[1]               This Court has developed a new awareness and understanding of a category of vexatious litigant. As we shall see, while there is often a lack of homogeneity, and some individuals or groups have no name or special identity, they (by their own admission or by descriptions given by others) often fall into the following descriptions: Detaxers; Freemen or Freemen-on-the-Land; Sovereign Men or Sovereign Citizens; Church of the Ecumenical Redemption International (CERI); Moorish Law; and other labels - there is no closed list. In the absence of a better moniker, I have collectively labelled them as Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument litigants [“OPCA litigants”], to functionally define them collectively for what they literally are. These persons employ a collection of techniques and arguments promoted and sold by ‘gurus’ (as hereafter defined) to disrupt court operations and to attempt to frustrate the legal rights of governments, corporations, and individuals.

[2]               Over a decade of reported cases have proven that the individual concepts advanced by OPCA litigants are invalid. What remains is to categorize these schemes and concepts, identify global defects to simplify future response to variations of identified and invalid OPCA themes, and develop court procedures and sanctions for persons who adopt and advance these vexatious litigation strategies.

[3]               One participant in this matter, the Respondent Dennis Larry Meads, appears to be a sophisticated and educated person, but is also an OPCA litigant. One of the purposes of these Reasons is, through this litigant, to uncover, expose, collate, and publish the tactics employed by the OPCA community, as a part of a process to eradicate the growing abuse that these litigants direct towards the justice and legal system we otherwise enjoy in Alberta and across Canada. I will respond on a point-by-point basis to the broad spectrum of OPCA schemes, concepts, and arguments advanced in this action by Mr. Meads.

[4]               OPCA litigants do not express any stereotypic beliefs other than a general rejection of court and state authority; nor do they fall into any common social or professional association. Arguments and claims of this nature emerge in all kinds of legal proceedings and all levels of Courts and tribunals. This group is unified by:

[5]               The Meads case illustrates many characteristic features of OPCA materials, in court conduct, and litigation strategies. These Reasons will, therefore, explain my June 8, 2012 decision and provide analysis and reasoning that is available for reference and application to other similar proceedings.

[6]               Naturally, my conclusions are important for these parties. However, they also are intended to assist others, who have been taken in/duped by gurus, to realize that these practices are entirely ineffective; to empower opposing parties and their counsel to take action; and as a warning to gurus that the Court will not tolerate their misconduct.

[7]               As a preliminary note, I will throughout these Reasons refer to persons by their ‘normal’ names, except to illustrate various OPCA motifs and concepts. OPCA litigants frequently adopt unusual variations on personal names, for example adding irrelevant punctuation, or using unusual capital and lower case character combinations. While OPCA litigants and their gurus put special significance on these alternative nomenclature forms, these are ineffectual in law and are meaningless paper masks. Therefore, in these Reasons, I will omit spurious name forms, titles, punctuation and the like.

[8]               These Reasons relate to materials and arguments advanced by Dennis Larry Meads [“Mr. Meads”] in and after a hearing on June 8, 2012 for appointment of a case management justice, as authorized by Alberta Rules of Court, Alta. Reg. 124/2010, s. 4.11(c) [the “Rules”, or individually a “Rule”]. The application was brought by Crystal Lynne Meads [“Ms. Meads”] in a divorce and matrimonial property action against Mr. Meads initiated on January 11, 2011.

[9]               I granted that application and appointed myself as the Case Management Justice. These Reasons follow from that hearing and deal with materials that have been filed or submitted by Mr. Meads.

[10]           Mr. and Ms. Meads were married in 1980. They had six children. The Meads separated in 2010. At present two children are potential dependants. On March 18, 2011, Veit J. ordered interim monthly child and spousal support payments from Mr. Meads. My understanding is that to date Mr. Meads has generally honoured that obligation.

[11]           Review of the divorce file discloses a number of unusual documents filed by Mr. Meads:

[12]           Mr. Meads and Ms. Reeves appeared before me on June 8, 2012. Ms. Reeves explained that Mr. Meads had generally conformed to the terms of Justice Veit’s March 18, 2011 Order, but that he had not disclosed financial records to calculate interim child and spousal support amounts. She also indicated that she was experiencing problems in moving this litigation forward as a consequence of unorthodox documentation from Mr. Meads. She had difficulty communicating with Mr. Meads, and asked the Court to appoint a case management justice to facilitate that process.

[13]           Mr. Meads commenced his submissions by noting that he was not Dennis Meads, the “corporate identity”, but was present as Dennis Larry Meads, “a flesh and blood man”. He said this Court is “a house of law.”

[14]           I explained the nature of case management and asked as to his position on that. He did not object, but wanted to talk about his own Motion, the April 27 documents, rather than Ms. Reeves’ point of interest.

[15]           Mr. Meads launched into an explanation of a number of things. He said that when he was born, he was given a register of birth, “a corporate identity”, bonded and registered in the Bank of Canada and in the state stock exchange, and that registration had an imputed income.

[16]           When Mr. Meads married Ms. Meads, he said he was told he required a marriage license to avoid commission of incest, but he has subsequently learned, from Black’s Law Dictionary, that a licence is an authorization to do something that is otherwise illegal. But, Mr. Meads said, he is only subject to God’s Law, the “Maximus of Law”, and the Bible indicates that adultery is the sole basis to dissolve a marriage. In this case, he alleged that Ms. Meads had committed adultery with his brother-in-law, and that she had broken the contract of marriage by that adultery - that is God’s law - the remainder is man’s law, statute law: which does not affect or apply to Mr. Meads.

[17]           Mr. Meads rejected the assertion that he had a legal obligation to pay spousal and child support, though he did so on his own accord. Further, he had identified to Ms. Meads and her lawyer (and myself) a method to access a huge amount of money that was attached to his “corporate identity” via his birth certificate. That could pay his child and spousal support obligations. Mr. Meads said he had provided the documentation to pursue that avenue, but Ms. Meads and her lawyers had not done so.

[18]           Mr. Meads asserted that he has done nothing wrong; he has committed no criminal offence; nothing that Ms. Meads’ lawyers have sought is mandatory; Ms. Meads has her 50% share of the marriage corporate entity; and his ongoing payments to Ms. Meads have purchased a new home for her and her partner, an RCMP officer.

[19]           Mr. Meads, at this point and later, provided his position concerning potential issues in dispute. Ms. Meads was concerned that a part of his reported income were RRSP withdrawals. Mr. Meads explained that amount was a living allowance he received for travelling to work away from home, a legitimate expense that is not a part of personal income for support calculations. Mr. Meads also alleged that his wife had received training as a laboratory technician, but had not pursued that career as she did not like the work.

[20]           Mr. Meads also explained why he discontinued child support payments after one of his children had her 18^th birthday. He explained that several of his older children have attended and been successful in post-secondary education, but that he and his wife believed that a child should pay for their own education. He saw no reason to treat this now adult child differently. That said, the Meads had assisted their older children during their studies, when necessary, and Mr. Meads reaffirmed he would do the same for the daughter who was now about to enter post-secondary education.

[21]           In his opinion, Ms. Meads had already received a fair share of the matrimonial property. She had taken the bulk of his silver bullion, and $250,000.00 from a joint bank account.

[22]           Mr. Meads then said:

[23]           After hearing submissions from the parties I concluded that case management would be appropriate in this instance, and appointed myself to that task. I noted that this Court will apply the laws of Canada, and explained to Mr. Meads the basic aspects of child and spousal support, matrimonial property division, and the mutual and reciprocal obligations for disclosure in family law proceedings, including disclosure that he may seek from Ms. Meads.

[24]           Mr. Meads then asked me “about the sign above my head”, which is the Royal Coat of Arms of Canada, and declared:

[25]           He complained that he had asked Ms. Reeves to provide her bond and license to practice law, but had not received that, and continued:

[26]           Mr. Meads stated that his birth certificate has an associated bond with large amounts of money that could easily discharge in full the claims advanced by Ms. Meads. He said this Court could order that payment. He then attempted to provide me with an envelope, presumably containing documents. Mr. Meads said the contents of the envelope had been “filed internationally”: a UCC filing, a Canadian filing, a commercial security agreement, an identity bond, “actual and constructive notices”, hold harmless and identity agreements, non-negotiable security agreements, an affidavit of his status, a copyright and trade-mark of his name contract, and definitions of the words used in those documents. “UCC” means the “Uniform Commercial Code”, which is U.S. commercial legislation.

[27]           I refused the envelope, and noted that if the envelope was abandoned then I would put those materials in the garbage. I reassured Mr. Meads that I will apply the laws of Alberta and Canada, and that while he is in Court, he will follow the Court’s rules. Mr. Meads’ reply was that was “unacceptable”, and he claimed that the “UCC” is “universal law”.

[28]           It appeared to me that it would be possible to sever the divorce and have that proceed, but there remained issues to address, specifically spousal and child support, and division of matrimonial property. It is generally my personal practice not to sever while such collateral, but important, matters remain unresolved. I asked Ms. Reeves to explain what disclosure she required, which amounted to 2010 and 2011 tax returns, certain employment pay and compensation information, as well as information in relation to Mr. Meads’ investments, including the precious metals he personally owns.

[29]           Mr. Meads explained he has yet to file his 2010 and 2011 income tax returns, and he did acknowledged that was a task he needed to address. He promised to provide that information by September 1, 2012.

[30]           After informing Mr. Meads about the Court’s contempt authority, I reassured him that I want to assist him and Ms. Meads to move forward, separate their affairs, and allow each to live on their own. There were still issues to explore, but that I would assist. Mr. Meads responded in this manner:

[31]           He asserted he was willing to go to jail, but as he is “flesh and blood” he is free from the “mumbo jumbo that is law”. Mr. Meads alleged that an emergency protection order to which he is subject was the result of a trap, and his wife had been coached by the RCMP to spring that trap. He rejected the system into which he is pushed, and indicated that my statements are directed to a “corporate entity” created by the government.

[32]           I reassured Mr. Meads that I did not want to put him into jail, but would do so if necessary. His recourse to my decisions is an appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal. Conversely, Mr. Meads could apply and the Court would order disclosure from Ms. Meads to learn the fate of the $250,000.00 and silver bullion that he alleges Ms. Meads possesses.

[33]           This led to a final statement by Mr. Meads. He asserted the Bible is the “Maximus of Law” and is the binding basis of all law, and said:

[34]           Mr. Meads then left the courtroom before the completion of the hearing. He abandoned the envelope he had attempted to provide to me. The envelope was put in the trash by the Clerk.

[35]           My “Conditions and Guidelines of Case Management” [“Conditions and Guidelines”] were sent to Mr. Meads on June 13, 2012. Part of those instructions was that in these proceedings Mr. Meads was not to correspond with the Court, except to either:

[36]           Though I will later return to this hearing at various points in these Reasons, I will now briefly outline my understanding of the meaning of certain of Mr. Meads’ actions and statements:

[37]           On June 19 and 21, 2012 the Court received two effectively identical sets of documents sent by Mr. Meads. One was addressed to me, the second to the Chief Court Clerk. These were not filed with the Court.

[38]           These documents generally match Mr. Meads’ verbal description of the abandoned envelope’s contents. The June 19 and 21 materials were returned to Mr. Meads as they do not represent an application for leave, supported by a draft application and supporting affidavit(s), as required by my Conditions and Guidelines for Case Management. Further, they have no application known to law. However, copies were retained.

[39]           The first document is a letter with multicoloured text (that facet I do not reproduce). It is addressed in this manner:

[40]           Summarizing this document, it thanks me for accepting appointment as “FIDUCIARY-TRUSTEE-LIABLE” on June 8, 2012. It then appoints me:

[41]           The letter then instructs, “under the guidance and direction with the Almighty God Jehovah watching over us through His Son and Reigning King Jesus Christ”, that I use the attached documents to do the following:

[42]           The remaining documents are:

[43]           From a review of these documents, it appears that Mr. Meads is purporting to split himself into two aspects. One gets his property and benefits, the other his debts and liabilities. The ‘Mr. Meads with liabilities’ has entirely indemnified the ‘Mr. Meads with property’. He also appears to instruct me and the Bank of Canada to use a secret bank account, with the same number as his social insurance number or birth certificate, to pay all his child and spousal support obligations, and provide him $100 billion in precious metals. Mr. Meads has also purported to create various contractual obligations for those who might interact with him, or who write or speak his name.

[44]           This is, of course, nonsense. As I have noted to Mr. Meads, these materials have no force or meaning in law, other than they indicate an intention on his part to evade his lawful obligations and the authority of the Court and government. He is an OPCA litigant. That has legal consequences for him, which these Reasons will explain.

[45]           These Reasons have a number of purposes. The requests of both Mr. and Ms. Meads are best met by a broad and comprehensive response. The scope and variety of Mr. Meads’ materials and submissions touches on many related issues.

[46]           Its context is also important. These Reasons sets the stage for an ongoing procedure - case management of this file - and respond to a collection of issues that have emerged immediately at the beginning that process. If not fully addressed, I believe the OPCA aspect of this litigation will hamper successful resolution of Mr. and Ms. Meads’ divorce.

[47]           Counsel for Ms. Meads, Ms. Reeves, sought case management because she cannot meaningfully communicate with Mr. Meads. She explained she had attempted to engage in mundane procedural steps, such as requests for disclosure, and instead received complex and cryptic documents, demands, and threats. She turned to the Court for hands-on management because she does not otherwise have an effective mechanism to deal with Mr. Meads, and his OPCA strategies.

[48]           These Reasons are intended to assist her, explain what she faces, and illustrate how this and other Courts have responded to litigants who adopt and advance OPCA concepts and strategies. I cast these Reasons broadly to help her both understand what she has already encountered, but also to deal with developments in the ongoing litigation and case management processes.

[49]           These Reasons are also a response to Mr. Meads. He clearly plans to frame his entire divorce action in an OPCA context. He arrived in court with that intention. That was the only ‘issue’ on which he wanted to respond. Since the June 8 hearing I have seen no evidence that Mr. Meads intends to abandon his strategies to defeat Court authority and his child and spousal support obligations.

[50]           I was explicit on June 8 that I considered Mr. Meads’ OPCA submissions and claims irrelevant, yet he has persisted. At that hearing he announced that my decision was “unacceptable”, and has subsequently acted in defiance of my explicit instructions that he only communicate with the Court to propose an application or to request a case management conference. He said he would not voluntarily put himself under the Court’s authority, denied the Court had any lawful hold over him, and left.

[51]           Mr. Meads did not accept the result of the June 8 hearing, and proceeded to send additional documentation to the Court and myself. His intention to employ OPCA concepts and defy my instructions is very clear in his June 19 and 21 cover letters. He demands that I act on his behalf, using highly unusual and mandatory language.

[52]           These Reasons are not merely a response to Mr. Meads’ in-court misconduct but also a global response to the entire litigation strategy he has underway. There are no signs he has decided to back down and adopt a more reasonable approach. From the file record and his documents, he has been on this path for over a year and a half. I intend these Reasons to clearly identify for him why it is time to change his approach.

[53]           There is a third reason for a broad-based decision and analysis. It so happens that Mr. Meads has provided a remarkable and well developed assortment of OPCA documents, concepts, materials, and strategies. These materials also illustrate particular idiosyncrasies that this and other Courts have identified as associated with the OPCA community and OPCA litigation. Phrased differently, Mr. Meads’ materials and approach provide an ideal type specimen for examination and commentary, which should be instructive to other OPCA litigants who have been taken in by these ideas, opposing parties and their counsel, as well as gurus.

[54]           Mr. Meads’ submissions also make an excellent subject for a global review of the law concerning OPCA, the OPCA community and its gurus, and how the court, lawyers, and litigants should respond to these vexatious practices and the persons who advance and advocate these techniques and ideas. In this sense, the present case management allows the litigation between Mr. and Ms. Meads to explore the OPCA community and its concepts, for the benefit of this and other Canadian Courts, and litigants appearing before the courts.

[55]           I will use Mr. Meads’ materials and arguments to illustrate many points in this review. Those materials will be supplemented from several sources. First, I review judgments from this and other Courts that report on OPCA strategies and court responses to OPCA litigants.

[56]           Second, this Court and its justices have been involved in a large number of court proceedings that include OPCA elements, deployed by a spectrum of OPCA litigants. As the senior administrative judicial official of the Court of Queen’s Bench in Edmonton, I am usually made aware of this litigation. Our Court’s experience has been that OPCA-related litigation involves particular security and court efficiency issues, which fall within my purview. Thus, I will, in certain instances in my review and analysis, reference unreported litigation before justices of this Court that has come to my attention.

[57]           Last, I am frequently the direct recipient of documents sent by OPCA litigants. This may be because I am the senior administrative justice of this Court in Edmonton. These documents frequently purport to ‘bind’ or ‘notify’ me of various OPCA schemes and obligations. I review this correspondence as a facet of my administrative judicial duties. Though no doubt unintentional, these materials are a useful and direct way to investigate certain OPCA schemes and strategies, and provide a plethora of characteristic OPCA litigation ‘fingerprints’.

[58]           Mr. Meads does not face any sanction or other negative consequence flowing from these Reasons. To date, I have not accepted any of his materials or submissions and he is aware of that. These Reasons do not put him at greater risk for his prior activities. However, to be clear, my decision to direct disclosure does anticipate sanctions for non-compliance, that should be of no surprise to Mr. Meads.

[59]           In fact, Mr. Meads can only benefit from a comprehensive response by this Court. Through these Reasons, Mr. Meads is now on notice of how Canadian courts have responded to OPCA litigation and litigants. The more thorough my explanation of that, the better.

[60]           The remainder of these Reasons address aspects of the OPCA phenomenon, and the courts’ responses, closing with the application of these Reasons to the Meads litigation. There are four main parts to these Reasons:

[61]           This part of the Reasons is a detailed review of the OPCA community, its membership, organization, and known history. It sets out the Court’s understanding of persons who affiliate with OPCA concepts, what traits they do and do not share, and how they organize themselves.

