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# **Community Effects of Law Enforcement Countermeasures against Organized Crime**

## **A Retrospective Analysis**

by

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Background and Objectives**

This project aimed to build upon the body of research on organized crime (OC) countermeasures by:

1. reviewing the literature and, in particular, studies that evaluated law enforcement operations; and
2. identifying and assessing the effects of several police countermeasures on security, well-being, and perceptions of safety in selected Canadian communities.

### **Methodology**

#### **Definition of a Countermeasure**

For the purposes of this report, countermeasures are referred to police interventions, operations or actions aimed at stopping individuals from continuing to commit or participate in an illegal act. The type of countermeasures used by the police is based, to a large extent, on the activities or behaviour of the participants.

To conduct this retrospective study on OC countermeasures, seven specific operations were selected. These operations varied across Canada and targeted different OC activities and groups that included biker gangs, Asian OC, Manitoba Warriors, and Eastern European groups. These countermeasures were selected, in part, because they were underway in the late 1990s and early 2000, a fact that enabled the collection of data following police intervention, and therefore a comparison to pre-intervention data.

#### **Review of Prior Literature on OC Countermeasures**

The review of the literature revealed few prior evaluations of OC countermeasures. Much of the information provided by the police agencies was descriptive and only focused on such factors as the number of charges and arrests, and materials confiscated as part of the police operation. These “body counts” were the main measures of success for each operation.

Unfortunately, these outcome measures tell us little about the disruption of a criminal organization, the effect on the illicit market, the effect on the crime situation in the relevant jurisdictions, or the effect of the police operation on perceptions of personal security, safety, and functioning of the community. Studies on police operations in other countries have shown that drug-supply reduction strategies have failed and even produced adverse effects, such as increases in crime and the strengthening of powerful cartels. Many of the initiatives lack a focus on longer-term outcomes and the conditions which facilitate criminal enterprises. Those operations that were successful have incorporated multiple strategies rather than simply a police crackdown.

### **Quantitative Data Analysis**

While several data sources were reviewed for their suitability in addressing the current research questions, only the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCR) and the General Social Survey (GSS) data sets were used in the analysis.

The UCR data were matched to each of the countermeasures and included offences most frequently committed by OC groups in Canada: drug trafficking, extortion, firearms infractions, prostitution, vehicle theft, counterfeit/fraud, gambling/illegal schemes, money laundering, attempted murder, homicide, assault, and smuggling. Unfortunately, the variable “organized crime by most serious violation for selected police services” could not be used, as this information was not collected until 2007.

Under the GSS, only the questions on victimization were used. This survey covers the geographic locations of interest and contains a number of items on perceptions of personal safety and feelings toward the criminal justice system. A discussion is provided on the limitations of selecting OC countermeasures, and the data sets used for this type of study.

### **Qualitative Data Analysis**

Finally, for each of the cities where a police countermeasure occurred, local newspaper coverage was examined. These were expected to place a greater focus on local crime issues than national newspapers. Articles were reviewed several years before and after the dates that



the police operations were active. These articles were collected through a search of a variety of data bases.

## **Key Findings**

### **Operation Springtime 2001**

The first countermeasure examined was Operation Springtime 2001 (Opération Printemps 2001), which aimed to destabilize the Hells Angels organization in the province of Quebec. When the GSS on personal safety for Montreal was examined from 1992 to 2004, perceptions of personal safety improved. This trend, however, also occurred in Quebec as well as in Canada. The improvement in Montreal and Quebec was more apparent but may not be specifically related to just the one police operation. These dramatic changes in perceptions of personal safety may also be attributed to factors such as the Quebec government's creation, in the 1990s, of the Wolverine Squad (Escouade Carcajou; 1995-1998). Other police operations were launched prior to Operation Springtime. This operation was conducted within the confines of the Mixed Regional Squads, which mirrored the Quebec Hells Angels by creating a squad of investigators to monitor the six biker club chapters across the province.

A similar trend can be found when the UCR data are examined. Typical OC activities appear to have declined, but much of this may be due to the combined operations of Wolverine and the Mixed Regional Squads, as well as other concurrent factors. The review of French and English newspapers reported on OC activities and various countermeasures between 1994 and 2006. The focus was also on the trials of those arrested as a result of the police operations. Few articles focused on how OC activities affected the safety of the communities.

### **Projects Kachou, Katalyst, and Kold**

The second countermeasure encompassed three projects (Kachou, Katalyst, and Kold) that focused on Asian OC in Edmonton, Alberta. Upon reviewing the GSS and UCR data sets, it appears that these three countermeasures had no effect – at least, none that was detectable using the outcome measures available for this project – on the perceptions of neighbourhood

crime levels, personal safety or residents' views on whether the police were doing a good job. Newspaper articles focused primarily on the trials stemming from projects Kachou and Katalyst. No newspaper articles were found on Project Kold.

### **Operation Northern Snow**

The next countermeasure examined was Operation Northern Snow, which targeted the Manitoba Warriors. The GSS data showed that the police operation had very little effect on Manitoba residents' perceptions of crime rates and the police, routine activities and satisfaction with personal safety. However, the UCR data suggest that the decrease in OC-related crimes may be directly associated with Operation Northern Snow, although there is no long-term effect on OC-related incidents. A review of local newspapers also revealed not a single article on the effect of the police operation on the safety of the community. Many articles focused on the social threats presented by Aboriginal gangs in general and, in particular, the Manitoba Warriors trial (e.g. cost of the trial, construction of the court house) and on the actual trial proceedings of the accused.

### **Projects Eider, E-Perhaps, and E-Page**

Another evaluation involved three projects: Eider, E-Perhaps and E-Page, all implemented in the Vancouver area. The GSS data for the years 1993 to 2004 indicated that, while the perception of those living in Vancouver and British Columbia fluctuated, any positive changes in the public's perception of crime cannot be linked to the three police operations. Also, the data provide no clear indication that these operations had an effect on the public's opinion of the local police. There was also no association between changes in OC-related crime and the police operations. Finally, only one article was found on Project E-Page.

### **Project OsaDa II**

The fifth evaluation focused on Project OsaDa II, which involved Eastern European OC members in the Toronto area. Upon review of the GSS data, no association can be made between this project and the public's perception of crime, public safety or the police. Further, the changes in OC incident rates cannot be linked to this undercover operation. Finally, there

was limited coverage in the English newspapers. However, a review of Russian newspapers or other Eastern European media may have revealed more articles.

### **Project Synergy**

The sixth police operation evaluated was a Calgary-based operation called Synergy. The focus of this countermeasure was to respond to violence between two warring gangs following several shootings and stabbings across Calgary. The GSS data showed a slight improvement in the public's feeling of safety with regard to walking alone after dark, which may have been due to Operation Synergy. A review of the UCR OC-related crime data shows no noticeable change in OC crime rates for the years following 2000. Notably, the content analysis revealed that the Calgary police announced that Operation Synergy had an effect on OC crime rates. Unfortunately, this trend could not be confirmed in our analysis.

### **Project Calvette**

The final project reviewed was Project Calvette, implemented in several cities, including Timmins, Ontario. Unfortunately, GSS data did not include smaller cities like Timmins (only Census Metropolitan Areas), and the reported UCR data had such limited information that it could not be used. The raw data submitted by the Timmins Police Services to Statistics Canada were not available. The review of newspapers focused on the arrests and trials of those accused and not on how this operation may have had an effect on the community. This review of the Timmins police operation illustrates the continued limitations of using existing data to evaluate law enforcement operations outside a larger Canadian city.

### **Conclusions and Considerations**

The findings from the GSS and UCR data, as well as the content analysis of print media stories, showed limited success of these police countermeasures on the public's perception of and actual safety. However, several suggestions are provided for future consideration in assessing the effect of police countermeasures. These include:

*(1) Need for performance measures on police OC countermeasures*

Police organizations in other countries are moving towards the development of performance measures to indicate whether resources are being used effectively and efficiently. For example, the Australian government developed a framework to measure police performance in domestic and family violence and the enforcement of drug laws.

*(2) The need for communication strategies on countermeasures.*

Consideration should be given to helping the police establish a corporate communication strategy to inform the public about their countermeasure activities. The literature on police corporate communications and the reporting of crimes suggests that this has been a challenge for police organizations, due to tensions between the media and the police.

*(3) The need to establish a database on countermeasures.*

Currently, information as to how many countermeasures take place in Canada, the nature of these activities, the police forces involved or the outcomes are unknown. Therefore, Consideration may be given to developing a national database.

*(4) Embedding prospective evaluation plans within countermeasure proposals*

Consideration be given by police agencies to build detailed, prospective evaluation plans into each proposal for a given countermeasure, and include the associated costs in the total estimated cost of the operation. These evaluation plans could be developed in consultation with experts such as academic researchers and professional program evaluators, and would describe the desired performance targets to be attained, as well as the specific qualitative and quantitative indicators to be used.

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## 1 Background

Organized crime (OC) has received considerable attention among policy-makers and law-enforcement agencies in recent decades. This development is due, in part, to the disproportionate harms produced by the illicit activities of criminal organizations and networks, as opposed to individuals and small groups. The increasing attention placed on transnational crime, following the events of September 11, 2001, has also raised the profile of OC and its potential interface with terrorism. In addition, the high-profile wars between rival groups, such as the blood-letting between the Hells Angels and Rock Machine unleashed in Quebec during the 1990s, have also been influential (CBC.ca, 2009). Moreover, growing claims that an increasing number of homicides in Canada are gang-related has generated further concern that this development reflects more activity on the part of criminal organizations (Dauvergne and Li, 2005).

An important milestone in the effort to control OC was the enactment of Bill C-95 in 1997. This law, colloquially referred to as the “anti-gang law,” defined the term “criminal organization” and recognized crimes committed for the benefit of a criminal organization. Bill C-24, passed in 2001, included an amendment that effectively criminalized membership in a criminal organization.<sup>1</sup> Bill C-95 also contained provisions dealing with the forfeiture of property used to commit an offence linked to a criminal organization and also for the forfeiture of proceeds of crime. In 2009, Bill C-14 further facilitated the battle against OC by creating three new offences—two of which aim to protect police officers—and by automatically making all murders committed by those affiliated with a criminal organization first-degree murders, regardless of whether they are planned or deliberate.

Other legislation passed over the last two decades has updated Canada’s drug laws, enhanced the search powers of police, eliminated the eligibility of individuals convicted of OC-related offences for accelerated parole review, and established new offences related to deceptive telemarketing, human smuggling, and trafficking. On an operational

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<sup>1</sup> Criminal Code of Canada, Section 467.

level, the emphasis has been on funding integrated, joint-forces enforcement units such as the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Units, the Integrated Proceeds of Crime Units, Integrated Market Enforcement Units and the Integrated Border Enforcement Units (Chorney, Linden, & Gunn, 2010).

In October 1998, the federal, provincial, and territorial ministers responsible for justice endorsed a joint statement on OC, establishing it as a high priority for public action. In September 2000, the Deputy Ministers' Steering Committee on Organized Crime tabled *A National Agenda to Combat Organized Crime*, outlining a shared federal-provincial-territorial plan of action to “deal with organized crime through a multi-disciplinary, multi-jurisdictional approach.” In addition to the coordinating role of the Steering Committee, the National Coordinating Committee on Organized Crime (NCC) was assigned the task of periodically taking stock of progress under the *National Agenda*. One of the first tasks endorsed by the deputy ministers under the *National Agenda* for its first year of operation was to begin addressing Canada's data deficiencies in the area of organized crime, recognizing the need for better sources and methodologies to measure OC's effects on Canadians, as well as the effectiveness of OC countermeasures.

An analysis by the Nathanson Centre for the Study of Organized Crime and Corruption (2001) confirmed the availability of limited statistical data in this area, but did identify existing or potential data sources. A feasibility study for police-level data collection was conducted by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (2002) and the most recently revised police incident reporting system (UCR2.2) of the Centre has begun to release very limited data on suspected links of criminal incidents to OC.

In 2001, the Measures to Combat Organized Crime (MCOC) initiative was established, involving Public Safety Canada, the RCMP, the Correctional Service of Canada, and the Department of Justice Canada. The initiative was allocated \$150 million in funding over a five-year period and \$30 million annually thereafter to further the development of research, policy and legislation, to promote investigation and enforcement, and to support prosecution. One of the significant challenges faced by MCOC was the collection of performance information.



In 2004, the National Coordinating Committee (NCC) Executive confirmed the complex methodological challenges of monitoring progress and evaluating specific initiatives. Prototype performance measures of progress becoming available at a broad macro level included the number, quantity and value of significant drug seizures at the border, seizures of suspected proceeds of crime, the number, degree and type of domestic disruptions of criminal organizations reported by the RCMP, the number and complexity of prosecutions of OC-affiliated individuals, sentence length of convicted offenders, counts by type of “gang affiliated” inmates serving federal sentences and numbers of intelligence files created by the Correctional Service.

Notwithstanding the growing availability of performance indicators, an assessment of the MCOC initiative by the Department of Justice (2004) has concluded:

“The quantitative data provided fell short of the data requirements outlined in the RMAF Results-based Management Accountability Framework (RMAF). Of the approximately 20 indicators outlined in the RMAF, matching data was received on only five. In several instances, data was provided that did not directly correlate with the RMAF indicator... The RCMP notes that research is lacking on the impacts of organized crime, and on existing awareness initiatives at the local and national levels.”

The paucity of quality performance indicators is a major reason for the dearth of rigorous evaluations of initiatives towards OC countermeasures. A review of evaluations of these countermeasures, commissioned by the Department of Justice Canada in 2003, found that much of the evidence was descriptive and anecdotal, and that the vast majority of the 18 OC suppression strategies identified in that review had not been subjected to evaluations of sufficient rigour to draw conclusions about their efficacy (Gabor, 2003).

## **2 Objectives**

The aim of this project was to build upon the body of evidence for the effectiveness of OC countermeasures by:

1. Updating the literature reviews undertaken by Gabor in 2003 and Melchers in 2007, with a focus on evaluations of law enforcement operations; and
2. Evaluating police operations targeting OC at a number of Canadian sites, using a variety of indicators. Traditional indicators included crime rates and evidence of the disruption of criminal organizations. Non-traditional indicators included the effect of the operations on community well-being and perceptions of safety.

### **3 Defining Police Countermeasures**

For the purposes of this report, police countermeasures refer to interventions, operations or actions aimed at stopping individuals from continuing to commit, or from participating in, an illegal act. The types of countermeasures used by the police are determined largely by the activities or behaviour of the participants.

In the context of high-level drug trafficking, for example, operations tend to be triggered by police surveillance, or some credible information viewed by higher-ranking law enforcement officials as being reasonably likely to lead to the successful takedown of key players. A simple complaint by a member of the public is insufficient to trigger such a costly investigation. Some solid intelligence must exist in order to initiate an operation against high-level traffickers (Desroches, 2005). The ultimate goal of police countermeasures is usually to disrupt a group, to arrest and charge the main players and to seize contraband and as much of the group's assets as possible.

In between the initiation of an operation and the final takedown, a number of investigative techniques may be employed to disable the participants or groups before they carry out any of their planned actions, or to stop any further actions. These techniques include:

- Physical and/or electronic surveillance to learn about a suspect's activities and associates (e.g., identification of a group's bank accounts to facilitate the detection of money laundering);

- Payment or other consideration to Informants for providing inside information about the group and its activities;
- Informant protection within the Witness Protection Program (Dandurand & Farr, 2010);
- Penetration of a criminal organization by undercover officers;
- Sting operations in which police officers may exchange money with, or buy contraband from, the suspects.

A plethora of surveillance technology and techniques have been used to identify targets of a potential police operation. In the US, the use of authorized electronic surveillance by federal and state authorities has increased dramatically since 1990 (Albanese, 2007: 258). The vast majority involved telephone wiretaps, and increasingly the recording of cell-phone conversations. In 2006, 80 percent of taps were used in the case of drug offences, while six percent involved homicide or assault cases, five percent involved racketeering offences, and three percent involved gambling cases. While the cost per tap has increased 10-fold from 1970 to 2006, 2.6 arrests and .41 convictions were achieved per tap in 2006.

The general view of electronic surveillance has been that the cost and manpower required may not justify the relatively small number of higher-echelon OC figures convicted through the use of these tools (Albanese, 2007: 262). For example, the surveillance of Hells Angels' chapters in Quebec in Operation Springtime yielded an astounding 270,000 logs, much of which has been referred to by Morselli (2009) as meaningless. The logs recorded interactions between 1,500 people. Issues also surround the interpretation of what is meant in intercepted conversations (e.g., is a "hit" a murder, robbery, or something else?) and whether the speakers are exaggerating or being deceptive.

The use of informants in OC cases is common. It has been said that the use of confidential informants is the most cost-effective investigative tool in these cases (Albanese, 2007: 262). Often, but not always, the informant is an offender who cooperates with authorities in exchange for a reduced charge, sentence or other

consideration. The aim is to generate information about high-level figures and criminal organizations as a whole. While informants are less costly and much faster in yielding information than electronic surveillance, serious questions exist about the validity of the information they provide and their credibility at trial – a case in point being the “biker trials” following Operation Springtime, where many of the key witnesses were criminals (one was a hitman) who turned informant on their *Nomads* chapter bosses, in exchange for more lenient sentences (Cherry, 2005; Sher & Marsden, 2004).

Working closely with informants may have a corrupting influence on law-enforcement agents. For example, in 2002, a former FBI agent, John Connolly, was convicted of racketeering for tipping off some Boston-area OC figures who were about to be indicted (Schreiber, 2001; Lavoie, 2002). Connolly simply got too close to the informant and hid the latter’s criminal activity in an effort to develop cases against other OC figures (Lyman and Potter, 2007:425).

However, the low cost of informants, along with their ability to furnish information more rapidly and with less risk than electronic surveillance or undercover operations, will ensure that they remain an important investigative tool in OC cases. One single informer in New York provided information leading to the indictment of 45 individuals from the Genovese crime group (Feuer, 2001).

Undercover investigations are not used as often as is commonly believed due to the length of time required to gain acceptance and develop information about a crime group. Considerable danger is involved. For example, in 2003, nearly 200 New York City undercover officers were transferred to less dangerous duties following the killings of two detectives, and complaints about the danger of these operations (Albanese, 2007: 265). Further, it is important to note that outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs), such as the Hells Angels, Bandidos, Outlaws, and Mongols, are notoriously perilous and difficult to penetrate for undercover officers, primarily because of the length of time (typically years) required to pass through the initiation process (i.e., hang-around → prospect → full-patch member), which often requires the commission of illegal acts. In addition, OMGs will now often hire private detectives to probe prospective members in order to screen out

possible undercover officers and informants, necessitating the careful construction of verifiable identities and histories for operatives (Marsden and Sher, 2006).

Despite the cost and danger, some undercover operations do manage to ensnare a large number of perpetrators. For instance, ATF undercover agent Jay Dobyns (a.k.a. “Jaybird”) managed to become a full-path member of the Arizona Hells Angels in Operation Black Biscuit (2001-2003; Droban, 2008; Marsen & Sher, 2006). Although the investigation was successful in leading to the indictment of numerous persons for RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) violations and other crimes, internal government squabbling ultimately led to many reduced sentences and dismissed charges. Somewhat more successful was an infiltration in the 1980s of the Bellingham, Washington chapter of the Bandidos motorcycle gang by undercover agent Alex Caine, which resulted in the arrest and prosecution – under RICO and other charges such as drug and weapons trafficking – of all but one of the Bellingham Bandidos and numerous affiliates (Caine, 2008). And for an example in a completely different context, a recent undercover operation in Tampa, Florida, arrested hundreds of customers of prostitutes whose services and fees were advertised on the Internet (Herdy, 2002).

Undercover investigations (particularly sting operations) must balance the need to apprehend individuals involved in compromising and illicit acts with the potential accusation that overzealous officers have entrapped people into committing acts they would not have committed without the encouragement of law enforcement. Leong (2007) has identified a number of criteria that can determine whether an operation has legitimately identified an instance of criminal behaviour or whether it constitutes entrapment.

These active police countermeasures against OC are aimed at detecting, disabling or disrupting their networks and infrastructure, controlling their access to sensitive knowledge and materials, discouraging involvement in these organizations and weakening their support and sponsors. However, it is also important to acknowledge that many criminal groups today operate in efficient trans-national networks (UNODC, 2010). These OC groups have fundamental advantages in acting with minimal risk, due to the

asymmetry of information (e.g., the OC groups have better information than others) to which they have access, and the ease with which they can select opportunity targets (Morselli, Gabor, and Kiedrowski 2010).

#### **4 Defining Organized Crime**

Many scholars and government agencies have commented on the definitional morass that prevails in the area of OC (Reuter, 1994; Gabor, 2003; Albanese, 2007). Commenting on the Federal Strike Forces established to fight OC, The General Accounting Office (1977) in the US observed that “there is no agreement on what OC is and, consequently, on precisely whom or what the Government is fighting.” Later in that same report, the GAO added: “Before a problem can be dealt with, it must be adequately defined. Participating Federal agencies cannot completely agree on what the term ‘organized crime’ encompasses.”

In 2001-2002, Statistics Canada conducted consultations with 11 Canadian police departments in an effort to assess the feasibility of collecting data routinely on OC (Ogrodnick, 2002). The exercise revealed that while the majority of the departments adopted the *Criminal Code* definition, most supplemented that definition with that of the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, the United Nations or some other source. It was also noteworthy that almost half of the intelligence units had no working definition of OC.

Albanese (2007:4) has compiled definitions offered by scholars over the last 35 years. These scholars have tended to emphasize the notions of an organized hierarchy, continuing enterprise, the rational pursuit of profit through crime, the use of force or threat and the corruption of officials to maintain immunity from prosecution. Based on these elements, Albanese offers the following “consensus” definition:

“OC is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are often in great public demand. Its continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, threats, monopoly control, and/or the corruption of public officials.”

Section 467.1 of the *Criminal Code* defines a criminal organization as a group, however organized, that:

(a) is composed of three or more persons in or outside Canada; and

(b) has as one of its main purposes or main activities the facilitation or commission of one or more serious offences that, if committed, would likely result in the direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including a financial benefit, by the group or by any of the persons who constitute the group.

It does not include a group of persons that forms randomly for the immediate commission of a single offence.

Section 467.11 of the *Criminal Code* makes it an offence to facilitate the ability of a criminal organization to commit a criminal offence, a provision some scholars view as an over-reach of the law, as an individual charged under this provision is not required to play an active role in that organization or even be aware of the illicit nature of the activity (Freedman, 2006). Orlova (2008), in her examination of both Canadian and Russian responses to OC, has found that legislation in both countries is excessively broad and vague, potentially capturing a wide variety of groups not usually associated with OC.

For the purpose of this project, the definition adopted by Statistics Canada in the UCR 2.2 survey was used as the operational definition of criminal organization (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 2008: 143). According to that definition,

“A criminal organization consists of a static or fluid group of (2 or more) individuals who communicate, co-operate, and conspire within an ongoing collective or network; and has as one of its main purposes or activities the facilitation or commission of offences undertaken or planned to generate material benefits or financial gain.”

This definition incorporates the notion of a group or network that engages in the rational pursuit of profit, that is a continuing enterprise, commits multiple offences and can assume different structures (static or fluid). It is consistent with and builds upon the

*Criminal Code* definition and shares a number of common elements with the European Union definition (Verpoest and Vander Beken, 2005). Moreover, Statistics Canada's definition is useful in the context of the present project because it excludes police operations dealing with more general public nuisance, disorder and violence issues (e.g., the policing of crime "hot spots"). Furthermore, it is consistent with the main elements of criminal organizations identified by 16 Canadian law-enforcement agencies in a survey conducted by Statistics Canada (Sauve, 1999).

## **5 Approach**

The principal aim of this project was to conduct, to the extent possible given available information, a retrospective assessment of the effects of police countermeasures on crime rates, well-being, and perceptions of safety in selected Canadian communities. Toward this aim, the following research questions were posed:

1. To what extent did the law enforcement countermeasure have an effect on targeted offences?
2. Did the law enforcement operations have an effect in the jurisdiction of concern?
3. To what extent do the data collected on the enforcement operations truly represent accurate measurement of these law enforcement operations?
4. To what extent do the variables (e.g., information from the Uniform Crime Reporting and GSS surveys) measure the effect of law enforcement operations?
5. How does one take into account a lag effect in terms of the effect of law enforcement operations?
6. For a longitudinal or time-series study, how many time points (pre- and post-intervention) should be included to assess the effect of a law enforcement operation?
7. To what extent can we identify additional outcome measures beyond those that have already been identified in the RFP?



8. Do the outcome measures used tap OC or simply specific (enterprise) crimes that may or may not be committed by a criminal organization or network?
9. To what extent can we measure the effect of police countermeasures on community safety?

To conduct this retrospective study, the following assumptions and limitations are recognized:

1. For the police countermeasures, the cost and the number of police officers involved and the number of individuals arrested or charged in each operation were not clearly known.
2. The operations were targeting OC groups as defined by the police. No information was provided on the structure of these organizations, the nature and changes sought in their operations or on their criminal activities.
3. Organized crime is measured as based on a tally of offences typically associated with the criminal activities of OC groups. Given the timeframe for the study, the data collected by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics on OC and street gangs was introduced in 2004 and hence was not available for analyses of operations prior to that year.
4. The data (UCR) used in this study were never meant to capture OC specifically, but were to relate to OC in more general terms. That is, for a given offence, the exact proportion of the incident counts linked to OC cannot be known. The inferences from the GSS data can be only generally related to police countermeasures or OC activities. While the UCR is designed to measure the incidence of reported crimes, these figures also include those initiated by the police as part of their countermeasure against OC.
5. The available data did not allow for measuring the effect of countermeasures at the community or neighbourhood level, as outcome data were available at the census metropolitan area (CMA) or regional levels only.

## 5.1 Identification of Police Countermeasures

A police operation qualified for this evaluation study if one or more investigative techniques were used against a criminal group or network involved in high-level criminal activity. Furthermore, the police countermeasure had to occur far enough in the recent past that a retrospective analysis of its effects could be undertaken.

The identification of police operations that targeted OC became a challenge. Unfortunately, there is no central record of these police operations. Consequently, police operations were identified by reviewing police-department annual reports, reports of criminal-intelligence agencies and other Canadian literature that focused on police operations. For example, Morselli and associates (2007) identified several police operations against bikers in Quebec, including the police operation called Springtime 2001.

Once the police operations were identified, the next step was to gain insight about the specifics of the operations. In recent years, the police services and intelligence community were more prone to provide a communication package that included a press release, the cost of the operation, the items seized during the raid and some background information on the specific OC activity or group(s) involved. Previously, the police were less likely to provide any information except for a press release. This created a challenge in understanding the specific location of the operations, the type of crime group that was the target of an operation, the objectives of the operation and, subsequently, the activities undertaken to meet those objectives.

Our team contacted the police services involved in the operations to gain further information. Unfortunately, the transient nature of police assignments and the possible retirement of many of the senior officers, hamper corporate memory within police organizations. This threatens the police services' ability to recall the investigations, the officers involved, or general information on particular countermeasures. Consequently, the information from the participating police services was, in some cases, very limited.

Where information on police countermeasures was available, access to that information was often restricted. Some police services asked that the researchers submit a request for access to information under Part 2 of *The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*. This process became too costly and cumbersome for the time available and it was unclear as to the type of information that might be released.

After a careful review, several police operations were identified. A key aim was to ensure that police operations were diverse in terms of the OC groups targeted (e.g, bikers, Asian groups, and Aboriginal groups), the illicit activities involved, the region in which the operations were based and the time of the operation. In order to focus on whether the operations had any effect on such factors as community cohesiveness, the aim was to select operations that occurred in the late 1990s or in the early 2000s, permitting analyses of several waves of follow-up data. Seven key police operations were ultimately selected. In some cases, where more than one police project had been implemented at about the same time and in proximity, they were selected and analyzed as one countermeasure. Some of these were large operations involving several law-enforcement agencies. The following operations were selected:

**Table 1 - Police Countermeasures Selected for the Study**

<b>NAME OF COUNTERMEASURE</b>	<b>YEAR</b>	<b>CITY/AREA</b>	<b>OC GROUPS TARGETED</b>
<b>1. Springtime</b>	2001	Montreal	Biker Gangs
<b>2. Project Kachou</b>	1999	Edmonton	Asian OC
<b>Project Katalyst</b>	2001	Edmonton	Asian OC
<b>Project Kold</b>	2003	Edmonton/NWT	Asian-based OC
<b>3. Operation Northern Snow</b>	1999	Winnipeg	Aboriginal OC
<b>4. Project Eider</b>	1998	Vancouver Area	Asian-based OC
<b>Project E-Perhaps</b>	1999	Vancouver Area	Asian-based OC
<b>Project E-page</b>	1999	Vancouver Area	Asian-based OC
<b>5. Project OsaDa II</b>	1999	Toronto Area	Eastern European OC
<b>6. Project Synergy</b>	2002	Calgary	Asian-based OC
<b>7. Project Calvette</b>	2004	Timmins	Transnational Criminal Organization

## 5.2 Review of the Literature

This project also involved a review of evaluations of police operations against OC in the scholarly literature. This phase relied on information from academic journals, policing and other trade magazines and government reports. A number of criminal justice/policing databases were searched. The websites of agencies, such as the Canadian Police Research Centre, the U.K.'s Home Office and the US National Institute of Justice were also consulted to identify any rigorous evaluations of law-enforcement operations. Of specific interest in this review were studies that have evaluated operations designed to control or disrupt OC.

## 5.3 Statistics Canada Data

As the present project involved the evaluation of law-enforcement operations against OC, we compared the nature and volume of crime attributed to OC, before and after each operation and in relation to neighbouring jurisdictions. OC was the critical dependent variable in our study. Two data sets were used: 1) The Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCR), which measures the police-reported incidence of crime in Canada and 2) The General Social Survey (GSS), which collected data on the nature and extent of criminal victimization in Canada<sup>2</sup>. The data sets were then matched to the respective cities or Census Metropolitan Areas. The exception was for the City of Timmins which is not part of a CMA. For the City of Timmins, only UCR data were used.

The GSS program as a whole gathers data on a variety of topics related to the social world in order to examine changes in the living conditions and welfare of Canadians over time. The goal of the GSS program is also to provide up-to-date information on social policy issues of recent or emerging interest. At the time of this report, the GSS had examined the topic of victimization in 4 cycles since 1988, with the target population for these cycles being Canadians aged 15 and older in private households in the ten provinces. Although there are varying areas of focus from cycle to cycle, common to all 4

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<sup>2</sup> For more information about these two surveys, please see. [www.statcan.gc.ca](http://www.statcan.gc.ca)

GSS cycles on victimization are perceptions of crime, police and courts; crime prevention precautions; and crime incident reports.

#### **5.4 Description of Data Sources: UCR and GSS**

Canada's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system, patterned on similar UCR systems put into place in the US, began issuing annual compilations in 1962. Today, the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Survey collects information at two levels of detail. The aggregate UCR1 survey collects ten data elements about the total number of incidents that are recorded by police classified and aggregated into offences type. The incident-based UCR2 survey began collecting information in the 1988 and reports much more detailed information, including characteristics of victims, accused and incidents by discrete incident classified according to an expanding list of offences. Reports for agencies using the UCR2 survey are aggregated for historical consistency with UCR1.

