e.g., “Where is Ann?”, the speaker expresses, among other propositions, that she believes that the addressee knows where Ann is. As a claim about the semantics of questions, this was wrong [see e.g. Hamblin (1958)], but as a claim about the pragmatics of questioning, it is captured by AKN-B.

  15. See DeRose (2002), Weiner (2005), and Williamson (2000) on this distinction.

  16. Second-order variants of ABK and AEK, like AKN-B, are also possible. But they will be ruled out for similar reasons.

  17. It may be observed that “Why would I know where they are?” could be an appropriate reply to the indirect “Do you know where my keys are?”. But such a reply is only be appropriate as criticism of the speaker as asking something whose answer should already be known. In general, if a speaker asks “Is p?”, one may reply “Why would it be the case that p?” to criticize the speaker in this way. All this is compatible with the present argument.

  18. See e.g. Whitcomb (2017) for a similar explanation.

  19. I take “as far as I know, p:” not to entail “I know p”, which I don’t think is controversial.

  20. See Benton (2011), van Elswyk (2021), and van Elswyk and Sapir (2021).

  21. See Benton (2011) and Benton and van Elswyk (2020).

  22. I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this worry and providing the example.

  23. I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this worry.

  24. I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this worry.

  25. It should be added that, although I agree that settling an inquiry requires knowing its answer (see Sect. 5), this is not an assumption I have made in arguing for AKN, and it needs to be assumed if instrumental rationality is to explain the relevant data.

  26. See e.g.  Stanley (2011, p. 42), and see Archer (2018) for relevant discussion. A related, though not identical, view is defended in Lee (forthcoming).

  27. See e.g. Kelp (2014), Kelp (2021), Whitcomb (2010), and van Elswyk and Sapir (2021) for defense. The claim that knowledge is the aim of inquiry is sometimes given in different formulations.

  28. This claim is challenged by Lackey (2007, 2008), appealing to cases of what she calls selfless assertion. I have no space to discuss the issue here, but see Milić (2017), Montminy (2013), and Turri (2014, 2015) for criticism of Lackey’s argument.

  29. See Friedman (2019b) for a defense of DBI. It is endorsed by others, e.g. Millson (2020).

  30. See van Elswyk and Sapir (2021) for a defense of the latter interpretation.

  31. See e.g. Kvanvig (2003) and Lynch (2005).

  32. See Archer (2021), Falbo (forthcoming) and Woodard (2022).

  33. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this point.

  34. Relatedly, one may wonder what the present account of questioning has to say about the cases that motivate an improvement account of the aim of inquiry. One case is offered by Archer (2021), where an economist (call her Ann) conducts an inquiry into whether a policy would yield certain results, even though she knows the available information is insufficient for knowing the answer. Ann nevertheless examines the evidence and arrives at an informed opinion, and thus a better epistemic position, on the matter. (See Falbo (forthcoming) for a related case.) I believe that thinking about what questioning would look like in such a case can shed some light on it. Suppose Ann has a twin, Beth, also an economist. Beth has the exact same information as Ann, and has already conducted the same inquiry. If Ann could ask Beth a question, instead of conducting her own inquiry, what should she ask? In my view, she shouldn’t ask “Will the policy yield these results?”, to which she knows Beth doesn’t know the answer, but rather something like “How likely is the policy to yield these results?”, to which Beth does know the answer. If so, then it is more plausible that the latter is really the question Ann is inquiring into, and to which she is aiming to know the answer. Thanks to an anonymous referee for calling my attention to such cases.

References

  • Åqvist, L. (1975). A new approach to the logical theory of interrogatives: Analysis and formalization. Tbl Verlag G. Narr.

  • Archer, A. (2018). Wondering about what you know. Analysis, 78(4), 596–604.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Archer, A. (2021). The aim of inquiry. Disputatio, 13(61), 95–119.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bach, K., & Harnish, R. M. (1979). Linguistic communication and speech acts. MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bell, M. (1975). Questioning. The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), 25(100), 193–212.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benton, M. A. (2011). Two more for the knowledge account of assertion. Analysis, 71(4), 684–687.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benton, M. A., & van Elswyk, P. (2020). Hedged assertion. In S. Goldberg (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of assertion (pp. 245–263). Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Biezma, M., & Rawlins, K. (2017). Rhetorical questions: Severing asking from questioning. Semantics and Linguistic Theory, 27, 302–322.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Braun, D. (2011). Implicating questions. Mind and Language, 26(5), 574–595.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Caponigro, I., & Sprouse, J. (2007). Rhetorical questions as questions. Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung, 11, 121–133.

    Google Scholar 

  • DeRose, K. (2002). Assertion, knowledge, and context. Philosophical Review, 111(2), 167–203.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Falbo, A. (2021). Inquiry and confirmation. Analysis, 81(4), 622–631.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Falbo, A. (Forthcoming). Inquiring minds want to improve. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1–15.