[62]           This community has “guru” leader, and follower / customer, cohorts. Groups of persons who have similar beliefs join together into “movements”. Known gurus and movements are identified and described.

[63]           The documentary material and in-court conduct of OPCA litigants involves very unusual and stereotypic motifs. The second part of these Reasons identifies these ‘fingerprints’ that characterize OPCA activities. The problematic character of OPCA litigation and litigants may warrant special court procedures; some possibilities are surveyed.

[64]           This part of the Reasons surveys existing caselaw that reports and rejects OPCA strategies and concepts. Those strategies and concepts are grouped by their shared themes and mechanisms. The theoretical basis and operation of certain more elaborate OPCA schemes are examined in detail.

[65]           No Canadian court has accepted an OPCA concept or approach as valid. This part of the decision identifies a common basis to reject these ideas as a category: they directly attack the inherent jurisdiction of Canadian courts. That fact is also a basis for why OPCA schemes are inherently vexatious, and provide evidence that may potentially lead to orders for contempt of court. Remedies for OPCA litigation and litigation strategies are reviewed.

[66]           There is no place in Canadian courts for anyone who advances OPCA concepts. The last part of these Reasons suggests how judges, lawyers, and litigants may respond to persons who adopt and advance th ese concepts. I also comment directly to those in the OPCA community - both gurus and their followers - with the hope that these Reasons will lead them to more productive and successful interaction with the courts, government, and their fellow citizens.

[67]           I will first engage in an overview of the OPCA community, its composition, and their concepts. Certain of these observations are generalizations that flow from the more specific examples and materials that make up the bulk of these Reasons. In other instances, this information reflects the experiences of justices of this Court that have come to my attention as the supervising administrative Justice of this Court.

[68]           Members in the OPCA community appear surprisingly unified by their methodology and objectives. They are otherwise diverse. OPCA litigants appearing in our Court may be anything from educated professionals to retired senior citizens. They may be wealthy or poor. The famous are not immune; for example the American action movie actor Wesley Snipes adopted OPCA techniques in an attempt to defeat his income tax obligations: United State v. Wesley Trent Snipes et al., No. 5:06‑cr‑00022‑WTH‑GRJ‑1 (U.S.D.C. M.D. Fl., February 1, 2008). Snipes presently is serving a three year prison sentence for income tax evasion.

[69]           In Canada, this category of litigation traces into the late 1990’s, representing the spread of concepts that emerged much earlier in the United States. Our Court’s experience has been that persons involved in the OPCA community often hold highly conspiratorial perspectives, but there is no consistency in who is the alleged hidden hand. Another uniform OPCA characteristic appears to be a belief that ordinary persons have been unfairly cheated, or deceived as to their rights. This belief that the common man has been abused and cheated by a hidden hand seems to form the basis for OPCA community members perceived right to break ‘the system’ and retaliate against ‘their oppressors’.

[70]           These Reasons in many instances identify reported caselaw that comments on OPCA litigants, OPCA gurus, and their misconduct. It should be understood that the reported caselaw is the proverbial tip of the iceberg. The vast majority of encounters between this Court and OPCA litigants are not reported. These litigants and their schemes have been encountered in almost all areas of law. They appear in chambers, in criminal proceedings, initiate civil litigation based on illusionary OPCA rights, attempt to evade court and state authority with procedural and defence-based schemes, and interfere with unrelated matters.

[71]           OPCA strategies as brought before this Court have proven disruptive, inflict unnecessary expenses on other parties, and are ultimately harmful to the persons who appear in court and attempt to invoke these vexatious strategies. Because of the nonsense they argue, OPCA litigants are invariably unsuccessful and their positions dismissed, typically without written reasons. Nevertheless, their litigation abuse continues. The growing volume of this kind of vexatious litigation is a reason why these Reasons suggest a strong response to curb this misconduct.

[72]           Beyond that, these are little more than scams that abuse legal processes. As this Court now recognizes that these schemes are intended for that purpose, a strict approach is appropriate when the Court responds to persons who purposefully say they stand outside the rules and law, or who intend to abuse, disrupt, and ultimately break the legal processes that govern conduct in Canada. The persons who advance these schemes, and particularly those who market and sell these concepts as commercial products, are parasites that must be stopped.

[73]           A critical first point is an appreciation that the concepts discussed in these Reasons are frequently a commercial product, designed, promoted, and sold by a community of individuals, whom I refer to as “gurus”. Gurus claim that their techniques provide easy rewards – one does not have to pay tax, child and spousal support payments, or pay attention to traffic laws. There are allegedly secret but accessible bank accounts that contain nearly unlimited funds, if you know the trick to unlock their gates. You can transform a bill into a cheque with a stamp and some coloured writing. You are only subject to criminal sanction if you agree to be subject to criminal sanction. You can make yourself independent of any state obligation if you so desire, and unilaterally force and enforce demands on other persons, institutions, and the state. All this is a consequence of the fact gurus proclaim they know secret principles and law, hidden from the public, but binding on the state, courts, and individuals.

[74]           And all these “secrets” can be yours, for small payment to the guru.

[75]           These claims are, of course, pseudolegal nonsense. A judge who encounters and reviews OPCA concepts will find their errors are obvious and manifest, once one strips away the layers of peculiar language, irrelevant references, and deciphers the often bizarre documentation which accompanies an OPCA scheme. When reduced to their conceptual core, most OPCA concepts are contemptibly stupid. Mr. Meads, for example, has presented the Court with documents that appear to be a contract between himself, and himself. One Mr. Meads promises to pay for any liability of the other Mr. Meads. One owns all property, the other all debts. What is the difference between these entities? One spells his name with upper case letters. The other adds spurious and meaningless punctuation to his name. Mr. Meads (with punctuation) is the Mr. Meads who appeared in court. He says the Mr. Meads (all capitals) is the one who should pay child and spousal support.

[76]           So where is that Mr. Meads (all capitals)? At one point in the June 8 hearing Mr. Meads said that Mr. Meads (all capitals) was a “corporate entity” attached to his birth certificate. Later, he told me that the other Mr. Meads was a “person” - and that I had created him! Again, total nonsense.

[77]           The bluntly idiotic substance of Mr. Mead’s argument explains the unnecessarily complicated manner in which it was presented. OPCA arguments are never sold to their customers as simple ideas, but instead are byzantine schemes which more closely resemble the plot of a dark fantasy novel than anything else. Latin maxims and powerful sounding language are often used. Documents are often ornamented with many strange marking and seals. Litigants engage in peculiar, ritual‑like in court conduct. All these features appear necessary for gurus to market OPCA schemes to their often desperate, ill‑informed, mentally disturbed, or legally abusive customers. This is crucial to understand the non-substance of any OPCA concept or strategy. The story and process of a OPCA scheme is not intended to impress or convince the Courts, but rather to impress the guru’s customer.

[78]           Mediaeval alchemy is a helpful analogue. Alchemists sold their services based on the theatre of their activities, rather than demonstrated results, or any analytical or systematic methodology. OPCA gurus are modern legal alchemists. They promise gold, but their methods are principally intended to impress the gullible, or those who wish to use this drivel to abuse the court system. Any lack of legal success by the OPCA litigant is, of course, portrayed as a consequence of the customer’s failure to properly understand and apply the guru’s special knowledge.

[79]           Caselaw that relates to Gurus, reviewed below, explains how gurus present these ideas in seminars, books, websites, and instructional DVDs and other recordings. They provide pre‑prepared documents, which sometimes are government forms, and instruct how to fill in the necessary information that then produces the desired effects. Gurus write scripts to follow in court. Some will attempt to act as your representative, and argue your case.

[80]           When gurus do appear in court their schemes uniformly fail, which is why most leave court appearances to their customers. That explains why it is not unusual to find that an OPCA litigant cannot even explain their own materials. They did not write them. They do not (fully) understand them. OPCA litigants appear, engage in a court drama that is more akin to a magic spell ritual than an actual legal proceeding, and wait to see if the court is entranced and compliant. If not, the litigant returns home to scrutinize at what point the wrong incantation was uttered, an incorrectly prepared artifact waved or submitted.

[81]           As is illustrated in the specific examples that follow, persons who adopt OPCA ideas may come from practically any part of society. OPCA ideas appear to be developed in social groups. For example, this Court has often observed ‘supporters’ attending OPCA litigation hearings. OPCA litigants frequently say they work or study in groups. Mr. Meads mentioned he studies the law with a number of other persons with similar interests. Internet forums are clearly important mechanisms by which OPCA litigants and those interested in OPCA concepts discuss and plan their activities. OPCA litigants and gurus often appear to prefer to communicate and broadcast their ideas with video recordings made available on the “www.youtube.com” website.

[82]           This Court and the reported caselaw indicates that OPCA litigants and gurus do not have a particular political orientation. Intriguingly, the same concepts and mechanisms are advanced by both persons who hold perspectives that are alternatively extremely right wing (for example: R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510; Warman v. Warman, 2005 CHRT 36; Warman v. Warman, 2005 CHRT 43) or extremely left wing (for example: Jackson v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2001 SKQB 377 at para. 21, 210 Sask.R. 285). They use the same ‘techniques’ but each has a different backstory or context for that methodology.

[83]           Other OPCA litigants proclaim bizarre alternative histories which have no obvious or explicit political affiliations, for example: Henry v. Starwood Hotels, 2010 ABCA 367, leave refused [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 475; Henry v. El, 2010 ABCA 312, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 138. Some, like Mr. Meads, frame their beliefs in a religious context, for example: Bloom v. Canada, 2011 ONSC 1308; Sandri v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 CanLII 44282, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 811 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Pappas v. Canada, 2006 TCC 692, [2006] G.S.T.C. 161; R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265.

[84]           The alternative history and conspiracy stories that cloak various different groups of OPCA litigants may be very different, but the caselaw and this Court’s experience increasingly points to these apparently disparate groups making the exact same pseudolegal arguments. The only ideology, such as it is, that unifies these litigants and their leaders is a belief that they should be immune from obligations.

[85]           These Reasons will survey a number of known OPCA gurus, and their activities. In summary, the guru class are nothing more than conmen. Gurus are the usual source of new OPCA concepts, though more often their novel contribution is to simply create a variation on or repackage a pre-existing strategy, perhaps changing language or putting in some particular twist to a concept. Gurus seem to borrow extensively from one another. For example, its appears that parts of a document filed in one OPCA matter may be reproduced in another proceeding. An excellent example of that is the ‘fee schedule’ attached to these Reasons. Identical language is reproduced in materials discussed in Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2011 BCSC 696.

[86]           The caselaw indicates that gurus adopt a number of strategies. One is that they provide materials, such as seminars, books, and DVDs, that explain the theoretical context of their ideas, and demonstrate the application of those ideas for the benefit of their customers. These commercial products may include items such as form documents, scripts, and other materials that can be used in court, sent to government actors, or used in litigation. Some OPCA gurus hold seminars to promote the materials they sell. Many have Internet web pages that serve the same function.

[87]           Typically, this Court has learned about gurus and their activities from the perspective of an outside observer. For example, in court, justices see litigants identify certain persons who provide assistance or guidance to an OPCA litigant. Some gurus have appeared before justices of  this Court and have directed (or appear to direct) the OPCA litigant’s conduct, or attempt to represent the OPCA litigant.

[88]           Recently, a more complete window into the operations of an OPCA guru and his customer base has been provided by the trial and conviction (R. v. Porisky, 2012 BCSC 67, 2012 D.T.C. 5037 [“Porisky Trial Decision”]) and sentencing (R. v. Porisky, 2012 BCSC 771 [“Porisky Sentencing Decision”]) of Russell Porisky and Elaine Gould for tax evasion and counseling others to commit fraud. R. v. Sydel, 2006 BCPC 346 also reports on the Porisky operation but from the perspective of one customer, a dentist. These cases provide many details on how an OPCA scheme operates.

[89]           Porisky operated a business, named “The Paradigm Education Group”, that advanced a concept that it was possible for a potential taxpayer to:

[90]           Porisky claimed this was in response to a banking conspiracy:

[91]           Porisky taught that the Canada Revenue Agency had tricked persons into believing there was an obligation to pay tax, and further that taxation is slavery, serfdom, and contrary to the Canadian Bill of Rights: para. 111. Justice Myer helpfully isolates representative examples of the alternative reality and rhetoric Porisky directed to his customers in the Appendix to the trial decision. It is typical that a guru will frame his or her arguments in a conspiratorial context, and claim that the potential customer has been cheated. The state is an enemy and oppressive. A few sample passages illustrate Porisky’s perspective on the world:

[92]           I will not review the basis on why Porisky’s “natural person” scheme is incorrect, as this question is thoroughly dissected in reported cases including: R. v. Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767 at para. 19, 93 O.R. (3d) 81, leave denied [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 522; R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at para. 27, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265; R. v. Pinno, 2002 SKPC 118 at paras. 12-13, 15-16, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 308; Kennedy v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2000 CanLII 22837 (ON SC), [2000] 4 C.T.C. 186, 2000 D.T.C. 6524 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); and Porisky Trial Decision at paras. 58-61.

[93]           Porisky and Paradigm advanced this scheme on a commercial basis. Porisky operated a website, and sold instructional materials such as books and DVDs: Porisky Trial Decision, at para. 39. Porisky also conducted seminars where he changed a fee (at para. 39), and provided levels of training and exams (at paras. 101‑105). Paradigm operated as something of a pyramid scheme; Porisky also qualified “educators” to further proselytize his approach: Porisky Trial Decision, at paras. 39, 106. At least one of these educators is now also the subject of criminal litigation: R. v. Lawson, 2012 BCSC 356, at para. 21, as are other participants in the Porisky tax evasion ring: R. v. McCartie, 2012 BCSC 928. Many other persons who used Porisky’s techniques have already been convicted of tax evasion: Porisky Trial Decision, at para. 63.

[94]           Additionally, and in what can only be described as an exercise in pure arrogance, Porisky demanded 7% of the next two years income from his subscribers in exchange for his or his educator’s assistance: Porisky Trial Decision, at para. 40. The tax liberator had become a tax collector.

[95]           The pseudolegal basis for Porisky’s claims is very representative of how OPCA arguments are rationalized and explained by their proponents. Statutes, caselaw (often foreign or obsolete), legal platitudes and definitions (again often foreign or obsolete), political ideology, and conspiracy, were strung together into a loose cloud that pointed to a desired result. Justice Myers eloquently described this process at para. 67 of the trial decision:

[96]           It is important at this point to again stress the audience for Porisky’s ideas. That was not the courts, government actors, but his clientele. What mattered was that his customer base believe and then pay for his services.

[97]           Porisky was convicted and sentenced for having personally evaded taxes, and having aided and abetted the evasion of income tax. Justice Myers rejected a disclaimer by Porisky that his ideas, materials, and advice were for “educational purposes only”: Porisky Trial Decision, at para. 98. Porisky had gone so far as to prepare (unsuccessful) legal arguments for one of his clients who had been sued for tax evasion. Porisky then analyzed that result, and told his subscribers why the client’s conviction was “ambiguous” and “... just another desperately needed bowl of propaganda pabulum for public consumption, to keep the masses asleep and enslaved ...” [sic]: paras. 118‑121.

[98]           In total, Porisky’s guru activities led to substantial tax evasion, which was difficult to quantify with precision: Porisky Sentencing Decision, at paras. 38‑40. He had approximately 800 “students” who applied his scheme: at para. 40. A 4.5 year prison sentence was ordered: para. 57.

[99]           Porisky’s guru activities are far from unique in Canada. A number of other gurus have been the subject of reported decisions, or have become directly known to this Court.

[100]      For over a decade David Kevin Lindsay [“Lindsay”] (usually styled David‑Kevin: Lindsay) has been involved in OPCA type activities as a guru and litigant. He has repeatedly personally challenged various aspects of tax legislation and the authority of the Canadian state and courts: R. v. Lindsay, 2004 MBCA 147, 187 Man.R. (2d) 236; R. v. Lindsay, 2006 BCSC 188, 68 W.C.B. (2d) 718, affirmed 2007 BCCA 214; R. v. Lindsay, 2006 BCCA 150, 265 D.L.R. (4th) 193; R. v. Lindsay, 2008 BCCA 30, 250 B.C.A.C. 270; R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265. In 2008 he was sentenced to 150 days imprisonment for failure to file income tax returns: R. v. Lindsay, 2008 BCPC 203, [2009] 1 C.T.C 86, affirmed 2010 BCSC 831, [2010] 5 C.T.C. 174, affirmed 2011 BCCA 99, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265.

[101]      OPCA concepts that Lindsay has promoted include:

[102]      Lindsay holds seminars (for pay) to teach his beliefs. R. v. Dick, 2002 BCCA 27, 163 B.C.A.C. 62, leave refused [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 128 provides a useful review of those activities and the manner in which Lindsay promotes himself:

[103]      As is typical of most recent gurus, Lindsay also advertises his services on an Internet website: British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lindsay, 2007 BCCA 165 at para. 15, 238 B.C.A.C. 254.