In 2005 an "organized crime/ street gang field" was added to the UCR to permit reporting police organizations to record known links to organized crime or criminal organizations. However this field has not at this time produced usable information. The number and definitions of offence codes are altered regularly. This creates difficulties assembling long historical series for certain offences. There are furthermore occasional shifts in local reporting practices that produce idiosyncratic numbers from year to year and across reporting jurisdictions.

The offences series from the aggregate survey count incidents, the unit of count for which varies according to the type of offence. Whenever an incident involves more than one offence, the survey classifies each incident under the offence that carries the longest maximum sentence under the *Criminal Code of Canada*. An incident may involve more than one offender and more than one offence. Data elements for the aggregate UCR1 series are compiled as independent series, including: reported incidents, actual or "founded" incidents, offences cleared by charge and those otherwise cleared, persons charged by sex and by whether adult or youth. Founded incident counts were used in this analysis.

A word of considerable caution is required as to relying upon police-recorded founded incidents as measures of trends in actual offences committed. These are counts of incidents known and recorded by police and furthermore are reported in manners which make them poor indicators of societal trends. Statistics derived from police reports also make for poor performance indicators in that they reflect the influences of the very police practices and priorities for which they are often set as standards. As police services become more proactive, orienting their efforts to community priorities and, hopefully, to those types of incidents for which a criminal justice response can be effective, the numbers of priority incidents will likely increase. This might then be wrongly interpreted as a “crime wave”, leading to less instead of more confidence in police action. Similarly there may be decreases in incidents for some offences resulting from changes in the way such offences are policed and police actions recorded.

Whereas criminal justice statistics are primarily designed to provide information on the caseload and processing activities of agencies, crime surveys like the General Social Survey (GSS) probe the experiences of individual respondents with some types of crime and with the criminal justice system. These are entirely different objectives and therefore it should not be surprising that information from one source is not easily, if at all, reconcilable with the other. Most victimization surveys simultaneously collect information about respondents’ attitudes towards and opinions about crime and criminal justice.

In 1985, Statistics Canada established the General Social Survey, a five year rotating annual cycle of telephone surveys designed to add to existing information on health, personal risk, education, work and family. The GSS cycle of surveys replaced a number of *ad hoc* surveys, including the Crime Survey. In 1988, Cycle 3 of the GSS collected among other personal risks some limited data on experiences of criminal victimization over the previous calendar year and on public perceptions of personal safety, crime and criminal justice of a random sample of over 10,000 households and individuals. Sample size was increased in 1999 from 10,000 to 26,000, providing more reliable estimates for smaller geographies and less frequently occurring response categories. The results of the

General Social Survey have become the standard source for information on personal and household victimization and perceptions of crime and criminal justice in Canada.

The General Social Survey (GSS) has since 1988 collected data on criminal victimization in the twelve months immediately prior to the interview on four more occasions, in 1993, 1999, 2004 and 2009. The release of data from the most recent cycle on criminal victimization is expected in 2010. The 1988 survey collected only very limited data. Thus, three cross-sectional cycles of data for a representative sample of the adult population covering many of the same items, were available at the time of this analysis.

#### **5.4.1 Variables from the UCR**

To identify the potential UCR variables, each of the police countermeasures were reviewed to identify the charges laid against the targeted individuals. This information came from the newspapers or was provided by a police agency. The charges identified in the newspapers were specific in some cases; in others, references were made to a criminal activity (i.e., gangsterism) or that charges were laid without any indication of the type of charges (e.g., under Operation Synergy there were . . . 288 charges under the Criminal Code and 166 under the Controlled Drug Substances Act“).

In addition, the offences most frequently committed by OC groups in Canada were also identified in a report by Statistics Canada called *Organized Crime Activity in Canada, 1998: Results of a "Pilot" Survey of 16 Police Services*<sup>3</sup>. These offences included: drug trafficking, extortion, firearms, prostitution, vehicle theft, counterfeit/fraud, gambling/illegal schemes, money laundering, attempted murder, homicide, assault, and smuggling. Unfortunately, the variable “OC by most serious violation for selected police services” could not be used, as information was not collected until 2007<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Sauvé, Julie (1999), *Organized Crime Activity in Canada, 1998: Results of a “pilot” Survey of 16 Police Services*, Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics,

<sup>4</sup> Only 2 police services reported data for 2007 with one of them refusing to sign off its organized crime numbers for release.



#### 5.4.2 Variables from the GSS

It was determined that only the GSS on victimization would be appropriate for our research needs (i.e. these surveys were most recently conducted in 1993, 1999, and 2004). The survey covers the geographic locations of interest and contains a number of items on perceptions of personal safety and feelings toward the criminal justice system. The questions from the GSS on Victimization included in the analysis included:

- Compared to other areas in Canada, do you think your neighbourhood has a higher amount of crime, about the same or a lower amount of crime?
- During the last five years, do you think that crime in your neighbourhood has increased, decreased or remained about the same?
- How safe do you feel from crime walking alone in your area after dark? How often do you walk alone in your area after dark?
- If you felt safer from crime, would you do this (more often)?
- While waiting for or using public transportation alone after dark, how worried do you feel?
- How often do you use public transportation alone after dark?
- If you felt safer from crime, would you do this (more often)?
- When alone in your home in the evening or at night, how worried do you feel?
- Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average job or a poor job of enforcing the law?
- Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average job or a poor job of promptly responding to calls?
- Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average job or a poor job of being approachable and easy to talk to?

- Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average job or a poor job of supplying information to the public on ways to reduce crime?
- Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average job or a poor job of ensuring the safety of the citizens of your area?
- In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your personal safety from crime?

## 5.5 Data Analysis

Given the limitations of the databases used for this study, this project used descriptive data analysis that focused on frequency of incidence. Significance testing was not carried out on the GSS because: (i) the number of respondents at low levels of geography is insufficient; (ii) the bootstrap method used for variance estimation is not usable for such small geographies; and (iii) statistical significance is not an appropriate proxy for the size of differences. Percentages of the incidence of criminal offences from the UCR, as well as responses to the community perception questions on the GSS, were reported for the city or region where the countermeasure occurred as well as for the province. For the GSS, these percentages were based on weighted frequencies, given the unequal probability of selection in the complex, stratified, clustered approach to the sampling plan for the survey.<sup>5</sup> This helped to understand any trends in the GSS data, which are presented in tables in Appendix A; Appendix B presents a graph showing trends in OC-related offences from the UCR.

### 5.5.1 Limitations of the Data

The GSS data sets used could be delimited in the case of Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA). This may be useful for those countermeasures that occurred in a CMA area (e.g., Toronto, Winnipeg, Vancouver). However, for the city of Timmins, there are no CMA-level data available on the GSS, nor are there any crime incident data that could be

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<sup>5</sup> The sampling weights are computed as the inverse of the selection probability:  $w_i = 1/p_i$ , where  $i$  denotes the respondent. Thus, respondents with a lower probability of selection for the survey are weighted more heavily in the estimation of parameters.

obtained from Statistics Canada from the Timmins police service specifically. Therefore, the analysis related to Project Calvette was conducted using only a content analysis of printed media, as described in more detail in the next section.

Furthermore, in the case of police projects in Vancouver, the specific location of the operation was unclear. If for example, the police operation occurred in the Richmond, British Columbia (BC) area, the UCR data would be limited, as crimes reported by the RCMP are excluded.<sup>6</sup> In the RCMP's jurisdictions, while serious crimes are reported to Statistics Canada, many of the other offences are only reported internally. Thus, in this case, the availability of data was very limited.

Ideally, multivariate time-series analysis would have been used, rather than a descriptive analysis of the dependent variables over only three time points. Time-series analysis assesses the effects of a given intervention while controlling for threats to internal validity, such as regression to the mean or instrumentation, which can otherwise lead to questions of attribution. This method was not used here due to the lack of a dataset with abounding time points. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), the authorities on multivariate analysis, recommend 50 time points for a true time-series analysis (Box and Jenkins, 1970).

Although the issue of meeting a critical cell sample size of  $n = 5$  was faced while exploring the GSS data, this posed just a minor problem, as this was only violated on irresolute response categories which were not of interest here (e.g., a response of "don't know").

A further limitation of the GSS data relates to the purpose of the survey. The GSS was not designed to relate specifically to enforcement measures; therefore, the survey does

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<sup>6</sup> For example, Richmond RCMP moved from the aggregate to the microdata UCR survey in 2003. A lack of functionality within their Record Management System to distinguish between established and un-established offences has affected Richmond's crime reporting. This has the net effect of artificially inflating their crime rate and lowering their clearance rate. Source: Summary of Changes over Time –Uniform Crime Reporting Survey: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-bin/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getMainChange&SurvId=3302&SurvVer=0&InstaId=15093&SDDS=3302&lang=en&db=imdb&adm=8&dis=2>

not measure changes in perceptions of many constructs that may be directly attributable to the countermeasures of interest. For example, the question, “During the last five years, do you think that crime in your neighbourhood has increased, decreased or remained about the same?” might have better served this project had it further asked if crime in one’s neighbourhood *related to a criminal organization* had changed within the last five years, and if this change was related to specific actions of the local police service. This weakness in the data places substantial limits on the attribution power of this project.

Some limitations may be inherent to any research on the topic of OC. For example, more substantial data on the activities of OC may be difficult to obtain, due to the sensitivity of intelligence operations or privacy concerns (Reuter, 1994:91). In addition, legal barriers may exist in gaining access to information obtained through electronic surveillance (Maltz, 1990:17). Also, information in intelligence files often has not been verified and may be inaccurate (Ogrodnick, 2002). While an extensive non-scholarly literature does contribute significantly to our understanding of OC, these works involve accounts of the experiences of investigators or prosecutors and biographies written by OC figures, often with the assistance of a journalist. However, such literature must be evaluated carefully, due to its tendency to be self-serving and sensationalistic (Gambetta, 1993; Firestone, 1993; Gabor, 2003; Morselli, 2005).

## **5.6 Content Analysis**

For each of the selected sites of police countermeasures, local newspaper articles were examined for any information that could supplement the quantitative data analysis. Local newspapers were chosen for the analysis as they were expected to place a greater focus on local crime issues than national newspapers.

Newspaper articles were reviewed several years before and after the date the police operations were active. The articles were collected through the Canadian Business and Current Affairs data bases, Canadian Newsstand Major Dailies database and Eureka. Although the contents of the articles, including the title, subtitle, and photograph captions are precisely duplicated in the database version retrieved from the archive, an exact

replica of the article is not accessible. The archive articles did not provide a photograph, but were provided in a standard word-processing format, so measurement of length had to be relative to that format rather than newspaper format.

For each content analysis conducted, key search words were identified. The keyword search pertained to the police countermeasures and included other words such as community, safe, and safety to ensure that we captured any articles that focused on safety or feeling safe in a community as a result of the police countermeasure.

Conducting a content analysis on this particular topic was a challenge. Many articles reviewed show that the media are confronted with a “must cover” event of police operations and continue to report on events directly related to that project. This includes the arrest and trial for each individual arrested during the police operation. These articles also lack essential information or any in-depth analysis. Some are mere factual reports, and there are few interviews of police officers, concerned citizens or of those involved in the trials. This finding is similar to other studies on content analysis and the reporting of crime through newspapers<sup>7</sup>. Given that print media in Canada are owned by a few companies, many of the stories published in different newspapers were very similar. In the end, few newspaper articles provided an in-depth analysis of the effect of police countermeasures on the surrounding community.

## **6 Previous Evaluations of Law-Enforcement Countermeasures**

Prior to the analysis of our selected countermeasures, this section provides a review of the research literature that updates the review conducted by Gabor in 2003, and at the same time contextualizes the current study within prior efforts. This review focused more specifically on the effects of law enforcement operations on community crime rates, well-being, feelings of security, and on the disruption of criminal organizations/networks.

### **6.1 Criteria for the Inclusion of Studies**

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<sup>7</sup> See for example. Tom Gabor and G. Weimann (1987) “Placing the blame for crime in press reports.” *Deviant Behavior: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, 8: 283-297

A number of scholars have commented on the absence of rigour employed by researchers evaluating the effectiveness of OC control measures (Albanese, 2009; Gabor, 2003). To demand a high level of rigour (e.g., experimental studies with random selection of sites) likely would exclude most research in this area. This review therefore adopted a methodologically inclusive approach, while requiring the presentation of some verifiable evidence, whether quantitative or qualitative, regarding the effects of a law-enforcement initiative.

To be included in this review, studies had to meet the following criteria:

- The focus was on research published from 2000 onward, although older works were included in the general discussion and analysis;
- The materials were published in English or French, although every attempt was made to cite other works when an abstract in one of Canada’s official languages was available;
- Works had to address the effect of a police operation—they could not simply be process evaluations;
- Works were excluded if they were self-evaluations by police departments using simple “body-count” measures, such as number of arrests and amounts of cash and drugs seized. The section below entitled “Canadian Law Enforcement Operations” contains a list of such Canadian police operations—these kinds of evaluations may be examined further in the future, where time and resources permit;
- The evaluation could use quantitative and/or qualitative measures or indicators of outcome;
- Evaluations referred explicitly to OC, criminal networks, or criminal organizations, although evaluations of crackdowns and other operations against street-level crime (e.g., prostitution, drug dealing), which could aid in identifying successful countermeasures against OC, were included.

## 6.2 The Search Strategy

Given the anticipated paucity of countermeasure evaluations in the OC literature, a multi-faceted strategy was adopted to identify relevant studies. The literature search tapped the following sources:

**Databases** - Scholarly databases consulted included the Criminal Justice Abstracts and the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (US). Keywords used in the searches included “OC,” “OC enforcement,” and “OC disruption.”

**Internet Search** - Google was searched using the keywords mentioned above.

**Textbooks and Seminal Articles** - The most recent editions of leading textbooks, such as those by Abadinsky (2007) and Lyman and Potter (2007) were reviewed for studies meeting the inclusion criteria. In addition, the bibliographies of seminal articles were reviewed for relevant scholarly works.

**Websites** - Government and law-enforcement websites were reviewed, including those of the: RCMP; FBI; Nathanson Centre for the Study of Organized Crime and Corruption; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center; Serious Organized Crime Agency (U.K.), US Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Intelligence Units (US), and the Australian Institute of Criminology.

**Project Authority and Team Members** - The Project Authority introduced some material to the research team. Collectively, members of the research team have considerable research and publishing experience on the topic of OC. All members were consulted regarding evaluation studies known to them.

## 7 The Effectiveness of Law Enforcement Operations Against Organized Crime

Albanese (2009) has asserted that research and the accumulation of knowledge about OC have been thwarted by an ideological approach to knowledge, resulting in a great deal of experience with very little learned from it. The standard policies used to combat OC have

not been evaluated, and their continued use has been based on belief, rather than on knowledge that they are effective.

As one assessment concluded, “it is incredible that more than 20 years of civil RICO litigation against racketeer-ridden unions has been conducted without any evaluation whatsoever . . . successes and failures have never been identified, much less documented or analyzed” (Jacobs, 2006: 238–239). An evidence-based review of OC control programs found that “despite all the legislative efforts aimed at OC and money laundering during the 1990s, there have been no major research studies in any key areas that conform to the normal canon of evaluation” (Levi & Maguire, 2004: 407).

An assessment of 18 separate OC control efforts concluded that “evidence of effectiveness of existing OC control strategies is scarce to the point of near-absence” (Gabor, 2003). An evaluation of 14 projects against OC in Sweden found they made “it more difficult for groups of individuals to carry out OC,” but no objective data are provided to support this conclusion (Swedish National Council on Crime Prevention, 2009: 96). The result is that after many years of experience, basic questions cannot be answered, such as: What should be the nature and duration of an intervention, and under what circumstances? Which remedial strategies work best and why?

## **7.1 Canadian Law Enforcement Operations**

Over the last few years, The RCMP have launched a number of operations resulting in searches, arrests, the freezing of bank accounts, as well as the seizure of drugs, firearms, and currency (RCMP, 2004-2005). These operations included:

### **7.1.1 International Cocaine Importing Network**

The sailboat *Friendship* was boarded off the coast of Nova Scotia and more than 500 kg of cocaine, valued at \$18 million, was seized. This police operation, referred to as “Colombie,” uncovered a major international network of traffickers from South America. The amount seized could have generated eight million doses sold on the street. This investigation subsequently led to Project “Coupure,” which made it possible to dismantle



a significant network of cannabis producers in Quebec. Eighty-three charges were laid against 15 individuals from various regions in Quebec.

### **7.1.2 Operation Against an International Cocaine Cartel**

Operation “Cruiser,” the Canadian segment of the US Project “Busted Manatee,” resulted in the arrest of five Québécois traffickers. In addition, 125 individuals, operating out of the Caribbean and North America, were arrested around the world for offences related to drugs and money laundering.

### **7.1.3 Project Outstay**

Launched in 2002, this project facilitated investigations into three separate organizations involved in drug trafficking in the Cornwall area. During these investigations, officers discovered a fourth network of smugglers. A dozen individuals from Montreal, Cornwall, Akwesasne, and northern New York were arrested and charged.

### **7.1.4 Project Metrotown**

In the spring of 1998, the police in Burnaby, BC noted an increase in calls for service at three apartment buildings, and drug trafficking activity at a nearby rapid transit station (RCMP, 2002). It was determined that the majority of those involved in the drug trade were Honduran nationals who had arrived in Canada claiming refugee status and used the apartments to produce and distribute crack cocaine. Potential buyers were drawn to the area, while area merchants were victimized, residents felt intimidated and school officials worried about the safety of students. The rapid-transit station allowed the drug traffickers to distribute their product to surrounding municipalities.

The response involved community partnerships, the City of Burnaby, the Burnaby School District, local and national enforcement agencies and several US enforcement agencies. Two taskforces were formed. One focused on traditional enforcement measures and the other on landlord-tenant and environmental issues. Initially, crime dropped; however, by the fall of 1999, the problem returned. New responses were developed involving community mobilization, addressing the issue of Honduran nationals entering Canada, the implementation of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

concepts and the formation of a joint forces enforcement team. The subsequent assessment revealed drug offences for the year 2000 were reduced by 49 percent from 1999. For the first five months of 2001, Criminal Code offences were reduced by 18 percent while drug offences were reduced by 91 percent compared to the same period in 2000.

The Organized Crime Agency of British Columbia (OCABC)<sup>8</sup> (2001) has also conducted some major operations. One recent initiative involved a criminal group, namely the Red Scorpions, exporting BC marijuana into the US and importing cocaine and cash into Canada. Investigators on both sides of the border seized about CAN \$600,000, three kilograms of cocaine, 175 kilograms of BC marijuana, an Astar 350 helicopter valued at approximately US \$410,000, and seven vehicles belonging to one of the principal targets.

In a joint operation between the RCMP, Vancouver Police Department, Canada Customs, and OCABC, links were identified between production of BC Bud and the illegal importation of firearms through the Port of Vancouver. Investigators seized 1,738 kilograms of marijuana and two semi-automatic pistols while investigators in Ecuador, the country of origin of the drugs, acting on information from Canadian investigators, seized approximately 4,000 additional kilograms of marijuana.

In still another project, investigators from OCABC, Surrey RCMP, RCMP Customs and Excise Section and Drug Sections, along with US Customs, targeted a group exporting BC marijuana into the US and importing cocaine and currency into Canada by boat. About \$50,000 in currency, 100 pounds of marijuana, a motor vessel, and a sport utility vehicle have been seized. Five individuals have been charged.

Intelligence sources on which OCABC relies indicate that some criminal networks have been disrupted as traffickers have ceased to transport drugs directly to California. Instead,

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<sup>8</sup> In 2004, the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit-British Columbia (CFSEU-BC) was developed in consultation with the Provincial Government as an initiative to integrate the OCABC, the municipal police departments and the RCMP.

they have re-routed their shipments to Toronto, through Calgary, then south to the US. This increases the cost of the commodity, the length of time for delivery and the risk of exposure of the offenders. OCABC also claims that enforcement activities have produced temporary disruptions in the supply of BC Bud as far south as Los Angeles and Mexico. Shortages in the supply of cocaine at the wholesale level have also been noted in BC. The agency further claims that OC figures have been migrating to less risky commodities.

At the same time, OCABC has acknowledged that enforcement activities in the Vancouver area have pushed marijuana cultivation inland, as well as to central Canada.

The agency has also noted a proliferation of clandestine laboratories for manufacturing ecstasy and methamphetamine as a way of circumventing pressure in relation to marijuana cultivation. The agency recognizes that shifting to these new operations, while disruptive to OC and requiring new manufacturing processes, equipment and markets, does not constitute a permanent disruption of these groups.

#### **7.1.5 Project Infiltrate**

In Alberta, Project Infiltrate disrupted a massive mortgage fraud operation believed to be the largest in Alberta history (Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, 2009). The discovery of a criminal organization swindling unsuspecting real estate investors out of nearly \$30 million began in 2003 when an Edmonton police constable working in a derelict housing unit shared information regarding significant discrepancies in property values. From this information, Alberta's Integrated Response to Organized Crime (IROC) unit became involved. A team was created that consisted of the RCMP and Edmonton Police. A total of 142 charges were laid in a scheme that involved 125 properties, more than 280 real estate transactions and 19 different lending institutions. Five Edmonton residents were convicted in connection with the scheme and one of the convictions marked the first time in Canadian history that a criminal was convicted of committing economic crimes for the benefit of a criminal organization.

### **7.1.6 Project Tandem**

This was a multi-jurisdictional police investigation led by the Ontario Biker Enforcement Unit and supported by law-enforcement agencies from the federal to local levels (Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, 2009). The investigation focused on illegal importing and trafficking in cocaine and hashish, the illegal distribution of firearms and proceeds of crime activities on the part of full-patch members of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club in Oshawa. The investigation subsequently spread to include six other Hells Angels chapters in southern Ontario. A total of 28 individuals, mostly full-patch members, were arrested and cumulative sentences totalling approximately 93 years in prison were imposed, along with the forfeiture of approximately \$644,895 in cash and seven vehicles.

### **7.1.7 Operation SHARQC**

The Sûreté du Québec spearheaded a major joint policing effort (Operation SHARQC or Stratégie Hells Angels Région Québec) involving municipal, provincial and federal police agencies (Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, 2009). This operation was said to have effectively dismantled the Hells Angels' infrastructure and disrupted their capacity to use communities in the Eastern region to carry out their criminal activities. Charges laid against accused individuals on April 15, 2009 included gangsterism, trafficking in a controlled substance, conspiracy to commit murder, and murder. The operation resulted in the seizure of \$5 million in cash, dozens of kilograms of cocaine, marijuana and hashish, and synthetic drugs. The Criminal Intelligence Service Alberta (CISA) (n.d.) has been involved in a number of major operations over the last decade. These include:

### **7.1.8 Project KLIU**

On January 18, 2002, the Calgary Police Service and the RCMP completed a joint forces operation in partnership with the OCABC, the US Secret Service, the Edmonton Police Service and Criminal Intelligence Service Alberta. The primary law enforcement partners worked with 13 other law-enforcement agencies, credit card companies and financial institutions, to dismantle an international counterfeit credit card ring.

The investigation resulted in 478 criminal charges against 63 people. It is estimated that this investigation prevented \$23 million in credit card fraud in Canada. Electronic data was stolen from thousands of legitimate credit cards at more than 100 stores throughout North America. The Calgary Police Service estimated that the investigation resulted in an 80 per cent reduction of counterfeit credit card fraud in Western Canada. The investigation yielded seizures of 126 counterfeit credit cards, close to \$1 million in cash and property, and thousands of items used to produce these fake credit cards.

### **7.1.9 Operation SHADOW**

This was the largest operation against the Hells Angels in Alberta (2000/2001). After an 11-month investigation involving the Calgary Police Service, RCMP, Criminal Intelligence Service Alberta and several other law-enforcement agencies, 27 search warrants were executed throughout Calgary and the surrounding area. Among the 51 members or associates of the Angels Calgary chapter, 275 charges were laid, including 213 drug-related charges and 55 weapons charges. Many were subsequently convicted. Significant amounts of drugs and weapons were seized either through undercover drug purchases, search-warrant executions or arrests. In addition, another \$250,000 dollars worth of property, cash and vehicles were seized as alleged proceeds of crime.

## **7.2 International Evidence on a Law Enforcement/Supply-Side Approach to Drug-Related Crime**

Currently, most of the emphasis of law enforcement in relation to OC on an international level is aimed at the drug trade (i.e., the cultivation, production, distribution, and use of

illicit drugs). This section examines the promise and limitations of an approach that aims to reduce the supply of illicit drugs, to punish those involved in smuggling and dealing, and to disrupt criminal operations.

Stevens and his associates (2005) present an overview of the global evidence on the reduction of drug-related crime. Their principal findings include the view that both crime and problematic drug use are linked to factors other than merely the supply of drugs; hence, solutions will involve wider social and economic policies. Their analysis of the available evidence suggests that supply-side measures against the production, traffic, distribution, and possession of drugs have not reduced, less yet eliminated, the drug trade and are therefore not cost-effective in reducing crime. They assert that examples of the success of attempts to reduce the importation of drugs into a country are rare, and tend to have negative rather than positive effects on crime. For example, they cite the Australian heroin drought, from 2000 to 2002, linked to the interruption of supply from Afghanistan, which saw heroin prices and crime rise, and an increase in the consumption of amphetamines (Bush et al., 2004; Donnelly et al., 2004).

Thailand's efforts to eradicate heroin production have also been followed by the increased use of methamphetamine. Stevens and his colleagues (2005) further note anecdotal reports that the first large-scale use of methamphetamines in California was associated with a cocaine drought, which inspired dealers and users to switch drugs.

Targeting those involved in the distribution of drugs also may not produce the desired result of preventing their use and associated crime. When the demand for drugs is stable, and supply is curtailed, profits are considerable, and ready replacements may be found for distributors who are incarcerated. The British Derbyshire Drug Market Project aimed to reduce the supply of heroin by arresting all known dealers, but found that they were replaced so quickly that availability of the drug was not significantly affected (Parker, 2004).

A major police initiative targeting drug dealing in London was followed by the interviews of 174 street drug users (Best et al., 2001). They were asked about drug price,

availability and purity. Only seven users reported price increases for any drug. The majority stated that there had been no change in any market features. This basic pattern was not influenced by whether the users were aware of the operation, whether they lived in the areas directly affected or by the number of different dealers they used to purchase their drugs. Little evidence from this initiative supports the assertion that targeted policing will affect the accessibility, price or quality of heroin, cannabis or crack cocaine.

Greater success has been claimed for the Tower Project in Blackburn, which used a combination of intensive supervision, market disruption and drug treatment for drug-related offenders, thereby attacking both supply and demand for illicit drugs. This project was accompanied by a significant fall in recorded crime (reductions in residential burglaries, robberies and car theft by 55, 57 and 40 percent, respectively, in the first year), although this fall began before the project started, and was similar in nearby areas not covered by the project (Chenery and Deakin, 2003). The evaluators suggested that the Tower Project can best be seen as “a crackdown consolidation” approach, which can sustain earlier falls in crime.

A study across the counties of New York State found that strict enforcement of drug laws between 1996 and 2000 was associated with increases, not decreases, in other crimes (Shepard and Blackley, 2005). State law-enforcement data found that an increase in drug arrests for sale and possession led to a significant increase in assaults, robberies, burglaries, and larcenies. Moreover, a 10 percent increase in marijuana-sale arrests led to 880 additional larcenies statewide.

Economists Rasmussen and Benson (1994) shed light on this counterintuitive finding. They note that police officers and departments as a whole must decide which laws to attempt to enforce and how rigorously. Increased resources directed towards a specific type of offence, such as drugs, lead inevitably to a decrease in resources dedicated to another offence. Law enforcement resource allocation, they argue, is a zero-sum game and any difference in appropriation is likely to manifest itself in delayed response times. “As drug crimes receive more attention from police . . . the queues for other offences must move slower as fewer resources are allocated to them.” This is of particular concern

when many cities and municipalities are losing police officers in response to budgetary constraints. Benson and his associates (1998) find support for this hypothesis. Data from Florida indicate that every additional drug arrest leads to an increase of 0.7 Index crimes. The authors surmise that increased law enforcement of drug offences has a dual effect: It directs resources away from the pursuit of Index crimes, and may drive potential economically motivated drug offenders into non-drug crimes (some of which may be more dangerous or costly to society), where law enforcement attention is not as greatly concentrated.

Efforts of law-enforcement agencies on a national level to reduce the supply and use of various illicit drugs have also been questioned. In the case of the United States, it has been estimated that source country control, interdiction, and domestic enforcement of laws relating to cocaine in the US do not produce benefits as high as their costs, even when the adverse effect on the source countries, for families of prisoners, and with regard to the victims of any increases in crime are not taken into account (Reuter and Boyum, 2005).

European efforts controlling OC have in general produced little effect. In early 2000, a questionnaire was sent by the Swedish National Council on Crime Prevention (2009) to relevant agencies in EU member states and other selected countries, requesting specific examples of both successful and unsuccessful initiatives undertaken to reduce OC. Respondents were asked to select examples pertaining to organized vehicle crime and illegal human trafficking. Questionnaires were sent out to 460 organizations. Just 16 respondents claimed some success in relation to vehicle crime or trafficking in human beings. Nearly all those invited to contribute were law-enforcement agencies. Many stated that no evaluation of the outcomes had been undertaken and most of the results specified consisted of numbers of arrests made and/or items (e.g., vehicles) recovered. Although a small number of replies indicated that the principal outcome had been the dismantlement of a criminal organization, very few considered whether the initiative had reduced specific opportunities for illegal activity that other gangs might exploit.

### **7.3 Effects of Varied Police Operations on Drug Trafficking and Crime**



On a more local level, Mazerolle and her colleagues (2007) conducted a review of studies evaluating the effect of drug-law-enforcement operations. Not all studies reviewed made a specific reference to OC or networks. Nevertheless, the research cited consists mostly of independent academic studies; their conclusions, while limited to the drug trade, are highly relevant to the present review as they address the consequences of a variety of police operations for drug use, drug dealing, and crime rates.

Four studies they identified assessed the effect of drug seizures on the price, purity, or availability of heroin. In three of these studies (e.g., Wood et al., 2003), drug seizures did not appear to have a street-level effect on the price, purity, or availability of heroin. These three studies also suggested that the seizures had no effect on drug-use patterns, drug-related deaths or overdoses, treatment enrolment, and rates of crime. Just one study suggested associated harm reductions due to seizures, as heroin overdose deaths declined (Australian Federal Police, 2004). One study suggested that drug seizures are cost effective, returning \$5.20 in associated benefits to the community for every \$1.00 spent (McFadden and Mwesigye, 2001).

Mazerolle et al. (2007) reviewed the effects of police crackdowns and found the following:

- (a) Crackdowns were largely ineffective in dealing with drug problems such as use, dealing, and drug offences;
- (b) Crackdowns appeared to have more success addressing associated crime problems, such as property and violent crime;
- (c) Displacement (both spatial and temporal) of drug and crime problems was a common problem;
- (d) Studies tended to find that crackdowns are only effective at reducing drug problems in the short term, although very few studies examined the long-term impact;

(e) Crackdowns generally do not align with the aim of harm reduction and tend to have an adverse effect on patterns of drug use, injection practices, and demand for treatment; and

(f) Certain communities (those more contained by physical barriers such as rivers and borders) and drug market characteristics (less entrenched markets) are more likely to respond to crackdowns.