  • Fogal, D., Harris, D. W., & Moss, M. (Eds.) (2018). New work on speech acts. Oxford University Press.

  • Friedman, J. (2013). Question-directed attitudes. Philosophical Perspectives, 27(1), 145–174.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, J. (2017). Why suspend judging? No\(\hat{u}\)s,51(2), 302–326.

  • Friedman, J. (2019). Checking again. Philosophical Issues, 29(1), 84–96.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, J. (2019). Inquiry and belief. No\(\hat{u}\)s,53(2), 296–315.

  • Friedman, J. (2020). The epistemic and the zetetic. Philosophical Review, 129(4), 501–536.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • George, B. R. (2013). Knowing-‘wh’, mention-some readings, and non-reducibility. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2(2), 166–177.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Groenendijk, J., & Stokhof, M. (2011). Questions. In J. van Benthem & A. ter Meulen (Eds.), Handbook of logic and language (2nd ed., pp. 1059–1131). London: Elsevier.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Hamblin, C. L. (1958). Questions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 36(3).

  • Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and lotteries. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haziza, E. (Forthcoming). Curious to know. Episteme, 1–15.

  • Jeffreys, H. (1939). Theory of probability. Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelp, C. (2014). Two for the knowledge goal of inquiry. American Philosophical Quarterly, 51(3), 227–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelp, C. (2021). Theory of inquiry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103(2), 359–384.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kelp, C., & Simion, M. (2020). The C account of assertion: a negative result. Synthese, 197(1), 125–137.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kvanvig, J. L. (2003). The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding. Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lackey, J. (2007). Norms of assertion. No\(\hat{u}\)s,41(4), 594–626.

  • Lackey, J. (2008). Learning from words: Testimony as a source of knowledge. Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lee, W. (Forthcoming). Belief and settledness. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

  • Levinson, S. C. (1979). Activity types and language. Linguistics, 17(5), 365–400.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lynch, M. P. (2005). True to life: Why truth matters. MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maitra, I. (2011). Assertion, norms, and games. In J. Brown & H. Cappelen (Eds.), Assertion: New philosophical essays (pp. 277–296). Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Marsili, N. (2019). The norm of assertion: A ‘constitutive’ rule? Inquiry, 1–22.

  • McGrath, M. (2021). Epistemic norms for waiting. Philosophical Topics, 49(2), 173–201.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Milić, I. (2017). Against selfless assertions. Philosophical Studies, 174(9), 2277–2295.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Millson, J. A. (2020). Seeking confirmation: A puzzle for norms of inquiry. Analysis, 80(4), 683–693.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Montminy, M. (2013). The single norm of assertion. Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy, 35–52.

  • Phillips, J., & George, B. R. (2018). Knowledge wh and false beliefs: Experimental investigations. Journal of Semantics, 35(3), 467–494.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sadock, J. M. (1971). Queclaratives. In Papers from the Seventh Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, 7, 223–232.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schlöder, J. J. (2018). The logic of the knowledge norm of assertion. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 7(1), 49–57.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language (Vol. 626). Cambridge University Press.

  • Stanley, J. (2011). Know how. Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Thorstad, D. (2021). Inquiry and the epistemic. Philosophical Studies.

  • Turri, J. (2014). You Gotta Believe. In C. Littlejohn & J. Turri (Eds.), Epistemic norms: New essays on action, belief and assertion (pp. 193–199). Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J. (2015). Selfless assertions: Some empirical evidence. Synthese, 192(4), 1221–1233.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van Elswyk, P. (2021). Representing knowledge. The Philosophical Review, 130(1), 97–143.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van Elswyk, P., & Sapir, Y. (2021). Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry. Synthese, 199(3), 5837–5859.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weiner, M. (2005). Must we know what we say? The Philosophical Review, 114(2), 227–251.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Whitcomb, D. (2010). Curiosity was framed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(3), 664–687.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Whitcomb, D. (2017). One kind of asking. The Philosophical Quarterly, 67(266), 148–168.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, D., & Sperber, D. (2012). Meaning and relevance. Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Woodard, E. (2022). The ignorance norm and paradoxical assertions. Philosophical Topics, 49(2), 321–322.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Nate Charlow, David Barnett, Benj Hellie, Jennifer Nagel, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussion.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, 170 St George St, Toronto, ON, M5R 2M8, Canada

    Eliran Haziza

Authors
  1. Eliran Haziza
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Eliran Haziza.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

The author has no conflicts of interest to declare that are relevant to the content of this article.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Haziza, E. Questioning and addressee knowledge. Synthese 201, 114 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04113-6

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04113-6

Keywords

Search

Navigation