[104]      Sadly, some persons have taken up that offer. Lindsay has a history of advising and representing persons who advance his schemes (Superior Filter Recycling Inc. v. Canada, 2005 TCC 638, 2005 D.T.C. 1426; R. v. Meikle, 2008 BCPC 265 at para. 5, [2009] 1 C.T.C. 184, affirmed 2009 BCSC 1540, [2010] 2 C.T.C. 76, affirmed on other grounds 2010 BCCA 337, 2010 D.T.C. 5140; Coulbeck v. University of Toronto, [2005] O.J. No. 4003 (QL), 142 A.C.W.S. (3d) 889 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Coulbeck v. University of Toronto, [2005] O.J. No. 5688 (QL), 145 A.C.W.S. (3d) 393 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); R. v. Dick, 2000 BCPC 221, [2003] 1 C.T.C. 277 (and related proceedings); R. v. J.B.C. Securities Ltd., 2003 NBCA 53 at para. 9, 261 N.B.R. (2d) 199; Canadian Western Bank v. Ricci, 2003 CanLII 45381 (Ont. Sup. Ct.); R. v. Gibbs, 2002 BCPC 703, [2006] 3 C.T.C. 307; Kennedy v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2000 CanLII 22837 (ON SC), [2000] 4 C.T.C. 186, 2000 D.T.C. 6524 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Audcent v. Maleki, 2006 ONCJ 401, [2007] 1 C.T.C. 212 (and related proceedings); Canada v. Galbraith, 2001 BCSC 675, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 504; R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510)), though he has been denied that role in a number of jurisdictions, including the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench (R. v. Main, 2000 ABQB 56, 259 A.R. 163; Hill v. Hill, 2008 SKQB 11 at paras. 29-30, 306 Sask.R. 259; Warman v. Icke, [2009] O.J. No. 3482 at para. 1 (QL), 2009 CanLII 43943; Ambrosi v. Duckworth, 2011 BCSC 1582; Superior Filter Recycling Inc. v. Canada, 2006 FCA 248, [2006] 5 C.T.C. 85; R. v. Linehan, 2000 ABQB 815, 276 A.R. 383).

[105]      He has been declared a vexatious litigant: British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lindsay, 2007 BCCA 165, 238 B.C.A.C. 254, leave refused [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 359; Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Lindsay, 2000 MBCA 11, 145 Man.R. (2d) 187. Lindsay frequently initiates legal proceedings and files private informations to harass lawyers, Canada Revenue Agency employees, and court sheriffs: British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lindsay, 2007 BCCA 165 at paras. 11-14, 27, 238 B.C.A.C. 254.

[106]      Lindsay’s misconduct goes further. Lindsay was, at a minimum, a “cheerleader” for an attempt by OPCA litigants to ‘arrest’ an Alberta Provincial Court judge during a hearing: R. v. Main, at para. 8. He persistently filed ungrounded complaints against judges: R. v. Main, at paras. 18, 28-29. He alleged judicial and state corruption: R. v. Main, at paras. 25-26. His activities are “... a wrongheaded, destructive, malicious use of the justice system by the defendant to effect a purpose which is the very antithesis of that which the section intends ...” [emphasis added]: Manitoba (Attorney‑General) v. Lindsay (1997), 1997 CanLII 22807 (MB KB), 120 Man.R. (2d) 141, 13 C.P.C. (4th) 15 (Man. Q.B.), varied on other grounds 2000 MBCA 11, 145 Man.R. (2d) 187.

[107]      Lindsay’s rhetoric is also documented. R. v. Lindsay, 2004 MBCA 147 at para. 35, 187 Man.R. (2d) 236 provides a review:

[108]      Those justices of the Alberta Queen’s Bench who have encountered OPCA litigants and gurus can attest this conduct is unexceptional.

[109]      Sometimes OPCA gurus claim to be lawyers. A particularly troubling set of reported decisions from British Columbia relate to John Ruiz Dempsey [“Dempsey”], or as he styles himself, “John-R: Dempsey”. Dempsey’s claims to be a lawyer were spurious, as is explained in Law Society of British Columbia v. Dempsey, 2005 BCSC 1277 at para. 22, 142 A.C.W.S. (3d) 346, affirmed 2006 BCCA 161, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 735:

[110]      Dempsey advertised his ‘services’ with a webpage entitled “The People v. The Banks: The Greatest Battle”. Law Society of British Columbia v. Dempsey recounts Dempsey’s activities, and they make a sorry tale. He initiated lawsuits in his own name, which were uniformly unsuccessful, except for waiver of court fees due to his indigent status: para. 25. Dempsey filed a succession of improper and related lawsuits and judicial reviews that led to him being declared a vexatious litigant: Dempsey v. Casey, 2004 BCCA 395 at paras. 36-38, 132 A.C.W.S. (3d) 833. Dempsey made numerous law society and police complaints (para. 44) and alleged (para. 43) that the judge presiding over the Law Society of British Columbia v. Dempsey proceeding:

[111]      Denied personal and direct access to the courts, Dempsey turned to the practice of law, and acted as an “agent” in 10 civil actions that largely involved persons attempting to avoid debts owed to financial institutions (para. 47) and a number of labour matters (para. 51). In addition to what might be classified as ‘conventional’ claims, Dempsey advanced a collection of arguments, including:

[112]      The British Columbia Court of Appeal in Ancheta v. Joe, 2005 BCCA 232 at para. 7, 213 B.C.A.C. 21, noted the defiant and uncooperative attitude typically expressed during this litigation, including the following:

[113]      Dempsey also initiated a total of six class actions (Law Society of British Columbia v. Dempsey, at paras. 73-83), directed at a variety of targets, including a government operated school for girls, a number of financial institutions, and the Government of Canada. The last action is described in this way at para. 81:

[114]      Law Society of British Columbia v. Dempsey, at paras. 84-103, summarizes affidavit evidence of those who entrusted their legal actions to Dempsey. The accounts make painful reading, as it becomes apparent that certain litigants had been deceived as to Dempsey’s true status, and that their potentially legitimate claims had been compromised by Dempsey’s activities. It is telling that Dempsey sued in defamation when one of his former clients made her experiences public: para. 90.

[115]      Dempsey alleged the legal profession is an unjust monopoly, and in his submissions and website engaged in the kind of rhetoric sadly typical of OPCA gurus, for example:

[116]      Dempsey also orchestrated in-court misconduct. Justice Garson reports in Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at paras. 16-24, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309 that persons in the public gallery would engage in “... chanting, disrespectful comments ...” that she concluded were “... tactics employed to frustrate the legitimate hearing of the applications and were deliberate, planned in advance, and well rehearsed.”

[117]      Dempsey then posted his account of that online:

[118]      Other times litigants did not attend (paras. 18-19) and “... the supporters in the gallery rose in what was clearly an orchestrated response and began reciting the Lord's Prayer aloud.” (para. 24). Dempsey also wrote the opposing parties that (para. 35):

[119]      Justice Garson ordered that Dempsey be personally liable for special costs along with the plaintiffs, as he was a person who instigated and guided “money for nothing” litigation: paras. 46, 48, 60. Dempsey also has been denied permission to represent OPCA litigants on the basis of his history of misconduct: Gravlin et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce et al, 2005 BCSC 839, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447.

[120]      Dempsey’s advice and representation had substantial costs for four of his clients and himself. People of Canada v. Envision Credit Union; Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2007 BCSC 1276, 160 A.C.W.S. (3d) 962 reports a cost award totalling $92,850.00. This seems to be the last reported action that involves Dempsey, though his webpage remains.

[121]      Robert Arthur Menard [“Menard”] (typically styled “Robert-Arthur: Menard”) is the subject of less case commentary. He is associated with the Freeman-on-the-Land OPCA movement, and identifies himself as such: United States of America v. Emery, 2005 BCSC 1192 at para. 7, 70 W.C.B. (2d) 37. Menard has attempted to participate in legal actions as an intervener, but was denied that status: United States of America v. Emery. That was an extradition proceeding. Menard’s OPCA concepts outlined in that case include:

[122]      Menard’s submissions concerning the United States were dramatic:

[123]      In 2008 the British Columbia Supreme Court in The Law Society of British Columbia v. Robert Arthur Menard (8 January 2008) Vancouver S073719 (B.C.S.C.) granted an order prohibiting Menard from acting as a lawyer and providing legal advice, and receiving compensation for the same.

[124]      This Court’s review of the Freeman-on-the-Land phenomenon has observed that Menard is associated with or operates a number of “Freeman” Internet websites that market OPCA materials, including the “Canadian Common Corps Of Peace Officers” (“C3PO”) (website: http://www.c3po.ca), a group of self-declared and appointed vigilante “peace officers” who:

[125]      Eldon Gerald Warman [“Warman”] is a “Detaxer”; he operates the “http://www.detaxcanada.org/” website. Warman typically styles himself via the ‘dash-colon’ motif as “Eldon-Gerald: Warman”. He has a historic association with Lindsay: R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510; Warman (Re), 2000 ABPC 181, 48 W.C.B. (2d) 194. His stated beliefs combine the “natural man” scheme of Porisky and Lindsay, with an emphasis on historical common law and the interrelationship between the king and society, such as the Magna Carta. A helpful survey of Warman’s concepts is found in R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510 at paras. 9-10.

[126]      In 2000 Warman had a roadside encounter with a peace officer who attempted to investigate the permit status for Warman’s vehicle. That led to an assault on the officer for which Warman was subsequently convicted: R. v. Warman, 2000 BCPC 22, affirmed 2001 BCCA 510. Warman had denied the officer’s authority because “... issuing tickets at the side of the road is to conduct a roving court not permitted by Section 17 of Magna Carta.”: para. 36. These roadside confrontations between peace officers and OPCA community members are a reported aspect of OPCA litigation, for example in R. v. Kaasgaard, 2011 MBQB 256.

[127]      Mr. Warman has been the subject of complaints of racist and anti-Semitic statements that were considered by the Canadian Human Rights Commission: Warman v. Warman, 2005 CHRT 36; Warman v. Warman, 2005 CHRT 43. The other “Warman” here is not a relative but instead is Richard Warman, a person who frequently advances human rights complainants. The former decision at para. 12  reproduces certain relevant passages from the “detaxcanada.org” website:

[128]      The CHRC continues at para. 12:

[129]      Warman’s current status is uncertain. The ‘detaxcanada.org’ website remains, however there is no recent Alberta legal proceeding that involves this person.

[130]      David J. Lavigne [“Lavigne”], operator of “The Tax Refusal” website (“http://www.taxrefusal.com/”) and founder of the “International Humanity House”, promotes an argument that a person need not pay tax on a moral or conscience basis. The one instance where Lavigne has argued his approach in Federal Court is unreported (see Jackson v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2001 SKQB 377 at para. 21, 210 Sask.R. 285). After that Lavigne attempted to represent several other litigants who adopted his concepts, but without success: Jackson v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), at para. 40; R. v. Reddick, 2002 SKCA 89, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 646.

[131]      Lavigne provides an interesting contrast to Warman. Both adopt almost the exact same pseudolegal arguments, but their ideologies could hardly be more opposite. Lavigne’s perspective is explained in Jackson v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), at paras. 18-20:

[132]      The materials filed in R. v. Reddick, at para. 5, express that ideology as a:

[133]      Lavigne’s webpage ‘/www.taxrefusal.com’ remains and is apparently being updated, though he does not seem to have been involved in further reported litigation.

[134]      Some gurus market themselves as religious authorities. An example is Edward Jay Robin Belanger (typically self-styled as the “minister Edward-Jay-Robin: Belanger”) [“Belanger”]. Belanger seems to be the leader or dominant personality in a local Edmonton-area OPCA movement named the “Church of the Ecumenical Redemption International” [“CERI”]. Its members usually give themselves the title “minister”. I have no explanation for why this title is never capitalized, however that is their consistent practice. Belanger and CERI members are frequent visitors to and litigants in the Edmonton-area courts.

[135]      A brief excerpt from a very lengthy “Asseveration/Affidavit of Criminal Complaint” sent to my office by Belanger provides the flavour of this guru’s rhetoric:

[136]      Belanger’s typical strategies are:

[137]      Belanger and his followers attempt to detach themselves from state and court authority by ‘publishing’ foisted unilateral agreements, either on the CERI website or via other means. In 2011 Belanger attempted to email a number of these documents to every person employed in the Alberta Justice department.

[138]      Belanger appears to administer the CERI website and posts in various online forums. He is one of the many gurus who use the Youtube service to host his videos. He has attempted to represent persons in court.

[139]      Belanger frequently files complaints and Criminal Code private informations directed to the judiciary, court, government, and law enforcement employees. He apparently has also sought military intervention against “traitors” in the state and court apparatus. Recently, Belanger and other CERI members entered the Edmonton Courts during the annual “Law Day”, a public and family oriented event intended to introduce lay people and particularly children to court and trial operations. Belanger’s group intended to disrupt that event, but were ejected. Belanger immediately attempted to press criminal charges against Court Sheriffs.

[140]      This list is not exhaustive; for example another candidate guru is reported in Dirks v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue ‑ M.N.R.); Dirks, Re, 2007 SKQB 124 at paras. 4-5, 31 C.B.R. (5th) 192 and R. v. Lemieux, 2007 SKPC 135 at paras. 34-35, [2008] 2 C.T.C. 291. This may be the Douglas Martin Nagel whose conviction was confirmed in R. v. Nagel, 2010 SKCA 118. Similarly, the “Mr. Plotnikoff” mentioned in Canada (Minister of National Revenue ‑ M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99 at para. 4, 340 F.T.R. 150 appears to be a guru given he apparently provided workshops on how to evade income tax.

[141]       This review of gurus is also undoubtedly incomplete since at least some OPCA schemes encountered in Canadian courts clearly originate from the United States. Those U.S. schemes made up much of the ‘first wave’ of OPCA litigants and still do appear.

[142]      Unsurprisingly, American OPCA schemes simply make no reference to Canadian law, principles, legislation, or institutions. They will only cite U.S. legislation, caselaw, history, and constitutional materials. Objectively, it is difficult to understand how any Canadian might imagine these techniques would prove successful.

[143]      A helpful example is that of American guru David Wynn Miller [“Miller”] (usually styled “PLENIPOTENTIARY JUDGE David-Wynn: Miller”), who advocates a bizarre form of “legal grammar”, which is not merely incomprehensible in Canada, but equally so in any other jurisdiction. National Leasing Group Inc. v. Top West Ventures Ltd., 2001 BCSC 111, 102 A.C.W.S. (3d) 303 provides examples of the resulting text. See also: Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Chesney, 2001 BCSC 625, 104 A.C.W.S. (3d) 826; Borkovic v. Laurentian Bank of Canada, 2001 BCSC 337, 103 A.C.W.S. (3d) 700. Succinctly, it appears that his law grammar provides rules on how to structure ‘legally effective’ documents. The result is very difficult to understand. Any defective document (ie. one not written in ‘Millerese’) is “fictitious‑language/scribble”: National Leasing Group Inc. v. Top West Ventures Ltd., at para. 6.

[144]      More recently ‘Canada‑specific’ schemes have emerged from the Canadian OPCA gurus. These often are crude adaptations of the American schemes, and simply replace American with Canadian law and institutions, for example, the ‘A4V’ ‘money for nothing’ approach reported in Underworld Services Ltd. v. Money Stop Ltd., 2012 ABQB 327, and the restricted scope of income tax liability advanced in Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 at para. 5.

[145]       That said, certain Canadian OPCA gurus, particularly Lindsay, have produced true “made in Canada” schemes which make little or no reference to American law and legislation, see: R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at paras. 31-32, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265; R. v. Lindsay, 2004 MBCA 147 at para. 32, 187 Man.R. (2d) 236. Nevertheless, many “made in Canada” OPCA strategies will still retain some common conceptual foundation with an American equivalent. For example, all ‘A4V’ schemes depend on American commercial law principles. It may therefore be useful to refer to U.S. commentary on OPCA strategies, if an equivalent concept can be identified.

[146]      At present, Mr. Mead’s guru and source for his arguments is unidentified.

[147]      This court has encountered documents substantially identical to those in Mr. Meads’ June 19 and 21 packages (other than personal information). Interestingly, Szoo’ v. RCMP, 2011 BCSC 696 attaches documents that duplicate text in Mr. Meads’ materials.

[148]      That suggests Mr. Mead is not the author of those documents, but rather that he has purchased a kit with those materials and the instructions as to their use. Evidence of the ‘pre-fab’ nature of the documents can be found in their content and format. For example, Mr. Meads forgot to fill in all the information for the “Notice to YOURFILINGCOUNTY County Register Of Deeds Clerk” document, as is shown by the “YOURFILINGCOUNTY” placeholder that remains in the title.

[149]      It appears that Mr. Meads’ guru is American. Review of the materials filed by Mr. Meads shows a strong American influence in his OPCA materials. For example, in one of his April 27, 2012 “Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause” documents he references “Title 18 United States Code”, which is the criminal and penal code for the federal government of the United States. Stating the obvious, this court will not be applying that legislation.

[150]      Similarly, Mr. Meads in his documents and arguments references the Uniform Commercial Code [the “UCC”], which is American legislation to harmonize commercial transactions within the United States. That too is not relevant to this proceeding, and will not be applied by this court. That said, as the caselaw survey that follows illustrates, the UCC is also a common motif in material from Canadian OPCA gurus, and forms a significant element in much OPCA mythology. However, why anyone would believe that American commercial legislation would apply in Canada is baffling. Still, OPCA litigants indicate that this legislation has a broad, even extraordinary scope. My office has recently received a document where an OPCA litigant said the UCC applies to governments, “... whether interstellar, intergalactic, international, national, state, provincial, or local ...” [emphasis added].

[151]      The various agreements, appointments, and the ‘fee schedule’ in Mr. Meads’ materials contain other language that suggests an American origin. For example, the property shuttled between the Meads dualities include:

[152]      Similarly, the ‘fee schedule’ references “Miranda” warnings, 4^th Amendment rights, and “Title 42 (Civil Rights), Title 18 U.S.C.A. (Criminal Codes), Title 28 U.S.C.A. (Civil Codes)”. These are American legislation and constitutional documents.

[153]      I would classify Mr. Meads’ OPCA materials as an ‘adapted American’ strategy. He (or his guru) has customized aspects of his documentation and arguments for a Canadian setting, but this does not appear to be a ‘home grown’ effort.