Police raids were found to have some immediate effects on drugs, crime and disorder; however, these effects were short term and decayed rapidly on withdrawal of the intervention (Cohen et al., 2003). Furthermore, areas at greater risk of drug, crime and disorder problems appeared more resistant to the effects of raids (Cohen et al., 2003).

Mazerolle and her colleagues (2007) found just two evaluated interventions confined specifically to undercover operations, although such operations were often part of more generalized crackdowns, stings, and related law-enforcement operations. The two studies (one in the US and the other in Australia) failed to find any evidence of effectiveness of undercover operations on drug offences (possession, trafficking, manufacturing, growing), individual drug use, changes in supply or demand within the drug market or drug-related, violent or property offences.

Two evaluated search-and-seizure interventions, both in the US, were identified. The operations specifically targeted chemical drugs such as methamphetamine, and focused on reducing supply by targeting their manufacture. Findings from the two evaluated interventions were positive, suggesting that such initiatives can help reduce the number of operating labs and thus reduce the supply of chemical drugs on the street (Indiana State Police Department, 1997; Salt Lake City Police Department, 2003).

Mazerolle and associates (2007) also reviewed evaluations of multi-jurisdictional task forces (MJTFs). The majority of the tactics used by MJTFs fall under supply-reduction strategies; however, some demand-reduction strategies were also included. The evaluations revealed mixed findings. Although MJTFs produce large increases in police outputs, such as arrests in general and seizures, they have had no discernible effect on

drug arrests but rather only improved communication and perceptions of quality of efforts for the police agencies involved. One evaluation showed that focused enforcement toward crime-prone youth can be effective in reducing drug offending, but it proved less effective at reducing violent behaviour.

A Canadian process evaluation conducted by Schneider and Hurst (2008) has explored some of the problems that have beset joint force operations (JFOs). A survey of operational and supervisory personnel assigned to the JFO uncovered significant differences in the level of satisfaction with the execution of the JFO concept between members from the lead (federal) enforcement agency and those of participating municipal and provincial agencies. Respondents from participating agencies reported a high rate of dissatisfaction with intelligence dissemination and sharing by the JFO, with communication between the JFO and member agencies, and the contribution the JFO makes to the priorities and outputs of participating agencies in their own jurisdictions. However, the Schneider and Hurst paper is an evaluation of only a single JFO, and more recent research on multiple integrated teams and units shows general satisfaction with the quality of personnel, information sharing, and commitment of partners (Chorney, Linden, & Gunn, 2010).

Another form of law-enforcement initiative involves an effort to establish drug-free zones. Such an initiative is based on the assumption that features of the ecological environment create opportunities for drug and crime problems (Robinson and Rengert, 2006). Establishing these zones involves identifying areas prone to high drug and associated criminal activity and then banishing convicted drug offenders. The single initiative evaluated was a supply-reduction strategy targeting dealers of illicit drugs. The evaluation found no evidence of an effect of drug-free zones on drug arrests. Rather, drug activity became more concentrated and was displaced.

Thirty evaluated interventions have involved a combination of reactive/directed interventions (crackdowns, undercover operations, and intensive policing) and proactive/partnership interventions (problem-oriented policing, proactive tactics), drug-nuisance abatement, third-party policing, civil remedies, community policing, and

CPTED) (Mazerolle et al., 2007). Interdiction was also used in a number of the interventions. A number of drugs and drug-related offences were targeted and the majority of interventions focused on supply reduction. Twenty-five of the 30 interventions had data pertaining to their effects on drug outcomes, such as drug-related offences and arrests. Of those, 21 (84 percent) found positive effects. One of the studies reported no effect, and two found mixed effects—indoor dealing was reduced, whereas street-level dealing remained stable. About 80 percent of the interventions were followed by declines in property, violence, disorder, or total offences, as well as in arrests. Two-thirds of the evaluations in which displacement was examined found evidence of displacement effects, while a diffusion of benefits was reported in two studies. Improvements in the quality of life or community satisfaction were found in half the interventions, and fear-of-crime reductions were found in four interventions.

#### **7.4 Some Adverse Effects of Law-Enforcement Countermeasures Directed Against OC**

The limited number of evaluations conducted has usually failed to take into account the side-effects or unintended consequences of interventions against OC. Naylor (2000) has illustrated such adverse consequences in the case of Jamaican *ganja* farmers. If these farmers were driven out of business, they would move *en masse* into the urban slums, swelling an already enormous problem of urban crime that can threaten Jamaica's social stability as well as tourism, the most important source of legal foreign exchange. Banks and the country's exchange reserves could be depleted and hence stifle economic growth. Consequently, loans extended to Jamaica by both Western banks and international development agencies might go into default. In such a scenario, what begins as an effort to tackle a criminal-justice problem can develop into a full-fledged social and economic crisis.

Levi and Maguire (2004) add that disrupting OC groups and/or arresting their leaders may reduce overall levels of criminal activity, but this is not self-evident as some types of crime can be committed without the involvement of OC groups. Furthermore, action against dominant groups may lead to greater levels of violence, at least in the short term,

as competitors seek to take advantage of an opportunity formerly regulated within the illicit market (Levi and Maguire, 2004). The authors argue that it remains largely a matter of faith that there is some effect beyond the immediate operational outcomes (such as arrests or drug seizures).

The Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada (CISC) (2009), an organization that facilitates the sharing of information and intelligence among Canadian law-enforcement agencies, recognizes the resilience of criminal organizations, and that most criminal markets are highly resistant to long-term disruption. It is acknowledged that temporary voids in criminal markets will continue to be areas of opportunity for crime groups to exploit. CISC notes that some OC groups continue to display a resiliency in their ability to recover from law-enforcement disruption, or, in some cases, to remain criminally active during the incarceration of members. In addition, such incarceration can serve as the basis for new criminal collaborations and the upgrading of crime-related skills.

Hicks (1998) illustrates the potential counterproductive nature of conventional law-enforcement strategies by pointing to Operation Green Ice, a massive multi-national and multi-agency initiative targeting Colombia's Cali cartel. More than \$47 million (US) was seized and 140 bank accounts were frozen worldwide. Notwithstanding this apparent success, the disruptive and preventive effects appeared marginal. For example, the amount seized represented .16 percent of the cartel's annual revenue. While the enforcement pressure contributed to an increase in the premiums (commissions) to be paid for money laundering (from 6 to 26 percent), such an increase made it financially even more lucrative for those entering the money-laundering business.

Stevens and his associates (2005) also make the point that strict enforcement may actually increase systemic crime, by increasing the price of drugs and the incentives for offenders to use violence to control their distribution. It is further argued that law enforcement cannot, by itself, improve the socio-economic conditions associated with crime. Extensive programs are in place to reduce the production of coca and opium in countries such as Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Myanmar, Laos and Afghanistan, but overall

output has remained stable despite these efforts, due to the interest of a wide segment of the population in sustaining such output.

Garoupa (2007) adds that there is likely an optimal level of law enforcement in tackling OC. An approach rooted in suppression and severe punishment may reduce the dimension of the criminal network but it might increase the effectiveness of its members. Smaller firms are easier to manage and, consequently, fewer mistakes are committed, diminishing the likelihood of detection.

Drug suppression policies that focus on incarcerating those involved in drug traffic must also contend with the argument that imprisonment takes a toll on inmates' families and on public budgets (Currie, 1998). While prison may incapacitate inmates from committing crimes, it also may incapacitate them for employment once they leave prison. A policy based on suppression creates thousands of single- or no-parent families and contributes to the next generation of offenders. It drains money away from services such as health, education and family support, which can prevent crime in the long term. As will be seen below, credible evidence suggests that there are more cost-effective ways of reducing crime than increasing the imprisonment of drug offenders.

Another potential adverse effect of law-enforcement pressure in one jurisdiction or in relation to one form of crime or product is the phenomenon of displacement (Gabor, 1990). Displacement refers to the idea that offenders will merely adapt or shift their operations to circumvent the parameters of the police operation. Thus, in 2001, the OCABC reported that enforcement personnel were regularly encountering evidence that in order to evade prosecution, marijuana cultivation was moving from centralized locations in greater Vancouver to venues further up the Fraser Valley and into the interior of the province. There were also indications of an increase in grow operations being established as far east as Ontario. While displacement is notoriously an elusive phenomenon to document, the possibility of such offender adaptation must be considered before a final verdict can be delivered about the efficacy of a law-enforcement operation.

Perhaps the most extreme manifestation of the counterproductive nature of an enforcement-based drug war was seen in the US during the 1990s, when low-level marijuana users were disproportionately targeted. King and Mauer (2005) have argued that this policy produced an enormous growth in people with an arrest and felony conviction record and that these people faced many of the same challenges and obstacles as people who have been incarcerated (e.g., denial of federal financial aid for higher education, denial of entry to public housing and barriers to employment). The authors noted important policy questions regarding the growth of marijuana arrests and the effect on law enforcement and court processing resources. As states continue to struggle under budgetary constraints, the wisdom of making nearly 700,000 marijuana arrests annually, the majority of which would be dismissed or processed as misdemeanours, was called into question. King and Mauer assert that it is empirically evident that the growth in marijuana arrests over the 1990s did not lead to a decrease in use or availability, nor an increase in cost. Meanwhile, billions were spent nationally on the apprehension and processing of marijuana arrestees, with no demonstrable effect on the use of marijuana itself, or any general reduction in other criminal behaviour.

## **7.5 Summary**

This updated review of evaluations of law-enforcement countermeasures targeting OC continues to show that rigorous evaluations are seriously lacking in this area. Many operations are not evaluated at all. The majority that are subject to some assessment are self-evaluations by the same agencies responsible for the operations. Thus, independent evaluations are relatively rare. In addition, evaluations most frequently rely on “body counts” (number of arrests, amounts of cash and drugs seized) as the main measures of the success of operations against OC. Such outcome measures tell us little about the extent of disruption of a criminal organization, the effect on the illicit market, the effect on the crime situation in the relevant jurisdictions and the effects of the police operation on the overall health, safety, and functioning of the community in which the operation occurred.

The review also indicates that the attempt to suppress OC and its associated enterprises cannot succeed in the longer term without some complementary initiatives, such as demand reduction, and addressing those community factors and individuals facilitating criminal activity (Van de Bunt and Van der Schoot, 2003). For example, countless international drug-supply-reduction strategies have failed and even produced adverse effects, such as increases in crime and the strengthening of powerful cartels.

Responses to OC have often been ideologically driven and based on myth rather than a careful examination of the true nature of criminal enterprises. Until recently, these responses have made little use of coordinated, analytical, problem-oriented preventive approaches to policing. The field has been largely dominated by law-enforcement agencies and the most common strategy remains penal incapacitation of individuals, especially of “kingpins.” As the Director of the University of Cambridge’s Institute of Criminology has put it, “Every serious review of research on the deterrent effects of punishment has concluded that there is no evidence to support the belief that incremental changes or differences in punishments in individual cases, or in general, have measurable deterrent effects” (Tonry, 2004). Sophisticated as many of the law-enforcement initiatives have been, they tend to lack a focus on longer-term outcomes, and on the conditions that facilitate criminal enterprises.

Indeed, while open and direct criticisms of suppression strategies are typically concentrated within the academic rather than government sphere, there has recently been more official recognition that reliance on law enforcement approaches is inadequate, and even dangerous. For instance, in a recent report on transnational organized crime, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010, iii) points out that because “transnational organized crime is driven by market forces, countermeasures must disrupt those markets, and not just the criminal groups that exploit them. Otherwise, new criminals will simply fill the void, and new routes will be found.” In this same vein, they further conclude that

most of the trafficking flows... are the product of market forces, rather than the plotting of dedicated criminal groups. Demand exists for drugs, prostitution,



cheap labour, firearms, wild animal parts, knock-off goods, hardwoods and child pornography. The consumption of these goods apparently carries little moral stigma, and little chance of apprehension, in the circles where the consumers operate; the demand endures, despite dramatic adaptive shifts in the production and trafficking of the contraband. To deal with these markets, creative solutions are needed, drawing on techniques not necessarily found in the law enforcement toolkit. (p. 18)

Non-traditional approaches could include such things as community crime prevention, passive citizen participation (raising awareness and creating hotlines), regulatory disruption of enterprises affiliated with OC, routine suspicious banking activity reports, more vigorous enforcement of taxation laws, and foreign policy and aid programs.

With regard to the illicit trade in drugs, the most successful strategies have been those incorporating multiple approaches, rather than simply a police crackdown. For example, success has been claimed for the Tower Project in Blackburn, which used a combination of intensive supervision, market disruption and drug treatment for drug-related offenders, thereby attacking both supply and demand for illicit drugs.

## **8 Effects of Selected Police Countermeasures**

The present project aims to address some of the limitations of previous evaluations of police countermeasures targeting OC. For one thing, the present evaluation is arms-length as opposed to the numerous self-evaluations conducted by Canadian law-enforcement agencies (RCMP, 2004-2005). In addition, the present evaluation goes beyond the body-count measures typically relied on in these self-evaluations. Body-count measures provide a mere tally of arrests and seizures of cash and contraband. There is no baseline provided of such arrests and seizures prior to the police operation and these outcomes tell us little about the disruption of criminal organizations or the effect of an operation on the quality of life and security of the community at large. Indeed, Castle (2008, pp. 140-141) sharply and succinctly summarizes these issues:

What measures exist to show whether or not this approach is working? Old habits die hard: it must be said that Canadian police agencies, public safety bureaucrats, politicians and the media remain comfortable with the anecdote as a means of demonstrating success: the press conference with a stack of drugs on a table, identification of enforcement success against senior organized crime figures, or attention to significant takedowns and seizures at border crossings, are all frequently offered as confirmation of progress. However, more rigorous alternatives may be available.

As indicated in the next section, the outcome measures used in the current project extend well beyond the traditional police self-evaluation. Seven police operations were selected to assess the effects of police countermeasures on OC. These operations are listed in Table 1 (see Section 5.1), and are now described in more detail below.

## **8.1 Operation Springtime 2001 (Opération Printemps 2001)**

### **8.1.1 Overview of the Operation**

On March 28, 2001, approximately 2,000 police officers from the SQ, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Montreal Urban Community Police Department, and 23 other municipal police forces were involved in a massive series of raids against biker gangs.<sup>9</sup> Arrests were also made in Ontario by the Ontario Provincial Police Special Squad and the RCMP “E” Division, in Vancouver by the Vancouver Police Department and the Organized Crime Agency of British Columbia, and in the city of Winnipeg by the Winnipeg Police Service. Arrests were also made by the Jamaican police, and Mexican police with the aid of Interpol (Mexico) of two suspects who were deported to Canada—one from Jamaica and the other from Mexico.

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<sup>9</sup> The massive Springtime 2001 sweeps were made possible by two parallel police investigations: Project Rush, which focused on gathering evidence which implicated the Montreal Nomads chapter and their associates in plotting and carrying out assassinations of both rival gang members and justice system employees (two prison guards); and Project Ocean, which documented the Nomads’ mechanisms for controlling the majority of the cocaine and hashish trade in Quebec in the 1990s, as well as their money laundering and accounting methods. A testimony to the scope of the investigations and related events is the preparation of two comprehensive books: Sher and Marsden’s (2004) *The Road to Hell*, and Cherry’s (2005) *The Biker Trials*.

The objective of Operation Springtime 2001 was to destabilize the Hells Angels organization in the province of Quebec by targeting the outlaw motorcycle gang's leaders and members. According to the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (2001), the Hells Angels and Nomads controlled large-scale distribution of drugs in Quebec, particularly cocaine and hashish. In the gang's highly structured hierarchical system, the lower-level puppet clubs (e.g., Rockers and Evil Ones in the Outaouais chapter) and their associated street gangs performed the bulk of the activities, particularly the more dangerous, violent and overtly criminal activities. In Québec, the gangs were responsible for the estimated billion-dollar-a-year distribution of hundreds of kilograms of hashish and cocaine a month. With the exception of Sherbrooke, all of the Hells Angels chapters in Québec and their puppet clubs were required to go through the Nomads to buy cocaine. The Nomads and the Hells Angels controlled the sales of hashish because the profits were less lucrative, and therefore any outlaw motorcycle gang could select their own sources (Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, 2001).

After collecting evidence through intercepted conversations between the outlaw biker gang members, police surveillance, agents using concealed recorders and the gangs' books and records, the police conducted several raids and issued arrest warrants for 125 suspected members of the affiliates of the Hells Angels. They also seized money, firearms (including a rocket launcher), vehicles, motorcycles and illegal drugs.

### **8.1.2 Data Analysis**

#### **GSS Analysis**

When cross-tabulations of the year and survey item were run for both Montreal and the province of Quebec, a positive association between the passage of time and perceptions of crime became clearly apparent. When Cycle 8 of the GSS on personal safety was published in 1993, 13 percent of Quebec residents, and 18 percent of Montreal residents felt their neighbourhoods had a higher amount of crime than other areas of Canada (see **Table 2** in **APPENDIX A**); however, as the 1990s came to a close, that figure decreased

by six percent and eight percent for Quebec and Montreal, respectively.<sup>10</sup> A more dramatic change in perceptions of neighbourhood crime levels for both Montreal and Quebec can be seen in **Table 3** in **APPENDIX A**. In 1993, 49 percent of Montreal residents believed that crime in their neighbourhood had increased within the last five years. By 2004, this figure had dropped to 26 percent. This trend was observed throughout the province of Quebec.

Perceptions of personal safety, with regard to routine activities, also improved quite dramatically within an 11-year period, with the percentage of those respondents who felt very unsafe while walking alone in their area after dark surpassing the 20 percent mark in Montreal in 1993, and falling to six percent in 1999 and five percent in 2004 (see **Table 4** in **APPENDIX A**). This decrease is also apparent in the province as whole, but to a lesser extent. The dramatic change appears to have occurred when the police became highly visible in the news media regarding their commitment to fighting the biker wars. This increased visibility followed the killing of 11-year-old Daniel Desrochers in 1995, who died in an explosion that was set off during the Hells Angels/Rock Machine turf war. However, it should be noted that this change in perceptions of personal safety was felt across Canada as the percentage of those feeling unsafe after dark in their communities dropped from 11 to four percent from 1993 to 2004. This said, the improvement in feelings of security was not as dramatic as in Quebec and Montreal, indicating there may indeed be a relationship between perceptions of personal safety and an occurrence specific to the province of Quebec. Further, the dramatic changes during the 1990s also coincided with Operation Wolverine, implemented between 1995 and 1999 and which received considerable coverage in the print media.

This trend mirrored public perceptions of security in other areas. There was a steady decline from 15 to two percent of respondents feeling very worried while waiting for or using public transportation alone after dark in Montreal from 1993 to 2004, and a slight decline from 25 percent in 1993 to 21 percent in 1999, before a spike to 29 percent in

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<sup>10</sup> The confidence intervals can be quite wide for the small samples within CMAs.

2004, for those Montreal residents who felt not at all worried (see **Table 5** in **APPENDIX A**). There was also a steady decrease in those who felt very worried when alone in their home in the evening or at night in both Quebec and Montreal from 1993 to 1999 to 2004 (see **Table 6** in **APPENDIX A**). Despite these improvements in the sense of security, the frequency with which respondents either walked alone in their area after dark or waited for or used public transportation alone after dark remained relatively stable over the 11-year observation period at both the provincial and CMA levels (see **Table 7 - Table 10** in **APPENDIX A**). Thus, improved perceptions of safety did not necessarily translate to changes in behaviour.

From 1993 to 2004, there was approximately a 10-percent increase in respondents saying that the local police in Montreal were doing a good job across all police activities included in the GSS, and a minor decrease in respondents saying that the police were doing a very poor job. In Montreal, 55 percent of respondents in 1993 considered the local police to be doing a good job at enforcing laws, while this figure grew to 65 percent in 1999 and decreased slightly to 63 percent in 2004 (see **Table 11** in **APPENDIX A**). This trend was almost completely mirrored in the Quebec as a whole. With regard to whether the Montreal police were doing a good job at ensuring the safety of local residents, Montreal respondents displayed an increase in confidence from 1993 to 1999 and a slight decrease from 1999 to 2004. There was also an increase from 47 percent in 1993 to 56 percent in both 1999 and 2004 of respondents in Montreal who felt the local police were doing a good job at promptly responding to calls (see **Table 12** in **APPENDIX A**). Those in Montreal who felt the local police were doing a good job of being approachable and easy to talk to sat at 53 percent in 1993, then increased and leveled off at 60 percent for both 1999 and 2004 (see **Table 13** in **APPENDIX A**).

Finally, Table 14 shows that the public perceived the local police to be doing a good job of supplying information to the public on ways to reduce crime. For both Quebec and Montreal, the public's perception increased from 1993 to 1999, but declined in following years to 2004. This frequent trend of major changes during the 1990s and a leveling off in the early 2000s may be attributed again to Operation Wolverine, which occurred between 1995 and 1999 and essentially bled into Operation Springtime in 2001. However, without

testing for the innumerable possible intervening variables, it is difficult to draw more definitive conclusions about the causes of these changes.

The level of citizen satisfaction with personal safety increased for Quebec residents from 79 percent in 1993 to 91 percent in 1999 and increased again to 94 percent in 2004. This trend was more dramatic in the city of Montreal, where 73 percent of residents felt satisfied in 1993, 89 percent in 1999, and 93 percent in 2004 (see **Table 15 and Table 16** in **APPENDIX A**). Although there was an increase in Quebec and Canada as a whole, the increase in Montreal was more dramatic over the 11-year study period and may be related to the police's publicized commitment through Operation Wolverine and Operation Springtime. However, the available data did not allow for multivariate analyses that could isolate the effects of these operations and rule out the many other influences on public perceptions.

### **UCR Analysis**

With regard to crime incidents in Montreal that may be associated with OC activities, 1991 brought a high over the 17-year observation period of approximately 320,000. This figure decreased steadily over the data collection period to about 210,000 in 2008, as part of a trend that mirrored other Canadian cities, such as Toronto and Vancouver (see **Figure 1** in **APPENDIX B**). Within this trend, however, several data points of note are unique to Montreal. Firstly, Montreal saw a dramatic decline from 1991 to 1996. Incidents then spiked from about 1996 to 1998. This may be related to the influx of arrests associated with Operation Wolverine. It is important to note that both Vancouver and Toronto also saw a spike in incidents in 1997; however, in the case of those cities, the spike immediately fell again before 1998, whereas in Montreal the spike persisted for two years.

The incidence rates in Montreal continued to decline from 1998 to 2001, as with Toronto and Vancouver, with a small spike in incidents in 2001. This small spike coincides with the arrests made during Operation Springtime. Following 2001, incidence rates continued to taper off until the final data collection point in 2008. It cannot be determined whether

the ongoing decrease in incidents, beginning in the early 2000s, indicated a lasting effect of Springtime, or if this decline was part of a large-scale decrease in OC-related incidents in Canada during the same time period. However, this long-term overall decline in incidents in Montreal, which began in 1991, does coincide with improved attitudes toward public safety seen in the GSS data between 1993 and 2004.

### **8.1.3 Data from the Montreal Urban Police**

In addition to the data from Statistics Canada, the Montreal Urban Police provided the following information. A survey conducted by Parent (2002) probed the effect of OC on three Montreal-area communities. It focused on citizens' perceptions, knowledge, and experiences relating to OC in their neighbourhoods. Three neighbourhoods were polled: Hochelaga-Maisonneuve, in the city's southeast end (reputed to be a home ground for many Hells Angels members); Saint-Henri, in the city's southwest end (reputed as a base for past criminal groups); and Montreal-North, in the city's northeast end, renowned for street gang presence. The polls took place during the summer of 2002, more than a year after the March 2001 Springtime Operation crackdown against the Hells Angels. Random sampling was adopted in the three neighbourhoods. In all, 281 citizens were polled by telephone – 81 in Hochelaga-Maisonneuve, 100 in Saint-Henri, and 100 in Montreal-North.

The Parent survey found that, while there was some variation, a solid majority of residents in all three communities reported the presence of OC in their neighbourhoods, and a significant proportion of residents in each community had witnessed an event linked to OC. In addition, a majority of residents reported the presence of violence in their neighbourhoods (See Table 17 in Appendix).

Respondents were also asked to compare the presence of OC in their neighbourhood with other Montreal neighbourhoods: 50.6 percent of the Hochelaga-Maisonneuve sample, 51 percent in Saint-Henri and 36 percent in Montreal-North felt there was more OC in their neighbourhood than in other parts of the city.

Parent also refers to a December 1998 SOM poll published in the Montreal Gazette, in which Montreal citizens were asked if they were scared of getting hurt or killed as an innocent victim of biker-gang violence. A total of 34.3 percent of the SOM sample reported such fears. In the SPVM survey (Parent 2002), 27 percent of the sample reported a fear of being the innocent victim of a settlement of accounts (a slight drop after Springtime 2001), followed by 32 percent of Montreal-North's sample, 28 percent of Saint Henri's sample, and 22 percent of Hochelaga-Maisonneuve's sample.

#### **8.1.4 Content Analysis**

This analysis is informed by a review of newspaper articles from 1994 to 2006. These articles were collected through the Canadian Business and Current Affairs (CBCA) databases, Canadian Newsstand Major Dailies database and Eureka. Local dailies included *The Gazette*, the only major English language paper published in Montreal, as well as *Le Devoir* and *La Presse*, two French language dailies. We did not include *Le Journal de Montréal* in our research due to its limited accessibility and its availability in microfilm only. The above three newspapers have the largest circulation in Montreal. In addition, there are several community newspapers in Montreal including: *The Canadian Jewish News* (English), *Cités Nouvelles* (French), *The Concordian* (English); *Courrier Ahuntsic* (French), the *Courrier Bordeaux-Carderville* (French), the *El Chasqui Latino* (French), *Hour* (English); *Journal de Rosemont* (French); *Journal le Plateau* (French), *Journal L'Express d'Outremont* (French); *Le Matin* (French); *Montreal Community Contact* (English), *Montreal Mirror* (English), *Montreal Tribune* (English), the *Senior Times* (English); *The Suburban* (English), *Voir* (French), the *Westmount Examiner* (English), and the *Westmount Independent* (English). While many of these community newspapers are not covered by the databases used in the search, these newspapers<sup>11</sup> were contacted to determine if they have any articles on the topic under review. Those editors

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<sup>11</sup> Some of these community newspapers did not exist during the period under review. For more information on these community newspapers see the Quebec Community Newspapers Association at [www.qcna.org](http://www.qcna.org)



that did respond to our inquiry indicated they do not publish articles on gang-related crime.

Multiple searches of *The Gazette* were conducted from April 1, 1994 to December 31, 2006, These dates included the killing of Daniel Desrochers on August 9, 1995 and Operation Springtime that was launched on March 28, 2001. To identify the articles, the following keyword searches were used: OC, bikers, Hells Angels, Bandidos, Pagans, crackdown, the Rock Machine, gangs, springtime, printemps 2001, police, arrest and Daniel Desrochers.

**Table 18 - Overview of Keyword Searches from English and French Newspapers - April 1, 1994 to December 31, 2006**

<b>KEYWORD SEARCHES</b>	<b>THE GAZETTE</b>	<b>LA PRESSE &amp; LE DEVOIR</b>
<b>OC, bikers, Hells Angels, Nomads, Bandidos, Pagans, crackdown, the Rock Machine, gangs, springtime, printemps 2001, police, arrest and Daniel Desrochers.</b>	232	583
<b>Police operations, Springtime, or printemps 2001</b>	34	553

The total number of articles included in the analysis does not reflect the total number of other gang- or OC-related incidents that occurred from 1994 to 2006. In some cases, the articles retrieved from 1994 to 2006 dealt with an event that occurred prior to 1994.

These articles usually involved criminal trials of people arrested for OC or gang activities (e.g., trials or those arrested for the Lennoxville massacre) or previous police operations.

*The Gazette* had few articles on the actual Springtime operation while the French newspapers provided substantially more coverage (553 articles compared to 34). Many of these articles focused on the actual operations or police investigations, or the many ongoing criminal trials involving the bikers. Many of these stories were in *Le Devoir*, which published articles in a tabloid format that sensationalized the crime stories.

Once collected and organized by date, the articles were analyzed and thematically coded based on the following:

- Title of the article;
- Individuals interviewed;
- The comments of those interviewed;
- The nature of the story (e.g., arrest, bombing);
- The tone of the story; and
- Whether any comments related to the fear of crime or feelings of security in the community.

Rather than focusing on the number of times specific words or phrases were mentioned, as per a more conventional content analysis, the primary interest was in revealing the linkages between the police operation “Springtime,” the construction of events prior to this operation, and the effect on the community after the police operation. This is a common approach in media analysis, one rooted in an understanding of the news media as a type of discursive space (Hier, 2002)<sup>12</sup>.

One of the first insights to emerge from the analysis is that the media accounts are structured in terms of criminal activities of the biker gangs, also known as the “Big Four” clubs (The Hells Angels, the Outlaws, the Bandidos, and the Pagans (Morselli et

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<sup>12</sup> Hier, S.P. (2002) “Raves, Risk and Ecstasy Panic: A Case Study in the Subversive Nature of Moral Regulation,” *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 27 (1) 33-57

al.,2007). On March 3, 1995, *The Gazette* published an article entitled “Accounts Payable, Body Count Balances Books When Business is Criminal,” which gives an overview of the number of people killed as a result of gang-based activities for the control of the drug, prostitution and rackets industry<sup>13</sup>. The article gives an historical account of the number of people killed by the biker gangs. What is interesting is that the journalist notes that “law-enforcement authorities don't get too worked up when bad guys start bumping one another off. They like to keep track on the scorecard and to know the motive. Cops show up at the church to take pictures and check plates, not pay their respects.”<sup>14</sup>

The reporting of a notorious incident in which a bomb exploded, killing a gang member and severely injuring a young boy, appeared to dominate the press for several years. Daniel Desrochers was the first innocent victim of the turf war between the Hells Angels and the Rock Machine<sup>15</sup>. The boy was playing in front of a school, when parts from a vehicle injured, and ultimately killed, the boy several days later. In response, *The Gazette* published an editorial after the police held a news conference in which they accused the public of complicity. The editor, in making reference to the police news conference, noted that “according to police logic everyone who has ever used illegal narcotics, ever paid a cent into the drug coffers of OC, is as responsible for what happened to Daniel as the person who pressed the detonator button.”<sup>16</sup> The editorial challenged the police response and argued they should be doing more to arrest the gang members, but at the same time acknowledged that the police require additional resources, including changes to the criminal law.

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<sup>13</sup> March 3, 1995

<sup>14</sup> Curran, Peggy(March 3, 1995) “Accounts payable; Body count balances books when business is criminal,” *The Gazette*, P. A3

<sup>15</sup> Wilton, Katherine, and Cherney, Elena (August 10, 1995) “Man killed, boy badly hurt in drug-war car bombing,” *The Gazette*, p A.1.

