Federal electoral districts redistribution 2022

Part III – Public consultation

The Proposal generated a great deal of response. The Commission received over 300 comments and submissions, and 161 individuals, including 34 members of Parliament (MPs), 16 wardens and 41 municipal officials, appeared before the Commission at various public hearings.

The Commission held 20 public consultation meetings between September 6 and October 13, 2022, including 17 in-person sessions in Gaspé, Matane, Rimouski, Rivière-du-Loup, Montréal (2 days), Saguenay, Lévis, the City of Québec, Saint-Jérôme, Sainte-Adèle, Gatineau, Val-d'Or, Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, Longueuil, Sherbrooke and Thetford-Mines, as well as three virtual sessions.

The public hearings were planned to cover as much territory as possible and to hear the views of as many people as possible, either in person or virtually.

The Commission carefully prepared every consultation meeting. All participants (including registered observers) were advised in advance of the order in which they would each be asked to speak, and the time allotted for their individual presentations.

At the beginning of each meeting, the Commission reminded the participants and observers of its complete independence from government, the nature of its mandate and the importance of the public consultation process.

All Commission members were impressed by the relevance and quality of the resolutions, comments and submissions received and of the presentations made during the public meetings. All interactions and discussions took place in a spirit of mutual respect and undeniably informed and clarified the thinking of the Commission's members.

Comments covered electoral district boundaries as well as district names. In the interest of avoiding repetition, the comments concerning each of the 10 territorial units are summarized in the 'Analysis and decisions' part of this report, followed by the Commission's decisions, with supporting reasons.

The following is a general overview of the comments received by the Commission

As regards district boundaries, several major recurring themes emerged from comments, such as the need for effective representation, preservation of the political weight of the regions in relation to urban centres and respect for communities of interest. As a general comment, it can be said that people do not welcome change when it comes to adjusting the electoral map, and preservation of the status quo is often high on their list of demands. Another key concern expressed by all elected officials (MPs, mayors, wardens, etc.) and community stakeholders who appeared before the Commission was maintenance of services to constituents. It should also be noted that in their comments the vast majority of participants specifically acknowledged the complexity of the Commission's task.

Most of the proposed name changes were aimed at ensuring that the federal electoral map better reflect the presence of all the Indigenous peoples in Quebec, and in particular, each of the 10 First Nations and the Inuit Nation.

On this topic, the response was generally favourable

However, reactions tended to be more negative in instances where the Commission proposed lengthening specific electoral district names by adding one (or two) Indigenous references. Many commentators were less in favour of adding such references if it meant eliminating one or more descriptors in a current district name. Others queried the need to add an Indigenous reference when the name of the riding already contains or appears to contain such a reference.

The Commission extends its warmest thanks to the various Indigenous communities that generously responded to its invitation to comment on proposed words or names (of individuals or places) for inclusion in electoral district names. The Commission notes, as it did in its Proposal, that the addition of an Indigenous reference to a particular electoral district name should not be perceived or interpreted as the Commission taking a position on any claim to the territory of that electoral district or any other territory whatsoever by the Indigenous nation to which the reference relates or by any other Indigenous nation.

Lastly, many constituents were critical about the length of electoral district names in Quebec. They urged the Commission to make a special effort to shorten the names and even offered suggestions. The Commission noted that concern and is now proposing several shorter names, some of which are based on those suggestions. The Commission is grateful for their input.

Before moving to the next section, the Commission believes it is necessary to return to the following four issues discussed throughout the public consultation: the concept of "community of interest," the concept of "effective representation," the target deviation of 10% above or below the electoral quota, and the addition of Indigenous references to certain electoral district names.

The concept of "community of interest" is not defined in the Act. However, the definition given by the Electoral Knowledge Network (in which Elections Canada is a contributing partner) illustrates the scope of the situations covered by the concept:

A 'community of interest' is rarely defined by statute, but it is generally thought of as a group of individuals united by shared interests or values. These shared interests may be the result of a common history or culture, a common ethnic background, or a variety of other ties that create a community of voters with distinct interests.1

People are understandably concerned about their corner of the country losing political weight in the House of Commons. Confronted with a relative decline in population, many participants urged the Commission to disregard the numerical criterion of the electoral quota ("one person, one vote") in favour of the more subjective criteria of effective representation, community of interest and regional community of identity.

Many participants therefore asked the Commission to respect existing physical boundaries established for administrative, political or economic purposes (for example, regional county municipalities (RCMs), cities and municipalities, as well as their boroughs and sometimes even their local electoral districts, regional consultation committees, identity-based groups, intermunicipal agreements on the sharing of things such as sports equipment, garbage collection, basin organizations... the list goes on). These many defined areas can readily constitute many identity bases associated with the concept of "community of interest," despite the fact that the initial rationale for creating them may have been purely administrative or economic.

The Commission does not question these initiatives. However, it wishes to emphasize that its mandate is to review the electoral map in accordance with the principles set out in the Act and therefore, full respect for the boundaries of all such "communities of interest" is simply not possible.

The Commission reiterates what commissions that preceded have said, namely that defending the status quo is not part of its mandate. Quite the contrary, especially since the rejection of change by some means that the inevitable upheavals resulting from the application of the Act every 10 years will necessarily have to be borne by the rest of the population, which understandably would be an inequitable outcome.