[154]      Gurus may be distant parties in OPCA litigation. In Mercedes‑Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at paras. 53-54, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), the OPCA litigant appeared to have used materials and techniques from an OPCA guru who promoted his techniques with radio broadcasts and hotel seminars. The OPCA litigant knew at least one person who helped promote those schemes in his geographic region. While not an explicit conclusion of that decision, the materials cited and described by Justice Brown in Mercedes‑Benz Financial v. Kovacevic indicate the litigant had been introduced to his scheme by a nomadic American “Sovereign Man” guru, Sam Kennedy. The OPCA litigant in Mercedes‑Benz Financial v. Kovacevic then attempted to obtain a luxury car for free via those techniques.

[155]      Sometimes gurus are indirectly involved in litigation, by providing advice and argument (for a fee), as did Porisky in the Sydel trial: Porisky Trial Decision, at para. 18.

[156]      In other instances the guru is present in the court, either representing the litigant, or offering instruction and advice. That kind of activity has been reported or observed for Canadian gurus Dempsey, Lavigne, Belanger, Menard, and Lindsay.

[157]      OPCA gurus and community members sometimes are ‘legal busybodies’ who attempt to introduce themselves into other proceedings. This Court’s experience has been that kind of participation consistently leads to further issues. Worse, there may be a potential resolution masked by that intervention. For example, a Moorish Law advocate, Sean Henry, has acted to represent his mother in a credit card debt collection proceeding. Henry’s conduct, described in more detail below, is exceptionally problematic.

[158]      The initial hearings to address this matter were entirely unsuccessful. Henry was then arrested. At the subsequent hearing before Belzil J. it was discovered that the mother was not only entirely willing to pay her outstanding debt, but had an investment account which she suggested could provide those funds. For whatever reason, the mother had not been willing to communicate those facts while her son, an OPCA litigant, was present. One can only guess at how many other conflicts might be resolved, were it not for interference of this kind.

[159]      In this Court’s experience, there are no stereotypic OPCA litigants. They may be of any age or gender. Some are affluent, while others are not. Canadian caselaw reports OPCA concepts advanced by professionals, ‘blue collar’ workers, business persons, and retired individuals. Some travel in groups, while others appear to operate by themselves.

[160]      This Court has observed that some OPCA litigants appear to suffer from cognitive or psychological disorders, however one should not presume those conditions from the presence of OPCA arguments and concepts. Similarly, bizarre in-court conduct does not necessarily mean these persons suffer from that kind of disorder. Anomalous behaviour may instead reflect the ‘rules’ of an OPCA strategy and script.

[161]      The motivation to adopt an OPCA approach varies. Certain OPCA litigants are clearly undergoing some kind of stress, such as:

[162]      Other times, OPCA litigation may be linked to some distressing event, such as a parent’s losing custody of a child. This may be the case for Mr. Meads, as he seems intensely dissatisfied with the end of his marriage.

[163]      Other OPCA litigants are simply scammers out for a quick buck: Mercedes‑Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); MBNA Canada Bank v. Luciani, 2011 ONSC 6347. A substantial amount of OPCA litigation seems to revolve on comparative trivialities, such as parking tickets: Waterloo (Regional Municipality) v. Bydeley, 2010 ONCJ 740 at para. 46, affirmed 2011 ONCJ 842, affirmed [2011] O.J. No. 6282 (QL) (Ont. C.A.); Sydorenko v. Manitoba, 2012 MBQB 42; R. v. Kaasgaard, 2011 MBQB 256.

[164]      OPCA litigants sometimes call themselves students of the law. That is a sham; their interest goes no further than finding the proverbial “Gotcha!” exception or loophole that they can spring to defeat state and court authority, see for example the Porisky Trial Decision and R. v. Sydel, 2006 BCPC 346.

[165]      Courts have commonly rejected claims by OPCA litigants that their actions were in good faith or innocent. R. v. Sydel, 2006 BCPC 346 provides a good example. The reason for that result is illustrated in Judge Meyer’s review at para. 20 of evidence that led him to dismiss a dentist’s claim she had a reasonable basis to believe the validity of OPCA Detaxer concepts:

[166]      It appears this is not atypical. The justices of this Court routinely encounter OPCA litigants who seem quite willing to ‘pull the wool over their own eyes’.

[167]      What is crucial is to understand that an OPCA litigant in court is likely operating under instructions obtained from a commercial source, and has been told to conduct and frame his or her court activities in an unnatural, incorrect, and distorted context. The litigant is instructed to follow a script that is, in all probability illogical, and certainly contrary to law. The OPCA litigant may not be able to explain his or her actions for the very same reason that a judge is confused by the documents, submissions, and in‑court conduct they provide. Neither really understands what is going on, but for different reasons.

[168]      The OPCA community includes a number of subsets that I will call ‘movements’. Each movement includes persons who have adopted similar alternative histories, and hold generally compatible beliefs. Different movements in many instances use exactly the same OPCA strategies. Members of a movement will often attend one another’s court appearances. They appear to engage in considerable ‘lateral’ discourse, and often seem to be, at a minimum, social acquaintances.

[169]      The first OPCA movement to appear in Canada were the “Detaxers”. These OPCA litigants focussed almost entirely on avoiding income tax obligations. Porisky, Lindsay, Lavigne, and Warman are or were some of the gurus in this community.

[170]      The Detaxer movement has employed a very wide assortment of OPCA strategies over the past decade, all without success. Lindsay, in particular, appears to have been an innovator and the source of many Canadian OPCA strategies. Lavigne and Warman’s litigation history illustrates how Detaxers may have either ‘left wing’ or ‘right wing’ leanings. In recent years this court has observed fewer true Detaxers, no doubt in part due to the failure of Lindsay’s many court actions and the ongoing prosecution of members in the Porisky tax evasion ring.

[171]      Many Detaxers were professionals or business persons with substantial incomes: R. v. Klundert (2004), 2004 CanLII 21268 (ON CA), 242 D.L.R. (4th) 644, 190 O.A.C. 36 (Ont. C.A.), leave refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 463; R. v. Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767 at para. 19, 93 O.R. (3d) 81, leave denied [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 522;  R. v. Amell, 2010 SKPC 107, 361 Sask.R. 61; R. v. Turnnir, 2006 BCPC 460; Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495; R. v. Sydel, 2006 BCPC 346. Meads appears to share that characteristic from the data before the court. Other Canadian OPCA movements seem to emerge from a lower income and/or occupational and employment context.

[172]      The Freemen-on-the-Land are a comparatively newer movement. From reported caselaw, individuals who self-identify with this movement appear active across Canada. The membership’s focus is strongly anti-government, and has libertarian and right wing overtones. Christian rhetoric is common. Menard is a guru in this movement.

[173]      It appears the Freemen are a Canadian innovation, which I understand has spread to other common-law jurisdictions, including the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, see for example: Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Rana, [2008] FCA 374; Glew v. White, [2012] WASCA 138; Van den Hoorn v Ellis, [2010] QDC 451. I am unclear whether Canada has returned the favour and this group has established itself in south of the 49^th parallel.

[174]      Stated simply, Freemen-on-the-Land believe they can ‘opt out’ of societal obligations and do as they like: Harper v. Atchison, 2011 SKQB 38 at paras. 6, 15, 369 Sask.R. 134; R. v. McCormick, 2012 NSCA 58 at paras. 19, 21; R. v. McCormick, 2012 NSSC 288 at paras. 28-32. A common theme in Freeman arguments is that state and court action requires the target’s consent, for example: Jabez Financial Services Inc. (Receiver of) v. Sponagle, 2008 NSSC 112 at para. 14, 264 N.S.R. (2d) 224.

[175]      Alarmingly, certain members of the Freeman-on-the-Land movement believe they have an unrestricted right to possess and use firearms. That has led in at least once instance to a Freeman-on-the-Land being found with a concealed unauthorized handgun; that Freeman-on-the-Land threatened to use the weapon on law enforcement personnel: R. v. McCormick, 2012 NSCA 58 at paras. 19, 21; R. v. McCormick, 2012 NSSC 288. In that, and many other ways, the Freemen-on-the-Land parallel the American Sovereign Man community. Both engage in a broad range of OPCA activities directed towards almost any government or social obligation. Both habitually use ‘fee schedules’, and advance claims and liens against state, police, and court actors. Many apply the ‘everything is a contract’ approach and so are extremely uncooperative, in and out of court.

[176]      The Sovereign Man / Sovereign Citizen movement is the chief U.S. OPCA community. Several reported Ontario decisions document court interactions with self-identified Sovereign Men. This court has had a limited exposure to Sovereign Men, most notably being a lawsuit advanced by Glenn Winningham [“Winningham”] (usually self-styled as “Glenn Winningham: House of Fearn”): Winningham v. Canada (30 November 2010) Lethbridge 1006 00907 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal denied (Alta. C.A.).

[177]      I was a defendant in this action, along with Canada, Alberta, many police officers, the Prime Minister, government ministers, the Lieutenant and Governor Generals, and Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Chief Justice Wittmann. The action alleged broad conspiracy and misconduct by Canadian state actors. A chief complaint by Winningham, who is a self-declared member of the “Republic of Texas”, is that Canada Customs had refused to admit him into Canada with his firearms. This was followed by a number of confrontations with Lethbridge area peace officers, particularly at traffic stops.

[178]      Winningham’s documents claim he is not subject to Canadian law on ‘everything is a contract’ and ‘courts apply admiralty law’ bases. He also claimed ‘governments’ are only corporations. The allegations and rhetoric in his court submissions express a perspective that is alarming:

[179]      My part in the conspiracy was to “... shove ... foreign martial law jurisdiction down the throats of all of the people ...” as an excuse to “... bring out [my] martial law shock troops and really "kick some ass!"” This would alienate the populace from the Queen and trigger a coup d’etat.

[180]      Langston J. struck Winningham’s action on, among other things, that the defendants had acted in various nefarious and treasonous ways, and refused Winningham’s demand for $1 billion in damages. American courts have similarly rejected Winningham’s claims. His action in Winningham v. Schulman (30 December 2009) District of Columbia 09 2435 was dismissed as being:

[181]      Winningham’s perspective of state oppression and violent focus seems representative of the Sovereign Man movement. In the United States, Sovereign Men are notorious for their violent conduct, intimidation of state and court personnel, and their misuse of legal processes to engage in “paper terrorism”: Robert Chamberlain & Donald P. Haider‑Markel, “"Lien on Me": State Policy Innovation in Response to Paper Terrorism” (2005) 58 Political Research Quarterly, pp. 449-460; Erick J. Haynie, “Populism, Free Speech, and the Rule of Law: The "Fully Informed" Jury Movement and Its Implications” (1997) 88 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology pp. 343-379; Susan P. Koniak “When Law Risks Madness” (1996) 8 Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature, pp. 65-138.  The FBI classifies Sovereign Men as a domestic terrorist movement.

[182]      A court that encounters what appears to be a genuine Sovereign Man / Sovereign Citizen may wish to take additional security precautions.

[183]      The Church of the Ecumenical Redemption International [“CERI”] is an Edmonton area OPCA group, apparently headed by Belanger. This Court has extensive exposure to CERI and its members.

[184]      First and foremost, CERI is a ‘pot church’. Like the pot churches reported in R. v. Baldasaro, 2009 ONCA 676, 265 O.A.C. 75, R. v. Baldasaro, [2006] O.T.C. 134, 68 W.C.B. (2d) 787 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), affirmed 2006 CanLII 31808 (ON CA), 216 O.A.C. 68, 213 C.C.C. (3d) 89 (Ont. C.A.), leave refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 474, and Tucker v. Canada; Baldasaro v. Canada, 2003 FC 1008, 239 F.T.R. 81, Belanger and CERI claim that marijuana is a lynchpin element of the Christian religion, and its use is mandated by the Bible, specifically the King James Bible. CERI’s membership otherwise appear to hold “left wing” and anti-capitalist views. Most members seem to belong to a low income demographic.

[185]      Some CERI members were involved in an earlier (unsuccessful) attempt to claim a religious right to use marijuana: R. v. Fehr, 2004 ABQB 859, 368 A.R. 122. At that point they defined themselves as “Reformed Druids”. In the present CERI members could be classified as King James Bible literalists. This Court therefore may have been witness to the cusp of the transformation (or conversion) of CERI from faith to faith, as in R. v. Fehr the “reformed druids” interpreted Exodus 30:23 as the basis for their claim: paras. 20-21.

[186]      CERI’s members generally reject state and court authority. Many of CERI’s arguments have religious trappings. CERI members have been encountered in all manner of proceedings. CERI members have adopted the ‘everything is a contract’ concept, and frequently argue ‘magic hat’ (discussed below) exceptions to the law. For example, a CERI member has recently in Alberta Provincial Court argued that her car was not subject to motor vehicle legislation because it is an “ecclesiastical pursuit chariot”. CERI members subscribe to the ‘double/split person’ concept, but attempt to detach themselves from their associated “corporate entity”.

[187]      Documents filed by CERI-associated litigants are unusually haphazard, even by OPCA documentary materials standards. In most instances they are clearly ‘cut and paste’ assemblies of other parent documents.

[188]      CERI’s membership is in frequent conflict with police, judges, and government officials. They file private criminal offence informations for “obstructing or violence to or arrest of officiating clergyman”, Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46, s. 176. CERI’s members had at least some contact with Winningham; CERI members witnessed his court materials. I have discussed how Belanger and several other CERI members recently attempted to disrupt a family-oriented public education event held at the Edmonton Courts.

[189]      Edmonton is home to Sean Henry (typically styled “:Chief : Nanya-Shaabu: El: of the At-sik-hata Nation of Yamassee Moors”, or less commonly, “Sean Henry Bey”), one of Canada’s very few Moorish Law OPCA litigants. He has frequently appeared in this Court.

[190]       The exotic nature of the Moorish Law movement and its claims warrant some comment, as casual exposure to a Moorish Law litigant may lead an observer to suspect mental impairment or disorder. The Moorish Law community is a predominately American offshoot of urban American black muslim churches such as a Nation of Islam. They claim that black muslims who self-identify as “Moors” are not subject to state or court authority because they are governed by separate law, or are the original inhabitants of North and South America.

[191]      In the case of Henry, he claims that the At-sik-hata Nation owns North America (now renamed “Atlan, Amexem, Turtle Island, Land of Frogs”) as a result of his treaty with the Olmec people, an early culture that existed in meso-America from 1500-400 B.C. and who are noted for their large sculptures of human heads. Justice Sanderman of our court, who had reviewed the documentary foundation of Henry’s many claims observed:

[192]      Henry claims his ownership of Canada renders him immune to court and state action, but also applies many other OPCA strategies such as ‘magic hats’, foisted unilateral agreements, and a variant on the ‘A4V’ ‘money for nothing’ concept.

[193]      Henry apparently spent some time in the United States and attempted to apply those concepts. United States of America v. Nanya Shaabu El, a/k/a Sean Wesley Henry (25 April 2008), 06-5197 (U.S. 4^th Circuit Court of Appeals) confirmed conviction of Henry for false claims of diplomat status, and rejected Henry’s argument that because he had claimed to be a diplomat for a non-existent state, “Atlan”, he could not have committed that offence.

[194]      Though it may seem unlikely to many readers, Henry is not alone in his peculiar beliefs. Shakes v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 CanLII 60494 (I.R.B.) reports on another Moorish Law OPCA litigant who claimed to be named “El Afif Hassan Hetep‑Bey”. In this action the litigant resisted a deportation order of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Immigration Appeal Division. Para. 10 describes the litigant’s materials:

[195]      The decision at paras. 14-18 reviews other documents received, including “a "Writ of Right" constituting "Notice of Default Judgement"”, rejection of the Immigration Appeal Division as not authorized by American law, and a “Claim of Right, Appellation/Name Correction, Pursuant to Indigenous Nationality & Aboriginal Citizenship” whereby Kiba Kerry Nicholas Shakes renounced his name, in favour of the name El Afif Hassan Hetep‑Bey.

[196]      The litigant was ordered deported, and a subsequent appeal, with counsel, was denied. The Board concluded at para. 32:

[197]      There are likely additional OPCA movements in Canada other than those identified above. Some may be local, such as CERI, and are therefore not known to Alberta courts. Others may be ‘below the radar’. Members of this Court report to me that they have encountered a significant number of OPCA litigants who do not self-identify with a known OPCA movement, or who, like Mr. Meads, do not have a known guru. Other movements will most probably emerge over time.

[198]      It is useful for a judge to know an OPCA litigant is associated with an organization, movement or guru. That, at a minimum, implies organized application and distribution of a set of OPCA concepts and beliefs, probably on a commercial basis. Useful movement-specific data includes the stereotypic strategies of that movement, any known movement gurus, and typical responses to court and state action by persons affiliated with that movement. Moveover, members of the OPCA community have proven violent; always an important fact.

[199]      This Court’s experience (personal and by other members) and the relevant caselaw has indicated that persons who engage in OPCA litigation tend to adopt certain stereotypic motifs in their written materials and in‑court conduct. The vast majority of these indicia are almost never shared by other self‑represented litigants, including those who may have difficulty communicating their positions and arguments, and by litigants who are affected by cognitive and psychological dysfunction.

[200]      Language that has a biblical or religious aspect, though common, is not as definitive an indication of OPCA context. Much of that is also present in a broader self-represented litigant population.

[201]      What follows is an incomplete summary of elements that suggest when a person has been exposed to OPCA concepts, is a part of the OPCA community, or has adopted OPCA-based litigation strategies. These features were identified from reported caselaw, from the experiences of the justices of this Court, and documentation received by this Court and my office.

[202]      To be explicit, however, these indicia do not prove a claim or action is invalid, or that a litigant is vexatious. These are telltale fingerprints that are typically found in OPCA litigation, and that, if identified, may warrant closer review and specific court procedures.

[203]      The documentation filed by OPCA litigants often includes many unusual features. Their significance, if any, is often opaque. Courts, lawyers, and litigants may find it helpful to identify persons with expertise in the rationale for these motifs, so that future reviews of OPCA indicia approach the telltale fingerprints on a schematic rather than anecdotal basis.