<sup>16</sup> Editorial (August 11, 1995) “ Wrong place wrong time; Better tools needed to end drug war,” *The Gazette*, p. B.2.

The death of Daniel Desrochers became a rallying cry, with several articles in *The Gazette*, *Le Devoir*, and *La Presse* that focused on how the police needed more resources to fight the gangs, and the federal government's responsibility to introduce anti-gang legislation under the *Criminal Code*. There was also a column published by the Montreal Urban Community Executive Committee that called for anti-gang legislation. According to the author of the column, "The death of 11-year-old Daniel Desrochers, after a bomb blast in east-end Montreal, part of a drug war between the Rock Machine and Hells Angels gangs, has prompted various groups to petition federal Justice Minister Allan Rock for tougher laws. The MUC executive said OC "threatens social cohesion and causes important economic losses."<sup>17</sup>

From 1995 to about 2001, three themes can be identified from the articles. First, several articles continued to call for more resources for the police, an anti-gang squad, the formation of a special team of prosecutors, the need for changes to the *Criminal Code*, and the introduction of Bill C-95. Second, public sensitivity stories revolved around the death of Daniel Desrochers and other victims of the gang wars in Montreal. Third, articles continued to report on the gang activities and provided updates on various trials involving bikers (e.g., for the murder of two prison guards). With the exception of one column, no articles focused on community cohesion or safety. The articles focused on activities of the gangs and few conducted any interviews with the police or the public.

On March 27, 1997, the Hells Angels and the Nomads issued a press release to counter the reports by the Montreal Urban Community Police that the Hells Angels were responsible for the car bomb that killed Daniel Desrochers and a suspected drug dealer<sup>18</sup>. According to the press release, "The Hell's Angel motorcycle club categorically denies that any of its members participated, directly or indirectly, in the explosion that claimed the lives of Daniel (Desrochers) and Marc Dube." The release further stated: "We

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<sup>17</sup>Editorial (August 25, 1995) "MUC wants anti-gang law," *The Gazette*, p.A.3

<sup>18</sup>Collister, Eddie (March 27, 1997) "Hells Angels deny role in boy's killing," *The Gazette*, p. A.8

vigorously denounce the police-disinformation campaign linking us to the drama. We also deplore the media's role in this sinister plot to smear our group."<sup>19</sup> The release offered condolences to the Desrochers and Dube families<sup>20</sup>.

Some articles revealed that José-Anne Desrochers, mother of Daniel, said that on two occasions she was offered enormous amounts of money from high-ranking Angels' member Mom Boucher's lawyer, and a member related to the Hells Angels, to remain silent.<sup>21</sup> Was it because they were afraid of her initiative regarding the petition to implement anti-gang legislation<sup>22</sup>? Boucher's lawyer stated that he never approached José-Anne on behalf of his client to offer her money because Mom denied being responsible for Daniel's death<sup>23</sup>.

Following Daniel Desrochers's death and the demands arising from the angry population to end the war between biker clubs, the Wolverine Squad (Escouade Carcajou) was created. According to several articles in *La Presse* and *Le Devoir*, Wolverine's main goals were security and to "bring back the peace in the streets of Montreal by stopping bomb attacks associated with the war between the Hells Angels and the Rock Machine".<sup>24,25,26</sup>

On March 28, 2001, police carried out their raids as part of Operation Springtime. The following day, an article appeared reporting on the operations. However, on March 30, a

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid

<sup>20</sup> The police did make an arrest on May 23, 2003, as part of the police operation called project Apache.

<sup>21</sup> Dufour, Valérie (March 27 2002), "Mon enfant contre une bombe : Un crime horrible resté impuni", *Le Devoir*, p. A5

<sup>22</sup> Lachapelle, Judith (March 30, 2005), "La Faucheuse met un terme au courageux combat de Josée-Anne Desrochers", *La Presse*, p.A1

<sup>23</sup> N/A (March 28, 2002), "Des millions contre le silence L'ex-avocat de Maurice Boucher contre-attaque", *Le Devoir*, p.A3

<sup>24</sup> Cédilot, André (November 4, 2003), "Jusqu'où la police peut-elle aller pour protéger un informateur?", *La Presse*, p. A12 (Our translation).

<sup>25</sup> Cédilot, André, Martin, Pelchat (January 18, 1996), "Carcajou victime des compressions?", *La Presse*, p.A4 (Our translation)

<sup>26</sup> For example see: Lesage, Gilles (October 18, 1995), "Les griffes du carcajou", *Le Devoir*, p.A1

lengthy editorial appeared in *The Gazette* entitled, “Justice comes at a price”<sup>27</sup>. The editorial challenges the Quebec justice system’s ability to respond to the arrests of approximately 140 individuals. The editorial did not address the possibility that the operation may have made the community a safer place to live.

The newspaper stories continued with the same themes as before Operation Springtime. The articles focused on the killings of various gang members, the shooting of a journalist, Michel Auger (April 7, 2001), the trials of those arrested, and, in particular, the court proceedings for Maurice (Mom) Boucher. In several articles, *Le Devoir* characterized Boucher as a ‘‘chief warrior.’’ The introductory paragraph of one article presents the war between the bikers, the collective awakening on the danger of the Hells Angels and the adoption of the anti-gang legislation as being directly related to the activities of Mom Boucher<sup>28</sup>. Furthermore, a few articles also focused on other police operations such as Project Apache, a crackdown on a cocaine trafficking ring in the Rosemont district that was run by the Hells Angels<sup>29</sup>.

Only one article addressed the safety of the community. On October 7, 2004, an article appeared in *The Gazette* entitled, “City safe despite street gangs: chief says”<sup>30</sup>. Paul Cherry reported that the Police Chief of the MUC, Michel Sarrazin, noted that violent crimes were declining, but was concerned about the increase in the violence of street gangs. Despite this, he noted that Montreal was a safe place to live.

Moreover, in *La Presse*, an article revealed a direct consequence of the success arising from Operation Springtime – the impressive number of arrests and serious charges. A police officer reported that the community seemed to be more confident towards them.

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<sup>27</sup> Editorial (March 30, 2001) “Justice comes at a price,” *The Gazette*, p.B.2

<sup>28</sup> Myles, Brian (10 septembre 2005), ‘‘Maurice Boucher, de petit délinquant à taulard’’, p. A6

<sup>29</sup> Sidhartha , Banerjee ( May 24, 2003) “Drug busts may hold key to boy’s killer,” *The Gazette*, p. A1

<sup>30</sup> Cherry, Paul (October, 7, 2004) “City safe despite street gangs, chief says,” *The Gazette*, p. A6

The article noted a significant increase in the amount of calls (40 percent) on the anti-gang phone line.<sup>31</sup>

In a second article in 1997, this time related to the Wolverine Squad, the author addressed the fact that community felt safer following the breakdown of a bunker used by the Hells Angels in Saint-Nicolas. In fact, the mayor stated: “ I am relieved to see that this bunker is now closed, forever I hope, and that it will eventually be transformed for another purpose.”<sup>32</sup> The journalist also stated that the community was terrified by the presence of the Hells Angels.

Nevertheless, some articles suggested that the community still felt insecure and that a collective feeling of security was impossible because of the phenomenon and the structure of OC. The speaker of the committee for the victims of the Hells Angels, Simone Chartrand, was interviewed after a trial. She believed that OC implies numerous people. She then added that “a miracle would be needed to live peacefully”<sup>33</sup>. This feeling of insecurity was expressed by Simone Chartrand after the life-sentence received by Mom Boucher, the leader of the Montreal Nomads chapter of the Angels who ordered the killings of two prison guards.

Also, during the trials subsequent to Operation Springtime, the attorney, Madeleine Giauque, reminded the jury about the events from 1997 to 2001, the war involving the Hells Angels and the Rock Machine, saying it had made 160 victims and “troubled social peace and had put in danger the security of the citizens”<sup>34</sup>. A more recent article also focused on the insecurity related to OC. It then explained that a police operation and

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<sup>31</sup> Pelchat, Martin (11 mai 2001), “Les Bandidos tentent de conquérir le marché”, *La Presse*, p.A1

<sup>32</sup> Canadian Press, The (22 novembre 1997), “Carcajou évince les Hells- La police envahit un repaire de motards à Saint-Nicolas”, *Le Devoir*, p.A14

<sup>33</sup> Myles, Brian (6 mai 2002), “ Boucher: la prison à vie - Le jury a reconnu le chef des Nomads coupable du meurtre prémédité de deux gardiens de prison”, *Le Devoir*, p.A1 (Our translation)

<sup>34</sup> Castonguay, Alec (April 9, 2004), “De dix à 22 ans de prison pour neuf Hells”, *Le Devoir*, p. A1 (Our translation)

associated arrests of gang members were designed to ‘‘give back the neighbourhood to the businessman and the citizens’’<sup>35</sup>.

In general, the police hoped that the outcome of such an operation would be to return some tranquility to the community. That said, the actions taken to eradicate OC (arrests and trials with severe penalties) were believed by lawyers and police officers to put an end to the feelings of insecurity. The public had not been consulted about this assertion; therefore, there is no basis upon which one can determine whether such law enforcement operations fulfilled their objectives.

### **8.1.5 Summary**

Operation Springtime was referred to as one of the largest one-day operations of its kind in Canadian history<sup>36</sup>. It was a major operation against outlaw bikers in Quebec which resulted in several major arrests and seizures of money, illegal drugs, properties and vehicles. Data from the GSS examined for an 11-year period (1993-2004) revealed that people residing in Montreal believed that crime was increasing prior to the Springtime operation, but waned after 2004. Further, the high proportion of Individuals who felt it was very unsafe to walk alone in their area after dark in 1993, dropped slightly in 1999 and then decreased substantially more in 2004. While these trends were similar in Quebec as a whole, the decline was more dramatic in Montreal, indicating that there may be an association between the public’s perception of personal safety and the activities of the Wolverine Squad and a continued consequence of the Springtime operation. It may also be argued that based on the GSS data, residents’ perception as to the performance of the police may also be attributed to Operation Wolverine and the follow up activities related to Operation Springtime.

Upon examining the incidents thought to be associated with OC within the UCR data for 1991 to 2008, Montreal saw a dramatic decline from 1991 to 1996. Incidents of crime then substantially increased from about 1996 to 1998. This increase in the number of

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<sup>35</sup> Cédilot, André (April 7, 2005) ‘‘La police frappe les gangs de rue’’, *La Presse*, p.A8

<sup>36</sup> Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (2001) 2001 Annual Report. Ottawa. (no page number)



incidents may be related to the influx of arrests which came out of Operation Wolverine at this time. From 1998 to roughly 2001, the number of crimes declined, except for a sharp increase around 2001, which may be attributed to the arrests made during Operation Springtime. After 2001, incidents again declined, but it is difficult to determine if it is associated with the police operation. In the early 2000s, a decline in crime was observed, coinciding with the improved attitudes towards public safety.

Data from the Montreal Urban Police was also obtained. This data pointed out that in the three neighbourhoods polled, many residents reported or witnessed OC activities. In these three areas, they felt there was more OC in their areas when compared to other areas of the city. However, while these were the views expressed, it is difficult to relate them to the police countermeasures.

Finally, English and French newspapers reviewed revealed significant coverage of OC. Few articles focused on the effect OC activities had on the community or contained an in-depth analysis of the issue. The majority of newspaper articles focused on OC activities and the consequences of the police operations, such as the trials of and stories about the individuals involved in the cases.

## **8.2 Project Kachou, Project Katalyst and Project Kold**

### **8.2.1 Overview of Projects**

These projects focused on Asian-based OC involved in cocaine trafficking, money laundering, possessing the proceeds of crime, conspiracy and participation in a criminal gang. Project Kachou involved the Edmonton Police, the RCMP and the Criminal Intelligence Service Alberta. Kachou was underway in 1995 and lasted 14 months. As a result of the project, 33 people were charged and approximately \$1.7 million in property, cash, jewellery and vehicles were seized as alleged proceeds of crime<sup>37</sup>. Approximately 300 to 600 police officers were involved in Project Kachou. According to press reports, the project involved 281,000 intercepted telephone calls, many requiring translation from

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<sup>37</sup> Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (2001) Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada, 2001.Ottawa.

Vietnamese or Chinese dialects, and has created 180,000 pages of reports, documents and other material<sup>38</sup>.

In a similar operation, Project Katalyst occurred in March, 2001. The Edmonton Police arrested five men and two women who were subsequently charged with cocaine trafficking. This operation was the result of a gang member being killed in 2000 after being involved in a shoot-out with the Edmonton Police Services<sup>39</sup>.

Project Kold was carried out in 2003. In the summer of that year, the Edmonton Police Services and the RCMP established a Joint-Forces Team to investigate the illegal activities of an Asian-based OC group that was allegedly trafficking drugs into Alberta and the Northwest Territories<sup>40</sup>. Police seized the following items: \$39,700 in Canadian currency, \$28,000 in US currency alleged to be the illegal proceeds of crime, a shotgun and ammunition, five pounds of marijuana, two pounds of cocaine, computer equipment and one vehicle.

## **8.2.2 Data Analysis**

### **GSS Analysis**

For this portion of the analysis, all OC countermeasures in Edmonton, Alberta were grouped together because the unique effects of a three concurrent operations (between 1995 and 2003) cannot be isolated. Given the timing of the events surrounding these countermeasures — with little in the print media regarding the first operation (Kachou) until the trial in 1999 — if one or all of these countermeasures did have an effect on any of the variables under analysis, one might hypothesize very little change in the crime data between 1993 and 1999, followed by a notable change between 1999 and 2004.

Additionally, based on the content analysis conducted here, much of the information on

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<sup>38</sup> Binder, Mel (2003), “Drug-gang trail to forge ahead: Dismissed charges won’t affect 8 men still before the court,” *Edmonton Journal*, September 18. P. B12

<sup>39</sup> Alberta Solicitor General and Criminal Intelligence Service Alberta (2002) Organized and Serious Crime Initiatives: Business Plan April 2002 to March 2005. Source: [http://www.cisalberta.ca/2002-5 percent20Business percent20Plan.pdf](http://www.cisalberta.ca/2002-5%20percent20Business%20Plan.pdf)

<sup>40</sup> Criminal Intelligence Service, Alberta (2003), Public Interest Stories: <http://www.cisalberta.ca/cisaaction.htm>

Asian gangs disseminated to the public via the print media prior to 1999 spoke of the increasing violence committed by Asian gangs, further cementing the basis for this choice.

Cross-tabulations for Edmonton and Alberta investigating the possible effect of Projects Kachou, Katalyst and Kold showed virtually no change in respondents' perceptions of crime in their neighbourhoods compared to others in Canada between 1993 and 2004, (see **Table 18** in **APPENDIX A**). In contrast, those who felt crime in their neighbourhood had increased in the previous five years declined in Edmonton from 47 percent in 1993 to 30 percent in 1999 and went back up to 35 percent in 2004 (see **Table 19** in **APPENDIX A**). This trend was virtually identical to Alberta as a whole. Those who felt crime remained about the same in their neighbourhood in the previous five years increased from 44 percent in Edmonton in 1993 to 54 percent in 1999, and back down to 50 percent in 2004. This may indicate that while Edmonton residents did not believe crime was worsening, an increasing number believed the police were not making inroads into crime. The subsequent decrease in Edmonton between 1999 and 2004, a time when these operations were present in the media to a much larger extent, coupled with a slight increase in feelings that crime was decreasing, may point to improvements in opinions regarding crime rates during and after the countermeasures. Whether or not this is related to OC specifically cannot be determined however, as these data measure crime as a whole – incidents linked to OC plus general, high-volume crime and delinquency. Further, because this change was also seen in Calgary and Alberta as a whole, it may be unlikely these improvements were due to the police operations.

With regard to perceptions of personal safety as they relate to routine activities such as walking alone in the dark, using or waiting for public transportation in the dark or being alone in one's home at night, there was very little change in public opinion from 1993 to 2004 for both Alberta and Edmonton. A small minority of provincial and CMA residents felt very worried or very unsafe (generally under 10 percent) (see **Table 20- Table 23** in **APPENDIX A**). Furthermore, there was very little change in the frequency with which both Alberta and Edmonton respondents participated in these activities between 1993 and 2004 (see **Table 24**, and **Table 26** in **APPENDIX A**), with the exception of the use of

public transportation. In 1993, 44 percent of Albertans and 50 percent of Edmonton residents would not use public transportation after dark more often if they felt safer, indicating approximately half of respondents did not avoid public transportation due to safety concerns. This number increased slightly for Alberta and Edmonton respectively in 1999, but decreased again by 10 percent for Alberta as a whole and by eight percent for Edmonton. These trends in Alberta and Edmonton from 1993 to 2004 may ultimately point to the fact that the OC operations there had no effect on routine activities; however, again, because this dataset does not measure items specific to perceptions surrounding OC and OC countermeasures, this claim cannot be made with any confidence.

There was almost no change in the perception of the police by Edmonton residents over the 11-year observation period. The vast majority of respondents in the city believed that police were doing a good or average job and just a small minority believed they were doing a poor job (see **Table 27 - Table 31** in **APPENDIX A**). This trend was mirrored for Alberta as a whole. This lack of change in public opinion may be an indication that either the public was not generally aware of police activities, or they were indifferent toward these activities.

Finally, perhaps the only variable of note within this analysis is that of satisfaction with personal safety. In 1993, 86 percent of Albertans and 81 percent of Edmonton residents were satisfied with their personal safety in relation to crime. This figure rose to 94 percent in 1999 for Albertans and 92 percent for Edmonton residents and remained stable in 2004. (See **Table 32** in **APPENDIX A**). In 1993, 13 percent of Albertans and 17 percent of Edmonton residents were dissatisfied with their personal safety from crime. Again, this figure decreased to five percent in 1999 for Alberta and six percent in 1999 for Edmonton and remained stable into 2004 (see **Table 32** in **APPENDIX A**). This increase in satisfaction during the 1990s comes before Projects Kachou, Katalyst and Kold gained any momentum. In fact, there was much negative press surrounding the OC situation in Edmonton during this time. This may indicate that these operations had no effect on Edmonton residents' perception of personal safety. This is further substantiated by the minor changes in public opinion found throughout this analysis. Again, however,

this dataset does not measure variables relating specifically to OC, therefore no definitive conclusions can be drawn.

### **UCR Analysis**

The distribution of OC-related offences for Edmonton is similar to other mid-western Canadian cities from 1991 to 2008 (see **Figure 1** in **APPENDIX B**). In 1991, Edmonton saw approximately 120,000 to 130,000 incidents of those offences typically related to OC. Like Calgary, Edmonton saw a dramatic decrease in incidents from 1991 to 1995, after which, the general trend for Winnipeg, Calgary and Edmonton is a relatively even distribution throughout the late 1990s at approximately 55,000 incidents per year. This decline in incidents following 1995 is not likely to be related to the incapacitation of offenders associated with Project Kachou because it was also observed in other Canadian cities.

Edmonton differed from other cities in that it experienced a small spike in incidents in 1998. Because the police operations occurred in 1995, 2001 and 2003, however, this was not likely linked to the raids associated with these operations. More positive views of the public about crime, as measured by the GSS from 1999 to 2004, are not consistent with the increase in incidence rates -as one would expect more crime incidents to negatively impact perceptions of crime. Further, although this influx in arrests in 1998 may have improved public perception of crime, because satisfaction of personal safety remained high and stable, and improvements in perceptions occurred across Canada, that is not likely the case.

### **8.2.3 Content Analysis**

The search of newspaper articles involved those published from 1991 to the present. The following table gives an overview of the results.

#### **Table 34 – Overview of the Keyword Searches for Projects Kachou and Katalyst from 1991 to 2010**

<b>Keyword Search</b>	<b>Number of articles</b>
<b>Kachou</b>	7
<b>Katalyst</b>	2
<b>Kold</b>	0
<b>Asian gangs</b>	Before March 10, 2001 – 72 After March 10, 2001 – 23
<b>Community and safety issues</b>	0

Projects Kachou and Katalyst, many articles focused on the increase in crimes attributed to Asian gangs. Bindman (1991), Owens (1991), Powell and Simons (1996) and Mullen (1996) wrote about how Asian gangs function in Edmonton and that these gangs may be small and loosely organized, but connected to much larger gangs in major Canadian cities<sup>41</sup>. In addition, some articles concentrated on the level of violence being committed by Asian and other gangs. Mah (1999) wrote about the feud between two rival drug gangs that resulted in several shootings in the city. An Edmonton police officer spoke about the increased violence of gangs: “I can tell you that it's a very active scene for Asian crime in Edmonton in comparison with other cities. It's an emerging problem. Edmonton was one of the quieter of the major cities but certainly you've outstripped Calgary in activity in the last several months. And with the new flare-ups, you've been busier than

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<sup>41</sup> Stephen Bindman, (1991), “Street gang problem growing-RCMP Report,” September 3, *Edmonton Journal*, p.A3; Greg Owens (1991), “Asian gang members roam across country, police say; Transient members target businesses in different cities; (Asian gang violence to increase, police warn,” *Edmonton Journal*, p.B.2; Kerry Powell and Paula Simons (1996),” Gangs well-connected,” July 17, *Edm. nton Journal*, p.B.3; Conal Mullen,(1996), “ Police plan report on all city’s gangs,” “July 16, *Edmonton Journal*

Montreal.”<sup>42</sup> *The Edmonton Journal* (2001), in a special feature article, provided a summary of all violent crimes during the past decade<sup>43</sup>.

While press reports focused on an increase in Asian gangs, the police chief at the time asserted that the Edmonton police did not need a specialized unit to deal with gang violence. The police chief is quoted as saying “sites such as West Edmonton Mall are safe and we have no reason to believe that any members of the public are more unduly at risk than they were before.”<sup>44</sup> According to the press reports, these comments were made in response to the slaying at West Edmonton Mall and how other major cities have established specialized units to respond to gangs. However, an editorial challenges the Chief’s view. The editorial questions whether the city has confidence in the police chief’s response to gang problems.<sup>45</sup>

The newspaper reports on Project Kachou focused on the trials of some of the suspects. According to these accounts, two individuals died on September 24, 1999 when they fell off a fourth-floor balcony, after police officers using stun grenades burst into their residence. The trials were delayed to allow for an inquiry into the incident<sup>46</sup>. These reports also focused on how some of the accused had their trial thrown out of court because the four-year prosecution took too long<sup>47</sup>. The trial cost the federal government approximately \$20 million in fees for defence lawyers alone<sup>48</sup>.

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<sup>42</sup> Bill Mah (1999), “Tracking the drug gangs: Many people are alarmed by the escalating violence as two rival drug gangs feud on city streets. What’s the cause of it, and what can be done about it?,” August 29, *Edmonton Journal*, p.F1

<sup>43</sup> *Edmonton Journal* (2001), “City violence over the last decade . Series: Battling the Gangs,” March 7, *Edmonton Journal*, p.A3

<sup>44</sup> Stevenson, James (1997), “Police chief rejects for gang unit: Funding would be a problem,” January 7, *Edmonton Journal*, p. B.1

<sup>45</sup> Editorial (2000), Lindsay has lost our confidence, January 14, *Edmonton Journal*, p.A16, p.B.5

<sup>46</sup> Kent, Gordon ( 2003) , “Lawyer wants police documents on fatal apartment raid,? November, 27. *Edmonton Journal*. pB3

<sup>47</sup> Kent, Gordon (2003), “Drug-gang trail to forge ahead: Dismissed charges won’t affect 8 men still before the courts” September 18. *Edmonton Journal*, p.B12

<sup>48</sup> Kent, Gordon ( 2003), \$20M cocaine trial tossed: Delays force judge to stay charges,” September 9. *Calgary Herald*. P.A.I (FRO)

The police operation Katalyst involved a similar raid. According to press reports, the raid included 25 police officers from Edmonton. Police seized 40 ounces of cocaine worth \$56,000 and \$162,000 in cash. The police learned about the drug ring after a shooting death in January 2000. An individual was killed after he fired shots at them<sup>49</sup>. The newspaper reports covering both operations were exclusively factual, rather than analytical in nature. There were no articles on Project Kold.

After the two police operations that focused on several arrests of Asian gang members and the seizure of drugs, money and weapons, the number of newspaper articles appeared to decline. It is unclear whether this decline was a result in the number of Asian gang incidents or a tolerance level with regard to their specific activities. Those articles that reviewed the gang-related crime focused on specific incidents and also provided a historical overview of similar events. Williams and Fekete (2002) provided an overview of all the summer crimes from 1996 to 2002<sup>50</sup>. Similarly, Loyie and D'Aliesio (2002) presented an overview of all gang-related homicides that occurred in the summer months of the years 1996 to 2002<sup>51</sup>. Loyie (2003) listed gang-related homicides from 1996 to 2003<sup>52</sup>, while Williams provides an overview of drive-by shootings during the same time period<sup>53</sup>. Loyie (2004) gave a summary of the 10 gang-related homicides in 2004<sup>54</sup>. Each one generated several news stories that gave a description of incidents and police actions (e.g., arrests made) taken, if any. D'Aliesio (2002) reported that the mayor of Edmonton was expressing confidence that the police had control of gang activities. "These people are in every city in the world ... they are in our city," he said. "These things flare up and the police are doing their best to keep track of it, to keep things at least cool between any

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<sup>49</sup> (2001), "Police dismantle gang with seven arrests," March 10, *Calgary Herald*, p. A9

<sup>50</sup> Williams, Ian and Fekete, Jason (2002), "Fears of gang violence grow: Summer of retaliation feared after known gang enforcer shot in night club parking lot," June 7, *Edmonton Journal*, pA1

<sup>51</sup> Loyie, Florence and D'Aliesio, Renata (2002), "Man dies in gang shooting: 19-year-old killed as shots fired from van near crowded club," August 11, *Edmonton Journal*, pA1

<sup>52</sup> Loyie, Florence (2003), "Gangland murder comes to town," May 12, *Edmonton Journal*, p.B3

<sup>53</sup> Williams, Ian (2003), "Driver dies in hail of bullets from 2<sup>nd</sup> car," April 25, *Edmonton Journal*, p.A1

<sup>54</sup> Loyie, Florence (2004), "Gang-related murders a trend that's worrying police," December 23, *Edmonton Journal*, p.B4



turf wars. I can't comment that much on what (the police) are doing, but I can tell the people that I'm very, very confident with the work they're doing"<sup>55</sup>

*The Edmonton Journal* provided little information regarding the harms caused by Asian gangs to the community. There is little evidence also as to whether Projects Kachou, Katalyst or Kold had any influence on media coverage. While there was a decline in the number of newspaper articles on Asian gangs, it is unclear whether this had anything to do with these specific police operations.

### **8.2.4 Summary**

The police projects Kachou, Katalyt and Kold focused on Asian OC activities in Edmonton. These projects occurred in a span of eight years from 1995 to 2003. Given the operations were similar they were grouped together for this analysis. When the GSS data from 1993 to 2004 on victimization was reviewed, no change was found in individuals' fear of crime or on perceptions of personal safety such as walking alone after dark, waiting for or using the bus in the dark or being alone at home in the evening. There was also no real change in residents' perception of the local police. A review of the UCR data also showed that police operations appear to have had no effect on the reported crime associated with OC. Finally, the review of newspapers did not report on how any of these projects may have affected public safety.

## **8.3 Operation Northern Snow**

### **8.3.1 Overview of the Project**

In November of 1998, the Winnipeg Police Service, along with the RCMP, conducted a series of raids that resulted in 35 Manitoba Warriors members and 15 associates of the gang facing 142 criminal charges<sup>56</sup>. These included murder, weapons violations and conspiring to traffic cocaine. The police also seized firearms and large amounts of drugs.

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<sup>55</sup> D'Aliesio, Renata (2002), "City gangs are in Check—Smith: Mayor concerned but 'very confident' police in control," August 12, *Edmonton Journal*, p. B1

<sup>56</sup> Winnipeg Police Service (2001), 2001 Annual Report. <http://www.winnipeg.ca/police/AnnualReports/2001/2001annual.pdf>

The police alleged that the Manitoba Warriors were a well-established Aboriginal street gang in Winnipeg that controlled much of the cocaine traffic in the city.

### **8.3.2 Data Analysis**

#### **GSS Analysis**

When cross-tabulations were run for the city of Winnipeg and for Manitoba as a whole, it was found that perceptions of neighbourhood crime rates improved over an 11-year period. While the rates of respondents who felt crime in their neighbourhood was higher than the rest of Canada only decreased slightly and the rates of those who felt crime was lower only increased slightly, the frequency trend was very clearly on the decline for the “higher” response category and on the upward for the “lower” response category (see **Table 33** in **APPENDIX A**). The changes in perceptions of crime in one’s area over the past five years followed the same trend, but with slightly more dramatic results. The rate of respondents who felt crime increased in the past five years for Manitoba in 1993 was 47 percent and 50 percent for Winnipeg. This rate fell to 34 percent and 37 percent for Manitoba and Winnipeg respectively in 1999. This rate remained stable for Manitoba in 2004, only decreasing by one percent over six years, but for Winnipeg this rate decreased further to 31 percent from 1999 to 2004.

Additionally, while there was little change in the number of respondents who felt crime decreased in either data collection locations, those who felt crime rates in their neighbourhood remained about the same over the previous five years was 42 percent for Manitoba and 40 percent for Winnipeg in 1993. This rate increased by nine percent in 1999 for Manitoba and eight percent for Winnipeg, and further increased by five percent in 2004 for Manitoba and 10 percent for those living in Winnipeg (see **Table 34** in **APPENDIX A**). Ultimately, fewer Winnipeg residents (and to a lesser extent, Manitoba residents) felt crime was increasing, more felt it was remaining the same.

Media coverage of Aboriginal street gangs began to gain momentum in the mid-1990s with Manitoba Warriors members acting as security in a major standoff at the Waterhen reserve in 1996, and with the implementation of Operation Disarm in 1997. Data trends

do coincide with these events. Perhaps residents acknowledged that police were aware of Aboriginal gang activities and the police were reacting accordingly, thus preventing crime from increasing. However, because Winnipeg and Manitoba respondents did not believe crime to be decreasing, it is difficult to say whether this trend had anything to do with the activities of the Aboriginal gangs and the response of the police. Further, because there are only three time points, we are unable to determine if this trend would have continued over time.

While there were slight improvements in perceptions of personal safety as related to routine activities after dark, such as walking alone, using public transportation and being in the home alone, these improvements were minor. The vast majority of the population for both Winnipeg and Manitoba as a whole felt very or reasonably safe (approximately 70 percent or more) while walking alone after dark across the 11-year time period. Slightly fewer respondents at the provincial and CMA levels felt worried while waiting for or using public transportation. Very few (under five percent) Winnipeg and Manitoba respondents felt very worried while in their home alone after dark (see **Table 35-Table 39** in **APPENDIX A**). Further, there was very little change from 1993 to 2004, both in Manitoba and in Winnipeg, in respondents' feelings about whether or not they would walk alone after dark if they felt safer from crime (see **Table 40** in **APPENDIX A**).