In short, the concept of community of interest (and to a lesser extent community of identity, historical development and manageable district size) are broad terms when seeking an exemption, if not overly broad. The risk is that derogations will become the rule, and the fundamental principle governing the drawing of an electoral map, namely equality of electoral weight, will be relegated to oblivion—which is not permissible under the current legislative framework.

The second major issue is the concept of "effective representation" put forward in the Carter decision2 and frequently invoked to justify departing from the rule governing redistribution set forth in paragraph 15(1)(a) of the Act, which is that "the population of each electoral district [...] shall, as close as reasonably possible, correspond to the electoral quota."

In considering the scope of the right to vote conferred by section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Supreme Court held in a majority decision, per McLachlin J. (before she became Chief Justice) that "the purpose of the right to vote enshrined in s. 3 of the Charter is not equality of voting power per se, but the right to 'effective representation'" (p. 183). However, the Supreme Court makes it clear that the "primary" requirement for effective representation is still relative parity of voting power (p. 183), adding later that "[p]arity of voting power, though of prime importance, is not the only factor to be taken into account" (p. 184). "It emerges therefore that deviations from absolute voter parity may be justified on the grounds of practical impossibility or the provision of more effective representation. Beyond this, the dilution of one citizen's vote as compared with another should not be countenanced" (p. 185).

In short, although parity is not the sole criterion, it continues to be the most important one.

The third issue concerns the target of 10% deviation from the electoral quota. Several commentators have queried the advisability, if not the validity, of such a target referred to in the Proposal whereas the Act refers to a maximum deviation of 25% (subsection 15(2)).

It is appropriate at this juncture to briefly address this issue to dispel any possible misunderstanding

The Act requires commissions to target 0% deviation, not 25% or 10%, the requirement being that "the population of each electoral district [...] shall, as close as reasonably possible, correspond to the electoral quota" (paragraph 15(1)(a)), with the possibility of departing from that requirement "in any case where the commission considers it necessary or desirable to depart therefrom" in light of any of the factors set forth in subparagraphs 15(1)(b)(i) and (ii). "Extraordinary circumstances" are necessary if the Commission wishes to exceed the 25% threshold imposed by the Act.

The distance between -25% and 25% is huge. An electoral district with a population 25% above the electoral quota has a population that is 67% higher than a district with a population 25% below the electoral quota.

And as the variance moves further from zero to 25% or -25%, the more difficult it becomes to justify, and the less "desirable" it is, given the paramount importance of the principle of equality of voting power, even in a context where the purpose of the right to vote under the Charter is not equality of voting power per se, but the right to "effective representation."

Hence, like the two commissions that preceded it, this Commission used a target of 10% as a concrete (in concreto) measure of its tolerance for deviation, a target determined on the basis of the principle of parity affirmed in subsection 15(1) of the Act coupled with the possibility of departing from that principle provided in subsection 15(2). The use of such a target deviation is entirely appropriate. Derogations are entirely at the discretion of a commission, and they may depart from the principle of equality of voting power where the commission considers it necessary or desirable to depart therefrom. Hence the importance for a commission to frame the exercise of its discretion, if only to help it demonstrate consistency in its exercise.

A 10% target deviation is therefore a useful working tool

Finally, some people are under the misapprehension that the Commission's mandate is to ensure that the population of each electoral district does not deviate from the electoral quota by more than or less than 25%. The mandate of all commissions is to ensure that the population of each electoral district is within the electoral quota as close as reasonably possible (subsection 15(1)), with the understanding that this requirement may be departed from where the Commission considers it necessary or desirable, as long as doing so does not exceed a positive or negative 25% deviation, except in "circumstances viewed by the commission as being extraordinary."

The fourth issue is the addition of Indigenous references to certain electoral district names. The Commission wanted the federal electoral map, for the first time, to reflect the presence of all the recognized Indigenous communities in Quebec, specifically the 10 First Nations and the Inuit Nation.

In the spirit of reconciliation sought by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Commission's initiative was approved by most participants and presenters at the public hearings, with a few exceptions.

Some participants and presenters raised the difficulty of pronouncing or memorizing some of the proposed words and personal and place names as a reason for not adding them to the name of an electoral district. In the Commission's view, any such difficulty is not a major obstacle. The references are there to highlight the presence of Indigenous people in the territory. They were proposed because the Commission believes that Indigenous people will relate to them. It is true that they are often quite different from the words and personal and place names that the non-Indigenous population is used to. It would have been surprising had it been otherwise. However, any difficulty in pronunciation or memorization should not be exaggerated and, more importantly, it is worth making the effort.

The Commission is still firmly convinced that an electoral map that acknowledges each of the 11 recognized Indigenous nations in Quebec is an eloquent and powerful message of reconciliation and vivre-ensemble.

It was maintained by some that the small number of Indigenous people in a particular community did not justify the inclusion of an Indigenous reference in the electoral district name. The Commission rejects this argument. The objective is for the electoral map to reflect the presence of all the recognized Indigenous nations in Quebec. The number of members of an Indigenous community is therefore not, from this perspective, a decisive factor.

Footnotes

1 The Electoral Knowledge Network. Defining Communities of Interest. https://aceproject.org/main/english/bd/bdb05c.htm

2 Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] 2SCR 158