[204]      Beyond that, OPCA documents are highly variable. They range from what appear to be professionally prepared, polished materials, to crude assemblages of photocopied pages with inconsistent fonts, formats, and paragraph and page numbers that imply a ‘copy and paste’ composition. OPCA documentation is sometimes ‘flamboyant’, with multicoloured text, bright water marks, graphics, and elaborate ornamentation on coloured paper: however, this is not necessarily that useful as a identifying motif.

[205]      Sometimes an OPCA document may be so disjointed that the OPCA fingerprint motifs are only evidence that the author is not suffering from mental or cognitive disturbance. This is particularly true for documents prepared according to the ‘legal grammar’ of Miller: National Leasing Group Inc. v. Top West Ventures Ltd., 2001 BCSC 111, 102 A.C.W.S. (3d) 303; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Chesney, 2001 BCSC 625, 104 A.C.W.S. (3d) 826; Borkovic v. Laurentian Bank of Canada, 2001 BCSC 337, 103 A.C.W.S. (3d) 700.

[206]      The vast majority of OPCA litigants use highly stereotypic formats to name and identify themselves. The most common form adds atypical punctuation, usually colons and dashes, into a name. Any litigant who uses this ‘dash colon’ motif almost certainly has some kind of OPCA background or affiliation. The most common versions of this name format are:

[207]      For example, OPCA guru David Kevin Lindsay styles his name as “David‑Kevin: Lindsay”. There are many variations on this basic form with various combinations of colons and dashes. Mr. Mead in his documents identifies himself as “::Dennis-Larry: Meads::”, “::dennis-larry: meads::”, or “:::dennis-larry:: of the meads-family:::”. The ‘dash colon’ motif has no legal significance or effect: R. v. Lindsay, 2006 BCCA 150 at para. 3, 265 D.L.R. (4th) 193; R. v. Lindsay, 2008 BCPC 203 at para. 7, [2009] 1 C.T.C 86, affirmed 2010 BCSC 831, [2010] 5 C.T.C. 174, affirmed 2011 BCCA 99, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265.

[208]      The rationale for the ‘dash colon’ motif is unknown. However, it seems to be derived in some manner from the “legal grammar” of Miller.

[209]      A second common name motif is that a litigant identifies his or herself as being:

[210]      Mr. Meads also sometimes employs the clan/family/house name motif, but he combines it with the ‘dash colon’ motif to create a hybrid: “::dennis-larry: of the meads-family::”. The family/clan/ house motif is also meaningless: R. v. Sargent, 2004 ONCJ 356 at para. 29, [2005] 1 C.T.C. 448.

[211]      A third name-related phenomenon is that the litigant states their name in duplicate forms, one with only upper case letters, the second with either upper and lower case letters or only lower case letters. Again, Mr. Meads’ written materials shows this motif, for example, the ‘signature’ of the April 27, 2012 “Notice for an Order to Show Cause” has “DENNIS LARRY MEADS by ::Dennis Larry::” below a handwritten signature. This duplication extends to handwritten signatures. For example, most of Mr. Meads’ documents are double signed, with one signature reading “DENNIS LARRY MEADS Grantor” and the other “::Dennis-Larry: Meads:: Grantee”. The capital version of the signature is printed and in black ink, while the ‘dash colon’ version is in red ink and handwritten. Meads extends this ‘double name’ form to others, including his wife, lawyer, a lawyer’s assistant, but strangely, not the Court.

[212]      It appears that duplicate names of this kind are usually an indication that the OPCA litigant has adopted a ‘double/split person’ strategy, which is later reviewed in detail. In brief, the capital letter version of the name is some kind of non-human thing, while the lower case name is the ‘flesh and blood’ aspect of the litigant. The red ink colour is presumably intended to represent blood. OPCA materials are rife with these kinds of arbitrary symbolism.

[213]      Another name‑related indication of an OPCA litigant is that the litigant marks their name with a copyright and/or trade-mark indication, usually the ©, (T) and TM symbols. These markings likely indicate a foisted unilateral agreement strategy.

[214]      OPCA litigants frequently mark their documents in unconventional ways. The meanings of many of these marks is unclear, and these certainly have limited or no legal significance. It may be that these motifs simply are theatre used by gurus to impress their customers, and create what appear to be ‘powerful’ documents.

[215]      Indicia that appear restricted to OPCA documents include:

[216]      OPCA litigants sometimes appear to imbue notaries with extraordinary court-like authority. That may explain why so many OPCA documents, including those filed by Mr. Meads, are often notarized when that formality is neither legally necessary nor appropriate. I will later comment on the responsibilities of legally trained persons to not notarize documents in that manner. A notary cannot give special status to an OPCA document: Papadopoulos v. Borg, 2009 ABCA 201 at paras. 3, 10.

[217]      One very peculiar form of notation is an indication of a specific OPCA ‘money for nothing’ scheme. This is a document that will have text written or stamped across it, typically at a 45 degree angle off vertical. The text will include the phrase “accept for value” or “accepted for value”. Typical target documents marked in this way include a birth certificate, a bill to the litigant, a court order against the litigant, a demand letter, or court document filed by an opposing party, for example: Underworld Services Ltd. v. Money Stop Ltd., 2012 ABQB 327 at paras. 5, 13; Mercedes‑Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at paras. 10-11, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).

[218]      One example stamp, described in Mercedes‑Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), read as follows:

[219]      This particular notation has many variations but all share the “accept for value” language, and usually mention the UCC. Notations of this kind are a clear indication that the litigant has adopted the ‘A4V’ ‘money for nothing’ scheme described below.

[220]      OPCA documents frequently include atypical language and terminology that can indicate OPCA affiliation. Presumably some of these terms have symbolic or scheme-related significance. These are helpful indicia to identify OPCA litigation and litigants.

[221]      Documents frequently refer to the litigant as having a particular status or characteristic:

[222]      Identification that a municipality, province, or Canada is a corporation is a clear indication of OPCA affiliation: Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309. A litigant with documents of this kind will typically be using the ‘everything is a contract’ OPCA scheme, discussed below. Similarly, a statement that a court is an admiralty or military court suggests OPCA affiliation, particularly when in an inappropriate context, such as litigation that does not involve military personnel, ships, or maritime subjects.

[223]      Any use of phrases such as “accept for value”, “accept for value and return for value”, or “accept for value and consideration and honour” indicates OPCA affiliation but not necessarily use of the ‘A4V’ OPCA scheme; this language arises in multiple contexts when incorporated in a document.

[224]      A statement that a court, government, or official is “de facto” is very indicative of OPCA affiliation.

[225]      Many OPCA documents, including those of Mr. Meads, feature a declaration concerning service, such as “service to agent is service to principal” and “service to principal is service to agent”, presumably an attempt to expand the ‘notification’ function of these materials.

[226]      The term “strawman” usually indicates an OPCA ‘double/split person’ strategy: Mercedes‑Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). So does framing other persons or parties with duplicate names, one in upper case letters, the other lower case.

[227]      A demand that a remedy be paid only in precious metals, usually gold or silver, is typical in OPCA litigation. Many OPCA ‘backstories’ revolve on the idea that national currencies have no actual or little ‘true’ value, hence the emphasis on precious metals.

[228]      Many OPCA documents mention certain obsolete, foreign, or typically otherwise irrelevant legislation, including:

[229]      Reliance on Black’s Law Dictionary, particularly an obsolete version of Black’s Law Dictionary, is suggestive of OPCA affiliation: Waterloo (Regional Municipality) v. Bydeley, 2010 ONCJ 740 at para. 39, affirmed 2011 ONCJ 842, affirmed [2011] O.J. No. 6282 (QL) (Ont. C.A.). OPCA litigants also often stress the relevance of and quote from the Bible, usually the King James version: Callaghan v. McCaw; C.C. v. J.M., 2010 SKQB 79 at para. 7, 351 Sask.R. 55.

[230]      A person’s birth certificate is a focus of certain OPCA schemes. Any mention or reproduction of that certificate in atypical circumstances is a strong indication of an OPCA ‘A4V’ scheme: Underworld Services Ltd. v. Money Stop Ltd., 2012 ABQB 327 at paras. 5, 13.

[231]      OPCA litigants sometimes use abnormal formats and elements in their mailing addresses. A common feature is omission of the postal code, or some variation from the postal code’s usual format. For example, Mr. Meads frequently encircles his postal code with square brackets: “[T7Z 1L5]”. Other times he states the postal code as “near [t7z 1l5]”. Other OPCA litigants replace postal codes with land registration information, such as the Torrens registration location for their mailing address. Yet another motif is that a return address includes “C/O a Third Party Acceptor”, or “No Code Noncommercial”.

[232]      Any avoidance or variation on postal code strongly suggests the OPCA litigant has adopted an ‘everything is a contract’ scheme. OPCA litigants in that category apparently believe that use of a postal code means accepting some kind of contract with the state.

[233]      Another variation is that an address is, in some manner, stated to qualify the manner of delivery. For example, Mr. Meads has filed several documents that include the phrase “Non Domestic to CANADA” after the postal code. That implies the litigant is not in Canada, and presumably therefore not subject to Canadian authority.

[234]      Sometimes an OPCA litigant will demand he or she only receive mail addressed in an unconventional manner. For example, Belanger in correspondence with my office has instructed that I only send him correspondence in this manner:

[235]      OPCA litigants sometimes include fictitious nation states in their addresses, or indicate that their mailing address is an embassy. These motifs indicate an ‘immunity’ OPCA strategy.

[236]      OPCA litigants also have a pattern of addressing government and court officials in a characteristic double-name format:

[237]      This motif usually indicates a litigant has adopted the ‘everything is a contract’ OPCA concept.

[238]      The examples identified above will very likely be encountered in related but variant forms. For example, Mr. Meads expresses the “flesh and blood man” declaration motif as “the living flesh and blood sentient-man” and that he is “the creation for the Lord God Almighty Jehovah”. Similarly, Mr. Meads expresses copyright in his name in a different manner: “DENNIS LARRY MEADS (Copyright for the Province-Alberta)”. I note, parenthetically, that this notation is nonsensical given that The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91 explicitly assigns jurisdiction for copyright to Canada.

[239]      These stylistic variations do not necessarily imply that documentation is not of an OPCA origin. There is a certain crude level of creativity and adaptation practised by OPCA litigants and gurus that has led to many meaningless variations in their irrelevant motifs.

[240]      Another common phenomenon is that OPCA litigants combine these features, and other aspects of OPCA schemes, in a single document. An extreme example of this is found in the full style of cause of Bloom v. Canada, 2010 FC 621, [2010] 5 C.T.C. 143:

[241]      Similarly, most of Mr. Meads’ documents exhibit multiple OPCA features.

[242]      OPCA litigants often engage in unusual in-court conduct. That seems to be in part because many OPCA litigants are following a ‘script’ prepared by OPCA gurus. This was apparently true for Mr. Meads. For example, at certain points in the court hearing he appeared to read, word for word, from a prepared document. Other aspects of his speech seemed rehearsed.

[243]      Common ‘scripted’ motifs include demands by the OPCA litigant:

[244]      OPCA litigants often present documentation to the court or another party at the hearing itself, without prior service or warning. Common examples include:

[245]      Another common motif is that an OPCA litigant will engage in various peculiar comments that relate to names and identification. For example, an OPCA litigant may refuse to identify themselves by name, instead stating they are an agent or representative of an entity identified by the litigant’s name, typically these entities are described in a manner such as:

[246]      Additionally, the OPCA litigant may identify him or herself with an entirely fictitious name or via a OPCA alternative name format: Shakes v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 CanLII 60494 at para. 11 (I.R.B.); R. v. Sargent, 2004 ONCJ 356, [2005] 1 C.T.C. 448; R. v. Crischuk, 2010 BCSC 716 at paras. 31-32, affirmed 2010 BCCA 391, 2010 D.T.C. 5141; Services de financement TD inc. c. Michaud, 2011 QCCQ 14868 at para. 6; this proceeding.

[247]      Similarly, an OPCA litigant may make an unusual mention of copyright or trade-mark, typically because the OPCA litigant claims copyright or trade-mark in their own name: Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 at para. 23; Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309.

[248]      OPCA litigants frequently deny that a court has jurisdiction or authority over them. That emerges in a number of ways:

[249]      Other stereotypic OPCA litigant conduct includes:

[250]      These various motifs are usually found in combination. A useful and representative sample transcript of OPCA litigant conduct is found in Canada v. Galbraith, 2001 BCSC 675 at paras. 26-28, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 504.

[251]      A particularly difficult category of OPCA litigant are those who adhere to the OPCA concept that all interactions between the state, courts, and individuals are contracts. As is later explained in greater detail, persons who adopt this concept will interpret almost any invitation by the court or compliance with court procedure as the formation of a contract. For example, members of this Court have observed that litigants who apply the OPCA ‘everything is a contract’ strategy will refuse simple court directions and processes, such as to pass the bar, sit, stand, or acknowledge their identity.

[252]      Similarly, litigants who refused to identify themselves but claim to represent an entity related to the litigant will often maintain this role in the face of strong court warning. These OPCA litigants are often very argumentative.

[253]      The manner in which the refusal occurs is often highly formalistic. Mr. Meads, for example, made this bizarre response to my suggestion of cooperation on a point:

[254]      OPCA litigants’ materials and in court strategies usually exhibit many of these features. Thus, they  provides a certain ‘redundancy’ that makes these markers a helpful indication that a particular litigant has purposefully adopted vexatious pseudolegal strategies intended to frustrate the operation of the court. As noted, these specific indicia are almost never encountered with non‑OPCA litigants, including those with either cognitive or psychological dysfunction.

[255]      OPCA litigants prefer to make their submissions in a highly complex and indirect manner. As a consequence, this Court’s experience has been that a typical OPCA submission will incorporate a great many of the indicia identified here. This too creates a high confidence that documents and litigants with these features have an OPCA affiliation.

[256]      Given the intrinsically vexatious nature of OPCA methodologies, which I review in detail below, it is appropriate that a court adopt special procedures for documents that show OPCA indicia, which may include:

[257]      OPCA litigants are known to engage in disruptive and inappropriate in‑court conduct: for example, Callaghan v. McCaw; C.C. v. J.M., 2010 SKQB 79 at para. 9, 351 Sask.R. 55, and sometimes appear with supporters who do the same: Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at paras. 16-24, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309. This misconduct extends to disrespect, threats, and in some cases violence directed to court personnel, judges, and other parties. For example: Shakes v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 CanLII 60494 (I.R.B.) and Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 at paras. 10-14.

[258]      OPCA litigants have an alarming predisposition to a belief that they can ‘take justice into their own hands’ and act against the judiciary. The attempted arrest of a judge reported in R. v. Main, at para. 8 is a good example. More recently, during the trial of a Porisky associate (R. v. Lawson, 2012 BCSC 356 at para. 26, 2012 D.T.C. 5069) the defendant referred to:

[259]      While Justice Myers chose to “... give Mr. Lawson the benefit of the doubt and assume that this was not meant as a veiled threat ...” (para. 27), I think this very effectively illustrates the potential activities that judges and court officials can expect when dealing with OPCA litigants. They have been incited by the misguided and dangerous rhetoric spewed by their gurus, and that raises the troubling possibility of in-court misconduct, if not physical risks.

[260]      OPCA litigants often attempt to ‘rally the troops’ so that groups of supporters appear at a hearing. That can lead to orchestrated disruptions (Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at paras. 16-24, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309) including threats directed at judges (R. v. Main, at para. 8). Our Court has experienced high tension incidents, particularly with Freemen-on-the-Land and CERI members, where persons in the public gallery had to be expelled, sometimes by force.

[261]      It is therefore appropriate that a court may adopt specific in‑court and security procedures in response to persons who are suspected OPCA litigants. Additional in-court security is generally warranted.

[262]      In particular, this Court has discovered that OPCA litigants will make clandestine audio and video recordings of Court proceedings, in violation of Court rules. These are then often posted on the Internet.

[263]      The fact that litigation involves OPCA motifs may also be a basis for a judge to order a courtroom closed to the public, particularly if persons in the public gallery disrupt proceedings, such as in Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at paras. 16-24, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309, or pose a physical threat. I have made an order of this kind about allowing public entry, subject to a search and removal of prohibited electronic recording equipment prior to entry.

[264]      Though OPCA concepts initially appear to be very diverse, they may be grouped into a limited number of general categories. In this Court’s experience, apparently novel OPCA concepts very often recycle old schemes, but use somewhat different terminology. These variants, once assigned to a general category, are obviously defective.

[265]      Different OPCA concepts and arguments are often interwoven. Concepts from different general categories often appear in the same document or argument, as OPCA litigants freely interchange and mix these ideas. As Mr. Meads’ materials and arguments illustrate, even a single letter may apply numerous concepts from multiple general OPCA scheme and concept categories. This ‘mixing’ and ‘layering’ occurs even when the result is illogical. For example, Mr. Meads claims to only adhere and be subject to “God’s law”, yet emphasizes the alleged operation and binding “universal” character of the UCC.

[266]      As a preliminary note, review of the caselaw and this Court’s experience indicates that OPCA concepts and argument do not generally rely on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1, Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [the “Charter”]. This may reflect the fact most OPCA concepts are adapted from American precursors, or that the typical OPCA litigant is unwilling to shield themselves under the authority of the Charter. They instead prefer to frame their arguments around the Canadian Bill of Rights (Canada (Minister of National Revenue ‑ M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99 at paras. 29-30, 340 F.T.R. 150; see also R. v. Amell, 2010 SKPC 107 at paras. 156-157, 361 Sask.R. 61; Friesen v. Canada, 2007 TCC 287 at para. 3, [2007] 5 C.T.C. 2067), which has a well-established limited legal effect (Attorney General of Canada v. Lavell, 1973 CanLII 175 (SCC), [1974] S.C.R. 1349, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481).

[267]      A very common OPCA scheme category is that the OPCA litigant is in some manner outside the jurisdiction of the court or state, or is somehow rendered immune from legal obligations. This category has three general forms:

[268]      A common and older OPCA concept is that a Canadian court has a restricted jurisdiction. The majority of these schemes appear to have an American origin.