There were also very few changes in responses surrounding waiting for or using public transportation. Those respondents who stated they would use public transportation more often after dark if they felt safer remained steady at around 15 percent from 1993 to 2004 in Manitoba. This number went from 20 percent in 1993 in Winnipeg to 16 percent in 1999 and to 21 percent in 2004; a modest change (see **Table 41** in **APPENDIX A**). The rate for those who said they would not use public transportation more often after dark if they felt safer from crime was 45 percent in Winnipeg in 1993, 54 percent in 1999 and back down to 46 percent in 2004. This change was more subtle for Manitoba as a whole.

In Winnipeg, 44 percent of respondents in 1993 believed the local police were doing a good job of enforcing the laws. This figure rose to 52 percent in 1999 and remained at 52 percent in 2004. The same trend held for those Winnipeg respondents who believe the

police to be doing an average job with 41 percent in 1993 and 36 percent in 1999 and 2004. By contrast, 11 percent of respondents felt the local police to be doing a poor job in Winnipeg in 1993. This figure decreased to five percent in 1999 and rose again to seven percent in 2004 (see **Table 42** in **APPENDIX A**).

The public perceptions of the work of the local police in Winnipeg generally followed this trend on all police-related variables measured; with slight improvements in opinion from 1993 to 1999 and then remaining stable from 1999 to 2004 (see **Table 43-Table 46** in **APPENDIX A**). It must be noted here, however, that this same trend can be seen on police-related variables across the province of Manitoba, as well as Canada as a whole. Furthermore, although there was a great deal of activity related to Operation Northern Snow prior to 1998, the overwhelming bulk of media attention on this operation occurred after 1998. Given this fact, one would hypothesize that if this operation had an effect on public opinion, changes in the data would be seen between 1999 and 2004, whereas the observed trend was very flat for this time period. The effect of this project on perceptions of the local police might be better investigated in the future when there are more time points for comparison.

Finally, on the variable measuring general satisfaction with personal safety, no noteworthy changes were seen, with the overwhelming majority of respondents (+/- 90 percent) being satisfied for both Manitoba and Winnipeg across an 11-year span (see **Table 47** in **APPENDIX A**).

Although no definitive conclusions can be drawn based on the results presented above, due to the limitations of the data set used, when compared to some of the more dramatic changes in public opinion seen in Quebec, it is likely that this operation had very little effect on Manitoba residents with regard to perceptions of crime rates, routine activities, perceptions of the police and satisfaction with personal safety.

## **UCR Analysis**

The analysis based on the UCR (see **Figure 1** in **APPENDIX B**) found that while typical OC-related incidents remained fairly stable in Winnipeg at approximately 55,000

incidents from 1991 to 2008, unlike other smaller cities such as Calgary and Edmonton, Winnipeg does increase slightly between 1995 and 1997. Unlike other Canadian cities comparable in population, Winnipeg faced a dip in incidents from 1999 to 2000. This dip does correspond with the perceptions of personal safety and attitudes toward the police seen in the GSS, as well as with the incarceration of high-level members of the Manitoba Warriors. Given the timing, the fact that the data are limited to Winnipeg only, and that it runs counter to comparable Canadian cities, it is quite likely that this decrease in OC-related incidents is related to Operation Northern Snow.

As can be expected based on the high level of crime reported in 2000, as well as the release of Warriors' members beginning in 2000, the OC-related incidents began to increase again in 2002, peaking in 2005. It cannot be said with any confidence, however, that this is related to Operation Northern Snow, as this trend was also apparent in Edmonton and Vancouver at the same time. However, despite the increase in OC-related crime, feelings of personal safety continued to improve slightly. Thus, the actual crime rates had no bearing on public opinion. Further, if the dip in crime rates from 1999 to 2000 was related to Operation Northern Snow, it can be concluded that this operation did not have a long-term effect on OC-related incidents.

### **8.3.3 Content Analysis**

The search criterion for this content analysis included the time period from five years prior to the 1998 operation to five years following; 1993-2003. The *Winnipeg Free Press* served as the basis for this analysis as it has the highest readership in Winnipeg, with an average of 125,000 readers per day (*Winnipeg Free Press*, 2010). Further, when the *Winnipeg Sun* was investigated, it yielded very few results. The articles were searched using Factiva.

Prior to 1996, there was no mention of Aboriginal gangs, the Manitoba Warriors or police activities as they relate to Aboriginal street gangs. However when Chief Harvey Nepinak of the Waterhen reserve was driven out by band members due to allegations of

corruption, the Manitoba Warriors received concurrent media attention in three articles.<sup>57</sup> Band members demanded to break away from the reserve and a barricade was set up while band members participated in negotiations with conciliator Judge Murray Sinclair. This situation resulted in a police standoff that lasted for several weeks, and the Manitoba Warriors acted as security for the dissidents to prevent police from crossing the barrier.<sup>58</sup> During this event the Manitoba Warriors, a Winnipeg street gang, were portrayed as highly connected to the Aboriginal community and the accusations of corruption against Chief Nepinak were said to have come to light “with the help of the Manitoba Warriors.”<sup>59</sup>

In early 1997, the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs (AMC) hired high-level Manitoba Warriors member Brian Contois on a three-month contract to advise on the issue of Aboriginal youth and help to create a strategy for deterring them from entering gangs.<sup>60</sup> This event was quite controversial for the Aboriginal community for a number of reasons and appeared in four articles in the *Free Press* between January 30 and February 19, 1997. Grand Chief Phil Fontaine made the decision to enlist the help of Contois as a liaison between elders and youth gangs without first consulting fellow chiefs, which subsequently caused differences between Fontaine and a number of Aboriginal leaders. Chief Alfred Everett of the Berens River First Nation was quoted as saying that while the act of hiring Contois was a “noble gesture,” Contois also represents “something in the community people don’t agree with... a lot of the elders are skeptical and unhappy over the whole thing.”<sup>61</sup> Only two weeks after Contois was enlisted by the AMC, Operation Disarm was employed and 22 Warriors members, including Contois, were arrested on drug trafficking and firearms charges.<sup>62</sup> This operation garnered mixed reviews: Police

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<sup>57</sup> Brodbeck, Tom. (1996, May 7). Waterhen dissidents welcome Sinclair. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>58</sup> Rampersad, Naline. (1996, May 8). Rebels optimistic standoff near end. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>59</sup> Brodbeck, Tom. (1996, May 13). Natives charged in armed standoff. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>60</sup> Sinclair, David. (1997, January 30). Street gang savior chiefs join forces with Warriors’ leader. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>61</sup> Bray, Allison. (1997, February 18). Fontaine loses respect over Contois. Decision to hire Former gang leader upsets several Manitoba chiefs. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>62</sup> Cole, Brian. (1997, February 14). Warriors bust. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

Chief David Cassels and other officers claimed the operation to be a success, as it uncovered information to be used in further investigations; however, one officer anonymously stated the operation was a waste of hundreds of thousands of dollars and resulted in only minor charges.<sup>63</sup>

Further, *Winnipeg Free Press* writer Brian Cole speculated that the operation was merely a media ploy used by the police to meet several objectives: Improve the image of the police, as well as embarrass Grand Chief Phil Fontaine and the AMC for hiring Contois, as according to Cole, the drug portion of the bust ultimately only amounted to \$325 worth of marijuana.<sup>64</sup> A few days following Contois' arrest through Operation Disarm in mid-February of 1997, the *Free Press* announced that Contois confirmed from jail that he had been relegated from his top position within the Manitoba Warriors due to his involvement with the AMC and the attention it garnered.<sup>65</sup> Despite the controversy, his strategy to combat youth gangs, which included the purchase of a building to be used for career planning, recreation, cultural activities and healing, was well underway by this time.<sup>66</sup> The fact that this gang member was still participating in community capacity building, despite his criminal engagement as well as his arrest, speaks volumes to the desperation the Aboriginal community felt with regard to the issue of street gangs. It seems they were willing to implement novel strategies despite controversy. Outside of the Aboriginal community, individuals such as Brian Cole viewed the police operation with skepticism and expressed empathy toward the AMC for their struggles with this issue.

Using Brian Contois to develop a strategy to tackle youth gang involvement seemed to set a precedent in the Aboriginal community as the Manitoba Warriors appeared in one article in the print media again in April 1997. The AMC hosted a summit on street-gangs and invited members of the Manitoba Warriors and the Indian Posse, a rival gang, to

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<sup>63</sup> *Ibid*, n.p.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid*, n.p.

<sup>65</sup> Sinclair, Gordon. (1997, February 19). Street leader Contois 'demoted'. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid*, n.p.

discuss ways to lure Aboriginal peoples away from gang activities.<sup>67</sup> The summit gained negative attention as organizers failed to include members from the Deuce, which is the youth branch of the Manitoba Warriors, as well as the Aboriginal Council of Winnipeg and the Metis Friendship Centre. It was believed that because AMC Grand Chief Fontaine represents those living on reserves, he should not get involved with the street gang issue in Winnipeg.<sup>68</sup> In contrast, the summit organizer, Jim LaVallee, stated that the AMC got involved in this issue because no one else had.<sup>69</sup>

The final media attention conferred on the Manitoba Warriors before Operation Northern Snow in November of 1998 was an article in July 1998 which discussed the vow made from prison by an upper-level Warriors member to contact subordinates and demand they put an end to their harassment of the mother of Jeff Giles, a man killed the previous year during the robbery of a grocery store.<sup>70</sup> The vow was made after Sagkeeng First Nation Chief Jerry Fontaine, who was heavily involved in Aboriginal outreach programs, telephoned the gang member in prison to see if anything could be done to help this woman, as the undercover police protection outside her home was not stopping the harassment.<sup>71</sup> This story has importance because despite concern showed by Justice Minister Vic Toews and the assurances of Winnipeg police sergeant Carl Shier<sup>72</sup>, ultimately this situation was addressed by the Aboriginal community itself, while more official approaches were making no progress.

The first article to discuss Northern Snow came out on November 6, 1998, two days after the arrests. The article reported that 29 alleged high-level gang members were arrested, including president, William Pangman, and among other items, 16 guns and thousands in

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<sup>67</sup> Owen, Bruce. (1997, April 5). Street-gang summit ignores Deuce. Secret AMC initiative drawing fire. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid*, n.p.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*, n.p.

<sup>70</sup> Samyn, Paul. (1998, July 9). Gang leader vows to help Giles family's terror. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*, n.p.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid*, n.p.



cash were seized in the raid.<sup>73</sup> Sgt. Al Cameron, head of the operation, was quoted as saying, “They are the most organized and most structured of the street gangs in Winnipeg - at least they were,” however, it was also admitted that this year-long investigation yielded just 10 percent of Warriors members. Fourteen suspects targeted in the operation were still on the lam – they were eventually caught.<sup>74</sup> This first media report stated that the accused would be tried using Canada’s new anti-gang legislation.<sup>75</sup>

The bulk of content after this point dealt with the financial burden of the case, with considerable attention being paid to a multi-million dollar courthouse built for this case – five articles focused on the courthouse. At the time construction began, there were 42 co-defendants and no place large enough to try them. The hope was that this building would turn into a long-term facility for future multi-defendant conspiracy trials.<sup>76</sup> In addition to a brief discussion of lawyers and academics and their skepticism as to how much use the building would actually get, one article specifically discussed public perceptions of safety.<sup>77</sup> Joy Coates, a resident of Fort Garry, the area in which the new courthouse was erected, and a member of Citizens Against Violence, stated that she had several calls from concerned residents who worried about the safety of their children.<sup>78</sup> Any further articles about the courthouse focused on issues such as motions to move the trial, as the special location might be an indication of guilt, prejudicing the jury.<sup>798081</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> McKie, Paul & McIntyre, Mike. (1998, November 6). Crime ‘corporation’ on run. Police believe Warriors ‘hard-core hierarchy’ swept up. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid*, n.p.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid*, n.p.

<sup>76</sup> McKie, Paul. (1999, February 4). Toews builds court for gangs. Security a concern for a year-long trial. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>77</sup> McKie, Paul. (1999, February 5). Area residents feel courthouse poses danger to children. Jury out on whether court a bonus of a boondoggle. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid*, n.p.

<sup>79</sup> McKie, Paul. (1999, September 8). Amazing’ Warriors trial debuts. Case adjourns till Tuesday in secure, high-tech court. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>80</sup> Janzen, Leah. (2000, February, 24). Crown defends special courthouse. Right to fair trial won’t be hurt, judge told; defence pushes to have gang law test moved. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>81</sup> Janzen, Leah. (2000, March 9). Gang trial gets go-ahead. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

The remainder of the articles focused on the trial with innumerable motions,<sup>82</sup> claims that defendants should be given leniency after having religious epiphanies<sup>83</sup> and the hefty costs of the trial (an estimated \$8 million in legal aid; \$30,000 to cover the cost of transporting a witness in witness-protection).<sup>84,85</sup> All the while, the number of accused to face trial slowly dwindled as gang members pleaded guilty to lesser charges.

Outside of the issue of the courthouse, the only other area of concern throughout the trial for community members was that of possible discrimination against the accused due to their Aboriginal backgrounds. One article staunchly spoke to this by reporting that a year since their arrest, none of the 35 accused had been released on bail by November 2, 1999.<sup>86</sup> Further, the article reported that Aboriginal groups were planning to rally outside the Law Courts Building that week based on the claim that the Warriors were being detained due to racism. Rally organizer Terry Nelson is quoted as saying, “The court system is looking at them as guilty until proven innocent,” and defence attorney Darren Sawchuck believed bail was denied to pressure the accused to plead guilty, and that if the defendants had been white with the same charges and prior records, they would have been released on bail.<sup>87</sup> In another article related to sentencing, three gang members appealed sentences following their guilty pleas, with defence attorney Evan Roitenberg claiming lesser sentences would “undo some of the systemic discrimination” many of the accused suffered through denial of bail, limited visits and no consideration for Aboriginal heritage in sentencing.<sup>88</sup> The appeals were denied, except for in one case.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Romanuik, Ross. (1999, September 7). Warriors set to go in dock for huge trial but motions could delay jury selection till January. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>83</sup> CP. (2000, July 11). Manitoba judge told to ignore claims Warriors have found God. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>84</sup> McKie, Paul. (1999, February 18). Gang defence bill \$8M? Lawyers for Manitoba Warriors wrapping up legal aid fee deal. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>85</sup> McIntyre, Mike. (2000, March 30). Money battle snags Warriors trial. Defence, Crown refusing to pay \$30,000 tab for protected witness. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>86</sup> McKie, Paul. (1999, November 2). 17 accused in Warriors trial without bail year later. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid*, n.p.

<sup>88</sup> CP. (2001, May 6). Mba court throws out discrimination argument by native gang. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid*, n.p.

At the closing of the trial, in response to an article in the *Free Press* entitled, “Warriors Case Ends with a Whimper: Organized-crime Charge Dropped; 12 Plead Guilty to Drug Counts,” an editorial was published that represented mistrust of the government to handle OC issues appropriately. This editorial pointed to the notion that the anti-gang legislation was rushed through parliament as a response to the biker wars in Montreal and if tested, convictions would have inevitably been appealed and the legislation could be revised after lessons learned.<sup>90</sup> In response to both this article and the editorial, lead prosecutor Bob Morrison asserted that Winnipeg, particularly downtown, does not feel like a safe place to live due to gang activity and that this trial put a significant dent in Warriors activities.<sup>91</sup> There was no mention, however, as to how this dent impacted feelings of safety in the downtown area.

A major event in the Aboriginal community occurred shortly after the completion of the trial. On February 24, 2002, the *Free Press* reported on the shooting of RCMP officer Const. Mike Templeton, with the suspects being Michael Gary Regamy and Warriors member Daniel Jonathan Courchene.<sup>92</sup> The officer’s injuries were non-life threatening; however, the suspects fled and were on the run for 12 days before they were apprehended during a seven-hour standoff with police.<sup>93</sup> Throughout the search, the police made their presence in the community well known, taking tips very seriously and raiding possible hide-outs in full riot gear.<sup>94</sup> One article stated that “the seriousness of the police response to the tip shocked area residents.”<sup>95</sup> Police spokesmen told the *Free Press* that the police

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<sup>90</sup> 2000, January 8. Editorial: After the whimper [Letter to the editor]. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>91</sup> McIntyre, Mike. (2000, July 11). Agitated Crown defends gang trial. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>92</sup> Owen, Bruce. (2002, February 24). Police hunt shooting suspects in city. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>93</sup> McIntyre, Mike. (2002, March 12). Mounties consider suing parole board. Unprecedented legal action comes in wake of shootings. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>94</sup> Owens, Bruce. (2002, March 2). Where are they? Police commandos storm apartment; tip proves false. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>95</sup> Owen, Bruce. (2002, February 28). Manhunt heats up. Dozens of police raid house, can’t find shooting suspects. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

response, involving more than 20 city police officers and RCMP officers, should show all Manitoba residents how resolute law enforcement was to detain the two fugitives.<sup>96</sup>

In response to a tip that proved to be false, one witness is quoted as saying, "he knocked really quietly, and when I opened the door, he whispered that I had to get out...I looked out and these officers had helmets on and (were) wearing camouflage and were standing behind these big black shields they had set up in the hallway next to the apartment they thought these guys were in."<sup>97</sup> Because these events occurred less than one year after the province received negative attention for the lacklustre finish of the Northern Snow trial, it may be that this aggressive response to tips was a strategy to restore public confidence in the criminal justice system.

Following the Warriors landmark trial, aside from the RCMP officer shooting, the majority of content in the print media comprised a string of criminal incidents reported in the *Winnipeg Free Press* involving Warriors members. Shane Myran was convicted for uttering threats against two Crown prosecutors in December 2000<sup>98</sup> and former Warriors president William Pangman was charged with uttering threats just weeks after he was released from the 4.5- year sentence he received in the Warriors trial.<sup>99</sup> Other events included suspected Aboriginal gang-related killings in three unrelated acts of street violence<sup>100</sup> and violent gang wars in 2003 on the Garden Hill First Nation reserve, including car-bombings.<sup>101</sup>

None of the reports of these events spoke to public perceptions of safety or the police. One report in late 2001 criticized the lenient sentence of two years less a day given to

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<sup>96</sup> Owens, Bruce. Where are they?...

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid*, n.p.

<sup>98</sup> CP. (2000, December 5). Winnipeg gang member convicted of threatening Crown attorney. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>99</sup> McIntyre, Mike. (2002, November 27). Ex-Manitoba Warriors head charged with uttering threats. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>100</sup> Sinclair, Gordon. (2000, June 3). Curb-stomping? Thank TV and the movies. The medium is the message, and the message is a nightmare. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>101</sup> CP. (2003, June 5). Rivalry between gangs on Man. First Nation like Wild West: police. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

Ronald Williams, a member of the Warriors' youth branch, the Deuce, who was convicted of manslaughter for beating to death 18-year-old Randy Sumner.<sup>102</sup> This report did quote Sumner's uncle as saying, "I can't believe the horror Natives inflict on each other, especially in gangs...to me, it's sometimes an insult to say I'm a native from Winnipeg."<sup>103</sup>

### **8.3.4 Summary**

This police undercover Operation Northern Snow resulted in one of the first mega gang trials. Those arrested were charged with more than 100 counts related to trafficking and other drug offences. The accused were alleged to be part of a well established Aboriginal street gang operating in Winnipeg. According to the GSS data, it appears that the police operation had very little effect on Manitoba residents with regard to perceptions of crime rates, routine activities, perceptions of the police and satisfaction with personal safety. However, the UCR data suggest that the short-term decrease in OC-related crimes following Operation Northern snow may be directly associated with this countermeasure, but there is no long-term effect on OC-related incidents. A review of the newspapers also revealed little coverage of the effect of the police operation on public safety. Many articles focused on the effect of Aboriginal gangs and, in particular, the trial (e.g. cost of the trial, construction of the court house).

## **8.4 Project Eider, Project E-Perhaps and Project E-Page**

### **8.4.1 Overview of Projects**

These three projects targeted Southeast Asian traffickers, particularly Chinese-based OC groups.

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<sup>102</sup> McIntyre, Mike. (2001, December 21). Killer laughs on was to jail. Hockey-stick slayer mocks justice system. *Winnipeg Free Press*, n.p.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid*, n.p.

According to the RCMP report entitled *Drug Situation in Canada* (1999),<sup>104</sup> Project Eider was a 13-month investigation involving the RCMP, the Vancouver Police Services, Milton Police Services, Metropolitan Toronto Police Services, and the Royal Hong Kong Police. The police seized 70 kilograms of heroin that was 93 percent pure and a large amount of cash. The seizure was carried out on November 26, 1998.

Several months later, on February 16, 1999, the police carried out project E-Perhaps in the ports of Vancouver. Here the police seized approximately 43 kilograms of SEA heroin (99 percent pure) from a marine container of brown sugar that originated in China and was headed for Burnaby, BC.

In June 1999, Project E-page was carried out after a 2-1/2 year international investigation. The arrests included 28 individuals of an OC group that was active in B.C and various cities in the United States, Hong Kong, Thailand and Myanmar.

## **8.4.2 Data Analysis**

### **GSS Analysis**

Upon investigating BC and the city of Vancouver through the use of cross-tabulations, it was found that perceptions of the amount of crime in one's neighbourhood compared to other areas in Canada remained relatively the same. From 1993 to 2004, residents of Vancouver believed crime in their neighbourhoods to be lower than the rest of Canada as well as compared to those in the province. During the same period, a smaller percentage living in Vancouver felt that they had a higher crime in their neighbourhood when compared to the rest of Canada and to the province. (see **Table 48** in **APPENDIX A**).

With regard to how crime rates have changed in the past five years, perceptions of Vancouver and BC residents improved by relatively the same extent over the 11-year data collection period. In Vancouver in 1993, 60 percent of respondents believed crime rates had increased in the previous five years. This number went down to and remained

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<sup>104</sup> Royal Canadian Mounted Police (1999) *Drug Situation in Canada*.

stable at 38 percent from 1999 to 2004. Those Vancouver respondents who felt crime remained about the same increased from 27 percent in 1993 to 46 percent in 1999 and 47 percent in 2004 (see **Table 49** in **APPENDIX A**). Because the seizures and arrests stemming from these operations occurred between late 1998 and mid-1999, and this quite dramatic improvement in perceptions of crime rates occurred prior to 1999, this change is not likely connected to these operations. In fact, this trend is mirrored within Winnipeg and Canada as a whole; without more data points, one might infer that 1993 was merely an outlying year and the subsequent years were a regression back to the mean.

When routine activities were investigated, it was found that the rate of those who felt very or reasonably safe from crime while walking alone in their area after dark remained relatively stable at 70-75 percent for BC and 65-70 percent for Vancouver, with a slight increase; the rate of those who felt somewhat safe remained relatively stable between approximately 15 and 20 percent, with a slight decrease for both BC and Vancouver from 1993 to 2004. The percent of respondents who felt very unsafe from crime while walking alone in their area after dark decreased slightly from 11 percent in BC in 1993 and 14 percent in Vancouver to five percent for both BC and Vancouver in 1999, where it remained stable in 2004. Again, this change from 1993 to 1999 comes before the activities of Eider, E-Perhaps and E-Page (see **Table 50** in **APPENDIX A**).

The rates of respondents who felt very or somewhat worried while waiting for or using public transportation alone after dark remained stable at 20-25 percent for BC and at 30-35 percent for Vancouver over the 11-year data collection period. Those who stated that they were not at all worried about safety in Vancouver while waiting for or using public transportation alone after dark decreased slightly, from 23 to 21 percent from 1993 to 1999, and went up to 28 percent in 2004. This variable remained stable at around 20 percent in BC (see **Table 51** in **APPENDIX A**). There was not enough data to determine changes in perceptions of personal safety when alone in the home in the evening or at night with regard to those not at all worried, however those who felt worried (one to four percent of respondents) and those who felt somewhat worried (20-25 percent) remained stable for both BC and Vancouver over the 11-year period (see **Table 52** in **APPENDIX A**).

With regard to routine activities alone after dark, there was no change in the frequency of use of public transportation for both BC and Vancouver from 1993 to 2004 (see **Table 53** in **APPENDIX A**). There was also a very slight decrease in Vancouver respondents who stated they walk alone in their area after dark daily; from 21 percent in 1993 to 17 percent in 1999 and again 17 percent in 2004, and a slight but steady increase of 26 percent in 1993, to 32 percent in 2004, of Vancouver respondents who walked alone in their area after dark at least once a week. The other response categories remained stable (see **Table 54** in **APPENDIX A**).

Finally, much like Winnipeg, there was very little change from 1993 to 2004 in respondents' feelings about whether or not they would walk alone after dark if they felt safer from crime, with approximately 25-30 percent saying they would do this more often across the 11-year time period for both BC and Vancouver, and approximately 35 percent saying they would not (see **Table 54** in **APPENDIX A**). There was, however, an increase of almost 10 percent in the number of Vancouver respondents who would use public transportation alone after dark more often if they felt safer from crime; with 15 percent in 1993, 21 percent in 1999 and 24 percent in 2004. (See **Table 55** in **APPENDIX A**). As with the other variables, because this change began prior to late 1999 when these operations were occurring, it is unlikely it was the result of the actions of the police. Further, because these operations garnered very little media attention, unlike with other operations, the police activities preceding the actual arrests and seizures would not have been known to the public to an extent that would have affected their perceptions of safety and routine activities. Accordingly, there was a relatively substantial decrease from 57 percent in 1993 to 42 percent in 2004 in those Vancouver residents who would not use public transportation alone after dark more often if they felt safer from crime. Again, this simply means that 42 percent of residents do not avoid public transportation due to safety reasons; avoidance is due to other factors (see **Table 55** in **APPENDIX A**).

As with other areas of Canada, public perception of the local police either improved slightly over the 11-year data collection period, or remained stable. The percentage of respondents who felt the local police were doing a good job of enforcing the laws increased very slightly in Vancouver, from 47 percent in 1993 to 51 percent in 2004, and



those who felt the local police to be doing an average job decreased from 43 percent in 1993 to 34 percent in 1999 and rose back up to 37 percent in 2004 – a minor fluctuation in the data. The small minority of Vancouver residents (less than 10 percent) who felt the local police were doing a poor job remained stable over time (see **Table 56** in **APPENDIX A**).

This trend was mirrored in BC as a whole. This very slight improvement in perceptions can be seen on the variable related to the local police ensuring the safety of area citizens. Here, those in the province who felt the police were doing a good job increased from 48 percent in 1993 to 49 percent in 1999 to 52 percent in 2004. The percentage of respondents in Vancouver who felt the police to be doing an average job decreased by one percent per data collection period, beginning in 1993 with 36 percent, and those who felt the police to be doing a poor job decreased steadily from 10 percent in 1993 to seven percent in 2004 (see **Table 57** in **APPENDIX A**). Those who felt the police to be doing a good job of promptly responding to calls increased from 40 percent in Vancouver in 1993 to 45 percent in 1999, where it remained stable, only increasing by one percent in 2004. The trend is the same for those who felt the police to be doing a poor job, which decreased from 14 percent in Vancouver in 1993 to 10 percent in 1999, where it remained. Those in Vancouver who felt the police to be doing an average job increased slightly from 22 percent in 1993 to 27 percent in 2004. This trend is mirrored in BC (see **Table 58** in **APPENDIX A**).

Public perception of the local police being approachable and easy to talk to remained unchanged in Vancouver from 1993 to 2004 with just over 60 percent of respondents believing the local police to be doing a good job, approximately 20 percent believing them to be doing an average job, and around 6 percent believing them to be doing a poor job (see **Table 59** in **APPENDIX A**). Finally, at around 11 percent and 30 percent there was very little change in the percent of respondents who believed the police to be doing a poor job or an average job respectively of supplying information to the public on ways to reduce crime in Vancouver. The percentage of respondents who stated the police were doing a good job of supplying the public with information on ways to reduce crime fluctuated in Vancouver from 47 percent in 1993 to 50 percent in 1999 and back down to

44 percent in 2004 (see **Table 60** in **APPENDIX A**). Because there was no real pattern to the changes in perceptions of the police, as well as many of the changes mirrored the face of Canada as a whole, one can conclude that Project Eider, Project E-Perhaps and Project E-Page had no measurable effect on public opinion of the local police.

Finally, on the variable satisfaction with personal safety from crime, the percent of respondents who felt satisfied increased from 83 percent in BC in 1993 to 93 percent in 2004, with the biggest increase (nine percent) occurring between 1999 and 2004. This also occurred in Vancouver wherein 80 percent of respondents were satisfied with their personal safety from crime in 1993 and 90 percent in 2004. Again, the largest increase (nine percent) occurred between 1999 and 2004. Accordingly, 18 percent of Vancouver respondents were dissatisfied with personal safety in 1993. This decreased to 11 percent in 1999 and again to nine percent in 2004 (see **Table 61** in **APPENDIX A**) — essentially no change. This trend was also seen in BC. Due to the timing of this change as well as the fact that it was not seen in Canada as a whole, one might infer this increase in satisfaction with personal safety was due to these police operations, however with the little media coverage these cases attracted, it is unlikely that enough residents were aware of this for it to have had an effect on overall satisfaction levels.

### **UCR Analysis**

Like Montreal and Toronto, Vancouver saw an overall decrease in OC-related incidents from approximately 260,000 incidents in 1991 to just fewer than 200,000 crimes in 2008 (see **Figure 1** in **APPENDIX B**). While incidents remained relatively stable from 1991 to 1996, with a slight decrease, there was a rather dramatic spike between 1996 and 1997, after which incidents continued to fall until 2001. Given that these raids began in late-1998 until mid-1999, one would expect a jump in incidents due to an influx in arrests, followed by a decrease in incidents.

Because this was not the case, in addition to the trend also seen in Toronto and Montreal, it appears as though this operation had no effect on OC-related incidents in Vancouver. Of note however is a slight increase in incidents beginning in 2001 and continuing until

2005, before dropping off. This increase was not seen in other comparable Canadian cities so it may be related to something specific to Vancouver, such as the release of many of the accused who were incarcerated due to these projects, or an increase in police pressure to tackle OC-related incidents following these operations. However, this increase in incidents in the mid-2000s was also apparent in smaller Canadian cities, such as Edmonton and Winnipeg. Therefore no definitive conclusions can be drawn here.

### **8.4.3 Content Analysis**

A substantial review of various newspaper databases was conducted to locate newspaper articles on Projects Eider, E-Perhaps and E-Page. After an intensive search, only one article was found that cited Project E-Page. Dawson (1999) wrote an article entitled, “Gangs feel safe here- word is we’re soft on them: We don’t scare Asian mobsters, Mountie admits.” The journalist focuses on how Canadian laws are ineffective in responding to gang activities. Those individuals arrested as part of E-Page were allegedly linked to Chinese secret societies or Triads<sup>105</sup>.

Given the limited information on the specific projects, we were unable to conduct a content analysis.

### **8.4.4 Summary**

This analysis focused on three police operations: Projects’ Eider, E-Perhaps and E-Page. These three operations extended from 1998 to 1999 and occurred in the Vancouver area. While the perception of those living in Vancouver and BC fluctuated, observed positive changes in the people’s views of crime cannot be linked to the three police operations. According to the GSS data, there is also no clear evidence that these three police operations had an effect on public opinion of the local police. There was also no association between temporal changes in the UCR data and the police operations. Given the limitations of the data and information on the projects, it is difficult to reach any clear conclusions.

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<sup>105</sup>Dawson . Fabian (1999), “Gangs fell safe here- word is we’re soft on them: We don’t scare Asian mobsters, Mountie admits. *The Province*, June 4. pA12

## 8.5 Project OsaDa II

### 8.5.1 Overview of Project

On December 9, 1999, the police carried out Project OsaDa II, aimed at Eastern European OC operating in Canada and the United States<sup>106</sup>. The police raids included more than 300 officers from the Toronto and York Police services, along with the Ontario Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit<sup>107</sup>. CFSEU comprises members of the Toronto Police Service, York and Peel Regional Police, Ontario Provincial Police, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and the Criminal Intelligence Service Ontario. Search warrants were executed at 20 locations in the Greater Toronto area, three in Windsor, one in Ottawa, and four in Montreal, resulting in 43 arrests.

### 8.5.2 Data Analysis

#### GSS Analysis

Cross-tabulations to investigate public perceptions of neighbourhood crime rates for Toronto and Ontario found that the percentage of residents who felt that crime in their area was about the same as other areas in Canada did not deviate from the 25-30 percent range over the 11-year data collection period; however, Toronto respondents who felt it was lower increased steadily, from 47 percent in 1993 to 55 percent in 2004. The same trend was seen in Ontario, but to a lesser degree. Further, a slightly positively skewed distribution can be seen for those Toronto respondents who felt crime was higher in their neighbourhood when compared to other areas of Canada, with a decrease from 18 percent in 1993 to 14 percent in 2004 (see **Table 62** in **APPENDIX A**).

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<sup>106</sup> Massive Police Operation Cracks Down on Organized Crime (December 9, 1999). Source: <http://www.angelfire.com/oh4/st31/news11.html>. CBC News ( November 10, 2000) Police Bust major Organized Crime Ring. Source: <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/1999/12/09/torarrests991209.html>

<sup>107</sup> Freed, Dale Ann and Millar, Cal (1999), "38 Held in swoop on crime network: Biggest arrest of East Europeans in N. American, police claim," *Toronto Star*, December 10., p1

There was quite a dramatic change in Toronto and to a lesser extent Ontario in the percent of respondents who felt crime in their neighbourhood had increased in the past five years. In 1993, 54 percent of Toronto residents felt crime in their neighbourhood had increased; this number decreased in 1999 to 30 percent, and increased again in 2004 to 37 percent. Although the percentage of respondents who felt crime in their neighbourhood had increased did not alter greatly ( $\leq 6$ ) for Ontario or Toronto from 1993 to 2004, those who felt crime in their neighbourhood remained about the same during the previous five years increased in Toronto from 34 percent in 1993 to 50 percent in 1999 and back down to 48 percent in 2004 (see **Table 63** in **APPENDIX A**). As the greatest improvements in perceptions of crime rates occurred between 1993 and 1999, and Project OsaDa II did not attract media attention until the raids in late 1999, it is unlikely these improvements in public opinion were related to the operation. Further, trends in perceptions by the public were seen in Canada as a whole.

Perceptions of personal safety, including activities such as walking alone after dark, using public transportation after dark and being alone in one's home after dark generally improved over the 11-year data collection period in both Toronto and Ontario. The percentage of Toronto respondents who felt very or reasonably safe from crime while walking alone in their area after dark increased from 64 percent in 1993 to 74 percent in 2004. Accordingly, Toronto respondents who felt somewhat unsafe decreased from 19 percent in 1993 to 11 percent in 1999 where it remained in 2004. The percentage of Toronto respondents who felt very unsafe while walking alone in their area after dark decreased from 15 percent in 1993 to four percent in 1999, and increased to six percent in 2004. These improvements can also be seen to a lesser extent in Ontario as a whole (see **Table 64** in **APPENDIX A**).

Toronto respondents who felt very or somewhat worried while waiting for or using public transportation alone after dark decreased from 31 percent in 1993 to 22 percent in 1999, before increasing again in 2004. While the percentage of respondents who felt not at all worried did not change in Ontario, in Toronto it increased slightly from 23 percent in 1999 to 25 percent in 2004 (see **Table 65** in **APPENDIX A**). Finally, while the percentage of respondents who felt very or somewhat worried while alone in their home

in the evening or at night in both Ontario and Toronto decreased from 1993 to 1999 before stabilizing at around 20 percent, respondents in Ontario who felt not at all worried increased from 73 percent in 1993 to 80 percent 1999, where it remained (decreasing by one percent to 79 percent) (see **Table 66** in **APPENDIX A**). There was not enough data to report on Toronto for this response category. The greatest improvements in perceptions of safety occurred between 1993 and 1999. While one article on Russian and Eastern European OC, written before 1999, was found in the content analysis, this was certainly not enough to sway public opinion on crime in general in the province of Ontario.

Despite any changes in perceptions of routine activities, the frequency with which these activities were engaged in did not change for Toronto or Ontario as a whole (see **Table 67 – Table 68** in **APPENDIX A**). Respondents in Toronto who stated that they would walk alone in their area after dark more often if they felt safer decreased from 35 percent in 1993 to 22 percent in 1999 and increased again to 29 percent in 2004 (see **Table 69** in **APPENDIX A**). This was also true for those who said they would use public transportation in Toronto alone after dark more often if they felt safer from crime, with 24 percent in this response category in 1993, 14 percent in 1999, and 22 percent in 2004 (see **Table 70** in **APPENDIX A**).

As the improvement in the public's sense of safety occurred prior to the initiative, it could not be attributed to Project OsaDa II. Between 1993 and 2004, little changed in the views held about the local police, with generally over 50 percent of respondents in both Ontario and Toronto perceiving the local police to be doing a good job on a variety of activities. Thus, this operation appeared to have little effect on views of the police (see **Table 71-Table 75** in **APPENDIX A**).

Finally, between 1993 and 1999, the proportion of Toronto respondents who stated that they felt satisfied with their personal safety from crime increased from 82 percent to 91 percent, with very little change thereafter. Accordingly, Toronto respondents who were dissatisfied decreased from 14 percent in 1993 to six percent in 1999, where it remained in 2004 (see **Table 76** in **APPENDIX A**). This trend can also be seen to a lesser extent in Ontario, and again, the changes occurred prior to the police operation.

## UCR Analysis

As in Montreal and Vancouver, when OC-related incidents were mapped from 1991 to 2008, incidents decreased in Toronto from approximately 370,000 in 1991 to approximately 225,000 in 2008 (see **Figure 1** in **APPENDIX B**). This drop coincides with improved perceptions of crime in one's area based on the GSS data for the mid-1990s. The main data point differentiating Toronto from other sizable Canadian cities is a rather dramatic increase in incidents between 2001 and 2004 before dipping down again from 2004 to 2006. Because the bulk of the arrests for this operation would have occurred in late 1999 and early 2000, which was in fact a year with very low incidents when compared to past years in Toronto, it appears as though this influx in arrests did not affect the overall incident rates. The increase in incidents during the early 2000s may be related to an increase in police pressure to target OC, given that this issue was brought to light in the print media during Project OsaDa II.

### 8.5.3 Content Analysis

The following tables provide a summary of the searches using key words.

**Table 78 - Overview of the Keyword Searches for Project Osada II from 1993 to 2007**

<b>Keyword Search</b>	<b>Number of Articles</b>
<b>OsaDa II</b>	2
<b>Russian Crime</b>	8
<b>Eastern European Organized Crime</b>	8
<b>Community Safety</b>	0

The newspaper search involved the years 1993 to 2007. While several articles focused on the growing issues of Russian OC and the links between Moscow and Toronto, one of the first articles that specifically mentioned Russian crime in Toronto was written in 1996. Bill (1996), under the headline “Russian crime hits Metro area – Offences run gamut from shoplifting to extortion to murder as web widens,” gave a historical overview of Russian crimes committed from 1991 to 1996<sup>108</sup>. The article focuses on a few individuals and their crimes, as well as their associations with criminals from the former Soviet Union. The author further cites the police chief, who warns that the Russian mob and other criminals from Eastern Europe are forming one of the largest OC threats.

However, a letter to the editor challenged the information that was published in several articles on Russian crime. Marsha Gershtein, editor and co-publisher of *Info (Russian) Toronto* in Thornhill, noted that the articles published in *The Toronto Star* displayed “shameful sensationalism that is increasingly becoming a staple of many newspapers” and is wrongfully stereotyping the Russian community<sup>109</sup>. The author of the letter to the editor felt there should be more balanced reporting on the successes of the Russian community rather than on stories of “Russian mafiya.”

The OsaDa II police operation was covered on December 10, 1999 under the headline, “38 Held in swoop on crime network: Biggest arrest of East Europeans in N. America, police claim”<sup>110</sup>. The article provides an overview of the project that involved pre-dawn raids and more than 300 police officers. Thirty-eight people arrested and arrest warrants issued for 17 others. The police referred to the raids as “a wake-up call, a reality check that Canada - and especially the GTA and the Golden Horseshoe,” adding that the area was “becoming a sanctuary for organized criminals and for organized criminal enterprise.” The police also referred to Project OsaDa II as “one of the most significant investigations into Eastern European organized crime since the fall of the Soviet Union in

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<sup>108</sup> Bill, Desmond (1996), “Russian crime hits Metro area Offences run gamut from shoplifting to extortion to murder as web widens,” June 1, *Toronto Star*, p.C.5

<sup>109</sup> Gershtein, Marsha (1966), “Russian mafiya not typical here” July 20, *Toronto Star*. Letter to the Editor, p.C.3

<sup>110</sup> Freed, Dal Anne and Millar, Cal (1999), “38 Held in swoop on crime network: Biggest arrest of East Europeans in N. America, police claim.” December 10, *Toronto Star* . p.1



1991, and shows the commitment that police agencies in Canada have to combating these criminals.”

Several articles continued to concentrate on the trials of those arrested under Project OsaDa II, however, no new articles were published nor were there any articles dealing with the effect of Project OsaDa II on the Russian community in Toronto.

#### **8.5.4 Summary**

Project OsaDa II focused on Eastern European OC members residing in the Toronto area, as well as throughout other communities in Ontario. Upon a review the GSS data, no association can be made between this operation and the changes to individuals’ perception of crime, their safety or the police. The changes in the OC crime incidents cannot be linked to the police undercover operation because of the limitations of the data. Finally, there was limited coverage in the English newspapers. However, a review of Russian newspapers or other Eastern European media may have revealed more articles.

### **8.6 Operation Synergy**

#### **8.6.1 Overview of the Project**

Operation Synergy was a 25-member police task force, established in 2003, to respond to the violence between two warring gangs following several shootings and stabbings across Calgary. The police made 72 arrests and laid 319 charges. The police also seized \$205,000 cash and \$391,000 in property alleged to be the illegal proceeds of crime, as well as \$3.4 million worth of cocaine, heroin, ecstasy, methamphetamine and marijuana.

## 8.6.2 Data Analysis

### GSS Analysis

No change in perceptions of the amount of crime in one's neighbourhood were found from 1993 to 2004; with five to 10 percent of Alberta and Calgary respondents believing crime to be higher, approximately 30 percent believing it to be about the same and approximately 60 to 65 percent of respondents believing crime in their neighbourhood to be lower than for other areas in Canada (see **Table 77** in **APPENDIX A**). As in Edmonton, there was quite a dramatic change in relation to perceptions of how crime had changed in the previous five years for both Calgary and Alberta.

In Calgary, the proportion of respondents who felt crime had increased in their neighbourhood in the past five years decreased from 53 percent in 1993 to 29 percent in 2004, with the most dramatic change between 1993 and 1999 (see **Table 78** in **APPENDIX A**). Again like Edmonton, the proportion of Calgary respondents who felt crime in their neighbourhood had remained about the same in the past five years increased from 33 percent in 1993 to 55 percent in 2004. Because Operation Synergy garnered media attention in 2003, when the arrests occurred, and because this change is also seen in Edmonton and Alberta as a whole, the change in public opinion was not likely related to this countermeasure.

Like Edmonton and Alberta, perceptions of personal safety when engaging in routine activities improved very slightly in Calgary, but these improvements occurred steadily throughout the 1990s, before this operation was implemented (see **Table 79** in **APPENDIX A**). Of note, however, is a seven percent increase in respondents who were not at all worried about their safety from crime while waiting for or using public transportation alone after dark between 1999 and 2004 in Calgary (see **Table 80** in **APPENDIX A**). This increase was also not seen in Alberta and Edmonton, and although there is no sure way to attribute this change to Operation Synergy, based on the timing of the change in public opinion, it is possible that this countermeasure may have contributed to the change. As in the rest of Canada, the frequency with which respondents engaged in routine activities, such as walking alone in their area after dark and waiting for or using

public transportation alone after dark, did not change measurably (see **Table 81 - Table 83** in **APPENDIX A**). Of note here, however, is the decrease in those Calgary respondents who stated they would walk alone after dark in their area more often if they felt safer from crime, which decreased from 31 percent in 1993 to 19 percent in 1999, where it remained stable in 2004. This may be an indication that fewer Calgary residents choose not to walk alone after dark due to a fear of crime; however, the improvement in public's sense of security did occur prior to Operation Synergy (see **Table 84 - Table 85** in **APPENDIX A**).

As in Canada as a whole, there was very little change in public perceptions of the local police in Calgary from 1993 to 2004 (see **Table 86 - Table 90** in **Appendix A**). Although not likely related to Operation Synergy, one point of interest is the decrease from 66 percent to 55 percent of Calgary respondents from 1993 to 1999 stating that they believed the local police to be doing a good job of supplying information to the public on ways to reduce crime. This percentage then increased slightly in 2004 to 58 percent (see **Table 91** in **APPENDIX A**). The decrease between 1993 and 1999 was not apparent in Alberta as a whole (See **Table 92** in **APPENDIX A**).

Finally, there was an increase from 85 percent in 1993 to 96 percent in 2004 in Calgary respondents who stated that overall they were satisfied with their personal safety. However, the majority of this increase occurred between 1993 and 1999, and was mirrored across Canada and not unique to Calgary (see **Table 93** in **APPENDIX A**).

### **UCR Analysis**

The trend in OC-related offences in Calgary looked similar to the distribution seen in Edmonton from 1991 to approximately 2000; after which the distribution in Calgary was flat. Overall, the incident rates in Calgary went from approximately 59,000 in 1991 to 52,500 in 2008. Despite Operation Synergy in 2003, there was no noticeable change in OC-related incidents during the 2000s. This lack of change in incidents corresponds with the increase in respondents on the GSS from 1993 to 2004 who believed the amount of crime in their area to be about the same as it was five years before. Inspector Brian Skeet

of the Organized Crime Control Section of the Calgary Police asserted that this operation had an effect on reducing violent crime in Calgary. However, data from the UCR indicate that Synergy had no visible effect on OC-related incidents.

### 8.6.3 Content Analysis

To conduct a content analysis on the media coverage of Project Synergy, articles printed in the *Calgary Herald* and *Calgary Sun*, were reviewed.. The search of articles covered the years 1995 to 2008 using the database Pro Quest and Google search engines. The following table gives an overview of the content analysis.

**Table 94 – Overview of the Key Word Searches for Project Kachou 1995 to 2008**

<b>Keyword Search</b>	<b>Number of Articles</b>
<b>Project Kachou</b>	7
<b>OC</b>	9
<b>Community Safety</b>	2

Prior to Operation Synergy, Asian-based OC groups were active in the Calgary area. These groups developed a rivalry due to a dispute over the profits from home invasions, prostitution, money laundering, extortion and drug trafficking. The conflict between these two gangs resulted in dozens of knifings, drive-by shootings and deaths.

Poole (2003) reported that the police believed the arrests made under Operation Synergy had an effect on reducing the number of drive-by shootings. Poole quoted Inspector Brian Skeet of the Organized Crime Control Section of the Calgary Police, as stating that “ the most important thing we accomplished was eliminating the deaths that were happening.”

Skeet further stated that “Taking off some key players in the more active cells made a significant impact”<sup>111</sup>.

In another article, Poole and van Rassel (2004) reported on the Criminal Intelligence Service Alberta’s Annual Report. The police made reference to Operation Synergy and how the police were able to disrupt, but not dismantle, the Asian gangs. The journalist quoted inspector Brian Skeet: “We (the police) certainly had an effect on some of the more violent criminal networks in Calgary and I think we were successful in dismantling the one that was behind all of this.” He further stated that “(Synergy) was a disruption to the overall picture, but it would be naive to think there weren't other people stepping in to pick up the slack.”<sup>112</sup>

While no newspaper articles could be found that focused on the effect of Operation Synergy on public safety, some comments were made regarding the costs associated with such operations. Inspector Allan Hargreaves, a criminal operations officer, stated that ““Because of all of the commonalities, there's really not a lot of difference. Large-scale investigations, such as the June 2003 Operation Synergy – which rounded up hundreds of street gang members – drained resources and put too much pressure on other areas of the police service”<sup>113</sup>.

In another article, Chief Beaton<sup>114</sup> and other members of the Calgary Police services<sup>115</sup> further mentioned the strain these operations place on police resources. Chief Beaton also provided his own opinion piece on how the Calgary Police have been responding to the

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<sup>111</sup> Poole, Emma (December 23, 2003), “Squad fights gangs, drugs: Combined unit tackles related crime,” *Calgary Herald*, p. B1 (Front)

<sup>112</sup> Poole, Emma, van Rassel, Jason (May 21, 2004), “Gangs diversify into new crimes: Mortgage fraud, crystal meth added to menu,” *Calgary Herald*, p. B1 (Front)

<sup>113</sup> Poole, Emma ( July 14, 2004), “ Police revamp key units: No discernible need for changes: union,” *Calgary Herald*, p. BI (FRONT)

<sup>114</sup> Van Rassel, Jason ( February 25, 2005), “Police declare war on gang violence: Homicide unit pieces together nightclub slaying,” *Calgary Herald*, p.A1 (Front)

<sup>115</sup> Calgary Herald ( Police Advisor) (May6, 2005), “Targeting gangs on Calgary streets: CPS Community Response Unit,” *Calgary Herald*, P. PA 03;

Asian gang situations in the city and the costs associated with operations like Synergy<sup>116</sup>. This was in response to an editorial challenging the Calgary Police Services to commit more resources (similar to those for Operation Synergy) to respond to the Asian gang problem<sup>117</sup>. Finally, a few follow-up stories focused on the individual trials that resulted in arrests as part of the police operation.

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<sup>116</sup> Beaton, Jack ( July 23, 2005),“We won't glorify gangs by naming them: chief,”(opinion) *Calgary Herald*, P. A23

<sup>117</sup> Editorial ( July 19, 2005), “Police disservice: CPS should admit Calgary has a gang problem,” *Calgary Herald*, p. A10

#### **8.6.4 Summary**

Operation Synergy was a 25-member police task force formed in 2003. The objective of the police operation was to quash the violence between two warring Asian gangs following several shootings and stabbings across Calgary. As a result of the police operation, numerous charges were laid, and money, illicit drugs and property were seized.

According to the GSS, when the data among Edmonton, Calgary and Alberta were analyzed, the views of Calgary residents as to crime rates and trends could not be conclusively linked to this countermeasure. However, there was a slight improvement in terms of residents' sense of safety when walking alone after dark. A contribution to this improvement may have been made by Operation Synergy. A review of the UCR OC-related crime data revealed no noticeable change in OC crime rates for the years up to and including 2000. Our media analysis indicated that the Calgary police were claiming that Operation Synergy had an effect on OC crime rates. Unfortunately, these claims were not supported by our analysis.

### **8.7 Project Calvette**

#### **8.7.1 Overview of Project**

On September 8, 2004, the partners in the Ontario Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit (CFSEU), which included the participation of the RCMP, Sûreté du Québec (SQ), Service de police de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM), Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Timmins Police Service, and the Ontario Provincial Police (O.P.P.), as well as international partners, dismantled an international criminal organization involved in the importation of cocaine into Canada<sup>118</sup>. Project Calvette involved the arrest of 38 individuals, including two from Timmins. The project involved a three-year

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<sup>118</sup> Timmins Police Service 2006) Community Safety: TPS Contributes to Project Calvette. Source: <http://police.timmins.ca/modules/news/article.php?storyid=179>. Sara Deeth (2004) reported individuals arrested were linked to several criminal organizations including the Italian Mafia and Quebec biker gangs.

investigation. It also led to an investigation into a murder committed in Timmins, Ontario. This murder was related to control of the narcotics traffic in Northern Ontario.

This police operation was in response to an August 10, 2004 seizure of 750 kilograms of cocaine in the Caribbean Ocean, allegedly heading for Canada. Project Calvette involved 57 law-enforcement officers from various services across the country, and was conducted with the collaboration of law-enforcement authorities in Germany, St. Maarten, the United States, Puerto Rico, Venezuela, Great Britain, The Netherlands, France, Spain, Thailand, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico and the Dominican Republic. The Timmins police had 15 officers assigned to the operation. In Timmins, 12 search warrants were executed, resulting in six arrests. Police in Timmins seized 20 rifles, a bullet-proof vest, a device to detonate explosives, 300 grams of hashish, 200 grams of hash oil and 35 grams of cocaine. They also confiscated \$25,000 in cash – \$1,700 of which was counterfeit money – as well as a stolen ring worth \$7,000. A total of \$1.4 million in cash was seized in Ontario and Quebec<sup>119</sup>. The charges included numerous drug and weapons offences, as well as charges of money laundering, fraud, possession of property obtained by crime and gangsterism.

### **8.7.2 Data analysis**

No GSS or UCR data could be reviewed because of the size of the sample.

### **8.7.3 Content Analysis**

To conduct a content analysis on the media coverage of Project Calvette, articles published in the *Timmins Daily News* were reviewed. This is the only newspaper in the town of Timmins. The search of articles covered the years 1989 to 2008 using the database Eureka. The following table gives an overview of the content analysis.

**Table 95 – Overview of the Key Word Searches for Project Calvette 1989 to 2008**

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<sup>119</sup> Deeth, Sarah (2004), Weapons seized in Timmins raids: Six charged in Timmins as part of massive drug bust,” *Timmins Daily Press*, September 9. pA5



<b>Keyword Search (including Timmins)</b>	<b>Number of Articles</b>
<b>Project Calvette</b>	4
<b>OC</b>	7
<b>Community Safety</b>	0

Prior to Project Calvette, there were articles reporting specific OC activities in Timmins. The day following the arrests produced by Project Calvette, there were articles as a result of a press conference involving the chief of police. Deeth (2004) reported that as a result of Project Calvette, the Timmins Police Services seized several rifles, illegal drugs, monies and jewellery<sup>120</sup>.

The journalist focused on how a community the size of Timmins can be linked to an international drug cartel. The police chief is quoted as saying, "Even a mid-size community such as Timmins, 827 kilometres away from Montreal and in another province, can have a profound effect in dismantling a criminal organization of international magnitude,"<sup>121</sup> The other two articles focused on the individuals arrested.

In 2005, an article was printed in the local paper, entitled "Residents spending millions on drugs: Hells Angels siphoning \$30 million from Timmins economy each year."<sup>122</sup> The journalist suggested that as many as 12 chapters of the Hells Angels bikers were linked to the city's drug trade. This information was coming from an author who was a former resident of Timmins and has written many books on the Hells Angels. The claims made,

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<sup>120</sup> Sarah Deeth (2004) "Massive drug, weapons, money cache unveiled: Police operation reveals depth of local connection to international cartel; six arrested in Timmins." September 10, *The Daily Press* p. A1

<sup>121</sup> Ebid

<sup>122</sup> Moro Teviah (2005), "Residents spending millions on drugs: Hells Angels siphoning \$30 million from Timmins economy each year," January 7, *The Daily Press*, Friday, P A1.

however, are disputed by the police chief as unsubstantiated. The police chief made reference to Project Calvette, which did uncover a connection to Hells Angels in Timmins,, but disputes the claim that 12 Hells Angels chapters have connections in Timmins.. The police chief referred to this connection to the Hells Angels as “one small component” associated with Project Calvette<sup>123</sup>. Project Calvette involved several criminal organizations including the Italian Mafia and Quebec biker gangs<sup>124</sup>.

An article a few days later pointed out that the Ontario Provincial Police are ineffective in responding to the drug problems in Timmins. The local police services do not have any officers working with the special squads of the Ontario Provincial Police. Representatives from the Ontario Provincial Police and the Timmins Police Service disputed the comments made by the local authors. But the Timmins police chief did challenge the competence of the Ontario Provincial Police in responding to the Hells Angels and drugs in the city. “The reason they fail is because they don't know how to do basic police work," he said. "At the end of the day, it always turns out that they've made major mistakes.”<sup>125</sup> The articles as a whole focused on the Hells Angels and drugs in the city following Project Calvette. None of the articles assessed the effect of Project Calvette on the safety of the community.

#### **8.7.4 Summary**

Project Calvette was selected to diversify the analysis of police countermeasures. This police operation was active in several communities that also included Timmins. Unfortunately, GSS data is unavailable because it is not part of a metropolitan area. UCR data were also not available given the sample size. While the data reported by the Timmins police could have been used, this information was not available. The newspaper reports focused on a few individuals who were arrested as a result of the police operation.

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<sup>123</sup> Ebid

<sup>124</sup> Sarah Deeth (2004) “Massive drug, weapons, money cache unveiled: Police operation reveals depth of local connection to international cartel; six arrested in Timmins.” September 10, *The Daily Press* p. A1

<sup>125</sup> Ebid

What is interesting is how an arrest of a few people is given front-page coverage in a smaller community. While the stories did not focus on the safety of the community, they did underscore the fact that OC activities exist in all communities. This project clearly demonstrates the limitation in using national data sets to try to evaluate a police operation that is not in a Census Metropolitan Area.

## **9 Conclusions**

The main purpose of this study was to retrospectively evaluate several police operations targeting OC activities, using a variety of indicators selected on the basis of their availability. The traditional indicators included crime rates and evidence of the disruption of criminal organizations. Seldom have non-traditional indicators been used to assess the effect of police operations on community health and perception of safety.

This report involved identifying police countermeasures (two and three operations were grouped together as one major operation) against OC activities that occurred several years ago. Consequently, seven police countermeasures were identified. These were implemented from 1998 to 2004 and involved activities associated with biker gangs, Asian OC, the Manitoba Warriors Aboriginal gang, and Eastern European OC. The cities selected were drawn from across Canada and ranged from small to major cities. For the purposes of this report, police countermeasures referred to interventions, operations or actions aimed at stopping individuals from continuing to commit or participate in an illegal act.

Next, we compared the nature and volume of crime often attributed to OC, before and after each operation and in relation to neighbouring jurisdictions. OC was the critical dependent variable in our study. Two data sets were used for this study: 1) The Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCR), which measures police-reported incidents of crime in Canada and 2) The General Social Survey (GSS), which collected public perception data on the nature and extent of criminal victimization in Canada. The GSS variables only focused on victimization data. The GSS data were from surveys conducted in 1993, 1999, and 2004. The data sets were then matched to the respective cities or Census

Metropolitan Areas. The exception was for Timmins, which is not part of a CMA. The analysis of UCR data could not be undertaken due to the small number of incidents in Timmins.

To identify the UCR variables, each of the police countermeasures were reviewed to identify the charges laid against the targeted individuals. This information came from newspapers or a police agency. In addition, the offences most frequently committed by OC groups in Canada were also identified in a report by Statistics Canada called, *Organized Crime Activity in Canada, 1998: Results of a "Pilot" Survey of 16 Police Services*. These offences included: drug trafficking, extortion, firearms, prostitution, vehicle theft, counterfeit/fraud, gambling/illegal schemes, money laundering, attempted murder, homicide, assault and smuggling. Unfortunately, the variable “OC by most serious violation for selected police services” could not be used as this information was not collected until 2007.

As with any retrospective study, this project had several major limitations. For example, the GSS data only involved Census Metropolitan Areas and was useful in the assessment of police countermeasures that occurred in the larger cities, but was not helpful for smaller cities, such as Timmins. Furthermore, the GSS data were not designed to measure Canadian perceptions of crime or the health of the community as they specifically relate to OC. Thirdly, there were limitations with regard to the OC variables selected; in particular, the percentage of each offence count related to OC could not be estimated, which may have produced a dampening effect on the UCR time series analysis. That is, if the incidents related to OC could have been isolated, it may have been possible to observe more fluctuations following the operations. And while more substantial data on activities of OC may be difficult to obtain, the usual problems plaguing official data, such as the “dark figure” or unreported crime, were also applicable here.

Fourth, ideally, a multivariate time-series analysis would have been used for this project, but given the limitations of the data only a descriptive analysis was provided. For each city where a police countermeasure occurred, a review of newspaper articles was also

conducted. The focus of the content analysis was to determine whether the print media focused on the safety or security concerns of the community.

The present project also involved a substantial review of existing literature and studies on law-enforcement countermeasures targeting OC. There is a lack of rigorous evaluations in this area. Many operations are not evaluated at all. The majority of operations subjected to some assessment are self-evaluations by the same agencies responsible for the operations, rather than independent assessments. In addition, evaluations most frequently rely on “body counts” (number of arrests, amounts of cash and drugs seized) as the main measures of the success of operations against OC. Such outcome measures tell us little about the extent of disruption of a criminal organization, the effect on the illicit market, the effect on the crime situation in the relevant jurisdictions, and the effect of the police operation on the overall well-being, safety and functioning of the community in which the operation occurred.

This project attempted to address some of the limitations of previous evaluations of police countermeasures targeting OC. This includes an arms-length evaluation as opposed to the numerous self-evaluations conducted by Canadian law-enforcement agencies. In addition, the present evaluation goes beyond the body-count measures typically relied on in these self-evaluations. Body-count measures provide a mere tally of arrests and seizures of cash and contraband. No baseline is provided of such arrests and seizures prior to the police operation, and these outcomes tell us little about the disruption of criminal organizations or the effect of an operation on the quality of life and security of the community at large.

The first police countermeasure examined was Operation Springtime 2001, considered one of the largest one-day operations of its kind in Canadian history. It was a major operation against bikers in Quebec, which resulted in several major arrests and seizures of money, illegal drugs, properties and vehicles. The GSS data revealed that the operation may have had an effect on Montrealers’ perception of safety. However, other factors, such as the creation of the Wolverine Squad, were also thought to have had an effect on public perceptions. A similar trend can be found when the UCR data are examined. OC

activities appeared to have declined, but much of this may be due to the combined effects of the Wolverine Squad's activities and the Springtime sweeps. The review of newspaper articles found only three articles in which the journalist reported on the issues of community health or safety as a result of Operation Springtime and to a certain extent the Wolverine Squad.

The second group of projects reviewed were the police operations called Projects Kachou, Katalyt and Kold, which focused on Asian OC activities in Edmonton. These occurred in a span of eight years from 1995 to 2003. Given their similarity, they were grouped together for this analysis. The GSS and UCR data sets showed no real changes in the public's perception of the quality of life and safety in the community or on crime that was thought to be OC-related. The review of newspapers did not reveal any information on how any of these projects affected public safety.