[269]      A typical situation is that an OPCA litigant may claim a court is a military or admiralty court, and therefore has no jurisdiction over the litigant: Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835; Ramjohn v. Rudd, 2007 ABQB 84, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 38; R. v. J.B.C. Securities Ltd., 2003 NBCA 53, 261 N.B.R. (2d) 199; this proceeding. Once the true restricted nature of the court is ‘unmasked’, the litigant will declare themselves immune to court action. That, of course, has been uniformly unsuccessful.

[270]      Mr. Meads at one point pursued this approach in his oral arguments. He demanded to know the meaning and significance of the Royal Coat of Arms of Canada attached to the back of the courtroom, behind the bench. Once I translated the Latin motto “A Mari usque ad Mare”, “from sea to sea”, Mr. Meads declared it meant the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench was an admiralty court which had no jurisdiction over himself. Mr. Meads was in one sense correct; this court can potentially address admiralty law matters, subject to legislation that assigns that jurisdiction to the Federal Court (Zavarovalna Skupnost, (Insurance Community Triglav Ltd.) v. Terrasses Jewellers Inc., 1983 CanLII 138 (SCC), [1983] 1 S.C.R. 283, 54 N.R. 321; Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c F‑7, s. 22). Admittedly landlocked as Alberta is, litigation of that kind is not exactly a common occurrence. Mr. Meads is, however, manifestly mistaken if he thinks that is the sole jurisdiction of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench.

[271]      Another Admiralty Law based argument illustrates how the word “includes” seems to baffle OPCA litigants. I have personally received a ‘foisted unilateral agreement’ (see below) that explains that “Canada” is restricted to the oceans that surround the landmass and its internal waters. The writer explains the basis of this argument is the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I‑21, s. 35(1), which reads in part:

[272]      OPCA litigants who advance these schemes will often focus on certain aspects of court formalities. Like Mr. Meads, they may scrutinize the court for some hidden indication of its true nature. A strange but common belief is that a flag with yellow or gold thread ‘fringes’ “denotes a military jurisdiction, not common law”. In R. v. J.B.C. Securities Ltd., 2003 NBCA 53 at para. 2, 261 N.B.R. (2d) 199, Chief Justice Drapeau of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal rejected a motion by Lindsay “... removing the gold‑fringed Canadian flag that has adorned the Court of Appeal’s hearing room for years ...”. This motion, and the argument that “[t]here is no lawful reason for a Canadian flag to be present other than the regular statutory authorized flag” was frivolous and vexatious: para. 9.

[273]      Another curious belief that purports to limit court jurisdiction is that notaries, as a kind of common law official, in some manner possess judicial or judge-like authority that displaces the authority of Canadian courts. In Jabez Financial Services Inc. (Receiver of) v. Sponagle, 2008 NSSC 112 at paras. 14, 264 N.S.R. (2d) 224 the OPCA litigant made the following claim:

[274]      Naturally, this claim is rubbish, and the litigants offered no foundation for this concept. The relevant legislation (Notaries Public Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. N‑6; Notaries Public Regulation, Alta. Reg 68/2003) does not authorize notaries to function in that manner. While I am a notary as a consequence of my office as a Justice (Notaries Public Act, s. 4), that does not make all notaries judges. OPCA litigants often assign special and misplaced significance to notaries and their activities, see for example Papadopoulos v. Borg, 2009 ABCA 201 at paras. 3, 10.

[275]      I will subsequently comment on the well established general authority of a superior court of inherent jurisdiction, and how that defeats this argument category.

[276]      Religion is a common basis for a claim that a court cannot act. While the precise manner in which religion or religious principles are invoked may vary, all these schemes appear to flow from a common rationale; there is some form of religious authority or law that trumps that of the court and Canada.

[277]      Some OPCA litigants claim immunity on the basis of religion, or like Mr. Meads, say they are only subject to something like “God’s Law”, or biblical principles. Often these religious beliefs conveniently excuse an OPCA litigant from some onerous obligation, such as paying taxes, or obtaining a driver’s licence, motor vehicle registration, and automobile insurance.  Members of the Edmonton area Church of the Ecumenical Redemption International, the group headed by “minister” Belanger, claim that their possession and use of marijuana is authorized by the King James Bible and therefore the state and courts have no authority to restrict those activities. Similarly, Mr. Meads, in his submissions, stated he does not recognize marriage outside a biblical context, and divorce can only flow from infidelity. He says a court‑ordered divorce based on other criteria cannot bind him.

[278]      Belief, religious activity, and association is a protected right under Charter, s. 2(a). However, Canadian courts recognize that as a restricted right that is subordinate “... to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”: Charter, s. 1. The Supreme Court of Canada has been explicit that religious beliefs do not trump the right of government to organize and regulate Canadian society, as was recently reviewed in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567.

[279]      OPCA litigants do not usually frame their religious arguments in a Charter context, but that would be the appropriate approach for them to pursue the rights they say flow from their beliefs, rather than a bald declaration of religion‑based immunity. That is not to suggest that such Charter-based arguments will succeed, but they will at least be appropriately framed.

[280]      OPCA litigants have also seized on the preamble to The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c .11, which reads:

[281]      This passage has been the subject of occasional judicial commentary, most simply because various litigants have argued that the preamble makes any of Canada’s laws subject to the “supremacy of God”. This proposition is expertly dismantled and dismissed by Justice Muldoon in O’Sullivan v. Canada (No. 2) (1991), 1991 CanLII 13582 (FC), 45 F.T.R. 284, 84 D.L.R. (4th) 124 (F.C.T.D.), where he concludes:

[282]      Other OPCA litigants claim that legislation, common law, and court principles and procedures are subject to “God’s Law”, or other divinely ordained rules or principles, have been uniformly rejected: Bloom v. Canada, 2011 ONSC 1308 at paras. 6-7; Sandri v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 CanLII 44282 at paras. 5, 13, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 811 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Pappas v. Canada, 2006 TCC 692 at paras 1, 9-12, [2006] G.S.T.C. 161; R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at para. 31, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265; Gravlin et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce et al, 2005 BCSC 839 at para. 50, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447.

[283]      In Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2005 BCSC 1730 at para. 6, 145 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1040, this declaration took the form of a colourfully named “Constructive Notice of Child of God Status”. At para. 30 Justice Garson concluded that was not a basis to remove her from a trial, as the litigant “... has not "accepted" my jurisdiction to hear this matter.” The same approach was unsuccessful at defeating the Law Society of British Columbia’s authority to regulate legal practice: Law Society of British Columbia v. Dempsey, 2005 BCSC 1277 at paras. 8, 16, 179, 194, 142 A.C.W.S. (3d) 346, affirmed 2006 BCCA 161, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 735, see also Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2011 BCSC 696 at paras. 21, 45.

[284]      Similarly, there is there is no “God given right” to travel on public roads that trumps legislation: Sydorenko v. Manitoba, 2012 MBQB 42, see also R. v. Kaasgaard, 2011 MBQB 256, para. 7 and Winningham v. Canada. Justice Herauf concluded a debtors’s claim to be “washed of debt by the blood of our Lord Jesus Christ who has redeemed us of all debt ... is pure unadulterated rubbish!”: Dirks v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue ‑ M.N.R.); Dirks, Re, 2007 SKQB 124 at para. 7, 31 C.B.R. (5th) 192.

[285]      Mr. Meads advanced an ill-formed argument that “God’s law” or the “Maximus of Law” is the law that he chooses to apply in this proceeding. There is, of course, no basis for that demand, and in any case that would not defeat or restrict the authority of this Court. The same would be true of any argument that this Court’s authority is subject to any other religious perspective or prescription.

[286]      In some instances an OPCA litigant may argue that a defect of some kind renders a court or judge without authority. An OPCA litigant may attempt to identify that defect by demanding that the court prove its authority is valid and genuine.

[287]      A very common demand is that a judge provide some indication of valid authority. Commonly that demand is for documentation, such as a certificate of appointment, or a copy of an oath of office: R. v. Lindsay, 2006 BCSC 188, 68 W.C.B. (2d) 718, affirmed 2007 BCCA 214; Ramjohn v. Rudd, 2007 ABQB 84 at para. 9, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 38; Bank of Montreal v. McCance, 2012 ABQB 537 at para. 7. In Alberta Treasury Branches v. Klassen, 2004 ABQB 463 at para. 25, 364 A.R. 230, an OPCA representative added the following post-script to his submissions:

[288]      Curiously, these litigants do not appear aware that judicial appointments are published as an Order-in-Council.

[289]      It is well established that a judge or court officer is presumptively authorized to act as they do, and rather the OPCA litigant who claims some deficiency or bias must prove that deficiency. In R. v. Crischuk, 2010 BCSC 716 at paras. 36-38, affirmed 2010 BCCA 391, 2010 D.T.C. 5141, Justice Barrows explained that onus in this manner:

[290]      An OPCA litigant sometimes demands that a judge swear various oaths and follows with an allegation that a failure to do so defeats the court’s authority. That is what appeared to happen in Kilini Creek/Patricia Hills Area Landowners v. Lac Ste. Anne (County) Subdivision and Development Appeal Board, 2001 ABCA 92 at para. 2, 104 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1142. Justice McClung’s response was succinct:

[291]      Other reported demands to demonstrate judicial authority include:

[292]      Other OPCA litigants claim judicial bias, influence, or conspiracy. However, a litigant who advances that kind of claim has an obligation to provide positive evidence to support the alleged conspiracy: R. v. Sydel, 2010 BCSC 1470 at paras. 27-29, see also R. v. Sydel, 2010 BCSC 1473 at paras. 18-23, 39, [2011] 1 C.T.C. 200, affirmed 2011 BCCA 103, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 191.

[293]      A further alleged defect category involves some formal aspect of the court or its activities. For example, Henry has argued that whether a judge is or is not gowned affects the judge’s jurisdiction: Henry v. Starwood Hotels, 2010 ABCA 367, leave refused [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 475; Henry v. El, 2010 ABCA 312 at para. 3, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 138.

[294]      A parallel concept is advanced by Edmonton area OPCA guru Belanger, who puts special significance on the edition of the Bible present in the courtroom and that a witness holds when swearing their evidence will be accurate and complete. Belanger claims that only a King James Bible (and perhaps a specific edition) can serve in that role. Of course, that is nonsense. There is neither legislation or common law that makes that requirement. The Alberta Evidence Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A‑18, s. 15(1) states the oath requires a person hold “... the Bible or New Testament, or Old Testament in the case of an adherent of the Jewish religion ...”, while s. 15(2) also permits that “... the oath may be taken or sworn on any one of the 4 Gospels.”

[295]      As for any common-law requirement, there is no question that the specific choice of Bible (or other sacred text) present in a courtroom falls within the jurisdiction of a court to manage its proceedings and procedures: I.H. Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 23, cited in B.C.G.E.U. v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 1988 CanLII 3 (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214, 53 D.L.R. (4th) 1; R. v. Morales, 1992 CanLII 53 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, 144 N.R. 176; R. v. Hinse, 1995 CanLII 54 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 597, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 54; MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, 1995 CanLII 57 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 385, see also R. v. Gillespie, 2000 CanLII 26952 (MB CA), 2000 MBCA 1, 185 D.L.R. (4th) 214 and R. v. Levogiannis, 1993 CanLII 47 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475 at paras. 27-28, 160 N.R. 371.

[296]      A recent Ontario case, Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 at paras. 10-14, reports a bizarre defective court authority OPCA concept. The trial judge adjourned a hearing and exited the courtroom in response to disruptive conduct by the OPCA litigant. That litigant, a self-declared sovereign man, then said:

[297]      The transcript indicates the clerk then responded: “No, you cannot.” The OPCA litigant left the courtroom. The proceeding continued later after first the judge and then the OPCA litigant returned. On appeal, Justice Coats concluded that the adjournment did not end the matter in the OPCA litigant’s favour, or permit the litigant to ‘seize control’ and end the proceeding.

[298]      A more global attack on the authority of the state has also been advanced as a defect that allegedly defeats court action. A good example of this variant is a peculiar argument that no post-1931 Governor General had a valid appointment because of a defect in the 1931 Statute of Westminster. That defect alleged cascaded to invalidate all post-1931 government legislation and action, including the operation of the courts and appointment of judges: R. v. Dick, 2001 BCPC 275; R. v. Lindsay, 2004 MBCA 147 at para. 32, 187 Man.R. (2d) 236.

[299]      Lindsay has also alleged that a defect in Queen Elizabeth II’s coronation oath subverts all government and judicial authority, as the Queen is “... constitutionally and contractually to uphold and enforce the laws of God as they are set out in the King James Version of the Holy Bible, which are the supreme source of law ...”: R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at paras. 31, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265. That allegedly collapses state and judicial authority. Unsurprisingly, the British Columbia Court of Appeal has concluded that argument has no basis: at para. 32.

[300]      All ‘defective court authority’ schemes face two issues:

[301]      OPCA litigants do not address either point. ‘Defective court’ arguments are bald allegations that the litigant deploys and then demands the court rebut. These frivolous arguments have a strong parallel in certain American OPCA concepts. Perhaps the strangest is reported by Jol A. Silversmith in “The "Missing Thirteenth Amendment": Constitutional Nonsense and Titles of Nobility”, 8 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 577 (April 1999). That paper documents how certain U.S. OPCA litigants allege that a secret and lost U.S. Constitutional Amendment subverts the authority of judges and lawyers by stripping their status as American citizens because they are petty British nobility, “esquires”.

[302]      Another branch of the immunity category flows from an argument that a person has some status or has undertaken certain steps that renders the OPCA litigant immune to court action. I have given this category the name ‘magic hats’ to capture the manner in which OPCA gurus and litigants approach these arguments. They freely wear, remove, and switch ‘magic hats’ as need be. Many OPCA schemes are a combination, or succession, of ‘magic hats’.

[303]      The manner in which ‘magic hat’ schemes are presented is sometimes entirely arbitrary; a litigant only need say “I am a sovereign man”, or “I am a Freeman-on-the-Land”, and then are allegedly rendered immune to state and court action, all without any other further effort, explanation, or rationale. Some litigants go further: Gravlin et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce et al, 2005 BCSC 839 at para. 24, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447 reports a litigant who filed an “Affidavit of Non-Participation in Commercial Activity” that announced “I am immune from the Jurisdiction of any Court in Canada.”

[304]      Sometimes a ‘magic hat’ is accompanied by a theoretical context to explain the operation of the ‘magic hat’. Mr. Meads, for example, explained his immunity to state and court action via his choice to be subject to “God’s law”, the “Maximus of Law”, which applies to him as he is a “living flesh and blood sentient-man”.

[305]      In these Reasons I will survey and categorize the plethora of ‘magic hats’ that are reported in Canadian jurisprudence and that have also been identified by this Court. There are three special categories of ‘magic hat’ schemes that will be reviewed separately because of their complex nature and due to the variations in which they are often expressed, that:

[306]      I will first examine and catalogue the simpler ‘magic hats’. These are not so much separate and distinct categories, but instead potentially useful groups for analysis and review. Sometime a particular ‘magic hat’ will fall into more than one group, depending on how it is expressed (or worn).

[307]      Many OPCA litigants argue that they cannot be the target of state sanction or legal obligation because they are not subject to that kind of obligation. These arguments are often bizarre. For example, Warman, then represented by Lindsay, (unsuccessfully) argued that the Criminal Code only applies to “fictitious persons”, and not “a sovereign, flesh and blood living man”: R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510 at paras. 9-10, 13-14. That was “... rejected as being without any legal, historical or constitutional foundation whatsoever.”: para. 14. A similar argument that only corporations, and not human beings, are subject to Canadian law was addressed and rejected in Waterloo (Regional Municipality) v. Bydeley, 2010 ONCJ 740 at para. 54, affirmed 2011 ONCJ 842, affirmed [2011] O.J. No. 6282 (QL) (Ont. C.A.), see also Winningham v. Canada where the litigant claimed the Criminal Code only applies to “corporations and fictitious persons”.

[308]      In R. v. Martin, 2012 NSPC 73 at para. 10 a Detaxer interpreted Charter, s. 32 to indicate that all Canadian law only applies to entities that advance government policy, programs, or functions. That proposition was rejected.

[309]      Another school of the ‘exempt’ category claims the OPCA litigant is immune because of an association with some foreign nation‑state, or aboriginal affiliation. These jurisdictions are often imaginary. This concept is popular among American OPCA litigants. For example, my office occasionally receives complex documents from persons who claim to be citizens of Texas, an independent nation‑state. On that basis, they claim immunity from traffic tickets issued in Alberta. Persons in this category will manufacture their own ‘national’ identification and license plates. Winningham attempted this approach, but also claimed to be an ambassador of the “Nation of Texas”: Winningham v. Canada.

[310]      Aboriginal status (real or fictitious) is another basis that allegedly provides immunity to court action or income tax obligation: Bloom v. Canada, 2010 FC 621 at paras. 3, 16, [2010] 5 C.T.C. 143; R. v. Crischuk, 2010 BCSC 716 at paras. 26-29, affirmed 2010 BCCA 391, 2010 D.T.C. 5141; see also Louison v. Ochapowace Indian Band #71, 2011 SKQB 87, 369 Sask.R. 258, affirmed 2011 SKCA 119 for a general commentary on the effect of pre-colonial occupation of lands. This court has received correspondence from “The Tacit Supreme In Law Court” of the “Sovran Nations Embassies of Mother Earth” which appears to combine aboriginal status and claimed nation status as a basis for immunity.