The third countermeasure involved a review of Operation Northern Snow. This operation resulted in one of the first mega-gang trials where those arrested were charged with over 100 counts related to trafficking and other drug offences. The accused were alleged to be part of the Manitoba Warriors, a well-established Aboriginal street gang operating in Winnipeg. According to the GSS, the police operation had very little effect on Manitoba residents with regard to perceptions of crime rates, routine activities, perceptions of the police and satisfaction with personal safety. However, the UCR data suggest that the decrease in OC-related crimes may be directly associated with this, but there has been no apparent long-term effect on OC-related incidents. A review of newspapers indicated an absence of articles focusing on the effect of the police operation on public security. Many articles focused on the effect of Aboriginal gangs, the cost of trials, and on the trials themselves.

Another police operation to be evaluated also involved a combination of three projects: Eider, E-Perhaps and E-page. These three projects targeted Southeast Asian traffickers; particularly, Chinese-based OC groups operating in the vicinity of Vancouver. Upon reviewing the GSS data for the years 1993 to 2004, while the perception of those living in Vancouver and BC fluctuated, any positive changes in the public's perception of crime or

the police could not be linked to the three operations. There was also no association between temporal changes in the UCR data and these police operations.

The fifth evaluation related to Project OsaDa II, which involved Eastern European OC members residing in the Toronto and surrounding area. Data from the GSS revealed no association between the operation and the public's perception of crime, safety or the police. In addition, OC-related crime did not appear to be influenced by OsaDa II. Finally, there was limited coverage in the English newspapers although a review of Russian or the Eastern European media may have revealed more articles.

The sixth police operation to be evaluated was Operation Synergy, a 25-member police task force formed in 2003. The objective of the police operation was to quash the violence between two warring Asian gangs following several shootings and stabbings across Calgary. As a result of the police operation, numerous charges were laid and seizures of money, illegal drugs and property occurred. The GSS data showed that when information on public safety was reviewed, there was a slight improvement in terms of residents' sense of security when walking alone after dark. OC-related crime did not appear to be influenced by the operation. According to the media analysis, however, the Calgary police were claiming that Synergy had an effect on OC-related crime rates. Unfortunately, this trend could not be confirmed in our analysis.

The final operation reviewed was Project Calvette. Timmins Police Service, as well as other Canadian and international police, dismantled an international criminal organization involved in the importation of cocaine into Canada. Project Calvette involved a three-year investigation and produced the arrest of 38 individuals, including two from Timmins. Calvette also led to an investigation into a murder committed in Timmins. This murder was related to control of the narcotics traffic in Northern Ontario. The aim of the present project was to determine the effect of such a police operation in Timmins. Unfortunately, GSS data did not include cities like Timmins (only Census Metropolitan Areas) and the reported UCR data had limited information that could be used. The raw data submitted by the Timmins Police Services to Statistics Canada were not available. The review of newspapers only focused on the arrests and trials of those accused and not

on how this operation may have had an effect on the community. This particular review of a police operation in Timmins shows the continued limitations of using existing data to evaluate law enforcement operations outside a larger Canadian city.

The present evaluation study was designed to determine the effect of police OC countermeasures on the health and safety of selected communities. Overall, our analysis showed that these operations had limited success. Only in a few situations can an association be made between a police countermeasure and residents' perceptions of personal safety or a reduction in OC activities. In addition, we have discussed the limitations of retrospective studies and issues of data availability that made it so difficult to comprehensively evaluate the effect of police countermeasures.

The content analysis also showed that the print media were more focused on the activities associated with the police countermeasures and the follow-up stories (e.g., trials, profile of those involved in the case) than on providing an understanding of the views of those living in the communities. This finding is similar to other studies on content analysis that indicate that the media focus on the sensational aspects of crime (e.g., the takedown of offenders and criminal trials) rather than the effect of an operation on a community.

The section that follows provides some suggestions with regard to future research that aims to assess the effect of police countermeasures, as well as describes strategies that can be employed by police agencies to build evaluations into particular countermeasures in the design and planning phase of the operations.



## **10 Considerations for Future Research**

### **10.1 Need for Performance Measures for Police OC Countermeasures**

While this retrospective study shed some light on the effects of the police countermeasures on crime rates, public safety, and quality of life issues, it also raised further challenges for the police and government officials. Over the past decade, police research underwent a major shift from “operational research” (e.g., training, advice, evaluation) (Moore and Braga, 2002, Eck, 2003, Eck, 2002) to how policing processes should be redesigned to address a broader spectrum of policing problems and issues (Drake and Simper, 2001, 2005; Fielding and Innes, 2006; Fleming, 2008; Fleming and Scott, 2008).

This transformation of policing resulted in new public management or police management models (Scott, 1998; Spottiswoode, 2000). According to this transformation, police management was to follow the developments in public administration and to concern itself with various models, all designed to measure and improve the quality of internal processes. Police management was to follow business-oriented models that emphasized accountability and performance (Kiedrowski et al, 2009; Moore and Braga, 2004; Marks and Sklansky, 2008). This shift in police accountability and performance was, in turn, fuelled by the demand for greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Furthermore, police services, like all other areas of government spending, are increasingly viewed as accountable to the public and are being called upon to show evidence of their performance (Stenning, 2009; Pollanen, 2005).

In their review of the literature on police service performance and accountability, Kiedrowski and his associates (2009) noted that police management needs to measure police performance to partly meet their external demands for accountability and partly to establish a form of accountability inside their police organizations to show that they are achieving identified goals rather than simply relying on executing established policies and procedures. The police are under pressure to show performance measures to indicate

whether resources are being used effectively and efficiently (Walker 2007; Loveday, 2006). Police management is posing the following questions: Are our policing strategies effective in reducing crime? How do we know?

In England, the police are mandated by legislation (e.g., Police Performance Assessment Framework or PPAF), which was replaced by the Assessment of Policing and Community Safety (APACS), to implement key performance indicators and to match these indicators to financial information (Anon (2003; Home Office, 2006, Home Office, 2006a, Home Office, 2008)). Under the PPAF/APACS, the police forces were to provide numerical measures for such activities as tackling OC. For example, the Avon and Somerset Police Authority, as part of their Local Policing Plan, have Protective Services as their third priority. Protective services is an “umbrella for some of the most serious crimes or problems which not only cause serious threats to public safety but can cause the greatest sense of public anxiety – for example, terrorism, major and organised crime, and road collisions” (Avon and Somerset Constabulary, 2009).


Under this priority, one of their objectives is “to continue playing a leading role in providing protective services in the region by tackling disorder, improving the safety of our roads and disrupting serious and organised crime networks.” The measures, while not specifically focused on OC, have achieved the following:

- A reduction in the number of people killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions in Avon and Somerset
- A reduction in the number of gun crimes
- An increase (22 percent) in the proportion of cases of rape where the offender is brought to justice
- An increase in the proportion of offenders brought to justice for serious violence against the person from 42 percent to 47 percent (Avon and Somerset Constabulary, 2009).

However, while the Home Office has attempted to establish criteria to measure complex crimes such as OC (Home Office, 2004), several critics have pointed out that measuring

anti-social behaviour is still a challenge (Kiedrowski et al, 2009). Some measures include the review of official crime statistics, community consultation (e.g., focus groups and polling) and the use of court data.

In Australia, the government has attempted to measure specific policing activities. As part of the Australian government’s policing strategy, there is a need for policing measures to assess the effectiveness of police performance in several areas. Recently, the Australian government developed a framework to measure police performance in domestic and family violence (Rollings and Taylor, 2008). A review of the police family-violence data-collection process was conducted. This included reviewing how family violence data are recorded by the police, identifying the most efficient methods of data extraction, family-violence police workload indicators and key family-violence intervention-program stakeholders and examining how police performance might be measured. The following diagram, as depicted in the article by Rollings and Taylor (2008), shows performance measures used in policing family violence:



Another area where specific performance measures were developed was in the enforcement of drug laws. Under Australia’s National Drug Strategy, law-enforcement

activities take place in order to reduce demand and levels of drug-related harm. However, in order to determine whether the law-enforcement strategies are effective, the National Drug Law Enforcement Research Fund commissioned the Australian Institute of Criminology to develop a model performance measurement framework for drug law enforcement in Australia (Homel and Willis, 2007). According to Willis et al, (2008), the performance measurement system was developed to:

1. Help provide a better accounting for the benefits from the estimated \$1.7 billion expenditure on DLE in Australia
2. Improve the type and range of performance measures and indicators currently used by DLE agencies
3. Develop a measurement framework that provides DLE agencies from a local through to a national level with a consistent and systematic means of assessing and reporting performance and assessing effectiveness (2008:vi)

The performance model encompassed both a “core performance measurement framework built around four high level outcomes and a process for adapting the framework to accommodate the specific needs of the range of Drug Law-enforcement agencies<sup>126</sup> operating in different settings around Australia”(Homel and Willis, 2007:1).

The development of the framework occurred over several years and involved different stages (Homel and Willis 2007). Homel and Willis pointed out that much of the framework’s development occurred through implementation trials undertaken at the Australian Customs Service and the New South Wales Police Force. The performance measures focused on the high-level outcomes of drug law enforcement<sup>127</sup>. These were:

1. Reducing drug crime and drug related crime
2. Improving public health
3. Improving public amenity

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<sup>126</sup> This included the Australian Customs Service, Australian Federal Police, Tasmania Police, South Australia Police, and the Victoria Police

<sup>127</sup> For more information on each of these outcomes see Homel and Willis, 2007.

#### 4. Reducing organised crime

Based on these outcomes, several performance measures were identified. Homel and Willis (2007) developed the following table that gives an overview of the outcomes and related performance measures<sup>128</sup>:

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<sup>128</sup> DUMA refers to the Australia Institute of Criminology's Drug Use Monitoring in Australia program; ABS refers to the Australian Bureau of Statistics

**Table 1: Model drug law enforcement performance measurement framework**

Performance measures	Performance indicators	Available data sources
<b>High level outcome: Reduced drug crime and drug-related crime</b>		
Trends in illicit drug detections/seizures	Number of illicit drug detection/seizures by drug type	Law enforcement databases
Trends in weight of illicit drug detections/seizures	Average median weight of illicit drug detections/seizures by drug type	Law enforcement databases
Trends in illicit drug arrests	Number of illicit drug traffic/supply arrests by drug type Number of illicit drug possession/use arrests by drug type	Law enforcement databases
Trends in illicit drug street prices	Average median street price of illicit drugs by drug type	Illicit Drug Reporting System (IDRS)
Perceived purity of illicit drugs	Number of people who perceive the purity of illicit drugs to be high, medium, low or to fluctuate by drug type	IDRS
Perceived availability of illicit drugs	Number of people who perceive the availability of illicit drugs to be very easy, easy, difficult or very difficult by drug type	IDRS
Changes in where users obtain their drugs	Number of users who sourced their illicit drugs the last time from: a house/flat; a public building; an abandoned building; on the street/outdoors Number of users who contacted their drug supplier the last time by: email/the internet; calling them on a mobile; calling them on the telephone; visiting a house/flat; paging them on a beeper; approaching them in public; obtaining drugs through a third party; being with them already Number of users who got their drugs the last time from: a regular source; an occasional source; a new source Number of users who got their drugs the last time from a location different from the arrest location	DUMA
Changes in trafficking modes	Number and weight of illicit drug detections/seizures (by drug type) that were trafficked via: cargo; air passengers/crew; postal services; car; private transport company; on the person (not including air passengers/crew)	Customs database and other law enforcement databases
Changes in the type of illicit drug trafficker	Number of illicit drug traffickers who are categorised by Customs as 'business', 'professional', 'amateur' or 'opportunist'	Customs database and other law enforcement databases
Trends in robberies	Number of people arrested for armed and unarmed robbery	Law enforcement databases ABS Recorded crime, victims data collection
<b>High level outcome: Reduced organised crime</b>		
Trends in weight of illicit drug detections/seizures	Median weight of illicit drug detections/seizures by drug type	Law enforcement databases
Changes in trafficking modes	Number and weight of illicit drug detections/seizures (by drug type) that were trafficked via: cargo; air passengers/crew; postal services; car; private transport company; on the person (not including air passengers/crew)	Customs database and other law enforcement databases
Changes in the type of illicit drug trafficker	Number of illicit drug traffickers who are categorised by Customs as 'business', 'professional', 'amateur' or 'opportunist'	Customs database and other law enforcement databases
<b>High level outcome: Improved public health</b>		
Trends in the frequency of illicit drugs consumed by drug type	Number of people who used illicit drugs in the past month by drug type Number of people who used illicit drugs in the past month who used: at least once a day; at least once a week (not daily); less than weekly	DUMA (both self-report and urinalysis data) IDRS National Minimum Data Set for Alcohol and Other Drug Treatment (NMDS)
Trends in HCV/HIV	Number of people with positive status of HCV/HIV	National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDS) National HIV Database
Trends in drug-related deaths	Number of drug-related deaths by drug type	ABS Causes of death collection
Trends in drug-related emergency department presentations	Number of drug-related emergency department presentations by drug type	State/territory health agencies
Trends in ambulance attendances at overdose	Number of ambulance attendances at overdose by drug type	State/territory health agencies National ambulance non-fatal opioid overdoses data collection
Trends in clients participating in drug treatment	Number of clients: in detoxification; in a rehabilitation program/therapeutic community; in outpatient/counselling; in a support group; in methadone maintenance; in buprenorphine treatment; in naltrexone treatment; seeing a general practitioner	NMDS (does not include methadone clients) Methadone/Buprenorphine Client Statistics (MCS) DUMA IDRS
<b>High level outcome: Improved public amenity</b>		
Trends in level of safety felt by the community	Number and proportion of people who feel very unsafe, unsafe, safe or very safe in their local area	National survey of community satisfaction with policing 1995–2000 Community perceptions of police services survey 2003 onwards
Trends in community concern about the 'drug problem'	Number and proportion of people who are very concerned, concerned, unconcerned about the drug problem in their local area and state	ABS <i>Crime and safety survey</i>

While the information is a summary of the work completed by the Australian Institute of Criminology on police performances, it is important to note that the work by the AIC focuses on filling the gaps in existing performance-measurement systems in police operations (Willis and Anderson, 2010).

In Canada, policing legislation has established regulations and standards for provincial policing services. These regulations and standards require police services to achieve specific benchmarks or accomplish adequate and effective policing services (Kiedrowski et al, 2009). Regulation 3/99 of the Ontario Police Service Act, for example, requires every Police Services Board to prepare a business plan for its police forces that focuses on the following areas:

1. The objectives, core business and functions of the police force, including how it will provide adequate and effective police services;
2. Quantitative and qualitative performance objectives and indicators relating to the provision of community-based crime-prevention initiatives, community patrol, criminal investigation services, community satisfaction, emergency calls for service, violent crime, property crime, youth crime, victim assistance and road safety;
3. Information technology
4. Resource planning
5. Police facilities

The RCMP have also moved towards performance-assessment measures as a response to a Treasury Board mandate to improve performance measurements. The RCMP established five performance indicators intended to refine and assess the organization's performance. These include:

1. Efficiency: the ratio of outputs (goods or services) produced to the inputs (dollars) expended over time
2. Productivity: the ratio of outputs (goods or services) produced to the inputs (person years or time) expended over time

3. Level of service: the ratio of the standards established to define the manner and/or timeliness in which the outputs are produced for the client to the actual manner/timeliness of produced goods or services
4. Quality of service: The extent to which the outputs produced have conformed to the specifications of the client. Client “reaction/response” to those outputs provided may be either formal or informal.
5. Effectiveness: The extent to which the objective(s) of the program(s) has/have been achieved (Sonnichsen, 2007:224).

While policing services in Canada continue to focus on performance measures, consideration should be given to adopting the Australian government initiatives on establishing effective policing measures. This would involve further research into the activities of the Australian government and to assess whether other governments have established similar initiatives for their law-enforcement agencies (i.e., police and regulatory policing agencies). Many of the obstacles faced in this retrospective study could be surmounted if police services in Canada develop and implement performance measures for activities such as countermeasures against OC.

Some initiatives are underway, spearheaded by the work of the RCMP. Using a Delphi panel method, the RCMP (2008) has completed a second version of the Disruption Attributes Tool (DAT), which is used to assess the effect of countermeasures on OC groups in terms of core business, finances and personnel. This tool goes beyond body counts (arrests, seizures, etc.) and focuses on the extent to which criminal organizations are disrupted. The tool both helps operations to determine their effect and is useful for accountability purposes when the RCMP reports on its effectiveness in disrupting OC groups. The DAT examines three attributes of OC group – core business, financial, and personnel. Indicators have been developed to assess the extent of disruption – high, medium, low, nil, unknown (each of these is defined in relation to the three attributes). The DAT focuses on disruption and is not concerned with the effect of police operations on the community (e.g., feelings of security, crime rates). Further work needs to be done to develop performance measures such as the DAT specific to organized crime.



The RCMP has also produced a Harm Prioritization Scale that measures the harm produced by the activities of criminal organizations (RCMP, 2008). Harm is determined by measuring the cost of a criminal activity to both individuals and to society. RCMP personnel were consulted and the Criminal Harms Inventory was developed. This inventory was then validated through consultation with individuals from other agencies, both police and others dealing with crime-related matters. Through further consultations, a Criminal Activities List was developed. As part of this list, 53 OC activities were identified. Experts were then consulted to determine the level of harm associated with each criminal activity. The harm score for each form of criminal activity took into account individual, societal and financial harms. The scoring of various harms makes it possible to evaluate the effect of police countermeasures by estimating the harms attributable to a criminal group before and after an intervention.

Finally, the policing sector has come under enormous pressures to increase the efficiency and transparency of outputs, to rationalize the use of public resources and to increase the quality of service delivery. The new public management model, which focuses on using performance measures, has also complemented the shift towards intelligence-led policing (Ratcliffe, 2008) or information-led policing (Taylor and Kowalyk, 2007). Under the intelligence-led policing model, police administrators can target valuable resources more effectively to ensure the best opportunities for a positive police intervention and maximum value for money (Wigget et al, 2003).

## **10.2 The Need for Communication Strategies on Countermeasures**

One of the major challenges in this project was accessing information on police countermeasures. While in recent years the police and other justice agencies have provided press releases regarding a specific police countermeasure, police need to provide more information to ensure that the effect of interventions can be assessed. Consideration should be given to helping the police establish a corporate communication strategy to inform the public about their countermeasure activities. (Of course, any communication strategies would need to be cognizant of the need for secrecy about upcoming operations, and control of information during subsequent trial proceedings).

The literature on police corporate communications and the reporting of crimes suggests that this has been a challenge for police organizations (Mawby, 2010), due to tensions between the media and the police.

A strong communication strategy may be an effective way to promote the organization and give the community a sense of safety. Such strategies will also improve the visibility of the police in the community, demonstrate that they are responding to community concerns and improve their relationship with the media. Further research is needed to understand how the police communicate their countermeasure activities to the public.

### **10.3 The Need to Establish a Database on Countermeasures**

Currently, information as to how many countermeasures take place in Canada, the nature of these activities, the police forces involved or the outcomes are unknown. Thus, to gain some understanding as to the number and nature of police countermeasures, each police service must be contacted. In the annual report of the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada or its provincial bureaus, there may be some mention about a particular countermeasure, but these accounts are far from comprehensive.

One consideration may be to develop a national database. This may be completed in partnership between Public Safety Canada and the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada. Such a database will help to identify the number and nature of countermeasures. This will also help to build strategic knowledge regarding the types of OC activities targeted by each countermeasure.

### **10.4 Embedding Prospective Evaluation Plans within Countermeasure Proposals**

As well as implementing the broad, national evaluation frameworks described above for measuring progress in the fight against OC, and building and maintaining annotated national databases on countermeasures, it would be very useful for police agencies to build detailed, prospective evaluation plans into each proposal for a given countermeasure, and include the associated costs in the total estimated cost of the operation. These evaluation plans could be developed in consultation with experts such as

academic researchers and professional program evaluators, and would describe the desired performance targets to be attained, as well as the specific qualitative and quantitative indicators to be used. Broadly speaking, those responsible for developing the plan should select the outcomes using the SMART strategy: **S**pecific, **M**easurable, **A**chievable, **R**elevant, and **T**imely. The plan should also outline the specific qualitative and quantitative (statistical) techniques which will be applied to the outcomes data. In addition, it is important to remember that given the wide variability in the structure, activities, and operating environments of criminal networks, law enforcement countermeasures will also have different features and outcomes, and hence will require tailored evaluation strategies.

Regarding the collection of appropriate evaluation data, it would be helpful to encourage police services across Canada to conduct polling – both pre- and post-intervention – similar to that undertaken by the Montreal Urban Community police service referred to in this study. This information would allow researchers to gauge perceptions of personal safety as they relate directly to a specific countermeasure. Such surveys would reduce reliance on datasets such as the GSS, which do not focus on police actions or OC specifically, nor specific operations at the neighbourhood or community level. In addition, in-person, semi-structured interviews with individual community members and focus groups would further help to determine the effects of countermeasures on communities and neighbourhoods. Further, the UCR now includes an OC checkbox that may be useful in future studies of OC countermeasures, as it would allow for a more precise count of incidents linked to criminal organizations. However, as noted previously, this variable is not yet performing sufficiently well to be used in such studies – thus far, most police agencies have been under-reporting the number of OC-related incidents.

Finally, it would also be beneficial to integrate process evaluations into proposals for law enforcement countermeasures, in addition to the outcome evaluations. In this way, strengths and weaknesses in the execution of the operation could potentially be linked, respectively, to meeting certain targeted objectives and falling short of achieving others. According to Schneider (2010, p. 312), the following questions should guide a process evaluation:

- Was the project implemented according to plan? Was it implemented competently and effectively? Was it implemented in a manner that would help achieve its ultimate goals?
- Were there sufficient resources available for proper implementation?
- What influence did the project implementation have on its outcomes (or absence of planned outcomes)? To what extent did the project implementation impact the ability of the project to meet (or not meet) its objectives?
- What were some of the factors involved in the implementation of a project that contributed to its success (or lack of success)?
- What specific problems were encountered as part of the implementation that may limit the impact of the project?

Carefully addressing these questions for each countermeasure will enable continual modifications and improvements to law enforcement strategies against OC. Once a significant number of process and outcome evaluations have been systematically conducted and documented, sophisticated methodological tools such as meta-analysis can also assist in summarizing and reporting on progress in the fight against OC (Pratt, 2010). Such efforts will, among other things, inform and strengthen future policy development, as well as enhance our knowledge and understanding with respect to how to respond effectively to existing and emerging OC problems.

**APPENDIX A: GSS Victimization Survey: Study Variables for 1993, 1999,  
and 2004**

**Table 2 Quebec and Montreal - Perceptions of the Amount of Crime in One's  
Neighbourhood Compared to Others, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Quebec	Quebec	Quebec	Montreal	Montreal	Montréal
Compared to other areas in Canada, do you think your neighbourhood has a higher amount of crime, about the same or a lower amount of crime?	Higher	13%	6%	7%	18%	9%	10%
	About the same	38%	32%	39%	40%	36%	42%
	Lower	46%	56%	49%	37%	48%	42%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 3 Quebec and Montreal - Perceptions of Changes in the Amount of Crime in One's Neighbourhood, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Quebec	Quebec	Quebec	Montreal	Montreal	Montréal
During the past 5 years, do you think that crime in your neighbourhood has increased, decreased or remained about the same?	Increased	47%	25%	23%	49%	25%	26%
	Decreased	5%	8%	8%	4%	8%	9%
	About the same	41%	59%	63%	39%	56%	58%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 4 Quebec and Montreal - Perceptions of Safety While Walking Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Quebec	Quebec	Quebec	Montreal	Montreal	Montréal
How safe do you feel from crime walking ALONE in your area after dark?	Very or reasonably safe	66%	72%	75%	60%	70%	73%
	Somewhat unsafe	16%	11%	10%	17%	13%	11%
	Very unsafe	17%	6%	5%	21%	6%	5%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 5 Quebec and Montreal - Perceptions of Safety While Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Quebec	Quebec	Quebec	Montreal	Montreal	Montréal
How worried are you while waiting for or using public transportation ALONE after dark?	Very worried?	10%	4%	2%	15%	6%	2%
	Somewhat worried?	11%	11%	11%	17%	17%	18%
	Not at all worried about your safety from crime?	19%	16%	20%	25%	21%	29%
	Does not use public transportation/night	37%	42%	37%	38%	49%	44%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$



**Table 6 Quebec and Montreal - Perceptions of Safety While Alone in Your Home in the Evening or at Night, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Quebec	Quebec	Quebec	Montreal	Montreal	Montreal
When ALONE in your home in the evening or at night, do you feel...	very worried?	7%	3%	2%	8%	3%	2%
	somewhat worried?	21%	18%	19%	22%	18%	20%
	not at all worried?	Data not available	77%	78%	Data not available	77%	77%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 7 Quebec and Montreal – Frequency of Walking Alone After Dark, by**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Quebec	Quebec	Quebec	Montreal	Montreal	Montréal
How often do you walk ALONE in your area after dark?	Daily?	19%	15%	14%	18%	16%	17%
	At least once a week?	28%	34%	38%	28%	34%	38%
	At least once a month?	10%	14%	14%	11%	13%	14%
	Less than once a month?	11%	14%	11%	13%	14%	11%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

**Year and Location**

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 8 Quebec and Montreal – Frequency of Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Quebec	Quebec	Quebec	Montreal	Montreal	Montreal
How often do you use public transportation ALONE after dark?	Daily?	7%	4%	5%	11%	7%	8%
	At least once a week?	8%	8%	7%	13%	13%	11%
	At least once a month?	5%	5%	5%	6%	7%	8%
	Less than once a month?	8%	8%	7%	13%	10%	10%
	Never?	11%	6%	8%	14%	7%	11%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 9 Quebec and Montreal – Walking Alone After Dark More Often, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Quebec	Quebec	Quebec	Montreal	Montreal	Montreal
If you felt safer from crime, would you walk alone in your area after dark (more often)?	Yes	30%	21%	22%	36%	24%	25%
	No	32%	37%	36%	32%	36%	37%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 10 Quebec and Montreal – Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark More Often, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Quebec	Quebec	Quebec	Montreal	Montreal	Montreal
If you felt safer from crime, would you use public transportation alone after dark more often?	Yes	18%	14%	11%	25%	20%	17%
	No	37%	42%	36%	39%	50%	44%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 11 Quebec and Montreal – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Enforcing the Laws, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Quebec	Quebec	Quebec	Montreal	Montreal	Montreal
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job at enforcing the laws?	Good job	55%	67%	64%	52%	65%	63%
	Average job	31%	24%	27%	31%	24%	28%
	Poor job	8%	4%	5%	9%	4%	5%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 12 Quebec and Montreal – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Promptly Responding to Calls, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Quebec	Quebec	Quebec	Montreal	Montreal	Montreal
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of promptly responding to calls?	Good job	47%	58%	56%	47%	56%	56%
	Average job	24%	19%	21%	22%	18%	20%
	Poor job	11%	5%	7%	11%	6%	7%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 13 Quebec and Montreal – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Being Approachable and Easy to Talk to, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Quebec	Quebec	Quebec	Montreal	Montreal	Montreal
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of being approachable and easy to talk to?	Good job	52%	66%	61%	53%	60%	60%
	Average job	22%	16%	20%	21%	17%	20%
	Poor job	11%	5%	5%	10%	5%	5%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 14 Quebec and Montreal – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Supplying Information to the Public on Ways to Reduce Crime, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Quebec	Quebec	Quebec	Montreal	Montreal	Montreal
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of supplying information to the public on ways to reduce crime?	Good job	47%	59%	53%	48%	54%	50%
	Average job	25%	23%	27%	23%	25%	27%
	Poor job	20%	8%	11%	20%	10%	11%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$



**Table 15 Quebec and Montreal – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Ensuring the Safety of Area Citizens, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Quebec	Quebec	Quebec	Montreal	Montreal	Montreal
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of ensuring the safety of the citizens in your area?	Good job	57%	71%	66%	55%	68%	65%
	Average job	28%	20%	25%	29%	21%	26%
	Poor job	11%	4%	5%	11%	5%	5%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 16 Quebec and Montreal – Satisfaction with Personal Safety from Crime, by year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Quebec	Quebec	Quebec	Montreal	Montreal	Montreal
In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your personal safety from crime?	Satisfied	79%	91%	94%	73%	89%	93%
	Dissatisfied	18%	7%	6%	23%	9%	6%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 17 – Views about Organized Crime and Violence in Three Montreal Communities<sup>129</sup>**

Community	% Reporting Presence of OC in Neighbourhood	% Reporting They Witnessed an Event Linked to OC	% Reporting The Presence of Violence in Their Neighbourhood
Hochelaga-Maisonneuve	89	25	69
Saint-Henri	81	23	69
Montreal-North	58	16	54
Hochelaga-Maisonneuve	89	25	69

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<sup>129</sup> Parent, George-André (2002). *Effect des activités du crime organisé dans trois quartiers de Montréal : Sondage fait auprès de résidents d'Hochelaga-Maisonneuve, Saint-Henri et Montréal-Nord*. Division de recherche et planification, Service de Police de Montréal.