[311]      An interesting variation on the aboriginal immunity concept is advanced by Henry as “:Chief : Nanya-Shaabu: El: of the At-sik-hata Nation of Yamassee Moors.” Henry not only claims to be the head of an independent nation‑state and aboriginal community, but that his tribe owns Canada. He now demands rent. Henry has at times filed bizarre and elaborate documents with this Court that appear intended to assert and enforce that ownership. I agree with Justice Sanderman’s succinct evaluation of Henry’s claims as “total gibberish”: Henry Estate v. Alberta Health Services, 2011 ABQB 113. Similarly, “Moorish” affiliation, in this case membership in the “Moorish Divine and National Movement of North America”, did not provide inherent jurisdiction or a capacity to trump Canadian legislation, administrative tribunals, or the courts: Shakes v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 CanLII 60494 at para. 33 (I.R.B.).

[312]      Henry also has worn a literal ‘magic hat’! In the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Henry v. Starwood Hotels (1 September 2010) Edmonton 1003‑01152 (Alberta Q.B.) before Justice Shelley, Henry appeared wearing what is best described as ceremonial garb, with a robe and red fez, that he indicated had special significance. Subsequently, Henry has appeared in Chambers wearing what appeared to be a lawyer’s robes. It seems that Moorish Law advocates place special weight on court dress, particularly since Henry appealed Justice Shelley’s findings in part on the basis that he had garbed himself in a manner appropriate for the occasion, but she had not: Henry v. Starwood Hotels, 2010 ABCA 367 at para. 4, leave refused [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 475.

[313]      Unsurprisingly, the Detaxers have developed their own “exempt” arguments as to why they should not have to pay income tax. I have previously commented on the thoroughly discredited argument that only corporations are taxpayers: R. v. Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767 at para. 19, 93 O.R. (3d) 81, leave refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 522; R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at para. 27, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265; R. v. Pinno, 2002 SKPC 118 at paras. 12-13, 15-16, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 308; Kennedy v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2000 CanLII 22837 (ON SC), [2000] 4 C.T.C. 186, 2000 D.T.C. 6524 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). Justice Myers put it as well as anyone in Porisky Trial Decision at para. 58:

[314]      Similarly, a claim that the obligation to pay tax falls solely on government employees was rejected in Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 at para. 5. I believe this is a literal application of what I understand to be a common American OPCA argument that the Internal Revenue Service classifies and penalizes as a “frivolous tax argument”, for example: McAffee v. United States, 84 A.F.T.R. 2d 99 (N.D.Ga. 1999)

[315]      Obligation to adhere to motor vehicle licensing, registration, and insurance seems to have spawned considerable OPCA litigant activity. One apparently common argument is that the OPCA litigant is not subject to those requirements because that legislation only applies to either commercial vehicles (Waterloo (Regional Municipality) v. Bydeley, 2010 ONCJ 740 at paras. 35-38, affirmed 2011 ONCJ 842, affirmed [2011] O.J. No. 6282 (QL) (Ont. C.A.)), or vehicles operated by corporations (R. v. Kaasgaard, 2011 MBQB 256 at paras. 8-9).

[316]      Similarly, courts have rejected arguments that a “driver” in motor vehicle legislation is restricted to obsolete interpretations of that definition: persons who direct horse-drawn vehicles, or persons whose profession involves moving livestock (Waterloo (Regional Municipality) v. Bydeley, 2010 ONCJ 740 at paras. 39-46, affirmed 2011 ONCJ 842, affirmed [2011] O.J. No. 6282 (QL) (Ont. C.A.)). This case reports the quite common OPCA litigant strategy of only citing historic rather than current references: para. 39. The failure of this and related arguments was summarized by Justice Stinson in this manner at para. 56:

[317]      Another common variation on the ‘immunity’ category is that a unilateral declaration of some form may defeat state and court authority. This concept is closely associated with the Sovereign Man and Freeman-on-the-Land movements, but also emerges in other contexts. The ‘immune declaration’ concept is interwoven into the general ‘obligation requires agreement’ OPCA strategy category, later reviewed in more detail.

[318]      Of course, it is indeed possible to cease to be governed by Canadian law. One only need leave Canada and break formal ties with this jurisdiction. However, the ‘immune by declaration’ school claims a person can live in Canada but without any obligation or responsibility as a consequence of some special status, which has various names such as a “sovereign man”, a “freeman”, or a “Freeman‑on‑the‑Land”. This “immune by declaration” group often draws an arbitrary line between “statutes” and “common law”, and says they are subject to “common law”, but not legislation. Mr. Meads appears to have adopted that kind of distinction.

[319]      Often immunity is based on nothing more than a bald allegation of some ‘magic hat’ status that flows from a name-based category. Examples include a claim to be:

[320]      Attempts to unilaterally declare immunity to income tax obligations are not uncommon, see: R. v. Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767 at para. 20, 93 O.R. (3d) 81, leave refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 522; R. v. Klundert (2004), 2004 CanLII 21268 (ON CA), 242 D.L.R. (4th) 644, 190 O.A.C. 36 (Ont. C.A.), leave refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 463; R. v. Pinno, 2002 SKPC 118 at paras. 22, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 308; R. v. Sargent, 2004 ONCJ 356 at paras. 40-41, [2005] 1 C.T.C. 448.

[321]      Similarly, in Jabez Financial Services Inc. (Receiver of) v. Sponagle, 2008 NSSC 112 at para. 14, 264 N.S.R. (2d) 224 and Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2011 BCSC 696 at paras. 17, 45 the OPCA litigants declared they had “abandoned” their social insurance number. In Gravlin et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce et al, 2005 BCSC 839 at para. 24, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447 the claim of immunity was a consequence of a declaration the OPCA litigant would not enter into “commercial activities”, and therefore “I am immune from the Jurisdiction of any Court in Canada.”

[322]      Another common claim is that the OPCA litigant is not the person identified in the litigation documents: R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at para. 31, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265. This concept is usually linked to the ‘double/split person’ OPCA strategy category, so the OPCA litigant will then explain they are some kind of representative, agent, trustee, or guardian for the litigation’s actual target.

[323]      Given the obsessive focus of the OPCA movement for documentary and procedural formalities (real or imagined), it is unsurprising that they have developed a wealth of arbitrary name-related rules. For example, Canadian courts have evaluated and rejected the following nomenclature-related schemes:

[324]      Similarly, OPCA litigants have demanded that court documents, such as informations and summons, display their names in all capital letters: R. v. Lawson, 2012 BCSC 356 at para. 9, 2012 D.T.C. 5069. That, presumably, would then allow the litigant to claim that the all-capitals name related to someone else, and thereby go free.

[325]      Another ‘immunity’ ‘magic hat’ is an argument that the litigant is only subject to a different form of law than that which would otherwise apply to the present action. This category is arguably a facet of the ‘restricted court authority’ immunity group.

[326]      It is helpful at this point to make a few comments on the manner in which OPCA litigants often use the term “common law”. OPCA litigants often draw an arbitrary line between “statutes” and “common law”, and say they are subject to “common law”, but not legislation. Of course, the opposite is in fact true, the “common law” is law developed incrementally by courts, and which is subordinate to legislation: statutes and regulations passed by the national and provincial governments. The Constitution Act provides the rules and principles that restrict the scope and nature of legislation, both by jurisdiction and on the basis of rights (ie. the Charter).

[327]      Persons who claim to only be subject to the “common law” also do not appear to mean the current common law, but typically instead reference some historic, typically medieval, form of English law, quite often the Magna Carta, which, as I have previously observed, is generally irrelevant.

[328]      Alberta Treasury Branches v. Klassen, 2004 ABQB 463 at para. 25, 364 A.R. 230 provides an example of how this ‘mutant’ common law may be expressed:

[329]       Another example of the peculiar OPCA definition of common law is that certain litigants will claim to not require motor vehicle registrations, licenses, or license plates, because when they operate a motor vehicle they are exercising their common law “right to travel”: R. v. Peddle, 1999 ABCA 284 at para. 7, 244 A.R. 184.

[330]      The Courts have consistently rejected OPCA arguments that the common law trumps legislation: R. v. Sargent, 2004 ONCJ 356 at paras. 42-43, [2005] 1 C.T.C. 448. OPCA litigants also sometimes advance an ill-defined “natural law” which is the sole authority over “flesh and blood” or “natural human persons”: Alberta Treasury Branches v. Klassen, 2004 ABQB 463 at paras. 25, 32, 364 A.R. 230, see also R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510 at paras. 9-10, 15. This language also appears in Mr. Meads’ ‘fee schedule’.

[331]      Similarly, attempts to apply foreign law, very often the UCC, are without merit: Henry v. El, 2010 ABCA 312 at para. 3, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 138; R. v. Pinno, 2002 SKPC 118 at paras. 12-13, 17-18, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 308. A combination of these features is evident in the documents reproduced in Papadopoulos v. Borg, 2009 ABCA 201 at para. 3.

[332]      Reversing the more typical position that a court is restricted to an admiralty law jurisdiction, some OPCA litigants have instead claimed they are solely subject to that kind of authority: Ramjohn v. Rudd, 2007 ABQB 84 at para. 9, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 38; Papadopoulos v. Borg, 2009 ABCA 201 at para. 3.

[333]      Last, OPCA litigants and gurus tend to emphasize Black’s Law Dictionary as an authoritative source for Canadian law. One could say that this is their (legal) bible. For example, Mr. Meads explained to me that as he learned about the law, he discovered the true meaning of the word “license”, “an authorization to do something otherwise illegal”, from Black’s Law Dictionary.

[334]      This choice of ‘bible’ is peculiar, given that Black’s Law Dictionary is an American, rather than Canadian text. Of course, Canadian courts do make reference to Black’s Law Dictionary, but it has nowhere near the same relevance as, say, Justice Côté’s recent text, Words That Bind: Words and Phrases Judicially Considered by the Supreme Court of Canada and by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to 1949 (Edmonton: Juriluber, 2011), or John B. Saunders, Words and Phrases Legally Defined (3^rd ed.) (London: Butterworths, 1988-2007).

[335]      Further, it is not uncommon that OPCA litigants will cite obsolete, older versions of Black’s Law Dictionary. The second edition appears particularly popular, perhaps because it is now in the public domain. In court, an OPCA litigant may recite a passage from Black’s Law Dictionary and then demand to know how that is incorrect.

[336]      As discussed below in relation to the ‘obligation requires agreement’ OPCA scheme category, certain OPCA litigants attempt to frame interactions between individuals and states as purely a form of contract, thus allegedly negating the effect of legislation. This approach has been uniformly rejected (Sandri v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 CanLII 44282 at paras. 6, 13, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 811 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at para. 32, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265), as are claims that the state has no authority in matrimonial and family matters because that too is a contract between two private persons (Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 at para. 25).

[337]      Mr. Meads has advanced that latter argument. He says his marriage with Ms. Meads was a contract governed by “God’s law”, rather than the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp), and Matrimonial Property Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M‑8. Neither legislation provides for an alternative scheme of law, and so I reject Mr. Meads’ claim.

[338]      Non-religious belief has been advanced and rejected as a basis for immunity to state and court action. This has typically emerged in an income tax context. This is the chief theme of OPCA guru Lavigne, his thesis being that he should not be obliged to pay tax or presumably engage in any other activity that may promote thermonuclear war or cause mass murder: Jackson v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2001 SKQB 377 at para. 36, 210 Sask.R. 285; R. v. Reddick, 2002 SKCA 89 at para. 8, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 646.

[339]      In R. v. McMordie, 2001 BCCA 412, 155 B.C.A.C. 21, Justice Proudfoot, at para. 9, rejected a parallel argument:

[340]      Though perhaps disappointing to those who advance these theories, the fact remains that issues of policy are not ones that a court can review. As a consequence, the courts have no authority to evaluate the policy aspects that drive state processes such as taxation. This was clearly expressed in Giagnocavo v. Canada (1995), 95 D.T.C. 5650 at paras. 7-9, 58 A.C.W.S. (3d) 401:

[341]      Detaxers and other OPCA litigants have advanced a wealth of ‘magic hats’ that allegedly negate an obligation to pay income tax. Some relate to the relationship between the state and an individual, that:

[342]      Others allegedly relate to some kind of right:

[343]      Some OPCA litigants allege that the income tax system is in some manner fraudulent. For example, the OPCA litigant in R. v. Callow, 2000 ABQB 335 at para. 18, [2000] 3 C.T.C. 427 argued that filing an income tax return is committing fraud. Alternatively, in Bruno v. Canada, 2000 BCSC 190 at paras. 10, 34, [2000] 2 C.T.C. 16, affirmed 2002 BCCA 47, 162 B.C.A.C. 293, the litigant said the ‘alleged’ national debt is a fraudulent scheme to extract funds for the International Monetary Fund.

[344]      Unsurprisingly, there are a range of income tax related ‘formalities’ caselaw. For example, Detaxers have argued that the state must provide a fully amended and certified complete version of the Income Tax Act: R. v. Bruno, 2002 BCCA 348 at para. 7; R. v. Gibbs, 2006 BCSC 481 at para. 54, [2006] 3 C.T.C. 223; Iwanow v. Canada, 2008 TCC 22 at paras. 18-21, 2008 CCI 22; R. v. Fehr, 2002 SKPC 8, 224 Sask.R. 132, see also Audcent v. Maleki, 2006 ONCJ 401, [2007] 1 C.T.C. 212. They also have attempted to use a “certified copy” of legislation, here the Excise Tax Act, to prove compliance, where that legislation was subsequently amended: R. v. Nagel, 2010 SKCA 118 at paras. 13-14, 362 Sask.R. 145.

[345]      Some perceived defect in the 1948 version of the Income Tax Act has been rejected as a basis to invalidate the current income tax legislation scheme: R. v. Lemieux, 2007 SKPC 135 at paras. 31-33, [2008] 2 C.T.C. 291; R. v. Crischuk, 2010 BCSC 716 at paras. 48-52, affirmed 2010 BCCA 391, 2010 D.T.C. 5141; R. v. Crischuk, 2010 BCCA 391 at para. 3, 2010 D.T.C. 5141; R. v. Sydel, 2010 BCSC 1473 at paras. 24-25, 35, [2011] 1 C.T.C. 200, affirmed 2011 BCCA 103, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 191.

[346]      Other OPCA litigants claim that ‘income’ has a restricted meaning, and for example: 

[347]      There really is no question that the Canadian government is authorized to require individuals pay income tax or other forms of indirect tax. Further, the consequences to a taxpayer who simply refuses to pay income tax are clear. It does not matter on what basis that claim is made, that refusal proves the willful intention to evade payment of tax: R. v. Klundert (2004), 2004 CanLII 21268 (ON CA), 242 D.L.R. (4th) 644 at paras. 58, 62-64, 190 O.A.C. 36 (Ont. C.A.), leave refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 463; R. v. Ricci (2004), 2004 CanLII 33347 (ON CA), 190 O.A.C. 375 at para. 6, [2005] 1 C.T.C. 40 (Ont. C.A.), leave refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 551; R. v. Kennedy, 2004 BCCA 638 at para. 14, 207 B.C.A.C. 102, leave refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 15.

[348]      Last are several ‘magic hats’ that do not seem to fall into a convenient category.

[349]      There are several that relate to legislation. In R. v. Nagel, 2010 SKCA 118 at paras. 15-16, 362 Sask.R. 145, an OPCA litigant argued that the presence or absence of formalities of how legislation was printed, such as a coat of arms and “Queen’s Printer” notations, were significant. Another legislation-related argument is that a person cannot know the law unless legislation is “fixed, certain and accessible”: Audcent v. Maleki, 2006 ONCJ 401, [2007] 1 C.T.C. 212 (Ont. Ct. J.). The ‘magic hat’ was that if law is amended, it is no longer knowable. Of course, that too was rejected.

[350]      Finally, Ellis v. Canada (Office of the Prime Minister), 2001 SKQB 378 at paras. 23-27, 210 Sask.R. 138, affirmed 2002 SKCA 35, 112 A.C.W.S. (3d) 849 comments on an OPCA litigant’s attempt to use the common law “Petition of Right” cause of action, which has been abolished by legislation; see also Winningham v. Canada.

[351]      OPCA litigants and gurus often claim that they are, somehow, not subject to Canadian law (common law and legislation) and the authority of the courts in this nation to enforce that law. They are, of course, wrong, but it is helpful to explain why.

[352]      The courts in Canada are a separate, distinct, and independent branch of government. In Ref re Remuneration of Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I.; Ref re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I., 1997 CanLII 317 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, 150 D.L.R. (4th) 577, Lamer C.J.C concluded that the independent character of this and other Canadian courts flows from unwritten constitutional principles that have been inherited from the U.K. (para. 83) and are a separate and essential constitutional aspect of government, “definitional to the Canadian understanding of constitutionalism” (para. 108).

[353]      The authority of this Court, like other superior courts of inherent jurisdiction, does not flow from legislation, as does, for example, the Provincial Court of Alberta. Rather, this Court has inherited that jurisdiction as a successor to the English Royal Courts. Canada (Attorney General) v. Law Society of British Columbia; Jabour v. Law Society of British Columbia, 1982 CanLII 29 (SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 1 explains this Court’s genealogy:

[354]      That heritage reaches to the very foundation of an independent judiciary:

[355]      That history and its associated authority is described in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, 1998 CanLII 818 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626 at para. 26, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 1 this manner:

[356]      The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench and similar Courts are now Canadian courts, but these superior courts of inherent jurisdiction are the successors to earlier English colonial courts that predate Confederation: Valin v. Langlois (1879), 1879 CanLII 29 (SCC), 3 S.C.R. 1 at 19‑20. In Alberta, that ‘inheritance’ was expressly indicated in the legislation that created this province: The Alberta Act, 1905, 4‑5 Edw. VII, c. 3, s. 16(1). The general authority that this court inherited is restated in the Supreme Court Act of Alberta, S.A. 1907, c. 3, s. 9:

[357]      Inherent jurisdiction has two relevant aspects: procedural and subject matter.