**Table 18 Alberta and Edmonton - Perceptions of the Amount of Crime in One's Neighbourhood Compared to Others, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Edmonton n	Edmonton n	Edmonton
Compared to other areas in Canada, do you think your neighbourhood has a higher amount of crime, about the same or a lower amount of crime?	Higher	9%	6%	8%	11%	9%	10%
	About the same	27%	26%	28%	32%	27%	32%
	Lower	59%	63%	61%	49%	59%	55%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 19 Alberta and Edmonton - Perceptions of Changes in the Amount of Crime in One's Neighbourhood, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Edmonton	Edmonton	Edmonton
		n	n	n	n	n	n
During the past 5 years, do you think that crime in your neighbourhood has increased, decreased or remained about the same?	Increased	49%	30%	35%	47%	30%	35%
	Decreased	3%	5%	4%	2%	4%	4%
	About the same	41%	52%	52%	44%	54%	50%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 20 Alberta and Edmonton - Perceptions of Safety While Walking Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Edmonton	Edmonton	Edmonton
					n	n	n
How safe do you feel from crime walking ALONE in your area after dark?	Very or reasonably safe	77%	78%	80%	69%	74%	77%
	Somewhat unsafe	14%	9%	10%	17%	11%	11%
	Very unsafe	8%	4%	3%	11%	5%	4%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 21 Alberta and Edmonton - Perceptions of Safety While Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Edmonton	Edmonton	Edmonton
How worried are you while waiting for or using public transportation ALONE after dark?	Very worried?	7%	2%	8%	8%	4%	3%
	Somewhat worried?	16%	14%	14%	14%	15%	19%
	Not at all worried about your safety from crime?	18%	18%	18%	18%	18%	18%
	Does not use public transportation/night	39%	44%	48%	48%	53%	47%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 22 Alberta and Edmonton - Perceptions of Safety While Alone in Your Home in the Evening or at Night, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Edmonton	Edmonton	Edmonton
When ALONE in your home in the evening or at night, do you feel...	very worried?	4%	2%	2%	3%	2%	1%
	somewhat worried?	23%	18%	17%	23%	21%	19%
	not at all worried?	Data not available	80%	81%	Data not available	Data not available	Data not available
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$



**Table 23 Alberta and Edmonton – Frequency of Walking Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Edmonton	Edmonton	Edmonton
How often do you walk ALONE in your area after dark?	Daily?	17%	21%	15%	17%	18%	13%
	At least once a week?	30%	29%	31%	26%	29%	33%
	At least once a month?	16%	14%	16%	16%	13%	16%
	Less than once a month?	11%	15%	16%	10%	16%	15%
	Never?	26%	13%	16%	Data not available	15%	17%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 24 Alberta and Edmonton – Frequency of Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Edmonton	Edmonton	Edmonton
How often do you use public transportation ALONE after dark?	Daily?	3%	4%	4%	3%	5%	4%
	At least once a week?	7%	6%	5%	8%	7%	6%
	At least once a month?	7%	6%	6%	6%	5%	6%
	Less than once a month?	9%	11%	9%	8%	11%	9%
	Never?	15%	7%	11%	16%	7%	14%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 25 Alberta and Edmonton – Walking Alone After Dark More Often, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Edmonton	Edmonton	Edmonton
If you felt safer from crime, would you walk alone in your area after dark (more often)?	Yes	26%	20%	21%	28%	26%	23%
	No	32%	34%	34%	34%	35%	37%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 26 Alberta and Edmonton – Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark More Often, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Edmonton	Edmonton	Edmonton
If you felt safer from crime, would you use public transportation alone after dark more often?	Yes	16%	10%	14%	18%	13%	18%
	No	44%	48%	38%	50%	55%	48%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 27 Alberta and Edmonton – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Enforcing the Laws, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Edmonton	Edmonton	Edmonton
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job at enforcing the laws?	Good job	62%	59%	57%	55%	54%	53%
	Average job	30%	31%	34%	36%	34%	36%
	Poor job	4%	6%	6%	5%	8%	7%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 28 Alberta and Edmonton – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Promptly Responding to Calls, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Edmonton	Edmonton	Edmonton
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of promptly responding to calls?	Good job	47%	45%	47%	38%	45%	39%
	Average job	25%	22%	26%	27%	23%	29%
	Poor job	9%	9%	9%	11%	9%	11%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 29 Alberta and Edmonton – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Being Approachable and Easy to Talk to, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Edmonton	Edmonton	Edmonton
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of being approachable and easy to talk to?	Good job	69%	67%	67%	62%	66%	66%
	Average job	17%	18%	19%	18%	20%	20%
	Poor job	6%	5%	5%	8%	5%	4%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 30 Alberta and Edmonton – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Supplying Information to the Public on Ways to Reduce Crime, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Edmonton	Edmonton	Edmonton
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of supplying information to the public on ways to reduce crime?	Good job	58%	54%	53%	52%	52%	49%
	Average job	25%	27%	27%	27%	30%	31%
	Poor job	9%	10%	10%	11%	9%	11%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 31 Alberta and Edmonton – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Ensuring the Safety of Area Citizens, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Edmonton	Edmonton	Edmonton
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of ensuring the safety of the citizens in your area?	Good job	59%	61%	60%	52%	54%	57%
	Average job	30%	28%	30%	32%	34%	30%
	Poor job	5%	5%	5%	9%	7%	6%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$



**Table 32 Alberta and Edmonton – Satisfaction with Personal Safety from Crime, by year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Edmonton	Edmonton	Edmonton
In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your personal safety from crime?	Satisfied	86%	94%	94%	81%	92%	93%
	Dissatisfied	13%	5%	5%	17%	6%	5%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 33 Manitoba and Winnipeg - Perceptions of the Amount of Crime in One's Neighbourhood Compared to Others, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Manitoba	Manitoba	Manitoba	Winnipeg	Winnipeg	Winnipeg
Compared to other areas in Canada, do you think your neighbourhood has a higher amount of crime, about the same or a lower amount of crime?	Higher	11%	7%	8%	13%	10%	10%
	About the same	29%	27%	28%	34%	33%	32%
	Lower	55%	60%	61%	47%	51%	54%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 34 Manitoba and Winnipeg - Perceptions of Changes in the Amount of Crime in One's Neighbourhood, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Manitoba	Manitoba	Manitoba	Winnipeg	Winnipeg	Winnipeg
During the past 5 years, do you think that crime in your neighbourhood has increased, decreased or remained about the same?	Increased	47%	34%	33%	50%	37%	31%
	Decreased	3%	5%	4%	2%	4%	4%
	About the same	42%	51%	56%	40%	48%	58%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 35 Manitoba and Winnipeg - Perceptions of Safety While Walking Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Manitoba	Manitoba	Manitoba	Winnipeg	Winnipeg	Winnipeg
How safe do you feel from crime walking ALONE in your area after dark?	Very or reasonably safe	76%	74%	78%	69%	68%	75%
	Somewhat unsafe	14%	10%	9%	18%	13%	11%
	Very unsafe	8%	4%	4%	11%	5%	5%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 36 Manitoba and Winnipeg - Perceptions of Safety While Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Manitoba	Manitoba	Manitoba	Winnipeg	Winnipeg	Winnipeg
How worried are you while waiting for or using public transportation ALONE after dark?	Very worried?	6%	3%	3%	10%	4%	5%
	Somewhat worried?	16%	13%	14%	21%	19%	21%
	Not at all worried about your safety from crime?	22%	17%	15%	28%	20%	21%
	Does not use public transportation/night	32%	39%	31%	38%	52%	44%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 37 Manitoba and Winnipeg - Perceptions of Safety While Alone in Your Home in the Evening or at Night, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Manitoba	Manitoba	Manitoba	Winnipeg	Winnipeg	Winnipeg
When ALONE in your home in the evening or at night, do you feel...	very worried?	5%	2%	1%	4%	2%	1%
	somewhat worried?	20%	18%	19%	22%	22%	22%
	not at all worried?	Data not available	79%	79%	Data not available	Data not available	76%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 38 Manitoba and Winnipeg – Frequency of Walking Alone After Dark,**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Manitoba	Manitoba	Manitoba	Winnipeg	Winnipeg	Winnipeg
How often do you walk ALONE in your area after dark?	Daily?	19%	17%	16%	19%	15%	14%
	At least once a week?	32%	32%	32%	32%	30%	33%
	At least once a month?	11%	14%	16%	11%	13%	16%
	Less than once a month?	11%	14%	11%	11%	16%	13%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 39 Manitoba and Winnipeg – Frequency of Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Manitoba	Manitoba	Manitoba	Winnipeg	Winnipeg	Winnipeg
How often do you use public transportation ALONE after dark?	Daily?	5%	4%	2%	6%	5%	3%
	At least once a week?	7%	6%	6%	10%	8%	9%
	At least once a month?	8%	6%	5%	11%	8%	8%
	Less than once a month?	9%	9%	8%	11%	11%	11%
	Never?	15%	8%	11%	20%	10%	15%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$



**Table 40 Manitoba and Winnipeg – Walking Alone After Dark More Often, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Manitoba	Manitoba	Manitoba	Winnipeg	Winnipeg	Winnipeg
If you felt safer from crime, would you walk alone in your area after dark (more often)?	Yes	23%	22%	23%	27%	28%	28%
	No	33%	33%	30%	35%	36%	33%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 41 Manitoba and Winnipeg – Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark More Often, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Manitoba	Manitoba	Manitoba	Winnipeg	Winnipeg	Winnipeg
If you felt safer from crime, would you use public transportation alone after dark more often?	Yes	14%	13%	15%	20%	16%	21%
	No	37%	39%	32%	45%	54%	46%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 42 Manitoba and Winnipeg – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Enforcing the Laws, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Manitoba	Manitoba	Manitoba	Winnipeg	Winnipeg	Winnipeg
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job at enforcing the laws?	Good job	50%	54%	52%	44%	52%	52%
	Average job	38%	34%	35%	41%	36%	36%
	Poor job	9%	6%	8%	11%	5%	7%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 43 Manitoba and Winnipeg – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Promptly Responding to Calls, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Manitoba	Manitoba	Manitoba	Winnipeg	Winnipeg	Winnipeg
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of promptly responding to calls?	Good job	41%	44%	42%	33%	39%	40%
	Average job	24%	21%	27%	26%	25%	30%
	Poor job	15%	10%	11%	17%	9%	11%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 44 Manitoba and Winnipeg – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Being Approachable and Easy to Talk to, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Manitoba	Manitoba	Manitoba	Winnipeg	Winnipeg	Winnipeg
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of being approachable and easy to talk to?	Good job	60%	64%	64%	56%	60%	62%
	Average job	26%	18%	23%	27%	18%	24%
	Poor job	5%	6%	5%	5%	6%	5%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 45 Manitoba and Winnipeg – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Supplying Information to the Public on Ways to Reduce Crime, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Manitoba	Manitoba	Manitoba	Winnipeg	Winnipeg	Winnipeg
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of supplying information to the public on ways to reduce crime?	Good job	48%	50%	49%	45%	49%	49%
	Average job	29%	27%	29%	31%	28%	32%
	Poor job	15%	9%	11%	17%	9%	10%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 46 Manitoba and Winnipeg – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Ensuring the Safety of Area Citizens, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Manitoba	Manitoba	Manitoba	Winnipeg	Winnipeg	Winnipeg
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of ensuring the safety of the citizens in your area?	Good job	53%	58%	55%	45%	53%	55%
	Average job	32%	29%	31%	37%	32%	32%
	Poor job	9%	6%	7%	11%	5%	7%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 47 Manitoba and Winnipeg – Satisfaction with Personal Safety from Crime, by year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Manitoba	Manitoba	Manitoba	Winnipeg	Winnipeg	Winnipeg
In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your personal safety from crime?	Satisfied	89%	89%	93%	86%	85%	92%
	Dissatisfied	8%	8%	6%	11%	10%	7%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 48 British Columbia and Vancouver - Perceptions of the Amount of Crime in One's Neighbourhood Compared to Others, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		British Columbia	British Columbia	British Columbia	Vancouver	Vancouver	Vancouver
Compared to other areas in Canada, do you think your neighbourhood has a higher amount of crime, about the same or a lower amount of crime?	Higher	14%	11%	13%	19%	16%	19%
	About the same	28%	30%	29%	33%	33%	32%
	Lower	53%	55%	56%	44%	47%	45%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$



**Table 49 British Columbia and Vancouver - Perceptions of Changes in the Amount of Crime in One's Neighbourhood, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		British Columbia	British Columbia	British Columbia	Vancouver	Vancouver	Vancouver
During the past 5 years, do you think that crime in your neighbourhood has increased, decreased or remained about the same?	Increased	59%	37%	36%	60%	38%	38%
	Decreased	2%	4%	5%	3%	5%	6%
	About the same	30%	48%	50%	27%	46%	47%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 50 British Columbia and Vancouver - Perceptions of Safety While Walking Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		British Columbia	British Columbia	British Columbia	Vancouver	Vancouver	Vancouver
How safe do you feel from crime walking ALONE in your area after dark?	Very or reasonably safe	70%	73%	74%	65%	70%	71%
	Somewhat unsafe	18%	14%	13%	20%	16%	16%
	Very unsafe	11%	5%	4%	14%	5%	5%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n =$

**Table 51 British Columbia and Vancouver - Perceptions of Safety While waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		British Columbia	British Columbia	British Columbia	Vancouver	Vancouver	Vancouver
How worried are you while waiting for or using public transportation ALONE after dark?	Very worried?	7%	5%	3%	10%	7%	5%
	Somewhat worried?	16%	20%	17%	20%	27%	25%
	Not at all worried about your safety from crime?	21%	19%	23%	23%	21%	28%
	Does not use public transportation/night	44%	44%	42%	45%	43%	39%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 52 British Columbia and Vancouver - Perceptions of Safety While Alone in Your Home in the Evening or at Night, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		British Columbia	British Columbia	British Columbia	Vancouver	Vancouver	Vancouver
When ALONE in your home in the evening or at night, do you feel...	very worried?	3%	2%	1%	4%	3%	2%
	somewhat worried?	22%	23%	20%	22%	25%	23%
	not at all worried?	Data not available	74%	78%	Data not available	71%	Data not available
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 53 British Columbia and Vancouver – Frequency of Walking Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		British Columbia	British Columbia	British Columbia	Vancouver	Vancouver	Vancouver
How often do you walk ALONE in your area after dark?	Daily?	21%	16%	15%	21%	17%	17%
	At least once a week?	27%	28%	31%	26%	28%	32%
	At least once a month?	14%	15%	16%	16%	15%	15%
	Less than once a month?	11%	13%	14%	11%	11%	13%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 54 British Columbia and Vancouver – Frequency of Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		British Columbia	British Columbia	British Columbia	Vancouver	Vancouver	Vancouver
How often do you use public transportation ALONE after dark?	Daily?	5%	4%	3%	8%	6%	6%
	At least once a week?	7%	7%	7%	10%	11%	11%
	At least once a month?	9%	8%	8%	10%	10%	11%
	Less than once a month?	10%	11%	11%	11%	14%	14%
	Never?	11%	14%	13%	13%	15%	15%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 55 British Columbia and Vancouver – Walking Alone After Dark More Often, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		British Columbia	British Columbia	British Columbia	Vancouver	Vancouver	Vancouver
If you felt safer from crime, would you walk alone in your area after dark (more often)?	Yes	27%	27%	25%	30%	30%	31%
	No	34%	36%	34%	33%	38%	33%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 56 British Columbia and Vancouver – Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark More Often, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		British Columbia	British Columbia	British Columbia	Vancouver	Vancouver	Vancouver
If you felt safer from crime, would you use public transportation alone after dark more often?	Yes	13%	17%	18%	15%	21%	24%
	No	51%	49%	42%	57%	53%	42%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 57 British Columbia and Vancouver – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Enforcing the Laws, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		British Columbia	British Columbia	British Columbia	Vancouver	Vancouver	Vancouver
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job at enforcing the laws?	Good job	48%	53%	54%	47%	50%	51%
	Average job	41%	34%	35%	43%	34%	37%
	Poor job	7%	7%	6%	7%	8%	7%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$



**Table 58 British Columbia and Vancouver – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Promptly Responding to Calls, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		British Columbia	British Columbia	British Columbia	Vancouver	Vancouver	Vancouver
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of promptly responding to calls?	Good job	40%	46%	46%	40%	45%	44%
	Average job	25%	24%	27%	22%	23%	27%
	Poor job	14%	9%	9%	14%	10%	10%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 59 British Columbia and Vancouver – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Being Approachable and Easy to Talk to, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		British Columbia	British Columbia	British Columbia	Vancouver	Vancouver	Vancouver
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of being approachable and easy to talk to?	Good job	64%	67%	65%	61%	62%	61%
	Average job	20%	18%	19%	20%	19%	21%
	Poor job	6%	5%	5%	7%	5%	6%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 60 British Columbia and Vancouver – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Supplying Information to the Public on Ways to Reduce Crime, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		British Columbia	British Columbia	British Columbia	Vancouver	Vancouver	Vancouver
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of supplying information to the public on ways to reduce crime?	Good job	51%	53%	49%	47%	50%	44%
	Average job	27%	28%	29%	30%	29%	31%
	Poor job	13%	9%	10%	13%	11%	11%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 61 British Columbia and Vancouver – Satisfaction with Personal Safety from Crime, by year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		British Columbia	British Columbia	British Columbia	Vancouver	Vancouver	Vancouver
In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your personal safety from crime?	Satisfied	83%	84%	93%	80%	81%	90%
	Dissatisfied	14%	9%	6%	18%	11%	9%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 62 Ontario and Toronto - Perceptions of the Amount of Crime in One's Neighbourhood Compared to Others, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Ontario	Ontario	Ontario	Toronto	Toronto	Toronto
Compared to other areas in Canada, do you think your neighbourhood has a higher amount of crime, about the same or a lower amount of crime?	Higher	11%	8%	9%	18%	11%	14%
	About the same	27%	27%	25%	30%	28%	27%
	Lower	57%	58%	62%	47%	53%	55%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 63 Ontario and Toronto - Perceptions of Changes in the Amount of Crime in One's Neighbourhood, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Ontario	Ontario	Ontario	Toronto	Toronto	Toronto
During the past 5 years, do you think that crime in your neighbourhood has increased, decreased or remained about the same?	Increased	48%	29%	31%	54%	30%	37%
	Decreased	3%	6%	5%	2%	6%	5%
	About the same	41%	53%	56%	34%	50%	48%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 64 Ontario and Toronto - Perceptions of Safety While Walking Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Ontario	Ontario	Ontario	Toronto	Toronto	Toronto
How safe do you feel from crime walking ALONE in your area after dark?	Very or reasonably safe	70%	73%	76%	64%	71%	74%
	Somewhat unsafe	16%	10%	10%	19%	11%	11%
	Very unsafe	11%	4%	4%	15%	4%	6%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 65 Ontario and Toronto - Perceptions of Safety While Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Ontario	Ontario	Ontario	Toronto	Toronto	Toronto
How worried are you while waiting for or using public transportation ALONE after dark?	Very worried?	7%	3%	3%	10%	4%	4%
	Somewhat worried?	15%	11%	14%	21%	18%	22%
	Not at all worried about your safety from crime?	21%	18%	21%	23%	23%	27%
	Does not use public transportation/night	40%	50%	39%	43%	51%	40%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$



**Table 66 Ontario and Toronto - Perceptions of Safety While Alone in Your Home in the Evening or at Night, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Ontario	Ontario	Ontario	Toronto	Toronto	Toronto
When ALONE in your home in the evening or at night, do you feel...	very worried?	5%	2%	2%	6%	2%	3%
	somewhat worried?	22%	17%	18%	23%	18%	20%
	not at all worried?	73%	80%	79%	Data not available	78%	76%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 67 Ontario and Toronto – Frequency of Walking Alone After Dark, by**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Ontario	Ontario	Ontario	Toronto	Toronto	Toronto
How often do you walk ALONE in your area after dark?	Daily?	19%	21%	17%	22%	21%	19%
	At least once a week?	29%	28%	31%	28%	29%	30%
	At least once a month?	11%	11%	15%	10%	11%	15%
	Less than once a month?	11%	13%	11%	11%	13%	11%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

**Year and Location**

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 68 Ontario and Toronto – Frequency of Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Ontario	Ontario	Ontario	Toronto	Toronto	Toronto
How often do you use public transportation ALONE after dark?	Daily?	5%	6%	4%	8%	9%	7%
	At least once a week?	8%	7%	8%	11%	10%	13%
	At least once a month?	6%	5%	7%	10%	7%	11%
	Less than once a month?	10%	9%	9%	11%	11%	11%
	Never?	14%	7%	11%	14%	7%	11%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 69 Ontario and Toronto – Walking Alone After Dark More Often, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Ontario	Ontario	Ontario	Toronto	Toronto	Toronto
If you felt safer from crime, would you walk alone in your area after dark (more often)?	Yes	29%	20%	24%	35%	22%	29%
	No	32%	35%	32%	30%	37%	30%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 70 Ontario and Toronto – Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark More Often, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Ontario	Ontario	Ontario	Toronto	Toronto	Toronto
If you felt safer from crime, would you use public transportation alone after dark more often?	Yes	17%	11%	17%	24%	14%	22%
	No	42%	50%	37%	47%	53%	40%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 71 Ontario and Toronto – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Enforcing the Laws, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Ontario	Ontario	Ontario	Toronto	Toronto	Toronto
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job at enforcing the laws?	Good job	59%	60%	60%	58%	61%	60%
	Average job	30%	29%	30%	30%	27%	29%
	Poor job	6%	5%	6%	6%	4%	6%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 72 Ontario and Toronto – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Promptly Responding to Calls, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Ontario	Ontario	Ontario	Toronto	Toronto	Toronto
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of promptly responding to calls?	Good job	48%	45%	52%	48%	45%	53%
	Average job	23%	19%	21%	22%	17%	20%
	Poor job	8%	8%	7%	7%	6%	5%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 73 Ontario and Toronto – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Being Approachable and Easy to Talk to, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Ontario	Ontario	Ontario	Toronto	Toronto	Toronto
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of being approachable and easy to talk to?	Good job	68%	65%	66%	64%	61%	63%
	Average job	17%	18%	19%	18%	18%	20%
	Poor job	4%	4%	5%	5%	4%	5%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 74 Ontario and Toronto – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Supplying Information to the Public on Ways to Reduce Crime, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Ontario	Ontario	Ontario	Toronto	Toronto	Toronto
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of supplying information to the public on ways to reduce crime?	Good job	51%	51%	49%	47%	47%	47%
	Average job	27%	26%	28%	29%	26%	28%
	Poor job	11%	10%	11%	13%	11%	14%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$



**Table 75 Ontario and Toronto – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Ensuring the Safety of Area Citizens, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Ontario	Ontario	Ontario	Toronto	Toronto	Toronto
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of ensuring the safety of the citizens in your area?	Good job	58%	61%	62%	56%	58%	61%
	Average job	30%	27%	27%	31%	28%	27%
	Poor job	6%	4%	5%	7%	5%	5%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 76 Ontario and Toronto – Satisfaction with Personal Safety from Crime, by year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Ontario	Ontario	Ontario	Toronto	Toronto	Toronto
In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your personal safety from crime?	Satisfied	87%	92%	94%	82%	91%	92%
	Dissatisfied	11%	5%	5%	14%	6%	7%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 77 Alberta and Calgary - Perceptions of the Amount of Crime in One's Neighbourhood Compared to Others, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Albert a	Alberta	Albert a	Calgary	Calgar y	Calgar y
Compared to other areas in Canada, do you think your neighbourhood has a higher amount of crime, about the same or a lower amount of crime?	Higher	9%	6%	8%	9%	6%	5%
	About the same	27%	26%	28%	29%	33%	28%
	Lower	59%	63%	61%	59%	57%	64%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 78 Alberta and Calgary - Perceptions of Changes in the Amount of Crime in One's Neighbourhood, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Calgary	Calgary	Calgary
During the past 5 years, do you think that crime in your neighbourhood has increased, decreased or remained about the same?	Increased	49%	30%	35%	53%	31%	29%
	Decreased	3%	5%	4%	3%	7%	5%
	About the same	41%	52%	52%	33%	47%	55%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 79 Alberta and Calgary - Perceptions of Safety While Walking Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Calgary	Calgary	Calgary
How safe do you feel from crime walking ALONE in your area after dark?	Very or reasonably safe	77%	78%	80%	75%	77%	81%
	Somewhat unsafe	14%	9%	10%	16%	9%	10%
	Very unsafe	8%	4%	3%	8%	4%	2%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 80 Alberta and Calgary - Perceptions of Safety While Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Calgary	Calgary	Calgary
How worried are you while waiting for or using public transportation ALONE after dark?	Very worried?	7%	2%	8%	10%	3%	2%
	Somewhat worried?	16%	14%	14%	22%	20%	23%
	Not at all worried about your safety from crime?	18%	18%	18%	21%	22%	29%
	Does not use public transportation/night	39%	44%	48%	43%	49%	40%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 81 Alberta and Calgary - Perceptions of Safety While Alone in Your Home in the Evening or at Night, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Calgary	Calgary	Calgary
When ALONE in your home in the evening or at night, do you feel...	very worried?	4%	2%	2%	3%	2%	2%
	somewhat worried?	23%	18%	17%	26%	18%	17%
	not at all worried?	Data not available	80%	81%	Data not available	80%	Data not available
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 82 Alberta and Calgary – Frequency of Walking Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Calgary	Calgary	Calgary
How often do you walk ALONE in your area after dark?	Daily?	17%	21%	15%	16%	22%	17%
	At least once a week?	30%	29%	31%	29%	30%	32%
	At least once a month?	16%	14%	16%	19%	14%	16%
	Less than once a month?	11%	15%	16%	12%	15%	17%
	Never?	26%	13%	16%	Data not available	10%	11%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$



**Table 83 Alberta and Calgary – Frequency of Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Calgary	Calgary	Calgary
How often do you use public transportation ALONE after dark?	Daily?	3%	4%	4%	6%	5%	8%
	At least once a week?	7%	6%	5%	10%	8%	6%
	At least once a month?	7%	6%	6%	11%	9%	10%
	Less than once a month?	9%	11%	9%	11%	15%	15%
	Never?	15%	7%	11%	15%	9%	16%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 84 Alberta and Calgary – Walking Alone After Dark More Often, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Calgary	Calgary	Calgary
If you felt safer from crime, would you walk alone in your area after dark (more often)?	Yes	26%	20%	21%	31%	19%	19%
	No	32%	34%	34%	32%	37%	34%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 85 Alberta and Calgary – Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark More Often, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Calgary	Calgary	Calgary
If you felt safer from crime, would you use public transportation alone after dark more often?	Yes	16%	10%	14%	22%	12%	18%
	No	44%	48%	38%	50%	59%	44%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 86 Alberta and Calgary – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Enforcing the Laws, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Calgary	Calgary	Calgary
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job at enforcing the laws?	Good job	62%	59%	57%	65%	63%	65%
	Average job	30%	31%	34%	27%	28%	29%
	Poor job	4%	6%	6%	3%	4%	3%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 87 Alberta and Calgary – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Promptly Responding to Calls, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Calgary	Calgary	Calgary
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of promptly responding to calls?	Good job	47%	45%	47%	50%	45%	52%
	Average job	25%	22%	26%	24%	22%	25%
	Poor job	9%	9%	9%	7%	7%	7%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 88 Alberta and Calgary – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Being Approachable and Easy to Talk to, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Calgary	Calgary	Calgary
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of being approachable and easy to talk to?	Good job	69%	67%	67%	66%	65%	66%
	Average job	17%	18%	19%	20%	18%	20%
	Poor job	6%	5%	5%	6%	4%	6%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 89 Alberta and Calgary – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Supplying Information to the Public on Ways to Reduce Crime, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Calgary	Calgary	Calgary
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of supplying information to the public on ways to reduce crime?	Good job	58%	54%	53%	66%	55%	58%
	Average job	25%	27%	27%	21%	25%	26%
	Poor job	9%	10%	10%	8%	11%	9%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 90 Alberta and Calgary – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Ensuring the Safety of Area Citizens, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Calgary	Calgary	Calgary
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of ensuring the safety of the citizens in your area?	Good job	59%	61%	60%	59%	63%	64%
	Average job	30%	28%	30%	32%	27%	28%
	Poor job	5%	5%	5%	4%	4%	3%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 91 Alberta and Calgary – Satisfaction with Personal Safety from Crime, by year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004	1993	1999	2004
		Alberta	Alberta	Alberta	Calgary	Calgary	Calgary
In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your personal safety from crime?	Satisfied	86%	94%	94%	85%	93%	96%
	Dissatisfied	13%	5%	5%	14%	5%	3%
	Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$



**Table 92 Canada - Perceptions of the Amount of Crime in One's Neighbourhood Compared to Others, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004
		Canada	Canada	Canada
Compared to other areas in Canada, do you think your neighbourhood has a higher amount of crime, about the same or a lower amount of crime?	Higher	11%	8%	9%
	About the same	29%	28%	29%
	Lower	56%	60%	59%
Total		100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 93 Canada - Perceptions of Changes in the Amount of Crime in One's Neighbourhood, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004
		Canada	Canada	Canada
During the past 5 years, do you think that crime in your neighbourhood has increased, decreased or remained about the same?	Increased	48%	29%	30%
	Decreased	4%	6%	6%
	About the same	41%	54%	58%
Total		100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 94 Canada - Perceptions of Safety While Walking Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004
		Canada	Canada	Canada
How safe do you feel from crime walking ALONE in your area after dark?	Very or reasonably safe	71%	74%	77%
	Somewhat unsafe	15%	10%	10%
	Very unsafe	12%	5%	4%
Total		100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 95 Canada - Perceptions of Safety While Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004
		Canada	Canada	Canada
How worried are you while waiting for or using public transportation ALONE after dark?	Very worried?	7%	3%	2%
	Somewhat worried?	14%	12%	13%
	Not at all worried about your safety from crime?	21%	17%	20%
	Does not use public transportation/night	37%	44%	37%
Total		100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 96 Canada - Perceptions of Safety While Alone in Your Home in the Evening or at Night, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004
		Canada	Canada	Canada
When ALONE in your home in the evening or at night, do you feel...	very worried?	5%	2%	2%
	somewhat worried?	21%	18%	18%
	not at all worried?	74%	79%	80%
Total		100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 97**      **Canada – Frequency of Walking Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004
		Canada	Canada	Canada
How often do you walk ALONE in your area after dark?	Daily?	19%	19%	16%
	At least once a week?	29%	30%	33%
	At least once a month?	12%	13%	15%
	Less than once a month?	12%	13%	12%
Total		100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories  
have not been included

here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 98 Canada – Frequency of Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004
		Canada	Canada	Canada
How often do you use public transportation ALONE after dark?	Daily?	5%	4%	4%
	At least once a week?	7%	7%	7%
	At least once a month?	6%	5%	6%
	Less than once a month?	9%	9%	8%
	Never?	14%	8%	10%
Total		100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 99 Canada – Walking Alone After Dark More Often, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004
		Canada	Canada	Canada
If you felt safer from crime, would you walk alone in your area after dark (more often)?	Yes	27%	21%	23%
	No	32%	35%	33%
	Total	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 100 Canada – Waiting for or Using Public Transportation Alone After Dark More Often, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004
		Canada	Canada	Canada
If you felt safer from crime, would you use public transportation alone after dark more often?	Yes	16%	12%	14%
	No	40%	45%	36%
	Total	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$



**Table 101 Canada – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Enforcing the Laws, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004
		Canada	Canada	Canada
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job at enforcing the laws?	Good job	56%	60%	59%
	Average job	32%	29%	31%
	Poor job	7%	5%	6%
Total		100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 102 Canada – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Promptly Responding to Calls, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004
		Canada	Canada	Canada
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of promptly responding to calls?	Good job	46%	49%	52%
	Average job	24%	21%	23%
	Poor job	10%	8%	8%
Total		100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 103 Canada – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Being Approachable and Easy to Talk to, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004
		Canada	Canada	Canada
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of being approachable and easy to talk to?	Good job	63%	66%	65%
	Average job	19%	17%	19%
	Poor job	6%	4%	5%
Total		100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 104 Canada – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Supplying Information to the Public on Ways to Reduce Crime, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004
		Canada	Canada	Canada
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of supplying information to the public on ways to reduce crime?	Good job	51%	54%	50%
	Average job	26%	26%	28%
	Poor job	13%	9%	11%
Total		100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**Table 105 Canada – Public Perceptions of the Quality of Work the Local Police are Doing of Ensuring the Safety of Area Citizens, by Year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004
		Canada	Canada	Canada
Do you think your local police force does a good job, an average or poor job of ensuring the safety of the citizens in your area?	Good job	57%	62%	61%
	Average job	30%	26%	28%
	Poor job	8%	5%	5%
Total		100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$


**Table 106 Canada – Satisfaction with Personal Safety From Crime, by year and Location**

		1993	1999	2004
		Canada	Canada	Canada
In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your personal safety from crime?	Satisfied	85%	91%	94%
	Dissatisfied	12%	6%	5%
	Total	100%	100%	100%

\*Some response categories have not been included here due to violations of the critical sample size threshold of  $n = 5$

**APPENDIX B: Uniform Crime Reporting Survey: Organized Crime-Related  
Offences for the Study Period**

**Figure 1 Organized Crime-related Incidents from 1991 to 2008 in 6 major  
Canadian Cities**



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