[358]      A commonly cited description of that procedural authority is provided by I.H. Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 23:

[359]      That passage has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada on a number of occasions: B.C.G.E.U. v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 1988 CanLII 3 (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214, 53 D.L.R. (4th) 1; R. v. Morales, 1992 CanLII 53 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, 144 N.R. 176; R. v. Hinse, 1995 CanLII 54 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 597, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 54; MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, 1995 CanLII 57 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 385.

[360]      R. v. Gillespie, 2000 CanLII 26952 (MB CA), 2000 MBCA 1, 185 D.L.R. (4th) 214 includes some interesting comments on the scope of the general authority in a courtroom setting:

[361]      A person who purports to dictate when and how a Canadian court shall operate that court’s inherent procedural jurisdiction. In Canada, there is no right by a litigant or any other person to advance that claim or engage in that kind of conduct. The judge, and no one else, rules the court.

[362]      A superior court of inherent jurisdiction has a special general jurisdiction in substantive as well as procedural law. It is a clear and well‑understood principle of Canadian law that where a person has a right in law, there must exist some tribunal where that right may be exercised and defended. If no other court has been assigned authority to address a particular kind of legal action or subject matter, then that authority falls to the superior courts of inherent jurisdiction.

[363]      The Supreme Court of Canada considered this inherent substantial jurisdiction of provincial superior courts in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, 1998 CanLII 818 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626 at para. 32:

[364]      The Privy Counsel, then the highest court of Canada, commented on the authority of the precursor to the present Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench in Board v. Board, 1919 CanLII 546 (UK JCPC), [1919] A.C. 956 (P.C.). At pp. 962-963 the Court concluded:

[365]      Canada’s constitution authorizes the Provincial and the Federal governments to create courts in addition to the superior courts ‘inherited’ from the period of direct British rule. The Tax Court of Canada, the various provincial courts, the military courts, and the federal courts are examples of these ‘statutory’ courts. In certain instances a statutory court has been granted sole jurisdiction for a particular subject or a part thereof, such as authority granted in the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T‑2. The Tax Court of Canada:

[366]      Assigning jurisdiction to a statutory court has the effect of removing that aspect of this Court’s general authority, see Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net for a more detailed review of this concept. Suffice to say that a person’s right to approach a Canadian court for recourse is generally not a question of “is there a court?” but rather “which court can hear this subject?”

[367]      There are, nevertheless, certain limits. Some subjects are simply not justiciable, for example government policy decisions: Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, 1985 CanLII 74 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481.

[368]      The inherent jurisdiction of Canadian courts cannot be defeated by Parliament and the provincial legislatures. Administrative tribunals are sometimes ‘protected’ by what are called “privative clauses”, legislative provisions that say that all or part of a decision of that tribunal is final. For example, in Pasiechnyk v. Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board), 1997 CanLII 316 (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 890, 149 D.L.R. (4th) 577 the Supreme Court of Canada evaluated the effect of a privative clause that read:

[369]      That did not stop the courts. As Justice Sopinka observed at para. 16:

[370]      This fact is why the majority of OPCA arguments can never succeed. There is always a court, though perhaps not this one, that has jurisdiction over these litigants and their activities. They cannot opt out. All arguments that invoke ‘immunity’ and indeed any schemes that claim a person can possess or acquire a status that allows them to ignore court authority are incorrect in law. I note this authority is a phenomenon that flows from the historical development of constitutional government, and is therefore an aspect of the common law so often stressed by OPCA litigants and gurus.

[371]      As is made expressly clear in Board v. Board and Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net: for every injury there is a forum to grant the appropriate remedy. A superior court of inherent jurisdiction, such as the Court of Queen’s Bench, has the jurisdiction to address any Alberta matter that has not been delegated to another statutory court. The inherent authority of a provincial Superior Court is therefore very broad indeed.

[372]      OPCA litigants also fail to appreciate that this inherent jurisdiction is adaptive, and ‘expands’ into any aspects of Canadian legal existence that are not explicitly allocated to another court. In Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., 1996 CanLII 215 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 495, 136 D.L.R. (4th) 289 McLachlin J. (as she then was) confirmed at para. 5 that provincial superior courts had authority to grant an interlocutory injunction in labour disputes, even though labour agreements are considered a complete code, and even where that injunction did not relate to a cause of action that would be heard in a provincial superior court (at para. 17). Justice McLachlin observed that this authority flows from that fact that the labour agreement provided “no adequate alternative remedy” (at para. 6), and it was this gap in an otherwise complete scheme that gave the court inherent jurisdiction.

[373]      This adaptive facet of inherent jurisdiction goes so far as to allow this Court to intrude, when necessary, into domains that would appear to have been allocated to a statutory court. The Alberta Court of Appeal in 783783 Alberta Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 ABCA 226 at paras. 24-28, 322 D.L.R. (4th) 56 concluded this Court had jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Income Tax Act, if that was necessary for a given case. Similarly, Thomas J. concluded he may examine Indian band counsel activities, despite the jurisdiction assigned to the Federal Court by the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F‑7, s. 18: 1985 Sawridge Trust v. Alberta (Public Trustee), 2012 ABQB 365 at paras. 50-54.

[374]      The inherent jurisdiction of Canada’s superior courts defeats almost all OPCA pseudolegal strategies. No person can claim to be outside court authority because they are subject to no court or law, or a restricted kind of law. No ‘magic hat’ can ever create an exemption from court supervision. All these arguments are defective and fail as a consequence.

[375]      For a moment, let us imagine that an OPCA guru were to discover some new realm or aspect of law. Novel developments are not unknown. For example the last quarter century has seen many innovations with potentially profound legal effects, including the advent of electronic communications and genetic material as form of property. What would be the effect? Once identified, that legal domain would necessarily become a part of the jurisdiction of some Canadian court, and typically that would mean that the jurisdiction of this court would necessarily expand to include this new facet or aspect of law, unless and until it was statutorily grants to another court.

[376]      I am aware of one attempt by an OPCA guru, Frank O’Collins, to ‘invent’ a new and total code of law. This person, whom I understand is an Australian, has published what he calls “Divine Canon Law”, the law that governs persons in the “One Heaven Society of United Free States of Spirits”. At least one Alberta OPCA litigant has claimed to be subject to only this “Divine Canon Law”. Does this defeat the inherent jurisdiction of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench? Of course not. While I strongly question that a person could bind themselves and society to abide by some distinct legal scheme that trumps the common law and statute, success would still leave that person subject to the scrutiny and supervision of this court.

[377]      In summary, when a litigant claims he or she has found themselves in the wrong court, then that is a potentially valid question of jurisdiction. However, a litigant is wrong in law if they say that, at this time, they choose to not be subject to any Canadian court, unless they claim that the subject in dispute is the jurisdiction of another tribunal, such as an arbitrator, or the courts of a different national or provincial jurisdiction. A defence with that basis may be struck without further analysis. A denial of court authority on that basis should be ignored.

[378]      The nature and jurisdiction of Canadian courts, globally, defeats all the OPCA strategies and concepts identified and reviewed in these Reasons, including the ‘obligation requires agreement’, ‘double/split person’, and ‘unilateral agreements’ categories discussed below. The exceptions are the ‘money for nothing’ schemes that I will review at a later point. The superior court’s inherent jurisdiction is a single basis that may be adopted and applied by any Justice who faces a novel OPCA strategy, if that argument, at its core, reduces, subverts, or denies court authority.

[379]      A second common OPCA litigation category is grounded in a belief that all legally enforceable rights require that a person agree to be subject to those obligations. This strategy takes two closely related forms:

[380]      Persons who advance this concept extend it to interactions between state actors, including Canada and the provinces, and individual persons. This is a kind of ‘magic hat’; the OPCA litigant says he or she has not agreed to be governed or subject to court authority, and the OPCA litigant is therefore allegedly immune.

[381]      Sometimes OPCA litigants and gurus express this global concept as that they only engage in commerce; this seems to be an attempt to declare that any interaction between persons and/or state actors is a contract. This may explain the curious but common manner in which I find myself addressed in OPCA correspondence, “John Rooke, carrying out business as Associate Chief Justice John Rooke”.

[382]      A necessary first step in any ‘everything is a contract’ or ‘consent is required’ scheme is that the OPCA litigant develop a mechanism that denies a unilateral obligation can arise from legislation.

[383]      Some OPCA litigants argue they have opted out of legislated obligations: Sydorenko v. Manitoba, 2012 MBQB 42 at paras. 17-18. Others simply claim consent is required, otherwise legislation is a set of optional guidelines: Waterloo (Regional Municipality) v. Bydeley, 2010 ONCJ 740 at para. 56, affirmed 2011 ONCJ 842, affirmed [2011] O.J. No. 6282 (QL) (Ont. C.A.); Bank of Montreal v. McCance, 2012 ABQB 537 at para. 29.

[384]      Another OPCA approach is to argue that a court or government actor is a corporation and therefore only has the rights of a corporation: Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309. The result is a claim that legislation has no more special meaning than any unilateral declaration. A telltale indication of this scheme is that a litigant files corporate registry documents for Canada, a province, or a municipality. For some reason, many OPCA litigants claim Canada is a “municipal corporation domiciled in the District of Columbia”.

[385]      Others wear a ‘magic hat’ that they say makes them immune from legislation, and only subject to the common law (which, as noted above, is often an aberrant definition of that category of law). In Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 39, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309 the ‘magic hat’ was being a “free will full liability person” under “Anglo-Saxon Common Law”. Freemen-on-the-Land take a similar approach: Harper v. Atchison, 2011 SKQB 38 at paras. 6, 15, 369 Sask.R. 134, see also Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2011 BCSC 696, and Jabez Financial Services Inc. (Receiver of) v. Sponagle, 2008 NSSC 112 at paras. 14, 18, 264 N.S.R. (2d) 224; Summerland (District) v. No Strings Enterprises Ltd., 2003 BCSC 990 at para. 19, 124 A.C.W.S. (3d) 39, leave denied 2004 BCCA 360, 131 A.C.W.S. (3d) 994.

[386]      Similarly, Detaxer gurus such as Warman and Lindsay have argued the that Magna Carta operates in a constitutional manner and invalidates legislation: R. v. Lindsay, 2008 BCCA 30 at paras. 19-21, 250 B.C.A.C. 270; see also R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510 at paras. 9-10, 13-14.

[387]      Of course, any other ‘magic hat’ or alleged defect that negates state authority would have the same effect. That is a reason why OPCA litigants have often focussed on some arcane flaw that collapses state authority, for example the alleged defect in Queen Elizabeth II’s coronation oath (R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at paras. 31-32, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265), or a flaw in the appointment of Governor Generals after passage of the 1931 Statute of Westminster (R. v. Dick, 2001 BCPC 275; R. v. Lindsay, 2004 MBCA 147 at para. 32, 187 Man.R. (2d) 236).

[388]      An OPCA litigant may argue he or she has no obligation unless the litigant has explicitly formed a contract for that obligation. In Canada this argument has frequently been advanced in an income tax context: R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at para. 31, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265; R. v. Pinno, 2002 SKPC 118 at paras. 12-13, 21, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 308; Banilevic v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2002 SKQB 371 at para. 10, 117 A.C.W.S. (3d) 549; Bruno v. Canada, 2000 BCSC 190 at para. 34, [2000] 2 C.T.C. 16, affirmed 2002 BCCA 47, 162 B.C.A.C. 293; Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 at paras. 5, 8; Sandri v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 CanLII 44282 at paras. 6,13, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 811 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309.

[389]      An interesting variation on this approach was made by Porisky, who at trial argued that if he did not want any government services, then he ought not be obliged to pay income tax: Porisky Trial Decision at para. 66. Though not expressed in quite that manner, Porisky seems to argue that he should not be bound in the ‘income tax contract’ as he has not received any consideration from the government.

[390]      In yet another variation of the ‘everything is a contract’ concept, a person attempt to sever all ‘contractual relationships’ with the state; success would presumably defeat all government authority. R. v. Pinno, 2002 SKPC 118 at paras. 22, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 308 provides an example where an OPCA litigant sent the Canada Revenue Agency a “constructive notice” that included this statement:

[391]      R. v. Sargent, 2004 ONCJ 356 at paras. 40-41, [2005] 1 C.T.C. 448 and Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309 report a similar strategy. A similar scheme appears to have been advanced by a Freeman-on-the-Land in R. v. McCormick, 2012 NSSC 288 to withdraw from a “social contract” with the state: paras. 28-32.

[392]      An OPCA litigant may also attempt to use the right of contract as a shield. For example, in Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 9, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309 an OPCA litigant challenged the court’s authority to refuse representation by an OPCA guru because:

[393]      The OPCA litigant in Sandri v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 CanLII 44282 at para. 10, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 811 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) took his defence one step further:

[394]      Sometimes OPCA litigants claim that their interaction with the court is a contract. For example, the OPCA litigant in Borkovic v. Laurentian Bank of Canada, 2001 BCSC 337 at paras. 4-12, 103 A.C.W.S. (3d) 700 argued he had ‘purchased’ a trial date by paying a court filing fee. The litigant then purported to direct court procedure: paras. 13-16.

[395]      OPCA litigants who adopt this scheme tend to identify practically any state document, even a driver’s license or a birth certificate, as a contract. CERI members explain that is the reason why they do not use driver’s licenses or license plates. They argue, in effect, that they do not wish to be in a contract with the state, and should be able to engage in activities, for example operation of a motor vehicle, without being bound to the state in that manner.

[396]      These persons go to great lengths to scour away all ‘contractual’ links, expecting that at some point the state’s authority will evaporate. The ‘everything is a contract’ concept may also emerge in a court context in another way. A OPCA litigant may, for example, demand to know whether the court is offering to enter into a contract with a litigant, or the terms of the contract between the court and the OPCA litigant.

[397]      Mr. Meads clearly adheres to the ‘everything is a contract’ concept. In his March 3, 2011 “""Good Faith Notice"" in the Nature of an Affidavit”, Mr. Meads says that a telephone call and a follow-up email from an Audrey Hardwick, who seems to have been the assistant to Ms. Meads’ then counsel, was an “Enticement into Slavery”. I am presuming here that ‘enticement into slavery’ is simply a particularly dramatic expression for contract obligation. Notice how simple receipt of communications is interpreted as a potential contract.

[398]      Later in the same document Mr. Meads adds:

[399]      Still later on in this same document is the following:

[400]      Once again, Mr. Meads is attempting to pre-empt formation of a contract. An analogous disclaimer in materials my office has received from an OPCA litigant read:

[401]      Interestingly, this seems to be the only instance where Mr. Meads saw notarization in this potentially dangerous light. Many of Mr. Meads’ June 19 and 21 documents also have been notarized, and some are directed to specific government officials, but Mr. Meads does not include the March 3, 2011 disclaimer. Consistency is not a strong point in OPCA litigant conduct.

[402]      The August 27, 2012 filings by Mr. Meads continue this theme. He states that Ms. Reeves has made “... an offer to Contract and/or Enticement of Slavery (Title 18 United States Code and/or Article 4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights) ...”.

[403]      Similarly at the June 8 hearing, when I made proposals to address disclosure by Ms. Meads, Mr. Meads responded with alarm: “You are enticing me into slavery.”

[404]       Earlier he alleged the same in response to activities by Ms. Reeves:

[405]      A second common variant of the ‘obligation requires agreement’ category is a belief that a person is immune if they simply say they have not consented to be subject to the law and the courts. Of course, this concept has not met with success: R. v. Jennings, 2007 ABCA 45 at para. 6; Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 at paras. 25, 29; see also Jabez Financial Services Inc. (Receiver of) v. Sponagle, 2008 NSSC 112 at paras. 14, 18, 264 N.S.R. (2d) 224; Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2011 BCSC 696 at paras. 17, 45.

[406]      Sometimes this motif emerges in documentary form. For example, this Court has received issued court orders stamped and returned with various messages, such as:

[407]       Various ‘magic hats’ may allegedly provide a basis for that declaration of immunity. Courts have encountered claims that Freeman-on-the-Land status (Harper v. Atchison, 2011 SKQB 38 at paras. 6, 15, 369 Sask.R. 134; Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2011 BCSC 696), or the Magna Carta (Harper v. Atchison, 2011 SKQB 38 at paras. 9-15, 369 Sask.R. 134; R. v. Jebbett, 2003 BCCA 69, 180 B.C.A.C. 21; Winningham v. Canada) nullifies government or court authority.

[408]      In R. v. McCormick, 2012 NSSC 150 at para. 9 an OPCA litigant argued the Freeman-on-the-Land ‘magic hat’ immunized against criminal sanction; see also R. v. McCormick, 2012 NSSC 288 at paras. 28-32. Naturally, that did not work. As Justice Moir observed in R. v. McCormick, 2012 NSSC 288 at para. 32: “[t]his teaching is not only wrong in the sense that it is false. It is wrongful. That is, it is full of wrong.”

[409]      A foisted unilateral contract can be an alleged basis for non-consent. One this Court has received concluded:

[410]      As with the ‘all relationships are contracts’ variant, OPCA litigants seem to see ‘consent’ emerging from very mundane activities. They may, for example, refuse to advance past the bar in a courtroom because that would ‘consent’ to court authority: Canada v. Galbraith, 2001 BCSC 675 at paras. 25-29, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 504; Mercedes‑Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at para. 8, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). The same reasoning leads this category of OPCA litigant to refuse to plead guilty or not-guilty, or to disobey an instruction to sit or stand.

[411]      A claim that the relationship between an individual and the state is always one of contract is clearly incorrect. Aspects of that relationship may flow from mutual contract (for example a person or corporation may be hired by the government to perform a task such as road maintenance), but the state has the right to engage in unilateral action, subject to the Charter, and the allocation and delegation of government authority.

[412]       Similarly, my authority over this dispute is not subject to the agreement or consent of either party. It flows from the inherent authority of this court, as shaped by legislation.

[413]      Either branch of the ‘obligation requires agreement’ OPCA strategy category seeks unsuccessfully to deny court authority, and operationally is an attempt by an OPCA litigant to restrict the scope of state and court jurisdiction.